from day to day small additions to or subtractions from land caused by the constant action of running water." Hence the title to land so gradually and imperceptibly acquired is not defeated merely by proof of the ancient boundaries (e). Where a river had receded from the ancient bank and left some pieces of dry land, which the owner of the opposite bank and river bed claimed as against the owner of the adjacent land; and upon which he had continually exercised exclusive acts of ownership; it was held that the direct evidence of ownership precluded any presumption arising from the mode of accretion, whether gradual or sudden, and that the process of change was therefore immaterial (f).-If a stream changes its course not by gradual alteration of the bed, but by abandoning the old bed and flowing in another direction, the private rights of riparian owners and others in the original stream are lost; and they acquire no similar rights in the new course of the water (g). The owner of the bed of a stream is not entitled to use Encroachit for any purpose that will interfere with the natural ment on bed. course of the stream injuriously to the riparian owners. Any building or work extending into the stream is primâ facie an encroachment upon their right, and is a cause of action in respect of the possible consequences upon the course of the stream, without the necessity of proving any damage in fact caused by it, or any particular probable damage; the onus being laid upon the person making it of showing that it is not in fact an encroachment and that it cannot have any perceptible effect upon the stream (h).—A riparian owner may build a wharf or bulwark for protection of his own bank provided he does not encroach upon the bed of the stream or alter the direction of the current injuriously to others (i). And it is said: (e) Foster v. Wright, supra. (f) Ford v. Lacey, 7 H. & N. 151; 30 L. J. Ex. 351. (g) Carlisle v. Graham, L. R. 4 Ex. 361; 38 L. J. Ex. 226. (h) Bickett v. Morris, L. R. 1 Sc. Ap. 47; L. Blackburn, Orr- (i) Chelmsford, L. C., Bickett v. Public navigable rivers. Riparian rights in navigable rivers. "that scouring and cleansing of a river bed, so as to keep the stream in its accustomed course and at its accustomed level, is not only permissible in but obligatory upon a riparian owner;" but "that a substantial interference with the bed of a stream, so as to increase or diminish the flow of water to the detriment of other riparian owners, is actionable in itself " (k). A public right of navigation upon inland rivers and streams is analogous to the right of highways upon land. It is established, in general, by public use, which also defines the limits and nature and extent of the navigation (1). The right of navigation on a lake is subject to the like principles (m). Tidal rivers are primâ facie public for the purpose of navigation by common law (n). Where the public have rights of navigation, the rights of owners of the soil and of riparian owners are subordinate to the rights of the public, as well as to those of the other riparian owners as above stated. The owner of the bed of the river cannot make any building or erection in any part of the bed of the river, to the obstruction of navigation (o). A riparian owner on a navigable river cannot in exercise of riparian rights appropriate water to an extent prejudicial to the navigation (p). A riparian owner upon a navigable river has the right of access to his own land, and of mooring vessels in the river adjoining his land, and keeping them there a reasonable time for the purpose of loading and unloading (q). But he has not the further right in aid of access to his land and of landing Morris, L. R. 1 Sc. Ap. 56; Att.- (k) Per cur. Rhodes v. Airedale (1) Hale, De J. Maris, c. 3; Orr-Ewing v. Colquhoun, L. R. 2 Ap. Ca. 839; Bell v. Quebec, L. R. 5 Ap. Ca. 93; 49 L. J. P. C. 1. (m) Marshall v. Ulleswater Nav. Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 167; 41 L. J. (n) Post, p. 162. (0) Att.-Gen. v. Lonsdale, L. R. 7 Eq. 377; 38 L. J. C. 335; OrrEwing v. Colquhoun, L. R. 2 Ap. Ca. 839; Att.-Gen. v. Terry, L. R. 9 Ch. 423. (p) Att.-Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry., L. R. 6 Ch. 572. (1) Marshall v. Ulleswater Nav. Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 166; 41 L. J. goods, to erect a wharf upon the bed of the river, or anything obstructive of the navigation; and a wharf set forward. three feet in the bed of a navigable river sixty feet broad was held to be an obstruction that must be removed (r). This right of access to riparian land, and of mooring vessels for the use of the land gives a special value to land upon a navigable river, independently of the public right of navigation; by loss of which the land may be "injuriously affected," and the owner entitled to compensation under the Lands Clauses Act, in the event of the navigation being compulsorily obstructed under statutory powers (s). An obstruction to navigation, like an obstruction on a Obstruction to navigation. highway, as being a nuisance, may be removed by any person actually obstructed in the use of the navigation; it is also ground for an indictment on the part of the public; a private individual cannot maintain an action to recover compensation for the inconvenience caused to him merely as one of the public, but he may maintain an action for the recovery of special damage caused either to his person or his property (t). course. If a public navigable river changes its course by reced- Change in ing from one channel and flowing through another, the public right of navigation continues over the new course; but subject to antecedent private rights in the new course which may be obstructive to the navigation (u). Thus a fishing weir legally existing in a navigable river does not become removable as a nuisance to the navigation by reason of the ancient navigable channel becoming choked up and impassable (r). Private rights incident to the river in Q. B. 41; Original Hartlepool Coll. v. Gibb, L. R. 5 C. D. 713; 46 L. J. C. 311; see post, p. 497. (r) Att.-Gen. v. Terry, L. R. 9 Ch. 423; Marshall v. Ulleswater Nav. Co., supra. (s) Lyon v. Fishmonger's Co., L. R. 1 Ap. Ca. 662; 44 L. J. C. 747; Metrop. Board v. McCarthy, L. R. 7 H. L. 243; 43 L. J. C. P. 385; Bell v. Quebec, L. R. 5 Ap. Ca. 84; 49 L. J. P. C. 1; A.-G. Straits (t) Hale, D. J. Maris, c. 3; per (u) Per cur. Carlisle v. Graham, L. R. 4 Ex. 361; 38 L. J. Ex. 226. (v) Williams v. Wilcox, 8 A. & E. 314. Private navigable river. Towing paths. the old channel, as a right of fishery, do not pass to the river in the new channel; but upon a gradual and insensible change in the course of a river, all rights public and private pass with it (w). An inland river may be navigable, without being public. "If any person at his own charge makes his own private stream to be passable for boats or barges, either by making of locks or cuts, or drawing together other streams, yet this seems not to make it juris publici, and he may apply it to his own private use. For it is not hereby made to be juris publici unless it were done at a common charge, or by a public authority, or that by long continuance of time it hath been freely devoted to a public use. So likewise if he purchaseth the King's charter to take a reasonable toll for the passage of the King's subjects and puts it in use, these seem to be devoting it to the common use. (x). The public right of navigation does not, necessarily or presumptively, include the right to use the banks of the river for towing. But a towing path may be established by custom or by grant, or, as frequently happens, by act of parliament passed for the regulation of the navigation. A towing path is a public easement or highway, restricted to the purpose of towing and navigating vessels on the river, and independent of the property in the soil (y). An authority which provides and maintains the towing path of a navigable river, and takes toll for its use is presumptively bound to repair it, and is responsible for damage caused by the want of repair. Thus a river conservancy board were held responsible for the loss of horses that fell into the river while towing a barge, through the bank giving way (≈). (w) Ante, p. 154. (x) Hale, De J. Maris, Hargr. Tracts, p. 9. See post, p. 162. (y) Ball v. Herbert, 3 T. R. 253; Bayley, J., The King v. Severn Ry., 2 B. & Ald. 648; Badger v. South Yorkshire Ry., 1 E. & E. 347; 28 (2) Winch v. Thames Conservancy, L.R.9 C. P. 378; 43 L. J. C. P. 167. CHAPTER XI. SEA AND TIDAL WATERS, SEA SHORE. The sovereignty of the sea--Admiralty jurisdiction-The Territorial Arm of sea-tidal rivers-right of navigation. Property of Crown in sea shore-grants of sea shore-limits of sea shore -jurisdiction over sea shore-public rights over sea shore. Prerogative rights and duties-protection of sea shores-commissioners of sewers-sea walls. Ports-prerogative of Crown-statutory authority-port dues. Wreck of the sea-prerogative of Crown-franchise of wreck-Receivers of Wreck. the sea. A claim of sovereignty was formerly made on behalf of Sovereignty of the Crown of England over all the narrow seas, that is, the channels of sea surrounding the British Isles; but it is now generally admitted that the open sea beyond low water mark is not within the realm, except for certain purposes of statutory regulation; therefore it is not within the jurisdiction of the common law, and is not the subject of property in the Crown or in a subject (a). The Admiralty Court in early times exercised juris- Jurisdiction diction over subjects of the realm in respect of offences of Admiralty. committed upon the high seas, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the common law. The boundary between the jurisdiction of the common law upon land and the Admiralty Court upon the high seas was the line of water according to the state of the tide, the sea shore between (a) Hale, De J. Maris, c. 4, citing Selden's Mare Clausum; The Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 175; 46 L. J. M. C. 17; Harris v. Fran conia, L. R. 2 C. P. D. 173; 46 |