Extinction by abroblamens lf the right to the water, which reverted at the end of the level though the mi had been pulled down during the lease. Where works which had been used for dyeing, with the sporenant essement of discharging the water fouled by the dyeworks into a stream, had been disused for more than twenty years and had been suffered to go to rain during whi & time other riparian owners had erected works open the stream; it was held that the easement was abankzei azi erall not be resumed to the injury of the other works on. Where the owner of a mill with water easements gave Hoence to a riparian owner to cut through the bank of the mill stream and erect a weir for the purpose of diverting the water to a mill of the latter, it was hell that after allowing such works to be executed he could not countermand them and require them to be pulled down so as to restore the flow of water to his own mill. But such licence would be revocable, except so far as it had been acted upon and expense incurred; for it is on that ground only that it can be irrevocable (y). Where a canal company constituted by statute, with power to divert natural streams to feed the canal, by a subsequent Act was empowered to convert the canal into a railway; it was held that in abandoning the canal the company lost their right to take and dispose of the water, and consequently the lower riparian owners were restored to their rights to have the streams flow in their original course (z). And under like circumstances it was held that the lower riparian owners were obliged to suffer the flow of the stream in its original course as before the diversion, although it was injurious to them (a). Easements are extinguished by the titles of both the unity of title. dominant and servient tenements becoming united in one (v) Davis v. Morgan, 4 B. & C. 8. (2) National Manure Co. v. Donald, 4 H. & N. 8; 28 L. J. Ex. 185. (a) Mason v. Shrewsbury Ry., L. R. 6 Q. B. 578; 40 L. J. Q. B. 293. person; because all uses and enjoyments of the servient tenement then become referable to the simple right of ownership. An easement cannot be maintained as a distinet right by an owner over any part of his own land; it essentially requires a dominant and a servient tenement in separate ownership (b). If the unity of title continues for a particular estate Suspension during paronly, as for a tenancy for life or years in one of the tene- ticular estate. ments, the easement is suspended during that estate; but it is not wholly extinguished, because there is no unity of the seisin of the fee simple, and upon the expiration of the particular estate it will revive for or against the reversioner (c). Accordingly "where there is a unity of seisin of the land and of a way over the land in one and the same person, the right of way is either extinguished or suspended, according to the duration of the respective estates in the land and the way; and after such extinguishment or during such suspension of the right the way cannot pass as an appurtenant under the ordinary legal sense of that word." "In order to pass a way existing in point of user, but extinguished or suspended in point of law, the grantor must either employ words of express grant, or must describe the way in question as one 'used and enjoyed with the land' which forms the subjectmatter of the conveyance" (d). Where a lessee for years granted easements of way over the demised tenement in favour of the reversioner who held the adjacent tenement, it was held that by a subsequent conveyance of the reversion to the lessee and consequent merger of the term of years, the easements which had been granted by the termor were extinguished. The easements depended upon the duration of the lease and came to an end with the termination of the lease (e).-Upon the same principle (b) Ante, p. 190. (c) Thomas v. Thomas, 2 C. M. & R. 34; Simper v. Foley, 2 J. & H. 555; Aynsley v. Glover, L. R. 10 Ch. 283; 44 L. J. C. 525. (d) Per cur. in James v. Plant, 4 A. & E. 761; Pheysey v. Vicary, 16 M. & W. 484; ante, p. 276. (e) Pearson, J., Dynevor v. Tennant, L. R. 32 C. D. 381; S. C., where ating lands, which have once belonged to diferent persons, one of whom was bound to repair the fernes intween the two afterwards become the property off the same person the pre-existing obligation to repair the fetus is destroyed by the unity of ownership; and where the person who has so become the owner of the entity afterwards parts with one of the two closes, the tato repair the fences will not revive, unless express w ris de introduced into the deed of conveyance for that perpORE Faded the tenements is held in trust, the unity of legal title does not operate as an extinction of the appurREDACT Ascents beanse there is no union of the bene460 worship, Thas where a church with ancient lights rested in the imbent in right of his office, and the siguent servient tenement, being glebe land, vested in him benedidly, it was held that there was no such unity of ownership as to extinguish the easements of light appurtenant to the chunk, and to justify him as owner of the glebe land in obstracting them. Upon the same principle to easement can be created by implied grant over land of which the grantor is only trustee (h). L. R. 33 C. D. 4; 55 L J. C. Prur. Boy'a v. Tamlyn, 6 B. & C. 337. $ Eccles. Commiss. v. Kino, L. R. 14 C. D. 213; 49 L. J. C. 529. A Beddington v. Atlee, L. R. 35 C. D. 328; 56 L. J. C. 655. SECTION V. REMEDIES FOR EASEMENTS. Action for damages-nominal damage-disturbance of easement-compensation under Lands Clauses Act. Action by reversioner-repeated actions for continuance of disturbance. Injunction-statutory and equitable jurisdiction-principles of granting injunction-mandatory injunction to remove nuisance-delay or acquiescence-interlocutory injunction. Injunction against obstructing lights. Abatement of nuisance to easement-abatement of nuisance to servient tenement-exercise of easement in excess-notice to abate nuisance - unnecessary damage. The remedies for the protection of an easement are, by action for damages; by action for an injunction; by the dominant owner himself abating the nuisance or obstruction to his right. An action may be maintained for the disturbance or Action for obstruction of an easement without proof of loss or damage damages. actually sustained, and judgment may be recovered for a nominal sum, if the act of disturbance is such as may injuriously affect the title to the easement. Accordingly Nominal it was held that a person might maintain an action for a damages. permanent obstruction of a way upon the servient tenement, though the way was at the time so obstructed upon his own tenement as to be incapable of use; the Court saying there was an injury to the right, though no damage accrued therefrom, for if acquiesced in for twenty years it would become evidence of an abandonment of the right; and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict with nominal damages (a). So, the owner of a house may maintain an action for an obstruction of the light appurtenant to the house, though he be not in occupation, and though the house be wholly unoccupied, or even not fit for occupation, so that no actual damage (a) Bower v. Hill, 1 Bing. N. C. 549; ante, p. 307. Disturbance of easement. accrues from the obstruction (b).-So a riparian owner may maintain an action for wrongfully diverting a natural watercourse, or for an unreasonable use of the water, or for polluting the water, although he may not himself require the use of the water or be able to prove any actual damage; because such acts affect the right by affording evidence of adverse rights (c). An additional pollution of a stream already polluted is a cause of action though it produce no perceptible damage by reason of previous pollutions; because upon the cessation of other pollutions the damage would become substantial and the continuance of the pollution would in time create a right (d). But the disturbance of the easement must be substantial, having regard to the nature of the easement, in order to give a cause of action. A person entitled to a right of way cannot complain of an obstruction that does not interfere with the reasonable use of the way. Thus in the case of a portico to a house projecting only two feet into a roadway forty feet wide, it was held that under the circumstances the portico was not an actionable obstruction; the Court said that if the roadway had been granted to the plaintiff by a conveyance setting out boundaries, he might have maintained an action of trespass; but the grant being only of the easement of a reasonable use of the road, there was no substantial interference with his right (e).—So with the easement of light, there must be a sensible and appreciable privation of light to give a cause of action; "there are many cases of new buildings darkening those opposite to them, but not in such a degree that an injunction could be maintained, or an action upon the case" (f). -So with water rights, in an action by a riparian owner for (b) Courtauld v. Legh, L. R. 4 Ex. 126; 38 L. J. Ex. 45. (c) Mason v. Hill, 3 B. & Ad. 304; 5 B. & Ad. 1; Wood v. Waud, 3 Ex. 748; Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353; Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R. 2 Ch. 478; 36 L. J. C. 584. (d) Ib.; Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co., L. R. 5 C. D. 769; 46 (e) Clifford v. Hoare, L. R. 9 C. P. 362; 43 L. J. C. P. 225. (f) Eldon, L. C., Att.-Gen. v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 343; Wood, V.-C., Dent v. Auction Mart, L. R. 2 Eq. 245; 35 L. J. C. 560. |