TEXT OF PUBLIC LAW 87-733 [S.J. RES. 230], 76 Stat. 697, APPROVED OCTOBER 3, 1962 JOINT RESOLUTION Expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedomloving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for selfdetermination.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to hear your views on that situation. Does this resolution provide a basis for policy? Can the State Department really take any action which would be contrary to the terms of that resolution? It reads, in part

Resolved. . . That the United States is determined

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedomloving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

Mr. HURWITCH. Is that the resolution of 1962?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; there is also a 1965 resolution. Without objection, we will put the text of that one also in the record at this point. (The text of House Resolution 560, agreed to Sept. 20, 1965, follows:)

TEXT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 560, AGREED TO SEPTEMBER 20, 1965

RESOLUTION To express the sense of the House of Representatives declaring the policy of the United States relative to the intervention of the international communistic movement in the Western Hemisphere

Whereas the subversive forces known as international communism, operating secretly and openly, directly and indirectly, threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all the Western Hemisphere nations; and

Whereas the American Continents, by the free and independent positions which they have assumed and maintained, are not subject to colonization or domination by any power; and

Whereas the intervention of international communism, directly or indirectly, however disguised, in any American state, conflicts with the established policy of the American Republics for the protection of the sovereignty of the peoples of such states and the political independence of their governments; and Whereas such a situation extended to any portions of the Western Hemisphere is dangerous to the peace and safety of the whole of it, including the United States; and Whereas the ninth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance recognized that acts possessing characteristics of aggression and intervention carried out against one or more if the member States of the Organization of American States may be responded to in either individual or collective form, which could go as far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) In any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. FASCELL (reading):

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) any such subversive domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by the American Republics; and

(2) In any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.

What I am asking is, what effect do these resolutions have on U.S. policy?

Mr. HURWITCH. Well, let me make a couple of statements with regard to that, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the joint resolution of 1962 on Cuba, does reflect U.S. policy toward Cuba. And that policy conforms to the hemispherewide policy adopted by the Organization of American States. I know, as I have indicated to you earlier, no reason to change this policy.

Second, what force those resolutions have with respect to its binding effect on the executive is a matter of considerable discussion in our Government today. I feel less qualified to make any comment on that, except to note that we do not consider the Cuban resolution in any way affects the powers of the executive and legislative branches. It has never, to my knowledge, been relied upon by the executive as the legal basis for any action.

Mr. FASCELL. We are discussing it thoroughly in another subcommittee of this same committee.

Mr. HURWITCH. I welcome being informed on that.

NO CHANGE IN CASTRO'S POLICY POSTURE

Mr. FASCELL. We are reviewing that subject now. The point is, there is really no change in the Castro posture that anybody can find. Is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Either by deed, action, or word?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is the whole basis of our investigation, to see if there was any. There has been none and we see no reason to change our policy.

TOTALITY OF SOVIET ACTIONS

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any logical basis for attempting to separate actions of the Soviet Union with respect to Cuba or the Caribbean or Latin America from the actions of the Soviet Union in Vietnam or the Middle East or Berlin? The fact is, is it not, that we would isolate those acts only at our own peril in reviewing what U.S. policy should be?

Mr. HURWITCH. I think that we have to look at the entire picture, just as I think the Soviets from their standpoint look at matters of the entire picture. Their interests lie in the hemisphere in a certain way. Our interests lie in a different way. I think all of this becomes a matter of assessment of power and position throughout the world. Two world powers have to assess their positions all over the place.

Mr. FASCELL. So there is no change as far as the method of assessment that our Government gives to the problems in the Caribbean and Cuba and Latin America if they involve the Russians? We still assess the total picture, do we not?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. As far as we know, the Russians do the same thing? Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. In that context, therefore, we have to read the totality of recent Soviet actions. Is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir; absolutely.

Mr. FASCELL. Let us review the totality of Soviet actions. One, there is known change of their policy in the Western Hemisphere relating to the accomplishment of their objectives, whatever they are. Is that

correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. Any change of policy or change of processes, procedures.

Mr. FASCELL. A method of procedure?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Our best information is that they are "trying to legitimize" their method of operation, which means that they are not going out of their way to support violent revolutions which would overthrow existing institutions. Is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. I would not want to appear naive, Mr. Chairman.

CHILEAN ELECTIONS

Mr. FASCELL. Neither would I. In other words, they have left themselves that possibility but they are actually emphasizing the nonviolent method for a while. Do you suppose it has anything to do with the elections in Chile?

Mr. HURWITCH. I think it has a lot to do with such matters as the election in Chile, but also from the long-range standpoint of the Soviet Union, I think they have learned.

Mr. FASCELL. The old way didn't work so good, so they are going to shift gears and try something else?

Mr. HURWITCH. Correct.

SOVIET NAVAL AND AIR VISITS TO CUBA

Mr. FASCELL. Reviewing the steps that have been taken by the Russians, we now have for the first time a new type of Russian aircraft landing in the Western Hemisphere. Is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that a reconnaissance type aircraft?
Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. We also have two visits of Russian naval units for the first time? And we had a recent extended visit of the Russian Defense Minister?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. In this total context, we cannot ignore the fact that the Russians are sending 65 planes with relief supplies to Peru. Mr. HURWITCH. They are scheduling 65 flights.

Mr. FASCELL. Scheduling?

Mr.HURWITCH. The first one has not arrived yet.

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Mr. FASCELL. The Russians have also made a rather concentrated effort in recent times to establish new diplomatic, consular, and trade missions in Latin America?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Could we get a list of those?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir. We will be pleased to put that in the record. (The information requested follows:)

SUMMARY CHART-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Mr. FASCELL. Are there any other acts that I have not enumerated here which ought to be included in the context of a review of Soviet actions or penetrations into Latin America, the Caribbean, or Cuba?

SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Mr. HURWITCH. Those are the most important, Mr. Chairman, I think we have evidence that in the early part of this year a number of shiploads of arms came from the Soviet Union to sort of renew the supply but nothing of any more sophisticated nature and size.

Mr. FASCELL. I was going to get to that next because of the constant, continuing, recurrent, persistent statements, rumors, articles, affidavits and photographs of missiles, both defensive and offensive, big, small, fat, skinny, short range, long range, and otherwise, which are reported to be now in Cuba. What about that?

Mr. HURWITCH. Let me answer it this way: The missiles of the type that threatened the United State, in the third week of October 1962, have been removed from Cuba and there has been no reintroduction of those missiles or any similar missiles. We are confident of that, based on the various intelligent techniques we have for ascertaining that. There are, what are called SAM missiles, surface-to-air missiles. As far as I know, they are SA-2, but not SA-3 models. Perhaps, when you talk to our military people, they would have some more detailed information on that. My understanding is that they are the SA-2 types. They also have coast guard vessels which have surface-to-surface missile capability. They have, I forget what they are called technically, but they have some kind of a small missile launcher for infantry for ground attack, sort of like artillery but missiles, or supposed to be artillery pieces. None of these do we regard as offensive, capable of threatening the United States.

I think it would be worth putting in the record at this point, if I may, that outside of the United States, Castro Cuba has more men under arms than any other armed force in the hemisphere.

Mr. FASCELL. Although it is still official U.S. policy that we do not consider the Castro government as a direct military threat to the United States?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. One final question and then I will let you get to your appointment.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES IN CUBA

A nuclear Russian sub visited Cuba for the first time; is that correct? Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any policy significance attached to that, along with the allegations which have heretofore been made that there are in place on the edges of Cuba certain types of installations which are necessary for the servicing of nuclear submarines?

Mr. HURWITCH. The policy implications of a visit of a nuclearpowered submarine are fairly difficult to assess in terms solely of the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Chairman, I think you rightfully pointed, and with great wisdom, the importance of keeping these matters in perspective, looking at these matters from a worldwide point of view.