with traitors, and let them come in the van of the tyrant's army to meet, on their native shores, the just vengeance of their countrymen. Let them not, by their unworthy complaints, weaken our energy. Let them not, by their cowardly insinuations, damp our courage. Let them not by their temporising policy, dissolve our unanimity. Let them not, by their mean submission, familiarise us to the language and aspect of slavery. The spirit of this country, I trust, is very different from this mean, I had almost said, this traiterous disposition, with which a few, and but a few, are actuated. The same spirit that roused the Athenians to meet their foes on the plains of Mara han, ought to inspire us to an equally glorious achievement. The same spirit that fired the heroic breast of Scipio and those Romans who fought the decisive battle of Zama on a hostile land, should animate us not to wait for, but anticipate the blow *. Let us not confine it to a few who may have more interest, but, I hope, not more inclination, to come forward and defend their country. The spirit of patriotism is as fierce and terrible in the breast of the peasant as in that of the wealthiest subject of the kingdom. With him it does not evaporate in empty words, or in mere contributions. It may even be unknown to himself till excited by emulation, felt by contrast, and roused by danger.-I respect and honour the promptitude of those who voluntarily offer their services for the defence of their country. In times, such as these, every mark of public spirit, from whatever quarter it comes, ought to be cherished and blown up to a flame. Whatever rank in society they hold; whatever their personal merits may be, they cannot, in such a blaze of patriotism, and amidst the general indignation of of all descriptions against the common ene my, be either remiss or backward in their duty. Let us chear them by our praises, not retard, not despirit them by ungenerous insinuations. None of them, I trust, grasps a sword, or handles a musket, but has de termined in his mind, should the enemy reach our shores, to conquer ог die. What other alternative is there between victory and death? If we were not what we are, and had not such a prize, such a possession to lose, caution might be necessary in entrusting the defence of the king

men

* The maxims of the Romans, to remove the seat of war, from their own, into an enemy's country, was equally wise and safe: and the counsel of Scipio to this efect, was founded upon the justest and most extensive views of policy.

dom to such hearts and hands only as were known to be staunch and firm. But here we have one common interest that imperiously calls upon every man to stand firm, if he would ensure the undisturbed possession of all that can render property, friends, and the noblest blessings of life desirable. I would only make it one great national measure, as it ought to be, and not leave it to the exertions of individuals, who, though zealous and ardent in the cause, cannot be expected to have such influence or such authority as to bring the whole population of the country into active preparation. would extend it to the peasantry of every denomination, and endeavour to rouze them by the love they bear to their parents, wives and children, to come forward and arm in their defence. It requires some delicacy and address indeed, to work upon their feelings and even to make them comprehend their duty. Their views are confined, not fallacious. Their temper is suspicious, not fickle. Their loyalty is sincere, not ostentatious. Their courage steady, not impetuous. It requires address to counteract their habits, to turn and familiarise their minds to new objects, and to induce them to perform extraordinary duties with chearfulness. It is well known, from many recent and terrible examples, how easily artful men can work upon their feelings and passions; how easily they are trained to the most desperate actions without any ra tional aim or settled purpose. It is only necessary to touch a master string in their breasts; to appeal to their passions by strong and urgent motives; and you may lead them, as easily, to what is great and magnanimous, as to what is sordid and base. From the undebauched peasantry of this country, men of upright minds, uncorrupted principles, and sound understanding, an appeal to their honour and independence would, in the present emergency, be warmly received. To their honour and independence, to their manly and generous feelings, and not to any sordid views of interest, that must fetter and chain da their minds, I would appeal. Let them not be wronged, nor any undue hardship be put upon them, and they will come forward at the voice of their country. Do not hire them to fight for their country instead of teaching them that they have a deep interest in defending it. Alleviate their burdens instead of increasing their pay; Those who work for a recompense regard it more than the end or intention of their labour. Do not degrade them so much in their own estimation (for on vulgar minds

men are the real strength of the nation, though they stand not in such a prominent point of view as mechanics and manufacturers, who, united together in towns, easily take that impulse which example and curiosity never fail to have over men who follow the same pursuits and are guided by the same principles. Such were the men who conquered at Cressy and Agincourt; who had, in their ordinary pursuits, weathered the storms and tempests, and were seasoned to hardships and fatigues. Such are the men, who should above all others, be called out to the defence of their country. I was rejoiced to find that the government were so wise as to pass an act for arming the country at large, and though the plan did not appear to me to be of that extensive kind which circumstances require, yet, I imagined, much might be done, with all its defects, if put in execution. I am sorry to find that they have relaxed from the measure of compulsion, and have limited their views to volunteers alone. For the defence of the country against a foreign invader, taking in every circumstance, the volunteers with the regular troops might be sufficient; but this, as I shall afterwards shew, is not the only thing which our ministers ought to have in view. This plan of mere internal defence is not what will secure us against French ambition. We may be alarmed, in the same state of preparation, for months, for years to come, while our enemy is every day becoming more powerful and more audacious. Our secu rity must depend upon great offensive ope. rations. If the spirit and resources of this country had been broken by any signal calamity; if the nations upon the continent were with-held from attacking France by any thing but fear, I should be far from advising such a measure. But our spirit and resources are great beyond example; the nations upon the continent have more reason than ever to embrace every means and every opportunity to free themselves from the terror of a merciless and faithless foe. Let us suppose that His Majesty's ministers were sensible of this, and knew how to take advantage of, and properly employ, the strength and courage of the country. Ac cording to the system first adopted by parliament, every man of a certain description, within the bounds of a Parish or small district, was to be called upon to repair, at certain times, to a place appointed for learning his exercise. I do not suppose that any kind of compulsion would be necssary to draw out the strength of the country, provided the time appointed for learning the

exercise was not in addition to their accustomed labours, but allowed them by their employers, without any diminution of their pay. Even the change of employment, and the pleasure of meeting together, would be considerable inducements. Great caution, I apprehend, would be necessary in the choice of drill serjeants to teach them their exercise. Men accustomed to a sober life would resent the bullying speeches and profane oaths of a set of officers, who foolishly imagine that big words and volleys of oaths add to their dignity and inspire fear. With all sober men, they inspire nothing but contempt, with all religious men aver sion and horror. I am no puritan, but, I know something of the nature of man, and how such a mode of conduct would affect the peasantry of this country. Prejudice, it may be called by our modern fine gentlemen, but I would be sorry to see such prejudices cradicated from their minds.-Let us suppose, however, that the young men in a district are embodied, that they meet at stated periods to learn their exercise; and that in a short time they can perform the usual evolutions with considerable dexterity. This is all that can be expected of them by the provisions of the act. 1 speak as if it were to be carried into execution. But would this exercise make them good soldiers, capable of meeting and sustaining the shock of a regular army, accustomed to a variety of complicated movements, and extensive but closely connected operations? To effectuate this, something more is necessary. They ought to be accustomed to act together in a body. For this purpose, the different corps in each county, should all be required to attend upon a certain day at a convenient place, and be there inspected by the General commanding in the district. should be encamped for a few days. They should be taught to act in concert, and to imitate, as nearly as possible, the evolutions of a regular army. By this means, they would soon become completely disciplined, and this nation would be as formidable by her military, as by her naval power. Such a time should be selected for calling out the different corps as would be least injurious to the interests of the country. Those festival days, for instance, that are usually spent in idleness and frivolity, might be employed to much better purpose and with much more satisfaction, in the hardy exer cise of arms. Proper encouragement should be given for any extraordinary exertion, and some badges of honour, perhaps, bestow ed, to stimulate the different corps to excel. A military and active spirit should be care

They

fully kept up, and strict discipline, on all occasions, enforced. The consequences of this plan may, I think, be obvious to all. The nation would become a military nation, without much expense, with very little loss of time, and without endangering the constitution. It is an extraordinary measure, and therefore the ministers seem to have startled at it, but these are extraordinary times, and call for no ordinary exertions. It would temper the commercial spirit to which we are too much inclined, and would infuse a life and vigour into the nation which it never felt before. But its effects would not terminate here. If the enemy does not attempt an immediate invasion, his object will be to weary us out, to keep us in a state of perpetual alarm, and to watch the time when discontent may break out among us. We shall, in the mean time, be forced to incur immense expense; we shall be burthened with oppressive taxes. The people, after their ardour is cooled, will be. gin to murmur, and the most fatal consequences may ensue. To obviate this, as far as human prudence can avail, the strictest economy ought to be practised. No superfluous waste, no needless offices, no unmerited pensions ought to remain as a burden upon the people. This would reconcile them to the necessity of measures and it is what surely ought to be performed. The greatest encouragement should be given to enlist in the troops of the line. They ought to be augmented very considerably. On them all offensive operations must depend. The arming of the people will form a counterpoise to their strength for internal and legal security, and will give efficacy and effect to all their external operations. This, if I am not deceived, is the only way to save this nation, in the first instance, and to restore the balance of power in Europe. Our ministers seem, however, to be afraid of trusting the people with their own defence. If they are really convinced that Buonaparté will soon make an attack upon this country, why are they so slow and irresolute in their measures? Why are they so ill provided with every thing, and so dilatory in putting the country in a posture of defence, as if our enemy would wait until they should throw out a signal that they were ready to receive him? They talk perpetually of the magnitude of the danger without resorting to effectual means to oppose it. They call upon the country to support them without taking instant measures to organise it. The people, when they can purchase an exemption from ser

vice in the Militia or Army of Reserve, have recourse to this measure. They learn the urgency of the danger from the tone and preparation of the minister. Whenever he is remiss and dilatory, they become remiss and dilatory. If he is active and resolute, the nation soon catches the same spirit. But at present, the strength of the country is not brought into action; it is left rude and undisciplined. A general arming would reach to all; would prepare all for the combat. And should the French be desperate enough to hazard an attempt upon us, little doubt, I think, may be entertained of the issue. The continental powers ought to be timely prepared for such an event. Upon the ruin of the expedition against this country, and the consternation which would follow among the French armies, they ought to be prepared to begin an immediate attack upon France, and our ministry should have a great force ready to send over to the continent to second their attempts. We shall then be in no dread of a second invasion. Buonaparté will then find sufficient employment for his troops at home, or should he make the attempt, he would find our shores begirt with armed hosts ready to oppose him with the best hopes of success. The high and gallant character which the British troops formerly acquired upon the continent, and recently in Egypt, and the disasters of the French expedition, would both dismay the enemy and gain entire confidence from the continental powers, such, especially, whose interest it would be to co-operate with us towards rescuing themselves from slavery. By putting the confederacy under our management, and placing at the head of it, an experienced, active, intelligent conciliating officer, what is there that we might not effect? Not all the legions of the tyrant would be capable of resisting British valour, seconded by an indignant, injured people. There would be a noble field opened for military fame. Our generals and our soldiers would there acquire that character which can only be gained by active service, and which they never can acquire when cooped up within the verge of this island. By a powerful co-operation France might be driven within her ancient limits; the power and renown of her consular tyrant blasted: his laurels plucked from his brow by the hands of a vindictive soldiery, or an infuriated mob. The legi timate king might be restored to his throne, and all through the exertions of this country. She ought to be the primum mobile to rouse the dormant powers of Europe. Their