Sir Sydney Smith. Every other consideration should give way to such a plan of operations, which would not only tend to reanimate the whole British nation, but to depress and confound the government and people of France. It would give additional naval security to our coasts, even suppose the troop ships were not suffered to carry more than ten or twelve guns each, and it would be the quickest and best way of bringing ten thousand soldiers to any point, supposing, (impracticable as I conceive it) the enemy should effect an invasion of our country; but in this, I have already said, I have no belief. With respect to the security of Ireland, of which I have not so positively spoken, nothing can be more efficient and better calculated for its protection, than an embarked force of such magnitude; as it would instantly be ready, in the event of an invasion of that country to proceed directly to the spot where the enemy might have effected a landing.--A similar system should be adopted in the Mediterrapean, for the purpose of alarming and annoying the whole coast of France and her allies.--In my next I shall probably give you some farther observations on the subject.--I am, Sir, yours-and a Friend to my Country.

TO THE EDITOR.

EARL ST. VINCENT.

SIR, I read with much satisfaction in your Register of the 4th of June, some observations on the conduct of the Admiral who commanded on the Mediterranean station in the year 1798, in permitting the expedition for Egypt under Buonaparté, to be formed at Toulon, to leave that Port, and to reach its distant destination without the smallest interruption from the British fleet. -That a transaction of this extraordinary nature, and evidently so big with mischief, should have escaped animadversion at the time it happened, can only be accounted for by the general delirium which Lord Nelson's victory then occasioned in the nation, and the sanguine expectations entertained in consequence, that the great objects of this expedition must thereby be frustrated. The importance of the possession of Malta and of Egypt by our enemies, was, as your correspondent observes, as well understood in this country then as now; and no one who seriously reflected upon the measures that produced this evil, could for a moment hesitate to pronounce them criminally reprehensible. -Amongst the observations above alluded to, which by the by appear to have been incorrectly printed and not completed, it is in

| sinuated, that half the force under Lord St. Vincent's command *, viz. twelve sail of the line with a large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels, would have been sufficient effectually to have blockaded the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, whilst the remainder might have been employed to watch the port of Toulon. Every act of Lord St. Vincent's conduct, that I have heard mentioned, seems to prove this to have been his opinion likewise, as far as relates to the Spaniards; nor can it be wondered it should be so, the action off Cape St. Vincent, between H. L. with 14 sail of the British line, and Don Lewis Cordovo with 27 sail of the Spanish, having happened only a short time before; in which the latter lost 2 or 3 of their largest and best ships. It is evident that Lord St. Vincent employed not more in general than eight or nine ships of the line to blockade Cadiz, and they appear to have performed the service effectually for a great length of time, except on five or six days, when the Spanish Admiral (having stripped all the fishing boats employed in the fishery off Cadiz, of their men; and, having also taken all those belonging to the ships of war and other vessels he left in port) made an unsuccessful effort with 20 ships of the line, to surprise Sir William Parker, who then commanded the British squadron of eight sail; from which he returned in three or four days with disgrace into Cadiz; having contrived in that short time, to get some of his ships aground and damaged in other respects. When the account of the Spanish fleet being at sea reached Lisbon, on the 8th of February, 1798, where Lord St. Vincent then was with the body of his fleet, so little did his Lordship appear apprehensive for his squadron under Sir William Parker, or for any mischief the Spanish fleet was likely to do whilst at full liberty to act, that he would not suffer any of his ships to pass the bar of the Tagus, and join Sir William that day, although the commanders of several were ready and desirous to do so, the occasion being very favourable. And a week or ten days afterwards on his Lordship's re-establishing the blockade of Cadiz, where the Spanish fleet had re-assembled, he employed no more ships for the purpose than he had done before. His Lordship returned to the

* Lord St. Vincent's fleet in March, April, and May, 1798, consisted generally of twenty-three or twenty-four sail of the line, of which, none less than seventy-four guns. Some fifty and forty-four gun ships on two decks, with a large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels. His Lordship had also at his disposal during a part of this time, six Portuguese ships of the line, and several of their frigates.

Tagus with the greatest part of his fleet, then all in good order for service, leaving Rear Admiral Sir John Orde, with 8 sail of the line and 3 or 4 frigates and smaller vessels, to continue the blockade, which he did until the month of April following.-Let us suppose however, notwithstanding the miserable state of the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, (and more wretched it need not be made appear, than a part, and the elite of it proved itself when afterwards engaged with Sir James Saumarez in the Gut of Gibraltar,) that it might have been most adviseable for his Lordship only to have detached, at an earlier period, the same number of ships from his fleet, that he sent at last off Toulon when too late, (viz. 6 sail of the line, one ship of fifty guns with several smaller,) instead of keeping them employed, as he usually did, in cruizing on remote stations for prizes, or in carrying passengers and bullocks, to the degradation and injury of the naval service; what might not have been effected by such a force under a skilful leader in delaying the sailing of the French fleet from Toulon, dependent as it was on other parts for its transports and supplies of every kind?-Retarding the departure of the expedition even for a week, would have been every thing; for, as it was, Lord Nelson with the reinforcement from England reached Malta three or four days only after the French left it. And who will pretend to say, had this force been sent off Toulon one month before Lord Nelson went there, that it might not have been the means of delaying the sailing of the French fleet more than that time. What professional man will assert that with such a force, joined by the Portuguese ships already mentioned, as being at Lord St Vincent's disposal, (and which were stationed soon after off Malta), Buonaparté might not have been arrested in his course, had he been encountered by it at sea, before our reinforcement arrived, with his numerous and ill appointed Armada !Had he been so, what a difference would it have made to this country! Malta and Egypt would not have been possessed by the French; quantities of British blood and treasure would have been saved; and the war now commencing, might eventually have been prevented! With such instances before us of successful enterprise on the part of the French during the last war, under circumstances the most desperate, as this now spoken of; that from Brest to Bantry Bay; and from the former port up the Mediterranean and back again; how can we reasonably expect to be safe from invasion at present, should the same unforeseen ne

glect prevail now among our naval rulers as did then? yet what hope can we entertain of better management from the same people, should we withhold our censure on their last conduct when so loudly called for? Let us remember that Bantry Bay is more than 100 leagues distant from Brest; Toulon from Brest about 600; and Egypt from Toulon upwards of 500! yet that all these distances were passed and repassed by hostile armaments, except the last, without the smallest interruption from our fleets, then in the zenith of their power and greatness; whilst those of our enemies were at their lowest ebb. The expedition to Bantry Bay consisting of ships of war and transports, was some time at anchor in that port, and weeks at sea; and but for providential interference in our favour, must have been completely successful. That from Brest to the Mediterranean consisted altogether of ships of war, and was ten or twelve weeks on its tour before it returned with a part of the Spanish fleet from Cadiz.--That to Egypt was composed of all sorts of vessels, the worst provided, amounting to near 400, with 40 or 50,000 troops on board; yet, so confident did its commander appear of his security from being intercepted, that he stopt and took Malta, that impregnable fortress, in his way, before proceeding to his final destination.--On these several occasions, we had only one port to watch and guard at a time, viz. Brest in two instances, and Toulon in one; and we had full and timely information of the designs carrying on in each. Comparing those bold attempts of distant invasion with these we are now menaced, how wide the difference, how much more easy to have been counteracted! An extent of near 200 leagues of enemies coast faces our own, in some parts not above eight or ten leagues distant from us, at most not exceeding thirty; full of harbours, from which expeditions for crossing the channel may be fitted out, and many of them difficult to be effectually watched. A few hours, a single night might land our enemies on our shores from different points, in small vessels, or even in open boats. Let us reflect on all this, and afterwards decide whether more skill and vigilance than was manifested by Lord St. Vincent in opposing Buonaparté, are not requisite at present to save us from serious mischief?-In palliation, for I never heard an attempt at justification of Lord St. Vincent's conduct on this cccasion, I have heard some friends of his say, it would have been imprudent to have sent the force I have spoken of in March o April off Toulon, as we had no port in the

Mediterranean where to repair in case of damage, or where to procure supplies. What would Lord St. Vincent say to this pretended friend for his defence? or to any officer who should make such a difficulty, if directed by his lordship on service similar to that alluded to off Toulon? Let the officers of the navy answer this question!—But to reply to it effectually; Lord St. Vincent did send such a force off Toulon.--He sent a smaller. He sent a larger when we had no port in the Mediterranean; when Malta had become a French port; and, when by the French preparations at Toulon, all the neutral states bordering the Mediterranean, were more than usually apprehensive of offending them.Lord Nelson, when there with only three sail of the line, one fifty gun ship, and some frigates, had his own ship dismasted; and his lordship repaired to Sardinia without molestation. His lordship afterwards, and before the glorious battle of Aboukir, watered and victualled his squadron in Sicily. But, if none of these supplies could have been had on the spot, might they not have been sent from Gibraltar? Have our ships on much less important occasions, never been at sea three or four months without going into port?Some others have said, we had evacuated the Mediterranean, and Lord St. Vincent had nothing to do with it!-Strange indeed would it be, if his lordship with a commission of commander in chief in the Mediterranean in his pocket, should have nothing to do with it; when Egypt and Malta, the Keys to our Indian possessions, were threatened by the French, and he had ships to spare to defend them! If such an argument is worth any thing, it should have been used against our sending a squadron there at last, when too late fully to counteract Buonaparté; and not against our sending it earlier when it might have defeated his views altogether. We had, it is true, evacuated the Mediterranean for some time, and the most fatal measure it was that we adopted during the whole war; had we, instead of employing our troops to parade uselessly with Lord St. Vincent in Portugal, whilst he lived upon our poor Consul at Lisbon, sent them together with some of our mercenaries engaged on disgraceful expeditions on the Continent, to take possession of Minorca, we might as easily have had that Island twelve months before it was attacked by Sir Charles Stuart, as we got it then; and, having that port, with such a fleet in the Mediterranean, as by proper exertions we might have had at the end of 1797, no Egyptian expedition would ever have been thought of by the French. The Austrians would have been successful

in Italy, and the battle of Marengo would never have taken place!! 17th June, 1803.

EARL ST. VINCENT.

T. U.

Observations on the Conduct of Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B. now Earl St. Vincent, from the 6th of April, 1796.

Admiral Sir John Jervis left St. Fiorenza Bay in the Island of Corsica, the 6th of April 1796, with the squadron under his command, and proceeded to Toulon, to block up the French squadron. In the month of October following, Rear Admiral Man in the Windsor Castle of 98 guns arrived off Toulon, making the fleet under Sir John Jervis to consist of 22 sail of the line, including two sail of the line detached under Commodore Nelson off Genoa. Hostilities with Spain, were known to be commenced, notwithstanding which, Sir John Jervis ordered Rear Admiral Man to return to Gibraltar. -On Admiral Man's passage to that fortress, his squadron of seven sail of the line, tell in with the Spanish fleet consisting of 36 sail of the line, and the Windsor Castle narrowly escaped being brought to action, and which might have endangered his whole squadron.-From Gibraltar Ad. miral Man sailed without delay for England; he was sensible Gibraltar was not a fit anchorage in time of war, for a squadron in the winter season, as the ships could not remain there for any number of days, because, the first hard Levanter (strong east wind) would have driven some of the ships over the Bay, and others into the Gut of Gibraltar, at the risk of being lost.-The latter part of October, Admiral Sir John Jervis returned to St. Fiorenza Bay in Corsica, to assist in evacuating that Island.-During the stay of the squadron in St. Fiorenz Bay, intelligence was received of the Spanish fleet of thirty-six sail of the line being off the Island of Corsica.-If Rear Admiral Man had not been detached with his squadron, Admiral Sir John Jervis would have had twentyto sail of the line to have fought the Spaniards, and might have captured and destroyed twenty or thirty sail of the enemy, for the Spanish fleet during the three days they were off the island of Cor◄ sica, sailed in a straggling manner, and their ships were much separated from each other.-What a glorious opportunity at one blow, was here lost, of destroying, or capturing, the naval force of Spain. -Had this event fortunately happened, Buonaparté never could have sailed for Egypt.-A disposeable naval force might in that case have been spared to have continued the blockade of Toulon. -What plea can Earl St. Vincent frame for reducing his force by detaching Admiral Man, who had at that time no service to perform: although, prior to his arrival off Toulon, he had with seven sail of the line been many months blocking up, in the most officer-like manner, Admiral Richery with eight sail of French ships of the line in Cadiz harbour?-On the appearance of hostilities with the Spaniards, the Marquis of Bute (the British Ambassador and Plenipotentiary in Spain,) recommended to Admiral Man without delay to reinforce with his squadron Admiral Sir John Jervis off Toulon, and which Rear Admiral Man did.It may be presumed Sir J. Jervis directed Admiral Man to return to Gibraltar, because, a British Ambassador with the best intentions and priority of intelligence, should not directly or indirectly dictate discretionally to any part of his squadron, although, by advice only. The above is perfectly

true, and which no one can deny.-When the Spanish fleet was off Corsica, the Island of Elba was in possession of the British, and Corsica was not at that time evacuated by the British troops, who had possession of Calvi, Bastia, and St. Fiorenza. The probable reason for evacuating Corsica, was the knowledge that a war with Spain was not far distant. Had the Spanish fleet been captured or destroyed off that Island, other directions might have been sent from England relative to it. After the evacuation of Corsica in the month of November, 1796, the squadron under Sir John Jervis sailed for Gibraltar, to procure a supply of provisions and coals. They arrived there after a passage of three weeks.-The tanks being out of order, no water could be procured though sheets of water fell,-Gibraltar is well known to be a dangerous anchorage in the winter, especially for a large squadron,-Was not Sir John Jervis acquainted with this circumstance, and also, that he was going to Lisbon? Could not the victuallers have met the squadron at Lisbon? Or, if already at Gibraltar, could they not have sailed with the squadron to the Westward, and as frequently happens, been cleared of their cargoes at sea?The squadron did not leave Gibraltar until the Courageux of 74 guns was shipwrecked, and only 50 persons out of a crew of 650 men, saved.-The Zealous of 74 guns, and Gibraltar of 80 guns, were damaged by striking on rocks under water, and beth were near being lost. The Zealous was afterwards hove down at Lisbon, and as the Gibraltar's damages could only be repaired in a dock, she was sent to England.-In the middle of December the squadron sailed for Lisbon, and on its arrival of the Tagus, the signal was made by Sir John Jervis, for the commanding officers of divisious, to lead their divisions into port.-The channel into Lisbon is one of the most awfully dangerous, perhaps, in the world, because the surf beats high, and with uncommon violence on the North and South Catchops, the two great shoals at the entrance of the Tagus, and between which the squadron had to sail.-The Britannia of 100 guns (the flag ship of Vice Admiral Thompson) sailed so badly that she retarded part of the squadron, and many ships were in consequence obliged to anchor. A store ship (44 guns) was, owing to this, near being lost: but was saved by the assistance of boats, and she again in the evening anchored (to the Eastward of the Bougee Fort) near the South Catchop.-The Bombay Castle of 74 guns, (that separated a few days before in chase) was coming in from sea, and about six o'clock in the evening, in an endeavour to avoid the store ship by passing to the southward of her, the Bombay Castle broached to and ·went on the South Catchop, where she was finally lost. Had Sir John Jervis allowed the ships to put into port as most convenient, all the squadron (without heading the Victory, his flag ship) would have been sately anchored in the Tagus before dark, and the channel would then have been left clear for the Bombay Castle.-Let any one attempt to refute this assertion,-The latter part of January 1797, Admiral Sir John Jervis waited for his dispatches at Lisbon, and at half ebb made the signal for the squadron to weigh. The consequence of doing this, and not taking a proper time of tide to sail out of the Tagus before the fod tide made, was the St. George of 98 guns, (Capt. Peard) meeting the flood tide and wind to the northward betwixt the Catchops, and the tide of flood setting to the south-east, carried her on the South Catchop, where she beat off her rudder

and was near being totally lost, but was saved by the great exertions of her captain, who, with the St. George returned to Lisbon.-Could not Admiral Sir John Jervis have taken a proper time of tide to sail with the squadron, and left a frigate to follow him with his dispatches? When Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson, K. B. sailed to attack Teneriffe, his orders were positive so to do. Neither Sir Horatio Nelson nor any officer in his squadron knew where to land, or the state of the fortifications; a description of those at Santa Cruz may not be unacceptable to the Public.The militia of the Island of Teneriffe amounts to seven or eight thousand men, and the garrison generally consisted in time of peace of twelve hundred soldiers, besides artillery men. There are four circular forts on an extensive esplanade behind the line wall. These forts are not to the northward of the landing place in the centre of the curtain of the line wall.-The fire of these forts crosses each other, and commands the esplanade. The Governor's house is about two hundred yards from the northernmost fort.-The guns of the forts are 24 pounders, and are under arches, and the parapet is above the guns. Each fort has a ditch and draw bridge, nor are the forts commanded by any hill near, except one in the town, and which is built upon and covered with houses. The line wall reaches north and south, beyond where the anchorage extends, and is mounted with heavy cannon.-There are two demi-bastions with flanks, and a straight curtain. -The two faces of the demi-bastions, the two flanks and the curtain have twenty-six pieces of heavy cannon mounted upon them to defend the wharf, and which is the only one.-The wharf projects from the centre of the curtain some distance into the sea,-The centre of the curtain is open about eight feet, and there is a large chevaux-de-frize seven feet high, and which closes the centre of the curtain every night.-About the middle of the wharf is a draw bridge, and from thence on each side of the wharf, there is an half chevaux-de-frize (the points outwards) all the way to the wall of the curtain; so that, at night, when the draw bridge of the wharf is hauled up, it is impossible to pass to the curtain. It is by no means difficult to land four thousand soldiers with field pieces, without any accident to be apprehended from the surf; but this landing cannot be made at the town of Santa Cruz.-How many brave men were here sacrificed? The fault was not Sir Horatio Nelson's.-Where does blame then attach itself? What motive could induce Earl St. Vincent to send so small a force to Teneriffe to capture the Spanish treasure? Was it that the late Hon. General Sir Charles Stuart and the British troops under his command at Lisbon might not have a share? Hoping to reserve all the plunder for the navy alone.-For plunder the treasure on shore must certainly have been, and not prize money: and, therefore, the treasure (had it been captured,) must have been divided according to the directions of the King, and in such proportions as his Majesty thought proper. -The fact is, the Spanish treasure was not at Teneriffe, but was afterwards supposed to have been landed at one of the Western Islands, and brought from thence in Portuguese men of war to Lisbon, and by American merchant ships to Cadiz. When the British ficet under Earl St. Vincent were cruizing off Cadiz, two Spanish frigates laden with treasure to a great amount, hailed Earl St. Vincent's flag ship, at twelve o'clock at night; and no notise being then taken of them, they

made their escape in shore, and immediately landed their treasures in safety. Whose fault was this? What would have been the consequence, if an inferior admiral or captain had acted in a similar manner? As Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde could not obtain a court-martial on Earl St. Vincent for his conduct towards him, Earl St. Vincent may, perhaps, consider himself as placed beyond the reach of all law; but his lordship must at the same time be aware that he cannot soar above the opinions of mankind, whose judgment will be formed from actions alone. B. N.

CONDUCT OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Sia, I am a plain man, not spending my time in contest, but a lover of truth; and having read in the Times, an answer, as it is termed, to your assertion, that "by the mode which the Admiralty has adopted in distributing apprentices to the shipwrights, in a few years the modellers and draftsmen will be extinct." I request that you will be pleased to insert my rejoinder to it, as I have the opportunity of being somewhat conversant with the subject in question-The writer says, "It was not this Board of Admiralty, but their predecessors, who procured an order in council, &c. &c." I cannot exactly say, who it was procured it; but this every dock-yard man does know, that no such mode was ever put in practice relative to apprentices until the present Board of Admiralty presided: and most unfortunately, like all the new regulations, this hath given general discontent. I am greatly apprehensive that this cannot be benefitting the nation; but with the present Admiralty every thing must be changed; every thing must be novel; for former regulations, by whomsoever planned, however they have stood the test of time and experience, will not do now. Unluckily the impossibility of complying with some of the new orders obliged the Board to cancel them, and have recourse to those again which they had superseded. Men would not, could not submit to them. Whether the present introduced mode is more eligible than the former, remains to be determined; but the boys now picked up are chiefly of the lowest order of the people.-Shipwrights not thinking it worth their while to bring their children up to a trade, where the extra is taken away, which formerly was universally allowed for a servant; and which the deserving were always in the hope of receiving in their turn with their apprentices.-Whereas, now however many extra hours the master works with the apprentice by his side; he neither receives any extra advantage from the extra labour of the apprentice, nor does the apprentice (though forced to work such extra) receive any more for the performance of his duty, either now or in expectation hereafter. At this very instant, three days for one are paid to the shipwright, if he works the hours, which have by the trade been stipulated to go for such; all able working men now receive at least two days, or what is termed double days pay; while the apprentice, who works all that time, only receives a single day's pay. When this informant set forth, that "formerly the master was paid three days for one, in the first year, nay, in the first week of his apprentices time," if he came within the line of truth; it was nevertheless, a misrepresentation. what was the fact? Government had settled what should be a day's work, what should be considered as two and three days. If the apprentice worked

For

such time (and not otherwise) the master certainly was paid for him; it was meant he should be. But what was he paid? Only the first year at the small rate allowed by government for the appreatice of 18. and 2d. per diem; increasing 2d. every year, and to the last year and day of his apprenticeship, his pay was still inferior to the workmen. This is the true statement, and surely it was fair. So when they worked on board of ships, sleeping hard, and from their homes, they were allowed by establishment additional pay; likewise at their dinner time when deprived of it, as some compen◄ sation for such deprivation. This was the regulation of those who had well considered the business, and which had stood the test of time. It would have been wise, if those who have made the changes had duly reflected on a trite adage: "Let well alone." The giving one-third of the pay to the apprentice (mind if he behaves well), does not induce parents to place their children; for they were accustomed to give them their board during their apprenticeship, in short, to find them in every thing. This expense ceased the day they were out of their time; when in their turn, they could, if necessary, assist their parents with the pleasing prospect of obtaining, probably, in the course of time an apprentice themselves, and of reaping the same advantages, which they had before been the means of giving to their masters. This is now no longer an object of pleasing expectation. Formerly people of some property placed their sons at school with the intention of apprenticing them, after gaining a proper education, to the master shipwright or his assistants, or to the master mast maker, master boat-builder, &c. in the fair hope of their succeeding, if fortunate, to those employments themselves; they gave with them from 20 to 80 pounds.-When deserving, the masters, as they rose, made a point of bringing them forward. It was the fair condition of the obligation. It was right individually, and in a national view.-The writer again says, "the doceur to the master shipwright is the indispensa ble and only key to the mould loft." There is no reason for supposing that the masters of the shipwrights are worse than other men, (although they have been shamefully stigmatized;) but, I would ask, in whose hands can the key be so properly kept? The fallacy of the above representation will plainly be seen, when it is known, that master shipwrights, and even surveyors of the navy have risen to those posts, having served their apprenticeship to persons in the yard very inferior to the master shipwright. This violent correspondent has either very superficial knowledge of the subject, or he lets out only just as much as will answer his purpose, using the shadow of truth, whi'e he hides the substance. But what will he say when I make it public, (for I will not call it informing him,) that by the new and wise regulations, every shipwright apprentice now indented is positively bound to the master shipwright; so his indenture runs; and the man, who receives the trifling advantage from him is called his instructor; he has no other right in, or authority over him; and consequently, has no stimulus to a care of him. It would be unreasonable to suppose the master shipwrights immaculate, however the great Board may be so.-A certain number of these apprentices must successively go to the mould loft: and any further comment is unnecessary. The writer next says, "Mr. Cobbelt pretends (and I assert that the Admiralty have been obliged to resort to the assistance of warranted carpenters of ships (i.c. the master carpenters) to do the com