but in foreign courts and countries, where this dispute will not fail to excite consider able interest, my statement may be of some ase.I was once under the command of General Fox, he being commanding officer of the garrison, where the 38th regiment, of which he was then Lieutenant Colonel, at that time, lay. I have, before and since that time, been with more than forty of our regiments of foot; and, except in the single instance of his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, I never saw so active and vigilant a field officer as General Fox. Since the epoch, to which I here allude, I have passed several years of my life amongst men, who had served immediately under General Fox, during the greater part of the war in America, where he had a conspicuous command in the flying army, and to which army be would never have been appointed, had he not been distinguished for qualities exactly the contrary of those, which are now, most falsely, I am persuaded, attributed to him. All those whom I have known, who served under him at that time; all the military men I ever heard speak of him, have uniformly given him the character of extraordinary activity, vigilance, punctuality, and zeal for the service; and this account perfectly corresponded with what I myself have seen of him. This knowledge of the character of General Fox emboldened me, the moment I heard any blame imputed to him, to state, that "he "had always been considered a very zealous and vigilant officer, and that, in the present instance, there was every reason to believe, no part of the biame would "be found to attach to him;" a statement, which, it now appears, was perfectly cor rect. But, indeed, the best and most complete reply to this ministerial backbiting is to be found in the commands, with which these ministers themselves have en. trusted General Fox. If he had been, at the time of his appointment to Ireland, or if he were now, the man which they wish the world to regard him; if he had been an indolent, slothful, negligent man, where are we to look for a justification for their conduct in having appointed him, at such at time, to the chief command of the forces in Ireland? And, if his conduct in Ireland has discovered to them the qualities they now impute to him; if, in short, he has misbehaved in Ireland; if, owing to his misbehaviour, or his inability, the city of Dublin has been surprised, is it wise, is it proper, is it decent, to commit to his generalship the immensely greater metropolis of England, including the palace, the family, and the sa cred person of the King?Let the partizans of ministers, of let the ministers themselves, answer these questions, if they can. THE VOLUNTEER-SYSTEM. Since the meeting of Parliament, this system, which was before falling into disrepute, bas experienced a considerable depreciation, notwithstanding the support, which it has received from that able financier, Mr. Pitt. He wished to render it more efficient; but, the very proposition which he made for that purpose, proved that his wish was impracticable; because the efficiency was not to be obtained without such means as could not be had, or could not be employed. His proposition, however, amounted to a full acknowledgment of the present inefficiency of the system. Thus far, he has proved the advesaries of the system to be right; and, it surely is not too much to ask of him, to be, in future, less pertinacious, upon this topic in particular, than he has heretofore been. He tells us, that, if we will adopt certain regulations, the system will be good; but, having before told us, that it would be good without those regulations, how can he expect that we now should place in his assurances an implicit belief.--How grievously has this gentleman disappointed his friends! How has he disappointed the nation! Instead of going into those grand subjects, the military and naval means and resources of the country, and the conduct of ministers relative thereto, he shuts his eyes to the past, and to the future also, except as far as relates to some trifling matters of detail, and that detail, too, of a sort that could, one would think, have seriously occupied no mind but that of some grocer or cheesemonger, puffed up with the vanity of being a colonel of volunteers. Was this the line of conduct which the nation expected to see pursued by Mr. Pitt ? -Mr. Fox's speech, on this occasion, contained some most excellent remarks. He truly described the vaunted system of volunteer-corps; he set at nought that mean, that worthless, that shop-keeping popularity, which Mr. Pitt still seemed to cling to; and, in short, his whole speech, even leaving the magnanimity of it out of the question, was well worthy of the applause, with which it was received. It was hoped, that Mr. Pitt's disposition, also, to bury all party animosities, and to form, in this critical juncture, an union of all the great character and talents in the country, would have appeared, from his conduct, at the opening of the Parliament; and, though this hope does seem to have been disappoint- | parte's threats of invasion? Why was not ed, it ought not to be entirely relinquished, till we have seen the part which the right honourable gentleman will take on the important questions relative to Ireland.Unanimity to see a cordial unanimity amongst the great men of the day must be -the wish of every one, who loves his king and country; for, such an unanimity is the only means of producing those great and wise measures, by which alone we can hope to recover our lost reputation, and to preserve ourselves from slavery. We are daily and hourly fading in the eyes of the world: foreign nations speculate upon our fall: the probable fall of England is a subject that is become familiar in their mercantile transactions. A striking and most woeful instance of this is now exhibited in our commercial concerns with the United States of America, where the merchants refuse to draw bills of exchange on England and to guarantee payment in case an invasion of the country shall bave taken place! I speak of a fact here, which I call upon the partisans of ministers to deny, if they can; and, in order to render the denial more specific, I will refer to both time and place. I say, then, that at Philadelphia and New York, on the 5th of November last, no bill of exchange on England was to be bought, without the insertion of a condition, that, in case England should be invaded, when the bill arrived, the drawer of the said bill should not be liable to damages. The consequence of which was, few people would purchase bills, and the consequence of that was, remittances were delayed, unless dollars could be collected and transmitted, at the loss of freight and insurance; and such was the demand for dollars, from this cause, that, at the time referred to, the bank at Philadelphia put a stop to, or, at least, limited, its issues in specie.-Such, as to America, are the consequences, and the natural consequences of a want of confidence in the stability of our government; for it is nothing short of that: and, that this want of confidence has, in great part, arisen from the contemptuous opinion, which the Americans, in common with all other foreigners, entertain of our ministry, no one will, I imagine, attempt to deny, especially if he has read the public prints of the United States, from one end to the other of which, those ministers are spoken of in terms, which no Englishman, though the opponent of ministers, can possibly hear without sorrow and shame, nor even without some degree of resentment.-Are we to be told, that this distrust, on the part of the Americans is merely the effect of Buona this effect produced last war, when an invasion of Ireland actually took place? Lord Hawkesbury said, no longer ago than the 10th of August last, that the dangers of the country were greater in 1799 than in the time when he was speaking; but, did the Americans refuse to guarantee bills in 1798? No such thing ever entered into their minds. During the whole of 1798 bills on England were regarded as good as at any former period; and, in short, during the whole of last war there was no merchant in America, who did not look upon England as the securest place in the whole world, his own country not excepted. To what, then, are we to attribute that want of confidence, which exists with respect to our country? To what but an universal contempt of the ministers, by whom that country is governed?-From this long and rambling digression, I should now return to the subject of Volunteer Corps, and offer a few observations on their exemptions and committees; but, want of room will compel me to postpone these topics to my next; in the mean time, however, I think it necessary to state, that I shall most amply prove the falsehood of an assertion which has been made, that the committer mentioned by Mr. Windham is a solitary instance, six-sevenths, at least, of the infantry corps being under the guidance of such committees, though the important and alarming fact was, it seems, utterly unknown to Mr. Pitt, the generalissimo of the shop-keeping army. I will once more, and for the last time, observe, on the baseness of accusing me, and those who think with me, on this subject, of despising the volunteers. It is the system, and not the men. To despise or hate the volunteers would, agreeably to a sentiment very happily expressed by a writer in the Morning Chronicle, be to despise or hate my country. And, is this my character? Have I ever despised, have I ever hated, have I ever turned my back upon, my county or my countrymen? And have I ever refused to face their en-nies? But, of these base arts of my opponents, I will take no more notice; for, of those who are so ignorant as to be misled by them, the good opinion is not worth possessing.-In referring to the attacks on the volunteer system, I should naturally enquire, what prevented Mr. Sheridan from stepping forward in its defence; Mr. Sheridan, who moved the vote of thanks, and who is said to have been rewarded by a colonelcy; but this enquiry also must be delayed till my next. ARMY ESTIMATES.] Mr. Addington said, some time ago, that, "even certain success in reducing the power of France would not have been worth forty millions of money." What may be the object; which that great man has, at present, in view, is, as far as I know, a profound secret. From what has been let out, one would believe, the object to be nothing more than an attempt, and a very humble attempt too, to eke out the existence of Britain, as an independent nation. If reducing the power of France was not worth forty millions, the object here supposed to be in view, cannot, surely, be worth nearly so much; yet, I think, it will be very wonderful indeed, if it does not cost the full sum, during the very first year of the war, the expenses of which Mr. Addington estimates at twenty-six millions, but which will not fall short of fortytwo or forty-three millions. It is, indeed, impossible, as yet, to make out a statement worthy of any other name than that of a guess, but, it is my opinion, that the expenses of the army, ordnance, and navy, for the first whole year of war, will be, for GreatBritain alone, nearly as follows:Ordinaries of the army as stated by the Secretary at War, exclusive of Barracks... 8,346,860 1,500,000 5,500,000 Barracks Extraordinary Services.. Bounties to 40,000 Army of Reserve at 401. per man.......... 1,600,000 Expenses of 397,000 Volunteers, at 7 1. per man, loss of labour not included, 2,779,000 In the speech from the throne, the minister thought proper to tell the House of Commons, that there was a "progressive im"provement of the revenue," which could not fail to encourage them to persevere in the present system of finance; and, the House of Commons, in their response to this part of the speech, assure his Majesty, that they are fully sensible of the advantages of this system From assurances like these, who would not believe, that the revenue has been more productive this year than it was last year? Most assuredly this is the notion intended to be conveyed to the public; yet, it will be no difficult matter to show, that the contrary is the fact, notwithstanding the comparative account of the produce of the permanent taxes, which has lately been laid before parliament, and which has been made the ground of exultation amongst the parti zans of the ministry. The paper, here referred to, purports to be an account of the net produce of all the permanent taxes in the years and quarters ending the 10th day of October 1802 and 1803, respectively; and, its object is to show, that the year ending the 10th of October, 1803, has been more productive than the year ending 10th Oct. 1802. The war taxes, that is to say, the taxes imposed and collected during this present year, are left out of course; but the produce of the addition made to the customs, under the pretext of consolidation, is included in the receipt of the present year. The totals of this comparative account stand thus. Year ending roth Oct. 1803... £30,192,335 Year ending 10th Oct. 1802... Difference 25,99,093 £4,993,242 Now, who would not imagine, that this sum of difference exhibited the degree of that improvement of the revenue, alluded to in the King's speech, and so much talked of out of doors? Who would imagine, that, as to the improvement of the revenue, as to the proof of national prosperity, contained in this account, the decision is against the present year, instead of being in favour of it? Strange as these suppositions may be, such, nevertheless, is the fact.- -In the year 1802, there were new taxes imposed to the annual estimated amount of £4,785,123. As these taxes were not enacted till the month of May, they yielded, in the year ending 10th October, 1802, only £986,570; and, of course, there has been, from these new taxes, the sum of £3,798,553 received in the year ending 10th October, 1803, more' than there was received from that source in the year ending 10th October, 1802.— Again: last winter, an act was passed to consolidate the custom duties, and, by means of this act of consolidation as it is called, an addition was made to those duties, which addition has, in the year ending 10th October, 1803, produced £62,500. A third cause of difference is to be found in the account of corn bounties, that is to say, sums paid by way of bounty for the importation of corn' and rice, which sums being paid at the Custom-house, where they are first deducted from the gross receipt at that House, are, of course, never brought into the Exchequer, and are not included in the accounts of the net produce of the taxes, laid before the House of Commons. During the endyear ing 10th October, 1802, there was, on this account, deducted from the net produce of the permanent-taxes £1,633,587; but, in the year ending 10th October, 1803, there was, on the same account, not one farthing deducted from the net produce of those taxes. The three sums here specified, must, then, in a comparative view of the two years, be deducted from the produce of the year ending 10th October, 1803; and, when this is done, it will be found, that the "improvement of *the revenue," which has been so much boasted of by the partizans of the minister, turns out to be a decline in its produce. Net produce of permanent taxes in £. year ending 10th Oct. 1803...... 30,192,335 New taxes not received in 1803, more than in 1802. 3,798,553 Arising from addition made Here is a defalcation of half a million instead of a "progressive improvement;" for, certainly, no one will pretend that the having made an addition to the receipt, by the means of new taxes, is a mark of "improve ment?" If it be, there is no denying, that we are under a course of improvement, such as no nation upon earth ever before, experienced. If this be improvement, the more numerous and the heavier are the burdens of the people, the more they ought to rejoice, for the greater, in that case, would be the means, and, of course, the credit of the nation! But, this is not the way to make a comparison between the produce of two years of taxes; this is not the way to make out a case of improvement. Such comparison, to be of any use for such a purpose, must be confined to taxes which were in existence, and in full operation at, or before, the commencement of the first of the two years, the produce of which is compared; for, whatever sum may have been collected from new taxes, if there is a falling off upon those which have existed during both the years, that falling off must, according to its magitude, be regarded as a mark of decline in the pecuniary prosperity of the nation. But there is another consideration, with which people seem to trouble themselves but very little, but which is of vast impor tance in every estimate of national receipt or expenditure, particularly in compara tive estimates; and that is the gradual des preciation of money. If the national receipt amounts to the same sum this year as it amounted to last year, people generallys suppose, that it will purchase as much service for the state; and, if there were no paper currency, and, of course, very little depreciation of money, this supposttion would never be very distant from the truth; but far different is the state in which we are, and in which we see the value of money lessen even during the short space that it remains in our hands. Upon a computation leaning rather in fa vour of the value of money, it appears, that since the year 1797, that is, since the restriction, as it is called, was enacted as to the issues of specie at the bank, the average annual depreciation of money has been at the rate of four-pence in the pound; and, therefore, unless we suppose the depreciation to have been, this year, less than usual, the sum of 30,000,000l. of money collected in taxes up to the 10th of October last, is not worth more, and, in fact, is not more, than that of 29,500,000l. collected last year; so that, adding this half million to the half million of real defi cit in the receipts, it appears, that the "improvement in the revenue" consists of a defalcation of a million.—~ Let us now see how the surplus of the consolidated fund is likely to stand at the end of the present year; first adverting to the promises held out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 10th of December, 1802, when he estimated the surplus of the consolidated fund, for the present year, at 7,845,000 1.; but "though he saw no reason to apprehend 66 a diminution of any part of the revenue, "he would not reckon upon a sum so large as might have been inferred from the experience of the three last quarters, and "he had, therefore, limited his expecta "tions to 6,500,000l." These words are quoted from his speech as published by himself, in the shape of a pamphlet ; but the whole speech will be found, very correctly given, in the Register, Vol. II. p 910 et seq.It will be remembered, that this estimate was, at the time of its being made, declared to be fallacious. On every point of his financial statements Mr. Addington was contradicted; but, as to the surplus of the consolidated fund in particular, he was brought to issue with his opponents. The month of January next will decide the question. In the mean time, however, it is proper to shew what that decision is likely to be.We have already seen, that the income up to October, exclusive of the sum derived from the new taxes imposed since the estimate was made, that is to say, the war taxes, amounted to 30,129,835 1. This was the produce of four quarters up to the 10th of October last; and, if we suppose that the present quarter, including arrears, will amount to as much as the last quarter, we certainly are far from under-rating its produce. The charge upon this income, or fund, will be, for the present year, excluding expenses incurred by new loan, and exclu ding also interest on Imperial loan, together with some other charges, 25,590,864 I., * which sum being deducted from the income, leaves a surplus of 4,538,9711., instead of 7,845,000 l., at which it was estimated by Mr. Addington, or at least, instead of 6,500,000 1., which he relied on, and which he actually included in his ways and means for the year. A short time will now fully discover who has been correct, and who incorrect, as to this subject. The hasty remarks here made will, at any rate, serve to awaken attention, amongst some few persons, and, as far as they have that effect, wili guard against that despondency, which a financial deficit, suddenly announced, is apt to create in this money-loving community, especially at a time when there appears to be less hope than ever of seeing an end to the RESTRICTION ON THE BANK.--On this subject, so closely connected with every ra tional view that can be taken of our ability to continue the war for any length of time, some observations were offered to the pub lic in a preceding sheet. But, it was not then remarked, that, the paying, or not paying, in specie, at the Bank of England, is, by our enemy, if not by the world at large, considered as the proof of whether we are able, or unable, to carry on the present war, to an extended period, without utter ruin to our national credit, or, in other words, without a national bankruptcy. The late Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Rose, in his Brief Examination of the Finances," observes, when speaking of the income tax, which had just then, in 1799, been imposed, that, amongst other great advantages arising from the resolution to levy a considera. ble portion of the taxes within the year, would be, to convince our enemies, and to འ་ "inform all Europe, that, if France built "hopes on the expected overthrow of our "financial system, and trusted to the failure "of our resources, that those hopes were " vain." * Lord Auckland, upon the same occasion said; such, then, my lords, is "the plan before us; establishing a sys "tem of supply essentially important in the "present struggle, essentially beneficial on "the eventual return of peace, and such as "will hereafter induce all nations to pause, "before they bring upon us the necessity of engaging in a new war with them."+ France has not " paused" long. How delu. sive, alas! have been all, yes all, the promises of the English financiers for twenty years past! And, how obstinately blind, how incorrigible, have been the people! The people? But, indeed, the people, properly so called; the people of Britain, know nothing of the matter.-Returning to the subject more directly in view, we find Mr. Addington, in proposing bis income tax, his plan for "raising a great part of the supplies within the year;" we find him, too, holding out to us, as one of its most beneficial effects," that of convincing the enemy "of this country, that it is hopeless for him "to contend with our finances, and of convincing the other powers of Europe, that they may safely join with us, in a common cause, for that the resources of this country are such as to give full security for "the punctual discharge of any engage 66 ments it may enter into." It is truly surprising that these financiers should, at pe riods so distant, repeat each others senti ments and words so exactly. But to all this boasting, all this grand display of "inex"haustible resources," Buonaparté laco nically replies: "pay your bank-notes in gold, "and silver, and then we will believe you, "without your going to war, and without your adding twelve millions annually to your taxes."§ The stoppage of cash pay ments, therefore, which the blind partisans of Ministers would fain have us regard as a thing of no consequence, is, in the opinion of our enemy, the criterion of our pecuniary means. Nor, can there be any doubt, that it is so in the opinion of the world; and as all credit depends entirely upon opinion, that which the world thinks, relative to our credit, really exists.On the 13th instant, a debate took place in the House of Lords, on the third reading of the Bank Restriction |