ously affects the adjacent owner by interfering with the access to or
drainage from his property, or the exclusion of light and air therefrom,
imposes an additional servitude for which he may recover damages.
Jones v. Erie etc. R. R. Co., 722.

7. STREETS-OCCUPATION OF, BY RAILROAD ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE-
DAMAGES.-When a railroad company owns the diagonal corners on pub-
lic streets, and is authorized by the city to connect them by an overhead
bridge, which the company places on abutments twenty-three feet high,
built upon its own land, the adjoining owner upon one of the remaining
corners is entitled to recover damages for any additional servitude thus
imposed upon his property, as for the exclusion of light and air there-
from, but he is not entitled to recover on the ground that his property
is diminished in value by the use to which the railroad company puts
its property; nor is he entitled to recover for the mere exposure of his
property to the noise, smoke, dust, and danger from his horses or those
of his visitors becoming frightened by moving trains. Jones v. Erie etc.
R. R. Co., 722.

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8. STREETS OCCUPATION OF, BY RAILROAD-ADDITIONAl Servitude.
Mere exposure to danger of horses being frightened by passing trains
twenty-three feet above the surface of the street is not an obstruction to
access to adjoining property, nor the imposition of a new servitude for
which the adjoining owner is entitled to recover. Jones v. Erie etc.
R. R. Co., 722.

9. DEED OF RIGHT OF WAY-CONSTRUCTION.

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An absolute conveyance of

a right of way from a land-owner and his wife to a railway company, re-
citing that it is given for and in consideration of the enhanced value to
be given and contemplated to arise to the grantor's land and other prop-
erty by the location and construction of the railroad, and for the con-
sideration of full and complete value accruing in locating and maintaining
a station on the land granted, is in no sense executory, and passes the
title to the land entirely out of the grantors, and to the railway company.
In such case the promises or obligations of the railway company referred
to in the deed are in the nature of covenants, not conditions, and the
grantors cannot reclaim the land on account of the non-performance of
the covenants by the grantee, but can only sue for the damages arising
from the breach of the contract. Chicago etc. R'y Co. v. Titterington, 39.
10. RAILROAD CONDUCTOR-RIGHT OF PASSENGER TO RELY ON DIRECTION
OF, IN BOARDING TRAIN. -The conductor of a railroad train, in directing
an intending passenger as to his method of getting upon the train, is
acting within the scope of his authority as such conductor, and the
passenger, in complying with his directions, is not guilty of negligence,
unless he exposes himself to plain and apparent danger. Irish v. Nor-
thern Pac. etc. R. R. Co., 899.

11. CARRIERS-CONNECTING RAILWAYS-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY.
-A connecting carrier by rail may, by contract, protect itself against
liability for loss not occurring on its own line, whether the shipment
is wholly within the state, or is interstate. McCarn v. International etc.
R'y Co., 51.

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12 CARRIERS-CONNECTING RAILWAY-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY.
A contract between a shipper and a connecting carrier by rail, stipulating
that such carrier shall not be liable for anything beyond its own line,
except to protect the through-rate of freight named, is valid, and will be
enforced. McCarn v. International etc. R'y Co., 51.

18. CONNECTING CARRIERS-EXTENT OF THEIR LIABILITY UNDER CONTRACT
TO FORWARD GOODS. — Where a railroad company contracts to forward,
not to transport, goods to a point beyond its own line, expressly stipu.
lating that it assumes no liability beyond its own rails, it cannot be held
liable in damages for any loss of or injury to such goods, occurring be.
yond its own line. Dunbar v. Port Royal etc. R'y Co., 860.

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14 THROUGH JOINT RATES DEFINED. The "through joint rates" re-
quired by chapter 17 of the acts of the twenty-third general assembly
of Iowa to be established are joint rates of charges for the transportation
of freight and cars over a united route. They consist of the separate rates
of each separate road, and cover all the charges for the transportation
over two or more roads, as though they constituted one road, the rates
fixed determining the whole charges. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
15. STATUTE PROVIDING FOR TRANSFER OF RAILROAD CARS NOT UNCONSTITU.
TIONAL. - The custom of transferring cars from one railroad company to
another, for the transportation of property over more than one railroad,
without breaking bulk, has been practiced so long as to be recognized as
of the course of business of which the courts will take judicial notice, and
an act of the legislature providing that car-load lots of freight shall be
transferred without unloading, unless done without charge to the shipper
or receiver of such shipments, and making it the duty of the state rail-
road commissioners to aid the railroad companies in the matter by mak-
ing and enforcing proper rules for the compensation of the companies for
the use of the cars so transferred, and for their ultimate return, does
not interfere with the constitutional guaranties for the protection of the
rights and property of such companies. Such an enactment is a legiti.
mate exercise of the legislative authority to regulate the performance of
duty by carriers, and to prescribe reasonable charges for the transporta-
tion of freight. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.

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16. JOINT RATES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF FREIGHT, STATE HAS POWER TO
ESTABLISH. A state which has power to fix the maximum charges for
the transportation of freight by railroads, provided such charges shall no
be unreasonable, has also authority and power to establish joint through
rates, and an act of the legislature providing that all railway companies
within the state shall, upon the demand of any person interested, estab-
lish joint through rates for the transportation of freight and cars between
points on their respective lines within the state, and making it the duty
of the board of state railroad commissioners, in case of a railroad com-
pany's failure to do so, to establish such joint through rates, is not un.
constitutional. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
17. RAILROAD CORPORATION MAKING NO ATTEMPT TO PREVENT TRAVEL
ACROSS its station-grounds and platform, as a short cut between public
streets, does not thereby invite the use of such station and platform for
the purposes of such travel. Redigan v. Boston etc. Railroad, 520.
18 RAILROAD CORPORATION LEAVING Unguarded an Opening Made by
RAISING A TRAP-DOOR, forming part of a platform at one of its sta-
tions, is not answerable to one injured by falling into such opening while
crossing the station and platform without the invitation of the corpora-
tion, in order to make a short cut between public streets, though he and
other persons had been in the habit of so crossing without objection.
This is because he is a mere licensee, to whom the corporation owes no
duty to warn him of danger resulting from the ordinary use by it of its
premises. Redigan v. Boston etc. Railroad, 520.

1. HIGHWAYS-RAILWAY CROSSINGS.

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IT IS THE DUTY OF A RAILWAY COR-
PORATION, upon building its railroad across a highway, to restore it as
nearly as possible to its former condition, and failing to do so, it is liable
for damages sustained on account of injuries received by reason of the
unsafe condition in which the highway was left, provided the injured
party used care commensurate with the apparent danger. Louisville etc.
R. R. Co. v. Pritchard, 451.

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20. HIGHWAY CROSSINGS. A GIRL INJURED BY BEING THROWN OUT OF A
VEHICLE at a point where a railway crossed a highway, because the high-
way had been left several inches below the railway track, is entitled to
recover for such injury, though she was driving a team at the time, and
it was moving from fright, if it was not unmanageable, and the accident
would not have occurred had the highway crossing been put and kept in
proper condition by the railway corporation. Louisville etc. R. R. Co.
v. Pritchard, 451.

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1. MASTER and Servant-RISKS ASSUMED BY AND CARE DUE TO Servant
ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROAD.-A railroad employee en-
gaged in constructing the road assumes greater risks from a defective
track than one passing over the road after its full completion and equip.
ment, but the former has the right to expect a degree of care and skill
from the company equal to that ordinarily exercised during the progress
of railroad construction, and the company is not exonerated from lia-
bility for injuries inflicted on him, through a risk that must be regarded
as extraordinary and unusual. Colorado etc. R'y Co. v. Naylon, 335.
12. MASTER and Servant -RISK NOT ASSUMED BY SERVANT.
- The single
spiking of three ties and the entire failure to spike the fourth tie to the
rails upon a curve in a railroad during the course of its construction is
such negligence toward an employee engaged in such construction work,
in exposing him to an extraordinary and unusual hazard not contem
plated in his employment, as renders the company liable for injury re
sulting to him therefrom. Colorado etc. R'y Co. v. Naylon, 335.
23. SECTION-FOREMAN AS VICE-PRINCIPAL. A railway section-foreman,
having power to control, employ, and discharge the men under him,
occupies the position of vice-principal as to them, in so far as they are
affected by his acts. He is the representative of the railway company in
the performance of any act, service, or duty in the line of his employ.
ment, and no distinction can be drawn between the performance of
those higher duties intrusted to him specially, and those of an ordinary
character, which both he and the subordinate servants under him are
in the habit of indiscriminately performing. Sweeney v. Gulf etc. R'y Co.,
71.

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24. MASTER And Servant — FOREMAN AS VICE-PRINCIPAL.

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A general fore-
man of men engaged in railroad construction, such men being subject
to his immediate control, employment, and discharge, while he has con-
trol of the trains and appliances used in the work of construction, sub-
ject to the superintending direction of the general superintendent of
construction when present, is a vice-principal during the absence of such
superintendent, so as to make the company liable for his negligence
toward one of the men under his control and direction. Colorado etc.
R'y Co. Naylon, 335.

LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF VICE-PRINCIPAL. A railway section.
foreman, having power to control, employ, and discharge the men under
him, is a vice-principal, and not a fellow-servant with them, and the
AM. ST. REP., VOL. XXXI. - 65

railway company is liable for his negligent act in throwing back an
open switch, whereby one of the men under his control is injured.
Sweeney v. Gulf etc. R'y Co., 71.

26. STREET-RAILWAYS-TRANSFER TICKETS-LIMITATION AS TO TIME OF
USING. A regulation that a transfer ticket from one line of street-rail-
way to another will not be honored unless presented within fifteen min.
utes after its delivery to the passenger is not unreasonable, in the absence
of any charter, ordinance, or contract obligation on the part of the com
pany to make such transfer, and it is the duty of the passenger receiv.
ing such transfer ticket to read it, and, if possible, to use it within the
time limited. If he fails to do so, the company cannot be held liable
in damages for not honoring the transfer after the time marked upon it
has expired, and for ejecting such passenger from the cars without
physical injury upon his refusal to pay an additional fare. Heffron v.
Detroit etc. R'y Co., 601.

27. STREET-RAILWAYS-TRANSFER TICKETS - LIMITATION AS TO TIME OF
USING. When a passenger upon a street-railway receives a transfer
ticket from one line of road to another, limited in its use to fifteen
minutes from the time he receives it, and he takes the first car passing
the point of transfer after receiving the ticket, he may recover of the
company for being ejected from the car upon his refusal to pay a sec-
ond fare, even though the time limit marked upon the transfer ticket
has expired. Heffron v. Detroit etc. R'y Co., 601.

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, Right of, to Impose Restrictions on Fran-
CHISE OF STREET-RAILWAY COMPANY. Where a street-railway com-
pany is authorized by the statute under which it was built and operated
to select and adopt a new method of propelling its cars, the municipal
corporation, having the right to regulate the use of the streets over which
the cars of the company run, has the power to impose such reasonable
conditions upon the company's enjoyment of its franchises as in their
judgment the interests of the public seem to require. Their authority
in this respect is coincident in extent with the company's right of selec
tion. Hudson River Telephone Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike etc. Co., 838.
29. ELECTRICITY AS MOTIVE POWER FOR STREET-CARS, AUTHORITY OF COM-
PANY TO ADOPT. — Where a statute, enacted before the introduction of
electricity as a propelling force, authorizes a corporation to construct a
street-railroad, and to operate it by any mechanical or other power ex-
cept steam, such company has authority, upon obtaining the consent of
the proper municipal authorities, to adopt electricity as a motive power,
and to place in the streets the apparatus and fixtures necessary for its
practical and efficient use. Such statute is not to be limited to such
methods of operating street-railroads as were known and in actual use
at the time of its passage; for its language, literally construed, includes
undiscovered as well as existing modes of operation. Nor is the com-
pany irrevocably bound by the choice of motive power first made by it
after the enactment of the statute. Hudson River Telephone Co. v. Water-
vliet Turnpike etc. Co., 838.

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30. STREET SURFACE RAILROAD ACT NOT APPLICABLE TO KOAD CHANGED
FROM HORSE TO ELECTRIC MOTIVE POWER.. A street-railway company
having the right, under the statute authorizing it to build and operate
its road, to change its motive power from horse-power to electricity is
not subject to the provisions of the street surface railroad act, requir
ing the approval of the railroad commissioners and the consent of the

owners of one half in value of the property abutting on the streets,
since it comes within the saving clause in that act, which declares that
the act shall not interfere with, repeal, or invalidate any rights thereto-
fore acquired, and inchoate as well as perfected rights are saved by that
provision. Hudson River Telephone Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike etc. Co.,
838.

Bee CONSTITUTIons, 3; Contracts, 1; Eminent Domain, 2; Fraud, 3; Mas-
ter and Servant, 20; NEGLIGENCE, 2; PLEADING, 2, 9; RECEIVERS;
Statutes, 10-12; TAXES, 2-5; TELEGRAPHS, 1; TELEPHONES, 3; TRIAL,
9; WITNESSES.

RATIFICATION.

See Aaznoy, 3; Corporations, 3, 5; Vendor and Purchashe.

REAL PROPERTY.

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1. POSSESSION OF REAL ESTATE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF TITLE, WHEN.
Actual visible possession of real estate by a tenant is constructive notice
of the title of the landlord. When, therefore, the person holding the
legal title to a lot of land in trust for another person conveys the prop
erty while it is in the actual visible possession of a tenant of the benefi-
ciary, the grantee takes with constructive notice of the right and title
of the beneficiary, and of the contingent dower interest of his wife, and
a person to whom such grantee mortgages the property, at the time of
the conveyance, is affected with like notice. The mortgagor, not being
an innocent purchaser without notice, but a purchaser with constructive
notice of the dower interest, does not acquire that interest by the con-
veyance, and cannot convey by the mortgage what he does not own, and
the mortgagee is not entitled to a foreclosure of the mortgage as against
the dower interest. Bowman v. Anderson, 473.
2 POSSESSION OF LAND, TO CONSTITUTE NOTICE, MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL.

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Possession of land necessary to impart notice of title thereto must be
adverse, exclusive, open, unequivocal, and notorious, and must be in-
consistent with the claim of any other person. The possession of a farm
by a woman claiming under an unrecorded deed from her son-in-law,
who was, at the date of the conveyance, residing on the farm, and who
continued to reside thereon after such date the same as before, exercis.
ing authority to some extent over the farm and the business of farming,
and with whom the grantee resided as a member of his family, is not,
therefore, sufficient to impart notice of title under the deed, even though
the grantee generally managed the business of the farm, and sold the
produce and stock raised thereon, it not appearing that she exercised
exclusive control over it. Elliot v. Lane, 504.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. - RIGHT OF THE OWNER OF PROPERTY TO USE IT
in the prosecution of a lawful and necessary business cannot be made to
rest upon the caprice of the majority, or of any number, of those own.
ing property surrounding that which he desires to use. Ex parte Sing
Lee, 218.

SUBTERRANEAN MINES AND WATER" LAND-OWNER'S RIGHT TO. - Ho
who owns the surface of land may dig therein, and apply to his own
purpose whatever he may there find between the surface and the center
of the earth. If he thereby draws off water from the land of another,
the latter is without redress by any action in the courts. People's Gas
Co. v. Tyner, 433.