1. ELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.—The abandonment, by a state,
of an authorized method of choosing presidential electors, and the adop-
tion and exclusive use for a great number of years of another authorized
method, does not impair the power of the state to readopt the former
method. It cannot, by nonuser, lose the power to exercise rights ex-
pressly delegated to it by the constitution of the United States. Mc-
Pherson v. Blacker, 587.
2 CONFLICT OF LAWS. - A FOREIGN LAW, in cases other than penal actions,
if not contrary to our public policy, or to abstract justice, or pure
morals, or calculated to injure the state or its citizens, will be recog
nized and enforced here, if we have jurisdiction over the necessary par
ties, and can see that, consistently with our forms of procedure and law
of trials, we can do substantial justice between the parties. Higgins ▼.
Central New England etc. R. R. Co., 544.
See CONSTITUTIONS, 1; CREDITOR'S SUIT; EXTRADITION; GUARDIAN AND
WARD; INTERSTATE COMMERCE; JURISDICTION; PUBLIC LANDS, 2; RAIL-
ROADS, 5, 16; STATUTES, 16; TAXES, 1-6; WHARVES.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
See CONTRACTS, 2
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. — SUBJECT OF AN ACT IS SUFFICIENTLY EXPRESSED
in its title when it is to amend a pre-existing act, the title of which is
recited verbatim in the title of such amendatory act, but without men-
tioning the year of its enactment. Willis v. Mabon, 626.
2. STATUTES UPHELD UNLESS PLAINLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
uphold statutes unless they are so plainly and palpably in conflict with
the constitution as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the judicial mind
as to their invalidity. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
3. REMEDIAL STATUTE- How CONSTRued.
In construing a remedial stat
ute, its language, so far as is consistent with a fair construction of the
law, should be so interpreted as to promote and advance the remedy.
McNulta v. Lockridge, 362.
4. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. — Where one statute is amendatory of another,
the two should be read together, and if one construction gives effect to
the amendatory act, while another construction would defeat it, the for-
mer construction should be adopted. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
5. JUSTICE AND POLICY OF STATUTES NOT MATTERS OF JUDICIAL CONSIDERA.
TION. The justice and policy of a statute are not matters for judicial
consideration. They are for the consideration of the legislative depart-
ment of the government alone. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
6. STATUTE NOT VOID FOR UNCERTAINTY WHEN. An amendatory act is not
void for uncertainty in not defining offenses for which it imposes penal.
ties, when the act which it amends explicitly defines such offenses.
Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
7. STATUTORY REMEDIES. Every statute made against an injury, mischief,
or grievance impliedly gives a remedy for it; if no remedy is expressly
given, the party has an action upon the statute. Willis v. Mabon, 626.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. - A STATUTE MAKING AN Arbitrary CLASSIFICA-
TION with respect to the subjects over which it operates, based upon no
reason suggested by a difference in their situation or circumstances dis-
closing the necessity or propriety of any different legislation in respect
to them, is unconstitutional. State v. Sheriff, 650.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATIONS.—A statute pro-
hibiting the emission of dense smoke within a city, but providing that its
provisions shall not be applicable to manufacturing establishments using
the entire product of combustion, and the heat, power, and light pro-
duced thereby, within the building wherein the same are generated,
or within a radius of three hundred feet therefrom, makes an arbitrary
distinction between different classes of business, and is therefore void.
State v. Sheriff, 650.
10. ATTORNEY'S FEES, RECOVERY OF, MAY BE PERMITTED IN ONE CLASS OF
CASES AND DENIED IN OTHERS. - The legislature may prescribe rules
permitting the recovery of attorney's fees in one class of cases and deny
it in all others. A statute which permits the plaintiff, in an action
against a railroad company for a violation of its provisions, to recover, in
addition to the damages therein provided for, an attorney's fee, confers no
special privilege prohibited by the constitution, nor can it be regarded
as imposing a penalty for exercising the right of defense. Burlington
etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
11. DUE PROCESS OF LAW, PROVIDED BY ACT AUTHORIZING ESTABLISHMENT
OF JOINT RATES OF TRANSPORTATION. A statute conferring upon a
state board of railroad commissioners authority to establish joint through
rates for the transportation of freight, after notice to the railroad com-
panies to be affected thereby, and an opportunity to be heard, does not
operate to deprive such railroad companies of their property without
due process of law. Special proceedings applicable to specified subject-
matter, and conformable to the rules requiring notice and the acquisition
of jurisdiction, and which affect all persons alike whose property or
rights come within the lawful scope of the proceedings, are prosecuted
with due process of law. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
12. RULES OF EVIDENCE - POWER OF STATE TO PRESCRIBE, IN ALL PROCEED-
INGS. A statute authorizing railroad commissioners to establish joint
rates of transportation which shall be regarded as prima facie reasonable
does not confer upon such commissioners judicial functions, but simply
prescribes a rule of evidence. It does not prevent the companies from
having the acts of the commissioners in fixing rates of charges reviewed
in the courts of the state. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.
13. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EX POST FACTO LAWs. A statute changing the
number of the grand jury in all cases, and authorizing a prosecution by
information as well as by indictment, does not alter the situation of an
accused to his disadvantage, and therefore is applicable to the prosecu-
tion of a crime alleged to have been committed before its passage, if the
constitution of the state, adopted, before the doing of the criminal act,
declared that the legislature may change, regulate, or abolish the grand
jury system, and that, until otherwise provided for by law, no person
shall, for a felony, be proceeded against criminally otherwise than by
indictment. In re Wright, 94.
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE INVALID IN PART. —The unconstitu⚫
tionality of one portion of a statute cannot defeat other portions, unless
the nature of the unconstitutional provision is such as to render it of vi
tal importance to the whole statute. McPherson v. Blacker, 587.
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. - STATUTE DECLARING THAT NO EMPLOYER SHALL
IMPOSE a fine or withhold the wages, or any part of the wages, of an
employee engaged in weaving, for an imperfection that may arise during
the process of weaving, is void, because it conflicts with that part of the
state constitution enumerating as one of the inalienable rights of man
that “of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." Common-
wealth v. Perry, 533.
16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. A statute of a state
denying the right to appoint as trustee any person who is not a resident
of the state is invalid, at least as against citizens of other states, be
cause it impairs their privileges and immunities, as granted under article
4, section 2, and the fourteenth amendment, of the constitution of the
United States. Roby v. Smith, 439.
17. POLICE POWER-LICENSE TAX. What business or occupation so far
affects the public welfare and good order as to require to be licensed is
a matter of legislative consideration and control, which, when exercised
in good faith, cannot be reviewed by the courts. Oil City v. Oil City Trust
Co., 770.
18. ELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.
- An act entitled "An act to
provide for the election of electors of President and Vice-President of
the United States," the body of which provides for the election of
alternate electors as well as electors, is not in conflict with that pro-
vision of the state constitution declaring that no law shall embrace
more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. It
merely provides for filling vacancies caused by the death or disability
of the electors. Nor is it invalid for failing to expressly provide for fill.
ing a vacancy in case it may occur by the death or disability of both the
elector or the alternate; nor because it fails to require notice of the
election of district electors provided for, as they are to be chosen at a
general election, and the general election law provides that notice shall
be given that presidential electors will be chosen at such general elec
tion. McPherson v. Blacker, 587.
19. ELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS. —A statute providing for the
election of presidential electors by districts, and also providing that
the counting, canvassing, and certifying of the votes cast for such eleo-
tors at large, and for district electors, "shall be done as near as may
be as is now provided by law," is not invalid and inoperative on the
ground that it fails to provide means for canvassing the votes for such
electors in the portions of a certain county which constitute the first,
and portions of the second, sixth, and seventh electoral districts, since
such districts are defined by law, and the canvass of the votes cast
therein is provided for by the general election law. McPherson v.
Blacker, 587.
20. ELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.—The fact that a state statute
providing for the method of choosing presidential electors is in con
flict with an act of Congress, in so far as it fixes a date for the meeting
of the electors and the method of certifying their action, does not ren-
der the remaining provisions of the act inoperative or unconstitutional.
McPherson v. Blacker, 587.
See CONSTITUTIONS, 3, 4, 5; CONTRACTS, 3; CORPORATIONS, 13, 14, 16; COUN
TIES; CREDITOR'S SUIT; CRIMINal Law, 1; DEEDS, 6; ELECTIONS, 1;
EMINENT DOMAIN, 2; HABEAS CORPUS; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; In-
JUNCTIONS, 3; JUDGMENTS 17, 22; MANDAMUS, 4; MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS, 14; NOTICE, 2, 3; OFFICERS, 2; RAILROADS, 14, 16, 28, 30;
RECEIVERS, 5; SALES, 2; TAXES, 3, 6-8; TELEPHONES; VENDOR AND
PURCHASER, 5; WILLS, 10.
STEAMSHIP COMPANIES.
See WHARVES.
See CONSTITUTIONS, 9; CORPORATIONS, 7-15, 17; EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS, 3; WATERS, 15, 17.
See CONSTITUTIONS, 9, CORPORATIONS; LIBEL, 6; Waters, 12.
STORAGE.
See WAREHOUSEMEN.
STREET-RAILWAYS.
See RAILROADS, 26-30; TELEPHONES, &
See EMINENT DOMAIN, 4; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 6–13, 15; Railroads,
2-8; 17, 18, 28-30; TELEPHONES, 2, 3; WITNESSES.
SUFFRAGE.
See ELECTIONS, 1.
See JUDGMENTS, 23; PROCESS.
SUPERINTENDENT.
See RAILROAds, 24.
1. WHAT CREATES. A bond with warrant of attorney to confess judgment,
given to secure payment of judgments assigned to the obligee, and ex-
pressly providing that it is to remain in force until the whole sum is
paid, creates a contract of suretyship on the part of the obligor, and
does not constitute him a mere guarantor. Campbell v. Sherman, 735.
2. SURETY AND GUARANTOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN. — A contract of sure
tyship creates a direct liability to the creditor for the act to be performed
by the debtor, but a contract of guaranty creates a liability only for his
ability to perform such act. A surety is an insurer of the debt, while
a guarantor is only an insurer of the solvency of the debtor. Campbell v.
Sherman, 735.
8. A SURETY MAY ASSERT THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION,
though the principal is not a party to the action. Stockton Sav. etc.
Society v. Giddings, 181.
4. SURETY CANnnot Present, BY WAY OF RECOUPMENT, a defense consisting
of a claim for damages resulting from a breach of warranty contained in
a contract made with his principal. The latter alone can assert this
claim. Stockton Sav. etc. Society v. Giddings, 181.
5. SURETY IS ENTITLED TO PROVE, AS A DEFENSE, that the obligation upon
which he is sued was given in payment for property purchased by his
principal, and that the latter has rescinded the purchase on some
ground authorizing such rescission. Stockton Sav. etc. Society v. Giddings,
181.
6. FAILURE OF CREDITOR TO REVIVE JUDGMENT does not release a surety,
in the absence of an express agreement that such judgment should be
kept revived for his benefit. Campbell v. Sherman, 735.
See BANKS, 1; Corporations, 16; Guaranty, 1.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 7; WATERS, 1-3.
See ESTOPPEL; TRUSTS, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3.
TAX DEEDS.
See TAXES, 7, 8.
1. PERSONALTY, WHERE MAY BE Taxed.
A state has a right to tax all
personal property found within its jurisdiction, without regard to the
place of the owner's domicile. Denver etc. R'y Co. v. Church, 252.
2 TAXATION OF RAILWAY CARS ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.— A
state has the right to tax railway cars found within its boundaries, al-
though they are engaged in interstate commerce, and, though used, are
not owned by the company to which they are assessed. Denver etc. R'y
Co. v. Church, 252.
3. ALL ROLLING STOCK owned, used, or operated by a domestic railway
company is, by the Colorado statutes, placed upon the same footing
with reference to state taxation, regardless of the interest, as lessee
or owner, of the company operating it. It is not exempt from taxation
merely because, in performing its regular journeys, it sometimes passes
out of the state and becomes temporarily useful in operating other rail.
roads. Denver etc. R'y Co. v. Church, 252.
4. TAXATION OF RAILWAY PERSONALTY. - Such personal property as is
owned or controlled by a railway company, but is not used in the direct
operation of its road within the state, cannot be taxed for state pur
poses, though such property may be so employed as to indirectly aid in
carrying on the business. Denver etc. R'y Co. v. Church, 252.
& PULLMAN SLEEPING-CARS Controlled and operated by a domestic rail.
way company, though owned by a foreign corporation, may be assessed
to the domestic corporation for state taxes when found within the
borders of the state, although they are employed one third of the time
outside the state in the transaction of business. Denver etc. R'y Co. v.
Church, 252.
6. POLICE POWER-LICENSE TAX ON BANKS - CONFLICT OF STATUTES.
A statute exempting banks from taxation on payment of a state tax does
not exempt them from the power of cities to impose a license fee or oo-
cupation tax as incidental to the exercise of the police power under
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