for which respondent was in no wise responsible, which was untrue in fact, but was at the time by respondent deemed to be immaterial, or to then and there correct such statement, with the possibility that he would thereby discredit his client before the court, and possibly prejudice her case, respondent permitted the evidence to pass without question or correction, feeling that the responsibility there for could in no wise be charged against him, as his client was a woman of exceptional intelligence, and had been distinctly advised by respondent in advance that it was not necessary to either aver or prove residence in Cook County, in view of the evidence establishing the commission of adultery in said Cook County."

According to this explanation, there was a conflict in his mind between his sense of duty to the court and his sense of duty to his client. Being in doubt whether to call the attention of the court to the false testimony, or to let it pass in silence, he finally chose the latter course. Whether or not silence was justifiable under these circumstances, it is not necessary to inquire. It is sufficient to say that the respond. ent was not content with silence. After his client's falsehood was uttered, he sought to make use of it. He continued to press upon the attention of the court the question of the defendant's alleged cruelty, knowing that proof of cruelty would be immaterial without the false statement as to residence to rest upon.

The record shows that after the judge had ceased to examine Mrs. Gordon, the respondent himself asked her the following question, and received the following answer: "I will ask you if at any time he was cruel to you by way of physical cruelty? A. Yes, sir; he knocked me down-stairs and struck me." Respondent knew that the evidence thus called out was of cruelty that had taken place in Canada, and yet just a moment before he had heard the witness falsely swear to a year's residence in Illinois, without which residence the cruelty in Canada would be unavailing.

But this was not all. Respondent took no steps to withdraw the testimony upon the subject of cruelty, and submit his case upon the charge of adultery. On the contrary, as soon as Mrs. Gordon had left the witness-stand, he handed up to the court the depositions of the Hallowells, tending to prove acts of cruelty committed outside of the state of Illinois, in order that such depositions might be considered by the

court in connection with the false testimony of his client as to a year's residence in Illinois.

Proofs were presented to the court in support of the two charges of cruelty and adultery. The case was placed before the mind of the judge in such a way that he might grant the divorce on either one of the charges, or on both, according to his view of the sufficiency of the evidence. He was imposed upon by the sworn statement of the complainant as to her residence in Illinois. If he had known that her statement was false, he would not have considered the testimony as to cruelty, but he did consider it.

The lawyer's duty is of a double character. He owes to his client the duty of fidelity, but he also owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he practices his profession. He is an officer of the court, a minister in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts to deception, or permits his clients to do so. He is under no obligations to seek to obtain, for those whom he represents, that which is forbidden by the law. If he suffers false and perjured testimony to be presented to the presiding judge, with the possible result of inducing the latter to take jurisdiction of a cause in which there would otherwise be no power to act, and to grant a judgment or decree which the law would prohibit if the real character of the offered testimony were known, he cannot shield himself behind his supposed obligations to his client. A non-resident of Illinois has no right to a divorce for acts of cruelty committed outside of Illinois, no matter how extreme or repeated such acts may have been. In such cases, residence in the state is a jurisdictional fact.

But the respondent went even farther. On the very day on which the false evidence was given by his client, he prepared a draught of a decree to be submitted to the court, and did afterwards so submit such draught. He says in his evidence: "I had in the mean time prepared. a draught of the decree, hoping to present it to the judge that afternoon if I could find him." In his answer to the information he says: "Respondent went to his office and proceeded to prepare. . . . a draught of the decree, which he supposed would be entered, in view of the testimony that had been given; . . . the original

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XXXL — 26

draught of this proposed decree was given by respondent to the court." A copy of the draught of the decree thus referred to has been introduced in evidence, and is in the record. It contains the following findings: "That the said defendant has, since the time of his marriage with the complainant, been guilty of adultery as charged in said bill of complaint, and that the said defendant has also been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty as charged in said bill of complaint."

It is true that after the judge had examined all the evidence submitted to him, including that of Coffeen, taken on the 27th, he erased the finding as to cruelty, and entered the decree upon the finding as to adultery. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the respondent presented a decree to the court containing a finding that the defendant had been guilty of cruelty, and expected that it would be entered, “in view of the testimony that had been given." What was the testimony that had been given? Testimony that the complainant had resided one year in Illinois, as well as testimony that acts of cruelty had been committed.

It is clear that in the preparation of the bill, in the taking of depositions, in the examination of witnesses upon the hearing, in the submission of testimony to the court, in the draughting of the decree presented to the court, the respondent intended to take his chances, and did take his chances, of procuring a decree either upon the ground of adultery or upon the ground of cruelty. The conclusion is abundantly established, that he intended to deceive and attempted to deceive the court by testimony of his client as to a residence in Illinois which he knew to be false.

Some unworthy act has been encountered at every stage in the investigation of this divorce case. No step can be taken in it without meeting with something that requires explanation. From the beginning to the end of it, the proceeding was a gross fraud, an outrageous imposition upon the administration of justice. It is impossible that any lawyer of intelligence could have conducted it without seeing and knowing its real character. If Mrs. Gordon originated and inspired all the wrong that was done, her solicitor either actively assisted her, or purposely shut his eyes to what she was doing. Her case had no merits whatever.

Let the rule in this case be made absolute, and let an order be entered striking the name of Charles J. Beattie, the re

spondent herein, from the roll of attorneys of this court, in accordance with the prayer of the information filed by the attorney-general.

ATTORNEYS, DISBARMENT OF: See extended notes to Burns v. Allen, 2 Am. St. Rep. 850-853; State v. Kirke, 95 Am. Dec. 338-345; Delano's Case, 42 Am. Rep. 557-565. The court will, of its own motion, disbar an attorney for unprofessional conduct appearing from the face of the record of a case in which he is acting as attorney: In re Henderson, 88 Tenn. 531.

METROPOLITAN NATIONAL BANK V. JONES.

[137 ILLINOIS, 634.]

ACCEPTANCE OF.

BANKS AND BANKING - CHECKS - RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO -There is no such thing as "acceptance" of checks in the ordinary sense of the term. A check being payable immediately and on demand, the holder can only present it for payment, and the bank can fulfill its duty to the depositor only by paying the amount demanded. The holder has no right to demand from the bank anything but payment of the check, and the bank has no right, as against the drawer, to do anything but pay it.

BANKS AND BANKING-CHECKS --EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION OF.

When

the holder, on making presentment of a check to the bank, instead of demanding and receiving payment, has the check certified, and retains it in his possession, he enters into a new and express contract with the bank, not within the scope of the legal relations of the parties, nor within the presumed intention of the drawer.

BANKS AND BANKING-CHECKS EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION OF.

By cer.

tification of a check the bank enters into an absolute undertaking to pay it when presented at any time within the period of limitation of actions. The transaction between the holder and the bank is, in legal effect, the same as though the holder had received payment, and had deposited the money with the bank, and received a certificate of deposit therefor.

BANKS AND BANKING

CHECKS-EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION.

The liability

of a bank after certification of a check is independent of the question of its possession of the requisite amount of funds of the drawer, it being by the act of certification estopped to deny the possession of sufficient funds. BANKS AND BANKING - CHECKS-EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION. - A bank, by certification of a check, becomes entitled to charge the amount thereof to the account of the drawer at the time of certification, thus appropri ating to the payment of the check the necessary amount of money on deposit to the credit of the drawer. BANKS AND BANKING - CHECKS EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION. As between the bank certifying a check and the drawer, the certification has the same effect as payment, the funds representing the amount of the check being as effectually withdrawn from the control of the drawer, and the indebtedness from the bank to the depositor, created by the deposit,

being as effectually satisfied to that amount, in the one case as in the other.

BANKS AND BANKING - CERTIFICATION OF CHECK RELEASES DRAWER. A bank, by certifying a check, becomes the principal and only debtor, and the holder, by taking a certificate of the check from the bank, instead of requiring payment, discharges the drawer, and the check then circulates as the representative of so much cash in bank, payable on demand to the holder.

BANKS AND BANKING CERTIFICATION OF CHECK

EFFECT OF-Discharge OF HOLDER. When the holder of a check presents it and procures it to be certified by the bank instead of being paid, such certification is, as between the holder and the drawer, a payment, and discharges the drawer from liability, and its presentment on the next business day after its issue and non-payment will not revive the drawer's liability. BANKS AND BANKING-CHECKS-EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION before Deliv. ERY. When the drawer of a check procures its certification by the bank before its delivery to the drawee, the drawer is liable upon non. payment on presentation to the bank. BANKS AND BANKING - CHECK AS APPROPRIATION OF DEPOSIT. -The giving of a check by a bank depositor operates, at least after presentment, as an assignment to the holder of a sufficient amount of the deposit to pay the check, and is, therefore, a definite appropriation of that sum to its payment, binding upon all the parties to the check.

BANKS AND Banking. - CHECKS — RIGHTS OF HOLDERS.

As between the parties to a check, the bank is the principal debtor to the payee or holder of a check drawn on funds on deposit, but the drawer is still liable, as surety at least, and is at liberty at any time, by paying and taking up his check, to reinvest himself with the legal title to the money on deposit.

Hamline, Scott, and Lord, for the appellant.

Runyan and Runyan, for the appellees.

BAILEY, J. This was a suit in assumpsit brought by the Metropolitan National Bank of Chicago against Noble Jones, Edward S. Jones, and Walter Metcalf, copartners doing business under the firm name of Noble Jones, to recover the amount of a bank check for $1,540, drawn by the defendants on the Traders' Bank of Chicago, payable to the order of the plaintiff. The defendants pleaded non assumpsit, and on trial before the court, a jury being waived, the issues were found for the defendants, and the court, after denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, gave judgment in favor of the defendants for costs.

The facts appear by stipulation, and are, in substance, as follows: On the first day of October, 1888, after the commencement of banking hours in the morning of that day, the defendants being indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,540, gave