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been held by good authority that where several railways constitute a continuous line, each of them performs a public duty and an independent employment, and in accepting freight from another carrier for further transportation over its own line, contracts expressly or by legal implication, not with the other carrier, but with the owner of the goods: Sherman v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 254. In any event, we think that the contract in this case, which was made by the appellee, even if not made with the plaintiff, was clearly made on his behalf and for his benefit, and therefore he could elect to ratify and enforce it.

But again, whether we should regard the first company as the agent of the plaintiff or the agent of the defendant (the authorities conflicting on this point) in contracting with the appellee for the transmission of the telegram from Ennis to Dallas, it is evident that such contract is a binding agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the breach of which, by the latter, the former may maintain his action for damages. The court therefore erred in directing the jury to find for the defendant.

The appellant further insists that the court erred in refug. ing to instruct the jury, at his request, to the effect that the defendant was bound by the written contract as its own act, because its execution had not been denied under oath by the defendant, and also because it had not denied under oath the existence of a partnership with the Chicago, Texas, and Northwestern Railway Company: Rev. Stats., art. 1265, secs. 6, 8; International etc. R’y Co. v. Tisdale, 74 Tex. 8; Bradford v. Taylor, 61 Tex. 508. The answer to this position is, that the petition does not allege any partnership, nor charge that the contract was executed by the defendant or under its authority. The Chicago, Texas, and Northwestern Railway Company does not appear to be even mentioned in the petition.

It may be further remarked, in reference to the issue of a partnership, had it been raised, that it should have been submitted to the jury, under appropriate instructions: Gulf etc. R’y Co. v. Baird, 75 Tex. 256; Lawson on Contracts of Carriers, sec. 242, and notes.

In view, however, of what we have said upon the other branch of the case, we deem it unnecessary to attempt to indicate what acts would be sufficient to authorize the presumption of a partnership between the connecting companies.

Because the court erred in charging the jury to find for the defendant, we think that the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES – CONNECTING LINES. – The liability of each company for the safe transmission of a message does not extend beyond its own line: Leonard v. New York etc. Tel. Co., 41 N. Y. 544; 1 Am. Rep. 446. No partnership or mutual agency can be inferred between connecting lines of telegraph from the fact that each received from the other messages for transmission over its own line, as required by law, and each, in the absence of a special agreement or arrangement with the sender of the message or with each other, will be liable for its own acts only: Baldwin v. United States Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 744; 6 Am. Rep. 165. Where the receiving company has limited its liability for error or delay in the transmission or delivery of a message to a small sum, and collects the whole sum due for the transmission of the message to a point on the line of a connecting company, the second company cannot avail itself of the conditions limiting the liability of the first company, and thus relieve itself of responsibility for negligence in delivering the message: Squire v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232; 93 Am. Dec. 157. The second company is solely liable, where the delay in the delivery of a message is caused by its own independent negligence, though the receiving company may also have been guilty of negligence in having changed the address. The change of address in such case cannot be regarded as the prox. imate cause of the loss: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Munford, 87 Tenn. 190; 10 Am. St. Rep. 630. As to the respective liabilities of connecting carriers, seo note to McCarn v. International etc. R’y Co., ante, p. 59.

Hegel v. WICHITA County.

(84 TEXAS, 392) COUNTIES — LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE BRIDGES. – A county is not liablo

for injuries caused by a defective bridge, in the absence of a statuto

creating such liability, either expressly or by necessary implication. COUNTIES' LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF OFFICERS. — In the absence of a

statute imposing liability, a county is not liable for injuries resulting

from the negligence of its officers or agents. COUNTIES AND CITIES — RESPECTIVE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE. – Cities,

independent of statute, are liable to respond in damages for injuries resulting from a failure to discharge their corporate duties, while counties or other quasi municipal corporations are not liable for similar injuries, unless such liability is expressly or impliedly created by statute. Cobb and Boyd, for the appellant. Ashby 8. James, for the appellee.

GAINES, A. J. This suit was brought by appellant to ro cover of Wichita County damages for personal injuries caused by a defective bridge. A demurrer was sustained to the petition, and the plaintiff having declined to amend, the suit was dismissed.

The question presented seems not to have been authoritatively decided in this court, though in City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 50 Am. Rep. 517, it is held that a city is liable under similar circumstances. But the opinion in that case recognizes the doctrine that a different rule applies as to counties. That cities may be made to respond in damages for injuries resulting from a failure to discharge their corporate duties, is affirmed by the courts of this country with practical unanimity. At the same time, it is very generally held that counties are not liable for similar injuries, unless such liability be created by statute, either by express words or by necessary implication. The latter doctrine hus been applied in the following cases: Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247; 6 Am. Dec. 63; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; 25 Am. Rep. 730; Haygood v. Justices, 20 Ga. 845; White v. County of Bond, 58 Ill. 297; 11 Am. Rep. 65; White v. Commissioners, 90 N. C. 437; 47 Am. Rep. 534; Brabham v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Miss. 363; 28 Am. Rep. 352; Reardon v. St. Louis Co., 36 Mo. 555; Board of Comm’rs v. Riggs, 24 Kan. 255; Wood v. County Comm’rs, 10 Neb. 552; Livermore v. Board etc., 29 N. J. L. 245; Wood v. Tipton County, 7 Baxt. 112; 32 Am. Rep. 561; Barnett v. Contra Costa Co., 67 Cal. 77; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439; Fry v. County of Albemarle, 86 Va. 195; 19 Am. St. Rep. 879; Mitchell v. Rockland, 52 Me. 118; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; 72 Am. Dec. 302; Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84; 4 Am. Rep. 450; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37. Many of these cases approve former rulings in the same court, and show a well-established rule of decision in the courts in which they were delivered. The contrary doctrine has been held in the courts indicated by the following cases: Board of Comm'rs v. Pritchett, 85 Ind. 68; Huff v. Poweshiek Co., 60 Iowa, 529; Eyler v. County Comm'rs, 49 Md. 257; 33 Am. Rep. 249; Rigony v. Skuylkill Co., 103 Pa. St. 382. In Iowa, counties are held liable for injuries incurred by defects in bridges; but in Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430, 36 Am. Rep. 236, it was decided by the supreme court of that state that no recovery could be had against a county for injuries received by reason of the negligent construction of a court-house. In that case the court say: “But as the line of decisions in this state as to the liability for defective bridges stands almost, if not quite, alone, as we have seen, we have no disposition to carry the doctrine further than is necessary to sustain the decisions of the court, which have stood so long that it may truthfully be said that they have the implied sanction of the law-making power and the people of the state." See also 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sec. 963; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 364.

It is apparent from the above citations that there is an overwhelming weight of authority in favor of the proposition that counties, as a rule, are not liable at common law for injuries resulting from the negligence of their officers or agents. The grounds upon which the decisions are placed are not uniform. Counties are not corporations in the fullest sense of that term. They are commonly called quasi corporations. They are created by the state for the purposes of government; their functions are political and administrative, and the powers conferred upon them are rather duties imposed than privileges granted. Cities, on the other hand, are deemed voluntary corporations; and while they exercise political functions, it is considered that their charters are granted, not so much with a view to the interests of the public as for the private advan. tage of their citizens. It is upon this distinction that the courts ordinarily base the difference in the rule of liability as applied to municipal corporations proper and to quasi muni. cipal corporations, such as counties and townships. Other courts hold, that since a county is but a political subdivision of the state, a suit against the county is, in effect, a suit against the state, and that therefore an action will not lie without the consent of the legislature. But upon whatever ground it should be placed, it is fairly well settled that in cases like this cities are liable, and counties are not; and we therefore feel constrained by the authorities to hold that the petition under consideration showed no cause of action against Wichita County.

The judgment is affirmed.

COUSTIES, LIABILITIES OP. – That the liabilities of counties are the crea. ture of statute, see notes to Gilman v. Contra Costa Co., 68 Am. Dec. 291-295, and White v. Bond County, 11 Am. Rep. 66. For a collection of the cases in the series illustrating the application of this rule to public bridges, see note to Lehigh County v. Hoffort, 2 Am. St. Rep. 591. In Washington it is held that a county is not liable for personal injuries caused by a defectivo sidewalk under its control: Clark v. Lincoln County, I Wash. 518.

COUNTIES — LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF County OFFICERS. — Counties are not liable to a private action at suit of a party injured by a neglect of


thoir officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such right of action is given by statate: Downing v. Mason County, 87 Ky. 208; 12 Am. St. Rep. 473. And the same rule holds in regard to actions on contracts: Lebcher v. Commissioners, 9 Mont. 315; Grant Co. v. Lake Co., 17 Or. 453. This privilege of suing counties can be withdrawn or denied at any time the legislature may think proper: Hunsaker v. Borden, 5 Cal. 288; 63 Am. Dec. 130.



idence property conveyed to and received by a city from its tax collector as a settlement of taxes collected by him and not paid over, such prop. orty not being adapted to or used by the city for any public purpose, is


When a city tax collector collects duly authorized taxes for a special city fund, and, failing to pay them over, the city takes a conveyance from him of his city residence property in settlement therefor, the property 80 acquired takes the place of such fund; and as the latter cannot be di. verted to any other purpose than that for which it is created, it is not subject to execution in favor of a general creditor of the city, notwithstanding the fact that the municipal authorities may have misapplied the rents received from such property. C. L. Vowell, for the appellant. Wood and Mayfield, for the appellee.

STAYTON, C. J. The tax collector of the city of Sherman having failed to pay to the proper officer taxes collected to meet the obligation of the city on outstanding bonds issued to aid in the construction of certain railways, suit was brought against him and the sureties on his bond. In compromise of that claim, the tax collector conveyed to the city the property in controversy. This settlement was made in March, 1887, and since that time the city has endeavored to sell the property, without success, on account of some litigation about it; but in the mean time the property has been rented, and the money thus received has been placed in the current expense fund of the city. Appellee, being a judgment creditor of the city, caused an execution to be levied on the property, and it was advertised for sale, when this suit was brought to enjoin the sale, on the ground that the property was not subject to sale to satisfy the execution. The property is residence property, and not adapted to or used by the city for any public

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