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DEVISE WILLS - INOPERATIVI Trust VESTS BENKTIOTAL INTEREST O HER AT
Law. - When a bequest is declared upon its face to be upon ruoh trusts as the testator has otherwise signified to the devisoo, ho takes no beneficial interest; and if the trusts are not sufficiontly definod by the will, or othor writing identified as part of it, the equitable interest gooo to the heirs, or next of kin, es property of the deceased not disposed of by tho will Heidenheimer 5. Bauman, 29.
So. EZ BOUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1; TRUIN,
DOWER. L INOHOATI RIQHT OF, DEFEATED BY PARTITION SALE. — The roletn of
• husband who acquires title to land as a tonant in common with other is subject to the paramount right of his co-tenants to demand partition. His wife's right of dower therein is therefore subordinate to that paramount right, which, when enforced by a sale made under a docreo of the court, defeats her inchoate right of dower in the land, although she was not a party to the action for partition. Holley v. Glover, 883.
2 EFTECT OF CONVEYANCE BY HUSBAND TO THIRD PERSON BEFORE Par
TITION. – Where a husband holding land as a tenant in common, is which his wife has an inchoate right of dower, conveys his interest to another person, and the land is thereafter sold under a decree of court in an action for partition to which the husband is a party, bat pot the wife, such right to dower is defeated, not because the husband was not the wife's representative, but by the exercise of the right of partition, which was paramount to it. The wife was not a necessary party to such action. Holley v. Glover, 883.
See REAL PROPERTY, I.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
EJECTMENT. L EJECTMENT WILL LIE ONLY FOR Things whereof possession may be do
livered, and it will not lie for a mere license, an incorporeal hereditar
ment, right of way, or an easement. Hancock v. McAvoy, 774. & EJECTMENT FOR RIGHT OF INTERMENT IN BURJAL Lors. — The exclusin
right of sepulture in the barying.ground of a cemetery corporation sab ject to its regulations is a mere license, and will not support an action of ojectment. Hancock v. McAvoy, 774.
See DEEDS, 6; EQUITY, 1.
ELECTIONS. L. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – PARTY HEADINGS. — A statute prescribing the
form and contents of ballots to be voted at an election, and provid. ing that a cross shall be stamped opposite the naine of every candidate intended to be voted for, except that the names of political parties which have filed certificates of nominations made by them may be printed at the head of all ballots, and a person intending to vote for all the candidates of any of such parties may stamp a cross opposite the name of such party, and shall then be deemed to have voted for all its nominees, is unconstitutional in so far as it permits the names of politi. cal parties to be so printed and their candidates to be so voted for, because it is an attempt to discriminate against classes of voters not belonging to any of such parties, by subjecting them to the alternativo of disfranchisement, or of casting their votes upon more burdensomo conditions than are imposed upon others no better entitled to the free
and untramineled exercise of the right of suffrage. Eaton v. Brown, 225 2 AUSTRALIAN BALLOT LAW – IRREGULARITY IN BALLOTS, WHEN WAIVED.
- When, under election laws, public officers are intrusted with the preparation and form of ballots to be used, and ample provision is mado for the correction of errors therein, either by a candidate or other eleotor before the election is held, any objection to irregularities in the form of the ballot, or to the presence thereon of a name not entitled to
be there, must be regarded as waived by a candidato, after the election
has been held and such ballots have been voted. Allen v. Glynn, 304. 1 AUSTRALIAN BALLOT LAW - BALLOTS wrru CROSS AT HEAD, HOW
COUNTED — ERRONEOUS PLACING OF CANDIDATE – When, under the Australian system of voting, the name of an opposing candidate is erroneously placed upon a ballot prepared by public officers, all such ballots cast with a cross at the head thereof will be counted for such candidate, and it will not be presumed that the elector casting such bal. lot does not wish nor intend to vote for any candidate for that particular office. Allen v. Glynn, 304. METHOD OF VOTING ONDER “ AUSTRALIAN" SYSTEM. – Under the “ Aug. tralian ballot system,” an elector desiring to vote an entire ticket need only put a cross at the head of the ballot; but if there is a single candi. date on the ticket whom he does not wish to vote for, he must omit the cross at the top, and place it opposite the name of every candidate voted for, in order that his ballot may not be counted for the candidate falling
under his displeasure. Allen v. Glynn, 304. 1 ERRORS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS IN PRINTING BALLOTS WILL NOT INVALI.
DATE — When the election laws provide severe penalties against publio officers for violations thereof, a failure of such officers to publish the names of candidates as required, or error in printing their names under the wrong party title, will not necessarily invalidate the ballots 80 printed and voted at an election. Allen v. Glynn, 304. ERRORS OF PUBLIO OFFICERS WILL NOT INVALIDATE. - While election laws are mandatory in the sense that they impose a duty upon those who come within their terms, yet, when public officers are intrusted with the preparation of the ballots voted, the election will not be invalidated because of every departure on the part of such officers from the term.
of such laws. Allen v. Glynn, 304. 3. ELECTION CONTEST — RIGHT TO HOLD OVER. - On the trial of an election
contest, pure and simple, the right of the contestor to hold over under an appointment to the office in dispute will not be considered. Allen v. Glynn, 304. Soe CONSTITUTIONS, 4-6; REWARDS, 1, 2; STATES, 1; STATUTES, 18-20.
EMBEZZLEMENT. b , SERVANT RECEIVES MONEY FROM THE SALE OF GOODS OF HIS Mag.
TER and drops it into a money-drawer of a cash register, having an intent to appropriate it, and slips it into the drawer for his own con. venience in keeping it for himself, his subsequently taking it from the drawer and appropriating it to his own use is not larceny, but ombezzlement; nor is the fact that the money had been furnished by the master to a detective for the purpose of making the purchase, and thereby fastening the crime on the servant, make his offense any less an embezzloment. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 560.
EMINENT DOMAIN. 1 HOHWAYS — PRIVATE PROPERTY CANNOT BE TAKEN TOR PRIVATE ROAD
- A constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for publio use prohibits, by implication, the taking of private property for any private use whatever without the consent of the owner. The ese tablishment of a highway over the land of one person for the mere con. venience of an adjoining owner is, therefore, prohibited by implication
by such constitutional provision. Richards v. Wolf, 501. & LAND OWNED BY RAILROAD OR GAS COMPANT MAY BE TAKEN FOR WHARJ
PURPOSES UNDER New YORK CONSOLIDATION ACT. — Although prope erty devoted to one public use will not be regarded as subject to the right of condemnation for another public use, unless the statute plainly grants such right, it is not necessary that the statute should, in terms, so enact, but it is sufficient if the right is conferred by necessary implication from the language used. The New York consolidation act contains a sufficient grant of power to include in condemnation proceedingo property of the nature therein described, even when owned by a rail. road or gas company, and used by it for landing freight or other property; and it is not necessary, in such proceedings, to show that the property to be taken is needed for the purpose of building any particu. lar pier, dock, or bulkhead, if it be required to carry out the general
plan. In re Mayor of Nero York etc., 825. & DAMAGES. - DISTINCT TRACTS OF LAND connected only by means of a
way, either private or public, cannot be treated as one for the assess ment of damages inflicted under the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Pennsylvania Co. v. Pennsylvania etc. R. R. Co., 762. DAMAGES — ABUTTING PROPERTY. – A parcel of land some distance re. moved from a street, and connected with property abutting thereon only by means of a private way, cannot be treated as abutting property for the purpose of claiming damages inflicted by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Pennsylvania Co. v. Pennsylvania etc. R. R. Co., 762 DAMAGES — A BUTTING OWNERS. — Property must be actually invaded, or it must abut upon a highway that is invaded in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, to entitle the owner thereof to recorer dam. ages. Pennsylvania Co. v. Pennsylvania etc. R. R. Co., 762. See CORPORATIONS, 1; RAILROADS, 1, 2; WATERS, 13; WHARVES
EQUITY, L PRACTICE IN CHANCERY, -THE RELIEF WHICH MAY BE GRANTED in a suit
in chancery must be restricted to the issues formed by the pleadings Hence if the sait is to restrain the prosecution, by defendant, of actions of ejectment or for specific performance, and if that is refused, for the allowance of the value of complainant's improvements on the property, the court cannot, in the absence of affirmative pleadings on behalf of the defendant, deoreo, after the cause has been submitted for decision, that the defendant be allowed to file a cross-bill, and upon the filing of such cross-bill on the same day, enter a decree against complainant for the possession of the property, and for a sum specified for the use, en.
joyment, rents, and profits thereof. Metcalf v. Hart, 122. & JURY IN EQUITY CASES — INSTRUCTIONS. – In cases of equitable cogni.
zance, triable with or without a jury, the court may call a jury to try such specifio questions of fast as may be presented to it, reserving to itself the power to make its own findings upon consideration of the evi.
donce and the verdict of the jury, and in such cases the court may ro
faso to give the jury any instructions. Saint v. Guerrerio, 32. & LIOENSI — PROTEOTION OF, IN Equrty. – When, by authority of a parol
license, the licensee has been put in possession and induced to place valuable improvements on the land, of which he would be defrauded and robbed by the revocation of the license, equity will interpose, and either forbid the licensor to revoke the license, or impose such terms as will avoid frand and acomplish what justice and good conscience de.
mand. Metcalf v. Hart, 122. Boo CORPORATIONS, B; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 2; HUSBAND AND WIT.
8; INJUNCTIONS; JUSTICES OF THE Peace; MORTGAGES, 6, 11; PARTIES, 1; PARTITIOX, 2; TRIAL 3, 6; Trusts, 6.
ESTATES. Lors ESTATE CANNOT BE ENLARGED INTO FEB BY WARRANTY CLAUSE IN
DIED. — Whero a deed, owing to the absence of words of inheritance in the conveying part, creates only a life estate in the grantee, such estate cannot be enlarged into a fee by the use of the word “heiro " in the war. ranty clause. Jordan v. Neece, 869.
Soo DEEDS, 1; PARTITION, 1.
ESTOPPEL AorUAL OWNERS OF LAND NOT ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THEIR RIGHT
WHEN Although a declaration of trust made and recorded by the members of a syndicate formed for the purchase of lands declares that a certain interest in such lands belongs to a party who has made falso representations to them, yet where such declaration was made in ignorance, which was not chargeable to neglect, and the person to whom the party who made the false representations mortgaged the lands had no knowledge of the execution of the declaration, the actual ownors of the lands are not estopped from asserting their rights thereto.
Shoufe v. Griffiths, 910. Boo BANKS, 4; HUSBAND AND Wire, 8; INSURANCE, 4; JUDGMENTS, 10, 11.
EVIDENCE 1. Wnis — EVIDENOB OT TESTATOR'S INTENT. — Parol evidence is admissi.
ble to give effect to ao intention expressed in a will, but such evidence is nover admissible for the purpose of showing a testator's intention by proof of his oral declarations of intent, either as to the persons who shall take his estate, or as to what particular part of his estate any one person
was intended to receive. Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 29. . CONSIDERATION OF A DEED may be proved by parol to be wholly differ
ent from that expressed therein. Moffatt v. Bulson, 192. LETTERS FORMING PART OF SAME CORRESPONDENCE, ADMISSIBLE IN EVI.
- When, in action on an insurance polioy, the defendant has introduced in evidence its letters to the plaintiff in relation to the lous in question, the plaintiff has the right to put in evidence letters written by him to the defendant, which form a part of the same corre spondence, although they contain declarations prejudicial to the defend. ant. Graves v. Merchants' etc. Ins. Co., 507.