GUARDIAN AND WARD.

1. JURISDICTION OF NON-RESIDENT MINORS. The power of the courts of the
state to appoint a guardian for non-resident minors having property
within its jurisdiction is unquestionable. Kurtz v. St. Paul etc. R. R.
Co., 657.

2. GUARDIAN'S SALE CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED in an action be-
tween third persons on the ground that the purchaser was the attorney
of the guardian. Kurtz v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., 657.

See MECHANIC'S LIEN, 3; NOTICE, 2, 3; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3; WILLA,
7-9.

HABEAS CORPUS.

UNCONSTITUTIOnality of StatUTE. — If a prisoner claims that the statute
under which he was convicted was unconstitutional, and therefore void,
that question may be considered and determined upon habeas corpus.
In re Wright, 94.

See EXTRADITION, 1.

HEIRS.

See TRUSTS, 3.

HEREDITAMENTS.

See EJECTMENt, 1.

HIGHWAYS.

A COURT CANNOT DIRECT HOW AND WHEN DRAINS shall be constructed by
highway officers. Patoka Township v. Hopkins, 417.

See EMINENT DOMAIN, 1, 5; RAILROADS, 19, 20; WATERS, 3.

HOMESTEAD.

1. Judgment. — When a person not under disability is sued, and the home-
stead is involved, it will be affected by any neglect to assert it, precisely
the same as any other right. Graham v. Culver, 105.

-

2 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMAN, WHEN NOT EXEMPT. When a mar-
ried woman owns an undivided interest in land on which are two houses
in a condition for occupancy, and rented at the time when the prop
erty is seized under execution issued on a judgment against her and
her husband, and while they are residing elsewhere, she cannot, in an
action to set aside the levy, change the character of the property to a
homestead, and claim it as exempt, by saying that she intends, at some
future time, to occupy it as a home. Evans v. Calman, 606.

See ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; JUDGMENTS, 8; PUBlio Lands, 3.

HUSBAND AND WIFE

1. WIFE CANNOT BECOME PARTNER IN BUSINESS WITH HER HUSBAND. — A
married woman cannot make a contract of partnership with her hus.
band. Board of Trade v. Hayden, 919.

2 HUSBAND's Debt.

A mortgage and note executed by a husband and
wife to secure the payment of a loan made to him cannot be enforced
against her under the statutes of Indiana, when the property embraced
in the mortgage is held by them as tenants by the entireties.
▼. Logue, 426.

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XXXI.-68

Wilson

-

3. HOMESTEAD, CONVEYANCE OF, BY HUSBAND ALONE. — The husband alone
may convey a part of a community homestead to a railway company for
a right of way, provided such conveyance does not operate to interfere
with the enjoyment of the homestead by the wife. Chicago etc. R. R.
Co. v. Titterington, 39.

-

-

-

4 CONVEYANCE BY HUSBAND to Wife Valid as AGAINST SUBSEQUENT CRED-
ITOR WHEN. — When a husband pays his wife one hundred dollars a
year for services rendered by her, and in consideration of the loan by
her to him of the sum so paid, and of other property given to her by her
relatives, makes to her a conveyance of property, such conveyance will
be valid as against a subsequent creditor. Daggett etc. Co. v. Bulfer, 464.
8. JUDGMENT AGAINST MARRIED WOMAN ESTOPPEL. When a married
woman, after personal service of summons, allows judgment to be taken
against her by default upon a note signed by herself and husband, she
is thereafter estopped from maintaining a suit in equity to set aside a
levy under execution issued on such judgment, on the ground that the
judgment is void as to her, because the consideration for the note was
not for her individual benefit or for the benefit of her estate. Evans v.
Calman, 606.

See DEEDS, 6; DOWER; INSURANCE, 8; JUDGMENTS, 8; MECHANIO'S LIxx, 4, &.

ICE.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 8, 9; SALES, 1, &

IMPRISONMENT.

See FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

IMPROVEMENTS.

See EQUITY, 3; LICENSE, 2, 3, 9; MORTGAGES, 8; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 2

INDICTMENT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2; EXTRAdition; Larceny, 1; Statutes, 18

INDORSEMENT.
See EXECUTION, 2.

INFANTS.

A NEXT FRIEND CANNOT COMPROMISE and discharge an action by agree-
ment made in good faith out of court, where no judgment is entered
in pursuance of such agreement, and it is never approved by the
court. If, however, judgment should be entered in accordance with the
agreement, it would no doubt bind the infant. In the absence of such
judgment or approval, the agreement is not admissible in bar of the
action, nor in mitigation of damages. Tripp v. Gifford, 530.

See GUARDIAN and Ward, 1; MASTER AND Servant, 3, 12–18; Mechan.
IO'S LIEN, 3; WITNESSES, 1.

INFORMATION.

See CRIMINAL Law, 2; Larceny, 1; Statutes, 13.

INFRINGEMENT.

See INJUNCTIONS, 1.

INJUNCTIONS.

1. INJUNCTION against JudgmENT. —A court of equity will grant an in-
junction to restrain a manufacturer and patentee from using a judgment
fraudulently and collusively obtained as the result of a conspiracy to
injure the complainant, who is engaged in a similar manufacturing busi.
ness, and from claiming that such decree is an adjudication upon the
merits as to the validity of such patent, or from using it in any way to
influence or threaten any person against purchasing the goods manu.
factured and sold by the complainant, who is in possession of facts and
proofs sufficient to defeat any suit that might be brought for the infringe.
ment of such patent. Grand Rapids etc. Furniture Co. v. Haney etc. Fur-
niture Co., 611.

-

2 NATURAL GAS-ENJOINING USE OF DANGEROUS EXPLOSIVES. — One who
sinks a gas-well in a thickly populated part of a city will be enjoined
from collecting dangerous explosives with which to "shoot "it, if his so
doing will endanger the lives or property of persons having no connec-
tion with his operations. People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 433.

1 INJUNCTION against CriminaL ACT. — The fact that an act complained of
has been made criminal by statute does not deprive a court of equity of
the power to enjoin its commission or continuance. People's Gas Co. v.
Tyner, 433.

-

4 MOTION FOR EXTRA ALLOWANCE OF COSTS, DUTY OF COURT to Dispose
or. — Where, in an action for an injunction, the defendant makes a mo-
tion for an extra allowance of costs, if the right sought to be enjoined
has a money value, and there is any evidence to establish such value,
the court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion, and it is its duty to
exercise its discretion, and dispose of the motion upon its merits. Hud-
son River Telephone Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike etc. Co., 838.
& INJUNCTION DISSOLVED WITHOUT ANSWER, WHEN. When the issues
raised on a motion to dissolve an injunction are all issues of law, and
not of fact, the injunction may be dissolved, although the facts alleged
in the petition have not been denied by answer. Burlington etc. R'y Co.
▼. Dey, 477.

DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTION NOT IN DISCRETION OF Court, when.
Where the dissolution of an injunction involves the determination of
questions of law arising upon the face of the petition, the supreme court
will not defer to the discretion of the trial court in refusing to dissolve
the injunction. If it appears upon the face of the pleadings that, as a
matter of law, the injunction ought not to have been granted, it will
dissolve it. Burlington etc. R'y Co. v. Dey, 477.

See EQUITY, 1; TELEPHONES, 3; WATERS, &

IN PERSONAM.

See JUDGMENTS, 2.

IN REM.

See JUDGMENTS, &

INSANE PERSONS.

See WILLS, 7-9.

INSOLVENCY.

Bee CORPORATIONS, 10, 11, 16; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3; La-

ITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 1.

IN STATU QUO.

See FRAUD, 1.

INSTRUCTIONS.

See APPEAL, 5, 6; EQUITY, 2; Trial, 7–11.

INSURANCE.

1. VARIANCE BETWEEN APPLICATION AND POLICY - PRESUMPTION. — When
a life tenant states his interest to be "a life lease," in his application for
fire insurance, and the insurance agent issues a policy on the full value
of the fee, the company cannot, after loss, set up the mistake of its agent
as a defense. The presumption exists that the policy represents the
precise and definite contract between the parties, and the burden of
proof is upon the one who seeks to change its terms by parol. Welsh v.
London Assur. Corp., 786.

2 NOTICE OF Loss. Proof that the adjuster of an insurance company was
sent to the place of the fire under instructions from his company, and
that he was there one week after the fire, is conclusive evidence of notice
to the company of the loss. Welsh v. London Assur. Corp., 786.
3. FURTHER PROOF OF LOSS MAY BE WAIVED BY AGENT OF COMPANY
WHEN.- Where, immediately after the loss of property insured, the
insurance company is notified of the loss, and within thirty days from
the date of the loss sends its adjuster to investigate the loss, who takes
a sworn statement from the insured as to how the fire originated, and
as to the amount and value of the property destroyed, and declares his
satisfaction with the proofs thus made, the power given to the adjuster
to investigate the loss includes the power to take proofs of the loss, and
although such proofs may be less complete than the policy called for, the
adjuster may be deemed to have had authority to waive any further
proofs. Graves v. Merchants' etc. Ins. Co., 507.

4 PROOF OF Loss-WAIVER - ESTOPPEL. —When the insured, in good
faith and within the stipulated time, does what he plainly intends as
acompliance with the requirements of his policy as to proofs of loss,
good faith equally requires that the company shall notify him promptly
of any objections thereto, so as to give him an opportunity to obviate
them, and mere silence may so mislead him, to his disadvantage, to sup-
pose the company satisfied, as to be of itself sufficient evidence of waiver
by estoppel. Welsh v. London Assur. Corp., 786.

-

-

6. INSURANCE BY LIFE TENANT- MEASURE OF DAMAGES. When a tenant
for life, intending to insure the property for the benefit of himself and the
remaindermen, receives a policy for the full value of the fee, by mistake
of the insurer, who accepts the full premium, the insured may recover
the full value of the policy after loss, as trustee for the remaindermen.
Welsh v. London Assur. Corp., 786.

ΙΟΥ.

---

6. CHANGE IN TITLE UNDER CONDITIONAL SALE - ASSIGNMENT OF POL-
A change in the possession of insured property without the con-
sent of the insurer, under a contract purporting to be a lease, but in
effect a conditional sale, with notice to the insurer of the change of pos
session, and that the property had been leased, but not of the terms

of the contract, prior to his consent to an assignment of the policy,
providing that any change in the title, interest, or possession of the in-
sured property, whether by sale, transfer, or conveyance, in whole or in
part, should render it void, is such a change in the title to the property
as will render the policy void in the hands of such assignee with notice of
the terms of the contract of conditional sale. Fire Ass'n v. Flour-
noy, 89.

7. ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY-NEW CONTRACT. The consent of the insurer
to an assignment of a policy creates a new contract on his part, when
there has been a prior forfeiture, only when the assignee is ignorant of
such forfeiture, or of the facts from which it resulted. Fire Ass'n v.
Flournoy, 89.

& JOINDER OF PARTIES PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION ON POLICY OF INSURANCE.
-A husband and wife are entitled to join as plaintiffs in an action upon
a policy of insurance to recover for their respective losses, where the pol.
icy has been issued to them jointly for a specified amount, upon a build.
ing which is the separate property of the wife, and for not exceeding
an amount named upon a stock of merchandise in said building, which
merchandise is the separate property of the husband, in consideration
of a single sum paid by them as premium, both properties having been
destroyed by fire. Graves v. Merchants' etc. Ins. Co., 507.

-

9. CERTIFICATE NOT FORFEITED BY SUBSEQUENT CHANGE TO PROHIBITED
EMPLOYMENT, WHEN. When a certificate in a mutual benefit society
is issued to a member who was, at the time of its issuance, engaged in
a lawful business not prohibited by the by-laws of the association, his
subsequent change of occupation to one that is hazardous and prohibited
by the by-laws of the association will not have the effect to render the
certificate void, when the contract of insurance contains nothing in refer-
ence to a change of occupation by a member. Hobbs ▼. Iowa Mut. Ben.
Ass'n, 466.

10. BENEFIT SOCIETY, PROVISIONS OF CERTIFICATE OF, NOT EXTENDED TO
POSTHUMOUS CHILD. - When a widower who receives a benefit certifi-
cate in the Ancient Order of United Workmen, in which his three child-
ren are designated as beneficiaries, subsequently marries, and after his
death a child of such marriage is born, the provisions of the contract rep-
resented by the certificate will not be extended beyond its terms so as to
include such posthumous child. Such a certificate is not at variance
with a by-law of the society, which provides that its object is "to afford
financial aid and benefit to the widows, orphans, and heirs or devisees of
deceased members." Spry v. Williams, 460.

See EVIDENCE, 3; TRIAL, 4; WITNESSES, 2.

INTEREST.

-

INTEREST ALLOWABLE, IN DISCRETION OF JURY, UPON SUM LOST THROUGH
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. - Where the value of property is diminished
by an injury wrongfully inflicted, the jury may, in their discretion,
give interest, by way of damages, on the amount by which the value is
diminished, from the time of the injury. Wilson v. Troy, 817.

See DEBTOR And Creditor, 2; TRUSTS, 11.

INTERMENT.

See EJECTMENT, 2