of Greece and his Government await with sorrow, but without weakness, the end of the trials which, by order of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, you may still inflict upon them."(q)

The next step of the British admiral was to lay an embargo on all Greek merchant-vessels, and to capture and detain all that he found upon the seas.

The French Government tendered its good offices for the adjustment of these claims; and although the Greek Government was compelled to accept unconditionally the terms imposed by England, the French mediation was practically accepted.

Three commissioners were appointed to examine into M. Pacifico's claims, and that person having demanded 21,2957. 1s. 4d., they awarded to him 1507.(r)

The case at the time excited, from a variety of reasons, a great sensation both in England and on the Continent.

A vote in the House of Peers censured, by a majority of *37,(s) [*32] the act of the British Foreign Ministers. In the House of Commons the issue was in some degree changed, the whole foreign policy of the British Minister was brought under consideration, and was sanctioned by a majority of 46,(t) after a debate remarkable for animation and eloquence, and for the brilliant defence of the Minister himself. His answer to the charge of issuing Reprisals before the Courts of Law of the country had been applied to and had denied justice,—the real point of International Law in M. Pacifico's case,—was, that the state of the courts rendered it a mockery to expect justice at their hands. Upon the evidence as to the accuracy or inaccuracy of this position, the historian will condemn or absolve this act of issuing Reprisals.

But the International Jurist is bound to say that the evidence at present produced does not appear to be of that overwhelming character which alone could warrant an exception from the well-known and valuable rule of International Law upon questions of this description. (u)

It should also be mentioned that Russia addressed a strong remonstrance to the British Government, in consequence of these proceedings

(9) Ann. Reg., vol. xcii. p. 286.

(r) See Correspondence respecting M. Pacifico's Claims, presented to the House of Commons August 7, 1851.

Majority in favour of Govt.

(u) Hansard's Parl. Deb. for 1850. Annual Register, vol. xcii. c. iii. pp. 57-88,

281-94.

against Greece, which she ended in these words :-"It remains, indeed, to be seen whether Great Britain, abusing the advantages which are afforded her by *her immense maritime superiority, intends, hence[*33] forward to pursue an isolated policy, without caring for those engagements which bind her to the other Cabinets,—whether she intends to disengage herself from every obligation as well as from all community of action, and to authorize all great Powers on every fitting opportunity, to recognise towards the weak no other rule but their own will, no other right but their own physical strength."(x)

No country has better understood both the theory and practice of Reprisals than the United States of North America.

In 1834, President Jackson, in his speech, thus expressed himself on the subject of Reprisals against France :—

"It is my conviction that the United States ought to insist on a prompt execution of the Treaty, and, in case it be refused or longer delayed, take redress into their own hands. After the delay on the part of France of a quarter of a century in acknowledging these claims by treaty, it is not to be tolerated that another quarter of a century is to be wasted in negotiating about the payment. The laws of nations provide a remedy for such occasions. It is a well-settled principle of the International Code, that where one nation owes another a liquidated debt, which it refuses or neglects to pay, the aggrieved party may seize on the property belonging to the other, its citizens, or subjects, sufficient to pay the debt, without giving just cause of war. This remedy has been repeatedly resorted to, and recently by France herself towards Partugal, under circumstances less questionable. The time at which resort should be had to this or any other mode of address, is a point to be decided by Congress. If an appropriation shall not be made by the French Chambers at their next session, it may justly be concluded, that the Government of France has finally determined to disregard its own solemn undertaking, *and refused to pay an acknowledged debt. In that [*34] event every day's delay on our part will be a stain upon our national honour, as well as a denial of justice to our injured citizens. Prompt measures, when the refusal of France shall be complete, will not only be most honourable and just, but will have the best effect upon our national character. Since France, in violation of the pledges given through her Minister here, has delayed her final action so long that her decision will not probably be known in time to be communicated to this Congress, I recommend that a law be passed, authorizing Reprisals upon French property, in case provisions shall not be made for the payment of tho debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers. Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to expect any thing from her fears, and preclude the necessity of a declaration that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us. She ought to look upon it as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the part of the United States to insist on their rights. That Government, by doing only

(x) Annual Register, vol. xcii. p. 294.

what it has itself acknowledged to be just, will be able to spare the United States the necessity of taking redress into their own hands, and save the property of French citizens from that seizure and sequestration which American citizens so long endured without retaliation or redress. If she should continue to refuse that act of acknowledged justice, and, in violation of the Law of Nations, make Reprisals on our part the occasion of hostilities against the United States, she would but add violence. to injustice, and could not fail to expose herself to the just censure of civilized nations, and the retributive judgments of heaven."(y) One of the grounds of the recent War, not Reprisals, between the N. A. United States and Mexico was the non-payment *of debts 5] due from the Government of that country to the subjects of the

[*35

United States.

XXIV. These observations on Reprisals may not unfitly be closed in the words of Bynkershoek(z).

"Sic manente pace, ipsius Principis est judicium de jure vel injuriâ querelæ, et sic Princeps qui judicavit litem suam facit. Utile sanè est ejusmodi pactis Repressaliarum usum restringere, in totum enim tollere, eorum, qui non uni Principi subsunt, improbitas non patitur."

XXIV. THERE is a mode of redress known to International Law which stands, as it were, midway between Reprisals and War, and which is known by the name of Embargo.

Embargo is an act of the State,(a) done in contemplation of hostilities, a retorsio facti, a seizure or rather a sequestration of property belonging to the Government or the individual members of the State which is the alleged wrong-doer. It may or may not be accompanied by a seizure of the persons to whom the goods belong. In maritime Embargoes the persons and goods are usually seized.(b)

The character and effect of such sequestration is thus described by Lord Stowell:(c)

Upon property so detained the declaration of war is said to have a retroactive effect, and to render it liable to be considered as the property of enemies taken in time of war. The property is seized provisionally,—

(y) Annual Register (1834), vol. lxxvi. pp. 360-1. (2) Q. J. P., l. i. c. xxiv.

(a) The Theresa Bonita, 4 Rob. Adm. Rep. 431.

(b) So Lord Stowell, discussing the claim of the master of an embargoed but subsequently restored vessel to freight, observes: "In the situation in which the two countries stood, the master had no right to make his demand against any subject of this country, being himself under detention as well as the vessel, on whosə behalf this demand arises."-Ib. 241.

(c) The Bædes Lust, 5 Ib. 245-6.

an act hostile enough in the mere execution, but equivocal as to its effects, and liable to be varied by subsequent events, and by the conduct of the Government, the property of whose subjects is so detained. This first seizure is equivocal, and if the matter in dispute terminates in reconciliation, the seizure *is converted into a mere Civil Embargo, so terminated. This would be the retroactive effect of that course [*37] of circumstances. On the contrary, if the transactions end in hostility, the retroactive effect is directly the other way. It impresses a hostile character upon the original seizure. It is declared to be Embargo; it is no longer an equivocal act, subject to two interpretations; there is a declaration of the animus, by which it was done, that it was done hostili animo, and is to be considered a hostile measure ab initio. The property taken is liable to be used as the property of persons trespassers ab initio, and guilty of injuries which they have refused to redeem by any amicable alteration of their measures.

This is the necessary course, if no particular compact intervenes for the restitution of such property taken before a formal declaration of hostilities."(d)

XXVI. There is another kind of Embargo which is a matter of English Public Law, namely, the Civil Embargo.

The established law in England is, that the sovereign may prohibit any of his subjects from leaving the realm; a proclamation, therefore, forbidding this, in general, for three weeks, by laying an Embargo upon all shipping in time of war will be equally binding as an Act of Parliament, because founded upon a prior law. (e)

These Civil Embargoes are founded upon a particular and urgent necessity of state,-upon the maxim, in fact, salus populi suprema lex,—yet the proclamations by which they are laid may be illegal, as contradicting an established law. This was the case respecting the Embargo to prevent the exportation of corn in 1766, such exportation being allowed by law at the time; and therefore the preamble to the stat. 7 Geo. 3, c. 7, for indemnifying all persons advising or acting under the order of Council, laying an Embargo on all ships laden *with corn or flour, during the recess of Parliament, in 1766, says, " which order could not [*38] be justified by law, but was so much for the service of the public, and so necessary for the safety and preservation of his majesty's subjects, that it ought to be justified by Act of Parliament." This Embargo, as was allowed, saved the people from famine; yet it was declared illegal by the above act of the legislature; and the proprietors of the embargoed ships and cargoes were accordingly indemnified by Government.(ƒ)

The leading case upon this subject is that of Sir Josiah Child v. Sands,(g) in which it was finally agreed by the judges that the king

(d) See, too, as the possible retroactive effect of a Declaration of War. The Herstelder (1 Rob. Adm. Rep. 117-18).

(e) Stephen's (Blackstone's) Com. vol. ii. p. 528.

(f) Beawes, Lex Mercatoria, vol. i. p. 393. Chapter Of Embargoes or Restraints

of Princes.

(g) This case will be found referred to in the books as follows:-In Skinner's Reports, p. 91, Sandys and the East India Company; and p. 334, Sands v. Child JULY, 1857.-6

might lay Embargoes, but then it must be pro bono publico, and not for the private advantage of a particular trader or company.

The crown, of course, has not this power of imposing a Civil Embargo in foreign ports, though possibly it might have power to do so in the ports of any ally.

The distinction between the Civil and the Belligerent (so to speak) Embargo, is explained in a judgment given by Lord Stowell, in the matter of the Dutch ships detained in port, at the Cape of Good Hope, before declaration of hostilities against Holland, claimed as droits of Admiralty, condemned to the Crown, jure coronæ.

"On the breaking out, I cannot say of war, but of that ambiguous situation into which the irregular conduct of France had put different countries, by dissolving the connection between the governors and the governed, it was found necessary, when Holland became exposed to the invasion of the French arms, to detain by the strong hand of [ *39] *power a number of Dutch ships in the ports of this kingdom. At the same time, conciliating language was used to the proprietors, and promises were held out to all such as should voluntarily come in, that their property should be restored to them. It is notorious also, that on the declaration of hostilites that ensued, these seizures were enforced, - with a retrospective operation, on all who had not complied with the terms; and were not considered as mere Civil Embargoes, but as acts of forcible possession, on which the property so seized was finally condemned as prize to the Crown. Now, unless very strong and solid distinctions can be pointed out between this case, and those which have pursued this course, I see no reason why this should not journey in the same track. Two or three distinctions have been taken. In the first place, it is said, that the detention in the ports of England was a mere Civil Embargo, and that an Embargo of that nature could not extend to foreign ports, where the Crown of England has no jurisdiction. In the first place, it is not necessary, that the Embargo should be exactly of the same nature, in order to vest the rights of the Crown: for any mode of forcible occupancy or detainer prior to hostilities is sufficient for the purpose; and, secondly, the nature of the Embargo in the ports of this kingdom is not very accurately described, when it is termed a mere Civil Embargo; for it was a detention by actual force applied to them. The ships were generally taken possession of by an armed power; it was not the mere hand of the custom house that was laid upon them, in the civil mode of forbidding an egress, but it was a restraint and compulsion, acting by the terror and use of force. The Embargo at the Cape was likewise an Embargo of force; and the very argument that it could not be a Civil Embargo, because this Government had no right to lay on a Civil Embargo in a foreign port, proves that it was an Embargo of force; though, if it was at all necessary that it should partake of anything like a civil authority, it must be remembered that the Stadtholder's name and authority is likewise employed; but it is notorious, that some ships of war that attempted forcibly to escape, were forcibly

[*40]

& Lynch. In 4 Modern Reports, 176 (Case 70), Sands v. Child. In 1 Salkeld's Reports, 31, tit. Admiralty, (Case 2), Sir Josiah Child v. Smith.