The decree of the court below is affirmed, with costs to defendant Jacob Neff.

LONG, GRANT, and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concurred. HOOKER, J., did not sit.

MAHIAT v. CODDE.

1. TRIAL-OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE-APPEAL.
An assignment of error founded upon a general objection to the
admission of testimony will not be considered. Counsel must
state the reasons for their objections, and will be limited upon
appeal to the reasons stated.

2. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-APPEAL.

Reasons why a motion for a new trial should have been granted, which were not called to the attention of the lower court, will not be considered upon appeal.

3. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-REQUESTS TO CHARGE.

Where all of the essential features of a case are covered by the instructions to the jury, it is sufficient. If counsel desire more explicit instructions, requests therefor should be presented.

4. NEW TRIAL-BREACH OF PROMIS OF MARRIAGE-EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.

A verdict of $5,000 in an action for breach of promise of mar. riage is held not to have been so grossly excessive as to require the interference of the appellate court by granting a new trial.

5. BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE-DAMAGES-INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.

A charge to e jury as to the measure of damages in an action for breach o' promise of marriage, which was substantially the same as that given in Miller Rosier, 31 Mich. 479, was approved.

Error to Wayne; Frazer, J. Submitted June 12, 1895. Decided September 26, 1895.

Assumpsit by Mary Mahiat against August Codde for breach of promise to marry. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Oscar M. Springer, for appellant.

William Stacey, for appellee.

GRANT, J. Plaintiff recovered verdict and judgment for $5,000 for breach of promise of marriage. The defendant's wife died June 19th, and in August following he commenced his attentions to plaintiff. September 12th he proposed marriage to her. He admits the proposal. She testified that she promised to consider the proposal; that two days after he came for an answer, and she accepted. The acceptance is denied by him. The jury found that the marriage contract was consummated, and the proofs are ample to sustain their finding. His letter to her dated October 11th is conclusive on this point. Referring to the conduct of his daughter to the plaintiff shortly before, evidently owing to her opposition to the marriage, he wrote: "If the whole world torment us against our union, there would be no change;" and signed himself "Your intended." The question of the contract was, therefore, properly left to the jury, and their finding is conclusive.

1. Two questions were asked by plaintiff's counsel to which counsel for defendant, according to the record, simply said, "Objected to," giving no reasons for his objections. The reasons now urged against their admissibility are not such as would at once occur to the court. Such a statement is not a sufficient basis for an exception, and will not be considered upon appeal. Counsel must state the reasons for their objections, and will be limited, in this court, to the reasons stated. Abbott v. Chaffee, 83 Mich. 256; Merkle v. Bennington Tp., 68 Mich. 133, and authorities there cited.

2. Counsel for defendant made a motion for a new trial, alleging 19 reasons therefor. This motion was overruled,

and the defendant excepted. The only error assigned upon this motion is that the court erred in denying it, for the reasons therein set forth. It is unnecessary to determine the question, urged by plaintiff's counsel, whether the exception and assignment are sufficiently definite. Many of these reasons refer to points not raised upon the trial, and to which the attention of the court was not called. These cannot be considered upon review by this court. Waterman v. Waterman, 34 Mich. 490; Lane v. Pere Marquette Boom Co., 62 Mich. 63; Wicks v. Ross, 37 Mich. 464; Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115.

The instructions of the court covered all the essential features of the case, and were, therefore, sufficient. If counsel desired more explicit instructions, they should have presented their requests to the court. Brown v. Furniture Co., 65 Mich. 360.

It was also insisted, upon the motion for a new trial, that the verdict was so excessive that the court should interpose and grant a new trial. The learned circuit. judge passed upon this question, and decided otherwise. It is now urged, with great persistency, that this court should reverse the verdict for that reason, and counsel make a strong argument upon the merits of the controversy, which would be very appropriate before a jury. The testimony is very strong that the plaintiff refused to live in the house in which defendant was then living; that she insisted upon a transfer of property to her, and that her sister should live with them, at his expense; and that she said he was too old, and she didn't want him. Some of these statements were admitted and explained, and others denied. There was a clear conflict of evidence upon all the essential points of the case. The circumstances under which the contract was made and broken, and the financial condition of the parties, were fairly placed before the jury, whose peculiar province it was to assess the damages. We cannot hold the verdict to be

so grossly excessive as to demand our interference by granting a new trial.

3. Error is assigned upon the instructions given at the request of the plaintiff. They were, in substance, the same as those approved by this court in Miller v. Rosier, 31 Mich. 479.

4. Complaint is made of the argument to the jury by the plaintiff's counsel. We find nothing in it which requires a reversal of the case, and it would be of no benefit to the profession to quote the language complained of, with the explanation necessary to its full understanding. The judgment is affirmed.

MCGRATH, C. J., LONG and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concurred. HOOKER, J., did not sit.

CHEEVER v. NORTH.

1. WILL-REVOCATION.

The execution of a will containing no express clause of revoca. tion does not, of its own force, operate to revoke a former will; and the subsequent destruction of the later will by the testator will effect a revival of the earlier one. A contrary rule is not implied by 2 How. Stat. § 5793, providing that no will shall be revoked except "by some other will or codicil" or by other specified means, but the statute is merely declara. tory of the common-law rule that a later will, becoming operative by the death of the testator, revokes a prior inconsistent will.

2. SAME-BURDEN OF PROOF

One who claims that a will was revoked by the subsequent execution of another will, which was afterwards destroyed by the testator, has the burden of proving that the later will contained an express clause of revocation.

3. WILL EVIDENCE OF CANCELLATION.

Proof that a will was kept in the cus dy of the testator, and could not be found after his death, raises a presumption that it was destroyed by him with the intention of canceling it.

4. EVIDENCE-EXISTENCE OF CODICIL TO WILL.

Testimony tending to show that a testator exhibited a paper which was signed and witnessed, that such paper assumed to dispose of but a part of the testator's property, and that he said at the time that it made some slight alterations in the terms of his original will, of which certain persons mentioned by him were executors, is sufficient to justify a finding that the paper was in fact a codicil to an existing will wherein said parties were named as executors.

5. TRIAL

STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL-HARMLESS ERROR. Upon the trial of an issue whether a will presented for probate had been revoked by a later will, a statement by proponent's counsel that he proposed to show that the subsequent will had been destroyed by the contestant was not prejudicial to the latter, who was a beneficiary under the later will, where the jury were instructed that, if such will was destroyed by one other than the testator, it might be probated.

6. COSTS-APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT.

Under 2 How. Stat. § 6791, providing that in cases contested in probate court, or in the circuit upon appeal, the court may award costs to either party, in its discretion, to be paid by the other party or out of the estate in controversy; and 2 How. Stat. § 8982, providing that costs upon appeal from the probate court shall be paid by the appellant or respondent, as directed by the court,-no more than the actual taxable costs are allowable to a contestant of a will upon its admission to probate in the circuit court.

Error to Washtenaw; Kinne, J. Submitted June 11, 1895. Decided September 26, 1895.

Noah W. Cheever and another presented for probate the will of Merchant H. Goodrich, deceased. From an order probating the will, A. Anna North and others appealed to the circuit court. Contestants bring error from a judgment admitting the will to probate, and proponents assign error upon that portion of the judgment awarding costs to contestants. Judgment modified and affirmed.