remain; and that he no more can commit suicide than he can commit murder.

§ 294. It has been said, that where a person effects an insurance, and puts an end to it by his own act, the law does not favor a return of premiums, as being contrary to public policy; and that it is to be lamented, that the law does not authorize a return of premium in cases so peculiar, and in which fraud has rarely, if ever, been detected.1

1 Blaney on Life Assurance, (London, 1837,) pp. 68, 69. He says, "The 'Atlas,' ',Crown,' 'Guardian,' 'Promoter,' 'West of England,' and 'Imperial,' and one or two other offices, with a kind of sympathetic feeling, promise, that in all such cases where the families of all such persons are left destitute, they will make such allowance as they shall deem just and reasonable. The 'Albion,' and 'United Kingdom,' with more apparent liberality, undertake, at all events, to pay the value of the policy in the same way they would have done if such policy had been surrendered in the lifetime of the party assured. The Law Life,' 'North British,' and 'Scottish Union,' limit the benefit, according to the discretion of their directors, in the event of the assured committing suicide." The same author tells us, that "Where policies are in the hands of assignees for a bonâ fide consideration, the 'Argus,' 'Guardian,' ‘Hand-in-Hand,' 'Law Life,' 'North British,' 'Palladium,' 'United Kingdom,' and 'West of England,' will, in cases of suicide, &c., treat them as valid and subsisting."

CHAPTER XIV.

THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST REQUISITE IN LIFE INSURANCE.

§ 295. THE importance, as a matter of expediency, and the consequent requirement of the law, that a party insuring against fire must have an interest in the property insured, has, in a previous chapter,1 been fully discussed, in which it was made distinctly to appear, that the party insuring must have an interest in the property insured, in order to entitle him to recover. The party insuring upon a life must have an interest in the life insured.2 Insurance upon lives as well as upon other events, in which the person insured has no interest, not only inevitably tends to introduce a pernicious sort of gambling speculations, but it is pregnant with serious mischief. An old writer of eminence speaks of the inhuman case of committing murder to gain the sum insured; and he relates thus: "An instance of which villany happened a few years ago in a London apothecary, who, having got his wife's life insured, soon after killed her." He then adds: "It is indeed true that the insurers are not obliged to pay a murderer convict, as happened in the case of the aforementioned apothecary; yet this does not restore the life sacrificed."

§ 296. The holder of a note given for money won at play, has not an insurable interest in the life of the maker of the

1 See ante, Chap. IV.

23 Kent, Comm. 7th ed. 441.

3 Ellis on Fire and Life Ins. 122; Williams on the Law of Personal Pro

note; the insurable interest of a creditor in the life of his debtor being required to be upon a good legal consideration.1

§ 297. In consequence of the perversion of the useful invention of Life Insurance, and with a view to repress abuses in the practice of it, the English Parliament interposed by a statute; as, at common law, it seemed to have been thought unnecessary that at the time of effecting the policy the assured should have had any interest which might be prejudiced by the happening of the event insured against. The statute 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, by section 1, enacts, "that no insurance shall be made on lives, or any other event wherein the person for whose benefit the policy shall be made, shall have no interest; and that every such insurance shall be void;" and by section 3, "that in all cases where the assured hath interest in such life or event, no greater sum shall be recovered or received from the insurers than the amount or value of the interest of the assured in such life or other event." 2 It was held by the Court of King's Bench, that in order to render a policy valid, within the meaning of this act, the party for whose benefit it is effected must have a pecuniary interest in the life insured; and that, therefore, a policy effected by a

An action was brought on a policy on the life of J. R., who was warranted in good health. By a memorandum at the foot of the policy, it was declared that it was intended to cover the sum of 5,000l., due from R. to the plaintiff, for which he had given his note. Two objections were made on the part of the defendants. 1st. That part of the consideration for the note was for money won at play. 2d. That R., at the time he gave the note, was an infant. Mr. Justice Buller nonsuited the plaintiff, upon the ground of part of the consideration of the note being for a gaming transaction, and, therefore, there was a want of interest in the plaintiff. Dwyder v. Edie, (1788); 2 Park on Ins. 639, 7th ed.; 2 Marsh. on Ins. 779; Ellis on Fire and Life Ins. 127.

2 Dowd. on Life and Fire Ins. 17; Rhind v. Wilkinson, 2 Taunt. R. 237; Ellis on Fire and Life Ins. 77; Wainwright v. Bland, 1 M. & Welsb. R. 32.

father in his own name, on the life of his son, he not having a pecuniary interest therein, was void.1

§ 298. The word "interest" in the above-mentioned statute of Geo. 3, does not mean an anxiety or solicitude about the life of the person, or a mere expectation of advantage,2 from its continuance, however strong that may be, but contemplates some beneficial right valuable in the eye of the law, and the deprivation of which would occasion a pecuniary loss. Hence a parent cannot, in that capacity alone, insure the life of his child; and a husband has not the requisite interest in the life of his wife. The heir, either presumptive or apparent, of a person incapable, from idiocy or incurable lunacy, of making a will or executing a conveyance, has nothing more than a bare expectation, and cannot insure the life of that person against events which may deprive him of a descendible estate. As has already been stated, although no positive legislative act has been passed in this country in respect to wager policies, yet they are held by our courts to be unlawful.6

1 Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & Cress. R. 724. It seems that in Ireland wagering life policies are lawful; and that in an action on such a policy, interest need neither be averred or proved. In a case in the Court of Exchequer in Ireland, Joy, C. B., says, - "The cases of marine insurance all go on the custom of merchants, who are presumed to have an interest, and not to effect insurances for the purpose of gambling. In such insurances, also, it is important for the insurer to know whether or not they are founded on interest. In life insurances, the same reason does not apply; and where the reason is different, the decision ought not to be the same." Shannon v. Nugent, Hayes, (Irish) R. 536.

2 See ante, Chap. IV.

3 Dowd. 19, citing Lucena v. Crawford, cited ante, § 68; Mackenzie v. Mackenzie, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 67.

4 Dowd. ubi sup.; Reed v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., Peake, Add. Cases, 70.

5 Lucena v. Crawford, ubi sup.

6 See ante, § 55, and Introd. § 18, et seq. It has been truly observed, that in addition to the legitimate uses, the contract of life insurance is liable to abuse,

§ 299. It is clear that any person may insure the life of another, if he has any valuable pecuniary interest in the continuance of the life of that other, at the time of effecting the policy.1

§ 300. A question was made in Lord v. Dall, in Massachusetts, whether the plaintiff had an interest in the life of

and may become a matter of speculation or mere gambling, rather than of prudent investment; and, to such an extent was this abuse formerly carried, that, in the year 1774, it became a matter of parliamentary discussion. And hence the act of 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, for regulating Insurances upon Lives, and for prohibiting all such insurances except in cases where the persons insuring shall have an interest in the life or death of the person insured. Every contract of insurance upon a life, made contrary to the act, was null and void, to all intents and purposes. Bunyon on the Law of Life Assurance, (London, 1854,) page 2.

1 Such is stated as a summary of the law in England upon the subject, in the excellent work of Dowdeswell on Life and Fire Ins. p. 21; and see Mackenzie v. Mackenzie, 15 Jur. 1091, and 4 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 67; Wainwright v. Bland, 1 M. & Welsb. R. 32. In a valuable work lately published on "Life Assurance," by an American author, "Dexter Reynolds, Counsellor at Law," we find that "in Valton and Adams v. National Loan Fund Life Assurance Society, in New York, three persons, Valton, Martin, and Schoonmaker, entered into a copartnership, to carry on the liquor business. Schoonmaker understood the business, and, as against the capital of Valton and Martin, was to put in his skill. Schoonmaker insured his life for ten thousand dollars, and by the articles of copartnership, in case of his death without children, or unmarried, his partners, Valton and Martin, were to receive the sum secured by the policy. Schoonmaker shortly afterwards died unmarried; Martin assigned his interest to Adams, and Valton and Adams sued to recover the insurance. The ground taken was, that the plaintiffs had an insurable interest in the life of Schoonmaker; that as he was to contribute only his skill, they had an interest in his life, not to be deprived of it, and thus of his skill and services. The court held, that they had an insurable interest, and the policy was not void for want of interest." The author cites Valton et al. v. National Loan Fund Life Assurance Society, at the Albany (N. Y.) Circuit, Wright, J., November, 1852. The case was then being carried up to the general term.

2 Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. R. 115.