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bia and Panama. The action of the United States in the case of Panama is justified.

It will be observed that territorial expansion and adjustment of boundaries are among the most prominent facts in relation to these treaty negotiations. Some attention is given to conflicts arising between the executive and the Senate in regard to the treaty-making power.

Considerable attention is given to historical setting of the treaties and their influence on later national development.

While adequacy of treatment has often been restricted by the limits of space, the author has succeeded in presenting a clear narrative of leading facts which will doubtless prove very useful both to college students and to the general reader.

A few minor errors of statement appear. Jefferson resigned from the office of Secretary of State on December 31, 1793 instead of in 1792 as stated (p. 51). The President proclaimed the Florida treaty on February 22, 1821, instead of in 1822 as stated (p. 174). The international controversy concerning seals in Bering Sea arose in 1886 and not in 1868 (p. 260). It was Article IV, and not Article IX (p. 136) of the convention of 1818 which renewed the commercial convention of July 3, 1815. The American policy to purchase Cuba began with the Polk negotiations of 1848, instead of in 1850 (p. 317). The peace commissioners at the close of the Spanish American War met at Paris on October 1, 1898 instead of 1899 (p. 331). President Hayes' Secretary of State was not James G. Blaine as stated by the author (p. 355). The author probably exaggerates English opposition against the United States Government in the American Civil War (pp. 276-277).

Although the narrative is usually clear, the arrangement of materials possibly could have been improved in several instances. Articles II-VII of the Alaska treaty (pp. 274-75) and the paragraph (pp. 259-60) relating to the contents of the treaty might more logically appear following the negotiation of the treaty and before the discussion of it in Congress. The Geneva arbitration (beginning on p. 298) logically belongs after the completion of the brief statement concerning the contents of the Treaty of Washington. The negotiation and provisions of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty (pp. 383-86) should follow the statement of the recognition of Panama (p. 377).

An example of a loose sentence is found on page 286 (2nd paragraph). Another appears on page 329. Examples of paragraphs which lack unity or clearness appear on pages 355 and 359.

There are only a few typographical errors. On page 307 (third line) "among" should begin a new sentence. On page 382 (line 12) "accurred" should be "occurred”. Evidently “surprize” (p. 172) should preferably be "surprise".


Le Principe des Nationalités et les Guerres. Son Application au Problème

Colonial. By Bernard Lavergne. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1921.

pp. xii, 211.

With this volume on the principle of nationalities, published in the series Les Questions Actuelles under the direction of Emile Borel and Georges Dumas of the Sorbonne, Bernard Lavergne, professor in the faculty of law of the University of Nancy, has made an interesting contribution to a difficult subject. His starting point is the absolute failure of the present League of Nations, as he sees it, due mainly to its own shortcomings, its disregard for the fundamental problems which should have formed its very basis. One of these problems, passed over in silence by the League, according to the author, is that of giving scientific form to the principle of nationalities, which has become such a burning issue during and after the war.

Professor Lavergne divides his book into three chapters: 1. The Complex Theory of Nationalities; 2. The Principle of Nationalities in its Relation to the Colonial Problem; 3. The General Peace Problem and the Pact of the League of Nations.

Calling attention in the first chapter to the fact that the writers on international law are practically unanimous in ignoring or passing briefly over the principle of nationalities, the author reaches his own rather unusual definition of a nation as being "every population that is prevented from becoming a state only by the oppression of a foreign government". In other words, a nation is a state in the making, while a state is a completed, achieved organic structure. He develops two forms of the theory of nationalities, the active form manifested by a demand of the "nation” for secession in order to become an autonomous state, and the more frequent passive form appearing in the desire to be reunited with the mother country.

Five conditions are necessary to entitle a "nation” to become an autonomous state in the active manner, namely: 1. Desire for autonomy; 2. Distinct historical development and traditions; 3. Ability to govern itself; 4. Possession of a population and economic wealth, also a sufficiently extended territory; 5. Sufficient scientific culture. The Russian provinces of Europe, as the Ukraine and the Baltic provinces, do not satisfy these requirements, according to the author, as they have no distinct historical traditions, although the outlying former provinces of Russia, such as Georgia, fulfil the conditions.

For the passive form of achieving autonomy only the desire of reuniting with the mother country is requisite. The desire of Austria to unite with Germany is an example of this. But in certain cases, as when small ethnic groups are located in the midst of a large state, or when the desire is manifested by backward peoples having no developed national consciousness (Macedonia, Albania), the wishes of the population can not be legitimately respected. Nor is Ireland entitled to autonomy, according to the author's method of reasoning, because it lacks sufficient economic wealth and, once independent of England, would have to become economically dependent upon some other state, which would be inadmissible and impracticable. The principle of equality of all states, large and small, emphasized so strongly during the war, is shown to be applicable only to the modern civilized states possessing real autonomy, not, for instance, to the Asiatic or African states. In Professor Lavergne's opinion the nations made a grave error when they pronounced the principle of free accession in the two Hague conferences, especially in the second. To him it is one of the reasons for the “semisterility” of these conferences.

In his second chapter the author takes up the question of colonization. Although the prime motive of colonization, he frankly states, is the enrichment of the colonizing nation, colonization is not incompatible with the principle of nationalities for two reasons. In the first place, as far as the colonies are concerned, it is not unjust, as it overturns nothing and violates no national sentiment among the natives, who do not possess such a sentiment. In the second place, colonization is beneficent to the colony economically and otherwise, provided always that the work of colonization is carried on in a spirit of justice and humanity by the colonizing power. This leads the author to a discussion of the French system of colonization. He finds it sound on the whole, although he deplores the French practice of allowing the colonists to elect deputies to the French Chamber and thus to deal with questions not concerning them.

The final chapter reviews once more the principal defects of the present League of Nations, as the author envisages them, namely its lack of basic principles and its non-conformity to any clear-cut type. He says that there are four distinct types of groups that the peoples of the world may form with a view to international order, to wit: 1. The old-fashioned, thoroughly discredited political alliance; 2. The judicial alliance, which failed to function in 1914; 3. The federal league, approached imperfectly by the present League of Nations; 4. A superstate or permanent federal union, that is, an international, universal group possessing an autonomous legislative council and an executive power, each with the right of absolute command in its particular sphere, the union having permanent binding force upon each member state and conditioning a frank renunciation of some sovereign rights on the part of each. This last alternative is the author's ideal. . Differences arising between nations, he claims, are questions of power and are not reducible to simple questions of law. As life means motion, so there will always be struggles between peoples. At present they are manifested in war. However, war must be replaced, not by a court of justice, but by an international legislative assembly with well-defined powers, wherein each state is represented by delegates. In this assembly the author would have the future battles of the nations waged in a parliamentary manner, just as now the political party issues are decided in the national parliaments. A court of justice, he says, is insufficient and inadequate, for it is not a question of judging but of legislating. We have experimented enough with wars, diplomacy and courts of justice in vainly attempting to bring about peace on earth, he argues. It only remains to try the international, worldembracing parliament.

The foregoing résumé of Professor Lavergne's argument will be sufficient to give the reader an idea of his line of reasoning. Such a book is easy to criticise. For one thing, its three chapters are not sufficiently connected in plan or thought, and a better, more exact title could be found for the work. Again, many Americans will be inclined to smile at the solicitude with which the author argues for his ideal international parliament, which he himself admits still lies far in the future. This is only another indication that Europeans are by force of circumstances taking problems of future international organization much more seriously than Americans. It might also be said in criticism that while the book begins as a theoretical study of the principle of nationalities it ends as a Tendenzschrift and that it is unfair to the principle of the judicial settlement of international disputes. But in spite of its shortcomings, whatever they may be, the book is a stimulating piece of work and reveals careful, logical thinking.


The Conduct of American Foreign Relations. By John Mabry Mathews,

Ph.D. New York: The Century Company, 1922. pp. vii, 353. $3.00.

This book is a study of law and practice in the management of our foreign relations. The author shows the basis and modes of control, describes the central organization, the diplomatic and consular service, shows how treaties are made and enforced, and how we enter into a state of neutrality, war and peace.

There are many books on our foreign relations, but this is the only one devoted to an exposition of how they are conducted. The author has smooth sailing when he describes the basis and machinery of control, but the waters become rougher when he describes the powers in treaty-making of each house of Congress and of both together and what are the untrammelled powers of the executive. Here we find much of conflict beginning when the government began and not yet settled. The principal sources of the book are: Moore's Digest, Butler's Treaty Making Power, Crandall's Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, John W. Foster's Practice of Diplomacy, Corwin's The President's Control of Foreign Relations, W. W. Willoughby's Constitutional Law of the United States, the volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States and the Supreme Court Reports, the richest mines of information being the Supreme Court Reports, Foreign Relations and Moore's Digest. The man who knows these three works thoroughly knows American international law.

Dipping into the middle of the book, the most important section is that which treats of treaty-making, and here Mr. Mathews draws a distinction between the “practical influence” of the Senate and the “legal control” of the President. The Senate may give its advice during the progress of treatymaking, but this is not necessary; or it may grant or withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty which is necessary. The Executive is wise if he seeks the advice with a view to obtaining the consent. That the Executive and the Senate should each so jealously guard over its authority Mr. Mathews thinks coincides with the purpose of the framers of the Constitution, because they aimed to curb power. The House, too, has interjected itself into treaty-making, being a part of the machinery necessary to pass laws and appropriate money, which often are necessary to put treaties in force. In 1796 the House called on the President for the papers in the Jay treaty and he refused to send them. Similar instances of conflict have occurred since then without determination of the question of legal obligation. The House takes the action which the treaty requires after some of the members have made speeches insisting that it is not obliged to do so. Mr. Mathews thinks that the inclusion of the Senate in the treaty-making power has proved to be a wise provision in the government, but that a minority of the Senate should not be allowed to block action on a treaty and that a majority should be sufficient to approve the ratification, at any rate if the majority represents states having more than a majority of the population of the country. In advocating approval of treaties by a majority of the Senate, Mr. Mathews has companionship, but that a majority of the population should be potential through Senators is a novel idea. The reviewer thinks that such an important law as a treaty, limiting, as all important treaties do, the sovereignty of the nation, should have general acceptance. A bare majority of one body of the legislature should not have unchecked power over national rights. Ours is not a government of the unchecked will of the majority. As for counting a majority of the population through representation in the Senate, the effect of doing so would be to destroy the foundations of the Senate. What would happen if the Senators from the same populous state took opposite sides on the question of approving a treaty? The subject is too large to be pursued here, however, and it is only fair to say that Mr. Mathews shows little interest in his own suggestion, as he says nothing in support of it. It plays no part in the development of his book.

The power of the President looms large on every page. In some fifty instances he has landed armed forces on foreign soil to protect American interests, acting under his own authority as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and under general international right without specific congressional authority. This part of the book would have been stronger without the quotation from Mr. Taft.

Mr. Taft says: “In practice the use of the naval marines for such a purpose has become so common that their landing is treated as a mere local

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