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preserving harmony of action. Understand this statement made after consultation with President of the Republic. Above text telegraphed to Legation at San Salvador.

[Paraphrase.] I understand that the local government is considering the reservations of El Salvador to the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 as stated in the Salvadoran Diario Oficial, No. 126, June 4, 1925. Are these reservations to be considered effective? See despatch No. 738, May 29, 1925, from the Legation in El Salvador. 31 [End paraphrase.]


816.01/29: Telegram The Minister in Guatemala (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

GUATEMALA, December 21, 1931—noon.

[Received 2:30 p. m.] 73. Your 36, December 20, 1 p. m.82 The Guatemalan Government is entirely in agreement with the Department's point of view and the necessary instructions will be given at once to the Guatemalan Minister in Salvador. Repeated to Salvador.


816.01/30 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Costa Rica (Werlich)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1931—2 p. m. 45. Your 58, December 21, 11 a. m., second paragraph. The reservations made by Salvador in ratifying the 1923 Treaty of Peace and Amity relate to Salvador alone, and do not appear to affect the obligations of the other signatories of the Treaty in regard to the stipulations thereof concerning the non-recognition of Governments coming into power through revolution.


816.01/34 : Telegram The Chargé in Costa Rica (Werlich) to the Secretary of State

SAN JOSÉ, December 22, 1931–5 p. m.

[Received 7:56 p. m.] 61. Referring to Department's telegram No. 42, December 20, 1 p. m. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me informally that the

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Costa Rican Minister at San Salvador will be instructed tomorrow that Costa Rica has decided not to recognize present regime in Salvador.

Above text telegraphed to Legation at San Salvador December 20, 3 p. m.


816.01 Caffery Mission/7 : Telegram

The Minister in El Salvador (Curtis) to the Secretary of State


SAN SALVADOR, December 22, 1931–5 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.] 123. From Jefferson Caffery. Last night I told Martínez categorically that under no circumstances could we recognize him and I explained why. He replied that he was exceedingly sorry to hear this as article 52, paragraph 5, of the constitution precluded him as Vice President from resigning. (This, obviously, is merely an excuse.)

Because of our stand we shall probably be bitterly attacked here as Martínez has won the support of the nation at large.

As there seems to be nothing to be gained by appealing further to Martínez direct, I am now trying to find other means of approach to our problem. As you know, the situation is complicated by the fact that under the constitution of El Salvador there is no impediment to Martínez automatically succeeding to the Presidency. In fact, there is no way under the constitution for him not to succeed. (Of course, he can always resign.)

I am continuing my investigations and I hope to send a definite report in a few days. In the meantime the attention of the Department is invited to two important factors which have already emerged:

1. It appears to be definitely established that it would not be wise to call the present Assembly in extraordinary session because of the number of agitator deputies placed there by Araujo. It is impossible to predict what they may do. Therefore, a new slate of designates can be elected soon after February by the new Assembly.

2. The military element now fully controls the situation, and the country at large is now accepting its control almost with enthusiasm. It is obvious that whoever succeeds Martínez can do so only with its support.


CURTIS 816.01 Caffery Mission/8: Telegram

The Minister in El Salvador (Curtis) to the Secretary of State


SAN SALVADOR, December 23, 1931–6 p. m.

[Received December 24–1:08 a. m.] 124. From Jefferson Caffery. Refer to Legation's 123, December 22, 5 p. m., last two sentences.

Rodolfo Duke 83 told me that the Mexican Minister here has encouraged the military to believe that it should not permit the United States to have any say as to whether or not Martínez remains President. I do not desire the American Embassy in Mexico to take any action on this at present. General Castaneda is the only man now in sight whom the military might accept in place of Martínez. (General Castaneda would also be entirely acceptable to the business and other civilian elements.) He is now Minister of Government, and at the time of the revolution held the rank of brigadier general and was commander at the military school. (There are some 30 generals of division above him.) Just previous to the last Presidential election he was purposely removed from a high military command he held as general in command of one of the important regions of the country and given this relatively unimportant post. I was informed that when ordered to bring his cadets to the Zapote Barracks he refused until two rounds of machine-gun shots were fired at the school.

It would appear, however, that since he now holds a Cabinet office he is debarred from being recognized by the words "or the election" at the end of clause 2 of article 2 of the treaty. If it is the feeling of the Department that my interpretation is wrong and that he could be recognized, please send me instructions as early as possible. It is reported that Martínez and Castaneda now control the situation and that the former is getting stronger every day. Not only has the Military Directorate been dissolved but the young officers have been scattered about the country by Martínez. Incidentally Martínez holds that he dissolved the Directorate because he had been led to believe that if it were dissolved, recognition would follow.

Martínez said that he was willing to deposit the Presidential power in the hands of a new First Designate for some specified period of time. (Under the constitution of El Salvador he could, of course, do this as he is actually President according to their law.) I assume,

, however, that the Department might construe this to be an implied objectionable bargain. [Caffery.]

Manager of the Banco Agricola Comercial.

816.01/35 : Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, December 24, 1931—10 a. m.

[Received 1:05 p. m.] 223. Department's 217, December 20, 1 p. m.. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that the Government of Nicaragua has decided not to recognize the present de facto regime in Salvador, in accordance with the clear terms of the Central American treaties of 1923. Repeated to San Salvador.


816.01/36 : Telegram The Chargé in Costa Rica (Werlich) to the Secretary of State

San José, December 24, 1931–11 a. m.

[Received 5:05 p. m.] 62. Referring to Department's telegram No. 42, December 20, 1 p. m., the Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me of the decision taken last night by the Costa Rican Government sitting with the President of the Republic not to recognize present regime in Salvador, and that Costa Rican diplomatic representatives at San Salvador, Guatemala City and at Washington informed by telegraph thereof this morning. Decision based on obligations of Costa Rica through 1923 treaty. Statement by the Foreign Minister to the press makes no mention of the United States but cites cooperation of Costa Rica with Guatemala and Honduras in the matter. Above text telegraphed to the Legation at San Salvador.


816.01/37 : Telegram The Minister in El Salvador (Curtis) to the Secretary of State

San SALVADOR, December 24, 1931–4 p. m.

[Received 9:55 p. m.] 125. A noon newspaper today published a statement signed Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the effect that press reports from Guatemala that the United States does not recognize the present Salvadoran Government are lacking in truth since the diplomatic representative of the United States has not yet said anything on this subject. Until last night the local press contained absolutely nothing indicative of our position and then published only telegrams from Guatemala.

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After considering the matter fully with Caffery and in complete agreement with him I went this afternoon to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the de facto government and read to him part of your telegram No. 71 [70], December 18, 6 p. m. concerning non-recognition of General Martínez.


816.01 Caffery Mission/10: Telegram

The Minister in El Salvador (Curtis) to the Secretary of State

SAN SALVADOR, December 28, 1931—noon.

[Received 2:40 p. m.] 127. From Caffery. Legation's telegram No. 124, December 23, 6 p. m., first two sentences of second paragraph. Castaneda insistently desires that I consult the Department regarding his somewhat original thesis that the word “election” refers only to popular elections for President and not to elections by the Assembly.

The military remain in complete control of the situation and firmly back up Martínez and Castaneda. [Caffery.]


816.01 Caffery Mission/11 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in El Salvador (Curtis)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1931–5 p. m. 75. For Caffery. Your 124, December 23, 6 p. m., and 127, December 28, noon. The Department has been giving careful consideration to the question of whether, if Castaneda were appointed First Designate by the Congress, he would be eligible for recognition following the resignation of Martínez. While the Department desires to take the most scrupulous care not to assume a position which would result in refusing recognition to anyone who might, under any reasonable interpretation of the Treaty of 1923, claim recognition as President of Salvador, it nevertheless cannot escape the conclusion that if General Castaneda were elected Designate by the Congress and this election should take place within 6 months of the time in which he had held the office of Minister of Interior, he would clearly be debarred from recognition under Article 2 of the Treaty.

The Department recognizes that an argument could be put forward that Castaneda was not barred because of the phrase "high military command" in subparagraph 2 of Article II, inasmuch as the rank of Brigadier General might conceivably be held as not being necessarily a "high military command”. The Department also assumes

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