appears merely to have encouraged proposals to still more unwise governmental action. It is becoming clear that the process of withdrawing from the position hitherto occupied in Haiti will be an exceedingly difficult and disagreeable one and that it will very probably be accompanied by more friction and more evidence of discontent among the Haitians than a policy of strict control. I look forward to the meeting of the Congress in April with a feeling of dismay, which is only mitigated by the very evident terror with which the members of the Government anticipate this same event. Respectfully yours, 838.00/2934: Telegram DANA G. MUNRO The Minister in Haiti (Munro) to the Secretary of State PORT-AU-PRINCE, March 11, 1931—10 a. m. [Received 3:40 p. m.] 17. The Haitianization negotiations have made little progress recently because the Haitian Government has insisted that it could not sign an agreement which did not include some definite provisions regarding the financial services. I have indicated our willingness to detach the Title Registry Office from the Bureau of Internal Revenue but have insisted that it would be impossible to assume any obligations regarding further Haitianization of the Customs and Internal Revenue Services. I suggested, however, that the agreement to be signed now might contain a clause stating that the two Governments would enter into a special accord regarding the financial control to be constituted after 1936 and that this clause might state that this accord would contain provisions for the further Haitianization of the financial services. After long discussions the Minister for Foreign Affairs said yesterday that my suggestion might be acceptable provided that the special accord were entered into in the very near future, say by October or December next. He proposed a clause reading approximately as follows: "In order to assure the service [of the] interest and amortization of the loan of $40,000,000 issued in series, the high contracting parties declare themselves ready to conclude (insert here a period of time) a special accord on the basis of article No. 8 of the protocol of October 3, 1919. They agree to Haitianize by the same accord those services under the Financial Adviser-General Receiver which shall not have been Haitianized by the present general accord". This formula appears satisfactory except that it may be well to bring out more clearly the intention of the two parties that the Haitianization contemplated in the second sentence will be a gradual process as in the case of the tentative accords reached for the Public Works and the Public Health Services. [Paraphrase.] Inasmuch as there is a strong element here which advocates the repudiation of the protocol as illegal, I think it would be a great advantage to obtain a definite recognition by the Government of Haiti of its obligation under article 8 of the protocol. [End paraphrase.] I recommend therefore that I be authorized to accept the inclusion in the Haitianization accord of a paragraph along the general lines proposed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs the exact language to be worked out by me with him. I should be glad if the Department would send instructions at its earliest convenience. MUNRO 838.51/2243: Telegram The Minister in Haiti (Munro) to the Secretary of State PORT-AU-PRINCE, March 14, 1931—11 a. m. [Received 9:55 p. m.] 18. The Haitian Government in its memorandum of January 14 22 indicated its desire that the Haitian personnel of the Customs Service should be commissioned by the President of Haiti. At present all employees except the Financial Adviser-General Receiver and his deputy are simply employed and discharged by the General Receiver on his own authority. In 1924 the High Commissioner requested that commissions be issued to all Haitian and American employees holding positions of authority and trust in the Customs in accordance with the treaty but disagreements as to the form of commissions made it impossible to accept those which were issued. When it became clear that there were practically no other concessions which we could make in regard to the Haitianization of the financial services the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Government would at least like to issue commissions to Haitian employees in the Customs Service. The General Receiver informed me that he had no objection to this procedure provided that it would not restrict his liberty of action in employing and discharging employees and that the issue of the commissions was a mere [formality?]. I have therefore tentatively suggested the following paragraph for inclusion in the Haitianization accord. "The President of Haiti will issue commissions to Haitian employees occupying positions of authority and trust in the Customs Service upon the recommendation of the General Receiver. The form of these commissions will be agreed upon by the Minister of Finance and the General Receiver. If the services of a commissioned employee should not be satisfactory or if his removal should be deemed necessary for "Ante, p. 408. other reasons, the General Receiver will terminate his services and will at the same time recommend such action as he considers advisable regarding his replacement making a temporary appointment if necessary until a new commission is issued." I made this suggestion subject to the Department's approval because it involves a question of treaty interpretation. Since the treaty has lately been interpreted as requiring the nomination by the President of those of only the very highest officials in the Customs Service, I do not see that there is any obstacle to such an agreement as the two Governments may wish to make regarding the manner of appointment of subordinate employees. If this meets with the approval of the Department the accord regarding the financial services will comprise the above paragraph, the paragraph contained in my telegram number 17 of March 11, and a provision regarding the land title registry. I have been given to understand that the accord in this form will be accepted by the Haitian Government. MUNRO 838.00/2936a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Haiti (Munro) WASHINGTON, March 18, 1931-6 p. m. 14. Department is giving very careful study to the Haitian matter and hopes to send you detailed instructions in a few days. The Department is inclined to feel that extensive concessions can be made with regard to the non-financial Treaty Services only on a recognition and re-affirmation by Haiti of effective control by the Financial AdviserGeneral Receiver over the financial services, such control to continue so long as any of the bonds are outstanding. It is likely that the Department's definite instructions will take the position that without effective control of the non-financial services it is preferable not to have responsibility therefor and to turn these services back to the Haitian Government. This of course does not apply to the constabulary which is specifically provided for in Article V and X of the Treaty. We are therefore considering proposing to Haiti a revised Convention which will confirm and extend the financial control throughout life of present outstanding bonds, while at same time it turns back to Haitian Government as rapidly as possible the non-financial services, excluding the Garde. But the Department's position will be that if it has responsibility it must have control and will insist upon the observance of the present Treaty until modified by such a new Conven tion. Department will therefore reply to the Bellegarde note supporting position you and Commander Duncan have taken. In part the Treaty provisions are confined to the interests of the two Governments and can be modified by them but in part the provisions of the Treaty have been made to protect the interests of third parties who have become creditors of Haiti on the faith of these provisions of the Treaty and the faith of the United States and Haiti has been pledged as to the performance of these stipulations. Those parts of the Treaty can not therefore be changed until all the bonds issued in reliance on the safeguards provided in that Treaty are retired. The Department desires you to know its feelings in the matter as it feels that difficulties will be cleared away in getting the Haitians to understand our program if the bases of our policy and our limitations are understood from the beginning. STIMSON 838.00/2938: Telegram The Minister in Haiti (Munro) to the Secretary of State PORT-AU-PRINCE, March 20, 1931-noon. [Received March 21-2:20 a. m.] 22. Department's telegram No. 14, March 18th, 1931. From the standpoint of local conditions here there are several objections to proposing a new treaty which would extend the present financial control while providing for a more rapid turnover of the other treaty services. The extension of the financial control in the form now exercised would be bitterly opposed in Haiti and a proposal to this effect at this time might create an exceedingly disagreeable and even dangerous situation. When Congress meets there will probably be a violent attack on the Government for failing to repudiate the treaty and to demand immediate withdrawal of all Americans. This attack which will be purely political in its nature, and inspired by persons who hope to profit if the present Government should be forced out of office, will be much more effective if we provide the Government's enemies with a new issue. The present administration on the whole has shown a more reasonable disposition than we could expect from any other group which might come into power under present conditions, but the comparatively satisfactory working relations which we have built up with it would be destroyed and the Government itself would be compelled to change its policy, if we came forward now with a proposal for an indefinite extension of the present financial control. The control as now exercised goes much farther in my opinion than will be necessary adequately to protect the interest of the bondholders after 1936. Under the present organization the Financial Adviser controls all activities of the Haitian Government to an extent which will be unjustifiable and undesirable when we have ceased to control the other treaty services and which will be extremely offensive to Haitian national sentiment. I am personally convinced that it is advisable from our point of view that the powers of this office should be greatly restricted after 1936 and I had been planning to discuss this matter in detail personally with the Department when I go on [leave?] next summer. The Haitian Government has already recognized its obligation to accept a sufficient control to protect the interest of the bondholders and I think that an agreement for this purpose can be worked out after the Haitianization program is disposed of and after Congress is out of the way. My experience in dealing with the Haitian Government, however, convinces me that it will be easier to work out this agreement on the basis of the rights granted by the treaty and the protocol than on the basis of a bargain regarding further Haitianization. With respect to the other services I am entirely in accord with the Department's views that we should retain no responsibility after we have given up effective control and that we should give up both responsibility and control as early as practicable. I think, however, that we owe it to ourselves as well as to Haiti to turn over the services as efficient working organizations and under such conditions as to afford a maximum probability that they will continue to [function] satisfactorily. This means that the process of Haitianization must be carefully worked out and also that the problem must be dealt with as a whole, avoiding action in one service which might cause us embarrassment in connection with another. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and I, after months of very difficult negotiations, have finally practically completed an accord for the Haitianization of the treaty services which will, I believe, be satisfactory to the Department and which is on the whole satisfactory to the Haitian Government except with regard to the financial services and the Garde where substantial concessions on our part are not now possible. I hope that this accord will be ready for signature in the very near future and I feel that it will settle most of the outstanding problems except those relating to finances. It even seems probable that the Government will make no serious difficulty about the appointment of Colvin provided that no untoward incidents disturb the very satisfactory progress which we have been making. I fear that a proposal such as the Department has in mind would undo most of what we have already accomplished without improving our prospects for the future. Both the Haitianization question and the question of future financial control can best be dealt with, it seems to me, by executive agreements which will not precipitate a new controversial discussion of the 591381-46-VOL. II-35 |