The Panama Canal

CHAPTER XXIII.

MECHANISM-OPERATION-FINANCE.

For the sake of variety we may take a little relaxation from the discussion of the heavy problems of treaty construction, neutralization, national sovereignty, and consider in a chapter, some of the physical and economic questions connected with the canal.

When the French people began the building of the Panama Canal they had in mind a channel at sea-level-an open strait like the Suez Canal. After years of work they foresaw the difficulties and changed the plan to one with locks.

When the Americans began work they "made the dirt fly" but with no definite type of canal in view; they simply began to cut down the mountain and make a channel for a canal.

The contest went on between the advocates of the two kinds of canal until 1906, when the President sent a message to Congress in favor of a lock canal. It was debated in Congress thoroughly, and an act was passed providing for locks, which was approved June 29, 1906.

It has been stated that Engineer Wallace favored the open canal, while Mr. Stevens and Colonel Goethals believed in the lock system.

There has been a most visionary idea among acting engineers as to what a sea-level canal would have cost. The first French estimate was $140,000,000. In 1906 the American estimate was $247,000,000. Later the amount had so increased, through the Culebra difficulties, that in 1909 it was supposed that the cost might run to $560,000,000. As the

CHAPTER XXII.

REASONS FOR BUILDING THE CANAL.

Many statesmen claim that we built the canal, solely, for our own people and such incidental use as we choose to accord to other nations; that we have all control, full ownership, absolute sovereignty; and we need ask nothing from any other power as to our canal policy. We presume that our motives in building the canal

were:

1. For honor and glory.

2. A determination, that no foreign nation should have prime control, and that we might secure ourselves from being discriminated against by any other operator.

3. To afford our traffic, both domestic and foreign, a short route from ocean to ocean, without a distant trip around Cape Horn.

4. For the profits that might in the course of time come from the operation of such a utility.

5. To move our warships, quickly, from coast to coast, in time of necessity or war.

6. For the often repeated benevolent purpose of benefiting civilization and the advancement of the whole world.

If there were other reasons we are not able to conjecture them. In the beginning, nothing was ever suggested about what the tolls should be or that any ships should be exempt, except in the Panama treaty certain free tolls were given as a part of the purchase money; and might be considered as tolls paid in advance.

The momentous problems were: Where to build,

how to build, and how to secure the lands? And finally is it possible to build and operate a canal? The French had failed; can we succeed?

Now, if one of the prime reasons was to furnish a short cut for our ships, from ocean to ocean, is it not enough to furnish the "short cut" without making it a clear donation?

If it were only the original cost of the canal, for which we are obligated, there might be a plea asking for favors in the nature of a subsidy. But we are only at the beginning of the expense of the canal. Operating expenses will be enormous, and new plans will ever be brought to the forefront for adoption and installation. No one can approximate what changes are in the immediate future. No one has a right to expect that all the nation's future finances can be expended in Panama, and that any ships of traffic can be allowed to navigate the canal without cost or tolls. We are now only at the threshold; the end is a very long way in the distance, with unconjectured millions of expenditure to be placed on top of the $400,000,000.

It is too soon for generosity; it will be better policy to see what the balance sheet will show. There is a national economic question to be solved of far greater moment than the international treaty questions. If we do not receive income from our own ships, then we are dependent wholly on foreign customers for funds to recoup our annual outlay. Can we expect their patronage, by notifying them, that we built the canal, and own it, and will do as we please with it?

Necessity might still drive some foreign ships to use the canal, almost against their desire; but is it not far better to court their good will and patronage, precisely as would every successful man of business?

The whole trouble with a nation operating a public

utility is, that it is liable to be affected with politics the same as toll exemption has affected the Panama Canal. Politics, at least in America, is not based on economy, but on what is best in a political sense; what is the selfinterest or the vagaries of any class of voters.

If a private corporation owned the canal, there would not be even a suggestion of toll exemption. Even in the post-office department all users pay the same rate, except officials who have the franking privilege, as a part of their salary.

Since all questions connected with the finances of the canal are yet an unsolved problem, let those who believe in "ship subsidy," if they have the political power, enact a law making the donation a definite sum, and pay the same out of a specific, known and ascertained fund. Let us for a moment follow the theory, that America built the canal for herself:

Then England signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with this end in view, and Panama went to revolution and to the edge of war to give America a canal for Americans. We are not sure that foreign nations, more than ourselves, are so overflowing with benevolence and altruism.