OCTOBER TERM, 1915.* PRENTIS v. PRENTIS. 1. QUIETING TITLE-PAROL AGREEMENTS-EQUITY-TRUSTS. Where complainants brought a suit to quiet title to store property in Detroit that defendants averred and gave testimony to show had been conveyed in trust to complainant charged with the obligation to pay over to his two brothers such sums of money as they might need, and where the claimed trust had been recognized by complainant who had paid considerable sums to the brothers from time to time, and who later voluntarily executed a quitclaim deed to one of the sisters-in-law, the conveyance being intended for the purpose of enabling her husband to borrow money and with the oral arrangement that it should be reconveyed to the grantor (afterwards carried out), and, where it further appeared that the grantee quitclaimed said premises to a son, who also found a blank deed from the first grantor, and filling up the spaces, recorded it so as to clear up title in his mother, the trial court properly treated the deeds from the sister-in-law to her son as void, and rightly found defendant to be the owner in fee, the complainants failing to produce evidence that would preponderate in their favor, and hence not sustaining the burden of proof resting upon them. 2. SAME STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Under section 9509, 3 Comp. Laws, performance of the alleged oral agreement sufficiently met any objection as to the invalidity of the trust because it was not in writing; if the executory arrangement was fully carried out by the parties, no sufficient reason existed to invalidate their acts by reason of the statute of frauds aforesaid. 3. SAME EVIDENCE. Held, further, that the grant of title by the wife of one of *Continued from Vol. 188. the brothers to her husband was understandingly executed and that she knew the purpose was to permit him to mortgage the property. 4. SAME. And the evidence failed to meet the burden of proof upon the contention that equitable title rested in the three brothers, two of whom received unequal shares of the rent, and paid taxes jointly; having but a tendency to show a beneficial use, not an equitable right in the real estate. Appeal from Wayne; Van Zile, J. Submitted June 10, 1915. (Docket No. 39.) Decided December 21, 1915. Bill by John H. Prentis and another against George H. Prentis and others to quiet title to certain real property. From a decree for defendants, complainants appeal. Affirmed. Henry B. Graves and Arthur E. Fixel, for complainants. George H. Prentis, in pro. per. George G. Prentis and Benjamin F. Mulford (James O. Murfin, of counsel), for defendant John F. Prentis. KUHN, J. The bill of complaint in this case was filed to quiet the complainants' alleged title to certain real estate in Detroit, which was formerly the homestead of Eben Prentis, and is now occupied by Himelhoch Bros. & Co.'s store on Woodward avenue, in the heart of the business section of Detroit. Eben Prentis died in October, 1868, leaving three sons, John F., George H., and Browse T. The first two named sons are the principal defendants in this suit, and the widow of Browse, Mary, and their son John H. (called Jack) are the complainants. The defendants Wayne County & Home Savings Bank and the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company hold mortgages on the property, and Himelhoch Bros. & Co. hold a lease; but their interests are not adversely affected in this litigation, and they are therefore merely nominal parties. On July 15, 1862, Eben Prentis conveyed the property to his son John F. by warranty deed. The defendants contend, and presented testimony in support of their claim, that at the time this conveyance was made it was understood between Eben and John F., who had no business of his own, that he was to give to his brothers money whenever they wanted it. It is the contention of complainants that this deed was given in trust for all three sons. On June 21, 1889, John F. gave to Mary, the wife of Browse, a quitclaim deed of the property defendants say at the solicitation of Browse, who wished to borrow money on it, and assured John F. that he should have the property back. Complainants say that this deed was given to Mary in trust for the three brothers, because foreclosure proceedings were pending against other property of John F. On April 9, 1891, Mary conveyed the property to Browse by warranty deed, which was recorded June 17, 1907, and on June 15, 1907, Browse conveyed the property to John F. by warranty deed, and on January 12, 1912, Mary quitclaimed to John F. The defendants say that this latter deed was in fulfillment of the plan by which the title originally vested in Mary. Complainants say it was procured by representations that it was needed to complete arrangements for a new building, for which Himelhoch Bros. & Co. were to make advances of rent, and John F. and George H. borrowed $35,000 on a mortgage given to the Wayne County & Home Savings Bank. On July 25, 1904, Jack Prentis received from his mother a warranty deed of the premises. Browse T. Prentis died May 4, 1912, devising all his property to his wife first, and to his son Jack if his wife should predecease him. After his father's death, Jack found among his papers a blank deed signed by John F. Prentis and acknowledged in blank before a notary public whose commission had expired in 1911. He filled up the blanks in the deed by inserting a description of the property here in suit, the date January 15, 1912, and the name of Mary Prentis as grantee, leaving the acknowledgment in blank. The witnesses were Jack Prentis and the notary. The real date of the deed is in dispute, as well as the purpose of it. It is the contention of the complainants that it was left with Browse shortly after the recording of the deed of Mary to Browse and Browse to John F., "for the purpose of protecting his branch of the family in their interests in the property." It is the contention of the defendants-and they presented the testimony of the notary and John F. to prove it-that it was given to enable Browse to sell some property on Crane avenue, owned by John F. and Browse, while John F. was in Florida for the winter. After the discovery of this blank deed, and before filling in all the blanks, Jack consulted his attorney, Mr. Fixel, upon whose advice he secured another warranty deed from his mother on October 28, 1913, and recorded it at once to protect his claimed rights. The deed of July 25, 1904, from Mary to Jack Prentis had not been recorded, for the reason, as given by Jack, that he did not wish to have his father know of its existence. Complainants in this suit, however, rest no claim of title on this blank deed, and say that it was only used "to bring George H. Prentis into the light," whom the complainants charged with machinations to get control of the property. Jack Prentis and Mr. Fixel interviewed the notary about the blank deed, and on the next day, when the notary told George H. about the interview, George H. placed on record a warranty deed from John F. to himself, dated December 18, 1913. Mortgages were issued on the property from time to time by John F. prior to April 9, 1891, the date of the deed to Mary, and by Mary and Browse T. after that date; and the proceeds were shared by the brothers, principally by George H. and Browse T. Leases which had been negotiated by Browse, between 1891 and 1907, were made in the name of John F. Prentis, and one was signed in 1895, "John F. Prentis, by Browse T. Prentis, his attorney." Rents were collected at times by Browse, and after his death by Jack, and receipts given, in the name of John F., and John F. made a division of the rents with his brothers. During all this time John F. usually collected the rents in per son. The bill prays that the deeds of Mary to Browse (April 9, 1891), Browse to John F. (June 15, 1907), and John F. to George H. (December 18, 1913), be set aside as clouds upon the title of Jack Prentis, and that John F. give a quitclaim deed to discharge any right, title, and interest appearing of record to have been conveyed to him by the quitclaim deed of Mary Prentis of January 12, 1912. The trial judge found for the defendants, dismissing the bill of complaint and granting the relief prayed for by George H. Prentis in his cross-bill by declaring the two deeds by Mary to Jack Prentis void and adjudging George H. Prentis to be the owner in fee simple of the premises. It is impossible, in a reveiw of this case, to attempt to set forth in an opinion the many incidents found in the record which show the unusual business relations which existed during many years between the parties to this litigation. But after a careful study of this record we are firmly of the opinion that there are at least as many things consistent with the theory of legal title in the defendant George H. Prentis as in the complainants. Complainants' case must therefore fail, as |