INDEX.

ABATEMENT-See MANDAMUS (8).

ABSENCE FROM STATE-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (1).

ABSOLUTE SEPARATION-See DIVORCE (2).

ACCOMMODATION INDORSER-See EVIDENCE (3).

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-See COMPROMISE AND SETTLE-
MENT (1).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT-See DEEDS (2).

ACQUIESCENCE-See BOUNDARIES (1).

ACREAGE-See TAXATION (1).

ACTION-See APPEAL AND ERROR (6); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS
(4); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (6); PARTNERSHIP (1).

ACTIONS, LIMITATION OF-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW-See MANDAMUS (6, 8).

ADJACENT LANDOWNERS-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
(2).

ADMISSIONS-See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1).

ADVANCES-See SALES (1).

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. If one of several cotenants, in the occupancy of lands, pur-
poses to acquire title by hostile tenure, as against his co-
tenants, the proof of his denial of their right should be
clear and unambiguous and must be brought home to their
knowledge by express notice or by implication: the case
I may not be made out by inference. Donohue v. Vos-
per, 80.

2. The possession of one of two tenants in common is of right
and does not import adverse possession, and the presump-
tion arising from such occupation must be overcome by
conduct inconsistent with the recognition of existing rights
in other tenants in common. Id

(707)

ADVERSE POSSESSION-Continued.

3. By executing with the several cotenants an option, and
thereafter, a mining lease of the holding in common, the
tenant in possession recognized their rights and stopped
the running of the statute as against them. Id.

4. Defendants' adverse possession during a long period of
time of a portion of the sidewalk in a city for a cellarway,
created no rights to a different portion of the street which
it later attempted to occupy with a new stairway in a
building that subsequently replaced the original one. City
of Ann Arbor v. Real Estate Co., 165.

5. Act No. 46, Pub. Acts 1907, providing that no rights as
against the public shall be acquired by reason of the oc-
cupancy or use of any public highway, street, etc., in any
township, village, or city of the State, whether such occu-
pation or use be adverse or not, and the charter of said
municipality enacted in 1867 containing similar provisions,
prevented defendant from obtaining prescriptive rights
after 1867, and, prior to that date, the evidence failed to
show hostile use for a sufficiently long period of time. Id.
6. In view of a city ordinance vesting in the board of public
works authority to issue permits to occupy any portion
of the street, defendant could not claim the right to pos-
session of part of the street, by virtue of a permit that its
predecessor in title secured from the city council to con-
struct a cellar way, especially when he never acted upon
it and did not convey his rights to the defendant, and the
board of public works took no action in relation thereto.
Id. 166.

See BOUNDARIES (2, 3).

AFFIRMATIVE PROOF-See EVIDENCE (11).

AFTER ACQUIRED TITLE-See DEEDS (1).

AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AGENT'S AUTHORITY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (1, 2).

ALIMONY-See DIVORCE (2, 6).

ALLEY-See EJECTMENT.

AMENDMENTS-See PLEADING (1-3); PRACTICE (1, 5).

ANIMALS-See RAILROADS (2, 3); SALES (4).

ANN ARBOR CHARTER-See ADVERSE POSSESSION (5).

APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. The bill of exceptions in a proceeding to review, in the
Supreme Court, by writ of error, the denial of a motion
for a new trial, under 3 Comp. Laws, § 10504, should con-
tain all proceedings upon such motion, including the

APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued.

reasons given by the trial court and exceptions taken to
the refusal, and failure to do so precluded the review of
the finding of the court, although counsel incorporated
such exceptions in the printed record. In re Keene's Es-
tate, 98.

2. In determining whether or not the trial court erred in di-
recting a verdict against plaintiff, who was injured by fall-
ing into an excavation in accumulated snow and ice, in
the streets of a city, the evidence must be considered in
that light which is most favorable to the claim of the
plaintiff. Morrison v. City of Ironwood, 117.

3. While a decision by an equally divided court may not be
conclusive in other subsequent causes, having different
parties, it operates as a rule of law binding upon the same
litigants in a later appeal; hence, after such opinion sus-
taining the trial court which overruled a demurrer to
plaintiff's declaration, the Supreme Court will treat the
parties as concluded by the determination in the former
appellate proceedings upon a review of the evidence of-
fered in support of plaintiff's averments. Gourlay v. In-
surance Co., 384.

4. A cause that presents only a moot point, relating to merely
abstract questions of law, will not be passed upon by the
Supreme Court; hence, on certiorari to review mandamus
proceedings in which the court denied the writ of man-
damus to compel village officials to approve relator's
liquor bond, this court will not decide the point after ex-
piration of the period covered by the license. Carlson v.
Wyman, 402.

5. On error to review a judgment at law, the appellant is not
entitled to reverse the judgment for failure to charge the
jury, if no requests for instructions were filed. Hydrex
Silent Exhaust Works v. Engine Works, 431.

6. The seller of specially manufactured articles that have been
refused by the purchaser has the remedy of retaining the
property in the event of their destruction and suing for
the entire purchase price, or he may sell the goods and
apply the proceeds on account, or keep them and bring an
action for the loss sustained. Id.

7. Upon certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Acci-
dent Board, its findings of fact, in the absence of fraud,
are conclusive. Papinaw v. Railway Co., 441.

8. In the absence of exceptions, improper argument of plain-
tiff's counsel is not reviewable on writ of error. Feist v.
Root, 596.

9. The Supreme Court will not, in civil causes, consider as-
signments of error based upon the failure of the court to
give instructions for which no requests were filed. Minds
v. Keyes, 629.

APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued.

10. The action of the trial court in declining to grant a mo-
tion for a new trial, indicating no abuse of discretion,
will not be reviewed by this court on writ of error. Id.
See DAMAGES (8); DRAINS (4); EVIDENCE (1, 9); JUDGMENT
(3); MANDAMUS (6, 7); TRIAL (1, 2); WATERS AND WATER-
COURSES (1).

APPLICATION-See INSURANCE (3).

APPROVAL OF PROBATE JUDGE See MORTGAGES (4).

AREAWAY-See ADVERSE POSSESSION (4).

ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (8); TRIAL
(1).

ARRESTING OPERATION OF STATUTE-See ADVERSE POSSES-
SION (3).

ASSAULT AND BATTERY-See EVIDENCE (1, 2); MASTER AND
SERVANT (14, 20); TRESPASS VI ET ARMIS (1, 2).

ASSESSMENTS-See DRAINS (1); TAXATION (4, 8).

ASSIGNMENTS-See ADVERSE POSSESSION (6); JUDGMENT (3);
MORTGAGES (1, 4).

ASSUMPSIT-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3, 6).

ASSUMPTION OF RISK-See MASTER AND SERVANT (1).

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-See JUDGMENT (4); PARTNERSHIP
(1, 3).

AUTHORITY TO EJECT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (16).

AUTOMOBILES.

1. In an action for injuries sustained in a collision with de-
fendant's automobile, language of the trial court, in the
charge to the jury, that plaintiff was "bound to use every
reasonable means to avoid a collision,” read in connection
with other instructions, held, cured or modified so as to
avoid prejudice. Jordan v. Wixson, 288.

2. Held, that the testimony warranted a verdict and judgment
for the defendant on the theory of contributory negli
gence. Id.

See EVIDENCE (9, 10); INTOXICATING LIQUORS (1); STREET
RAILWAYS (2).

BAILMENT-See CONTRACTS (1).

BALLOT BOXES-See MANDAMUS (2, 3).

BANKRUPTCY-See EQUITY (7).

BAR-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (6).