ACT OF PARLIAMENT to make provision as to the operation of the law in relation to Kenya as a Republic within the Commonwealth

[13 & 14 Eliz. 2. Ch. 5]

[23rd March 1965]

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. (1) Subject to this Act, all law which, whether being a rule of law or a provision of an Act of Parliament or of any other enactment or instrument whatsoever, was in force on 12th December 1964, or, having been passed or made before that date, comes or has come into force thereafter, shall, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament or some other authority having power in that behalf, have the same operation in relation to Kenya, and persons and things belonging to or connected with Kenya, as it would have apart from this subsection if Kenya had not become a Republic.

(2) This section applies to law of, or of any part of, the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and, in relation only to any enactment of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or any Order in Council made by virtue of any such enactment whereby any such enactment applies in relation to Kenya, to law of any other country or territory to which that enactment or Order extends.

(3) This section shall be deemed to have had effect from 12th December 1964.

2. (1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such adaptations in any Act of Parliament passed before 12th December 1964 as appear to Her necessary or expedient in consequence of Kenya having become a Republic.

(2) Any Order in Council made under subsection (1) of this section, and any Order in Council or other instrument made under any other enactment which varies or revokes a previous Order in Council or instrument in consequence of Kenya having become a Republic, may be so made so as to have effect from 12th December 1964.

(3) Any Order in Council under subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, and may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Order in Council.

3. This Act may be cited as the Kenya Republic Act 1965.

[NOTE.-A similar Act of Parliament received the Royal Assent in respect of Malawi on 3rd August, 1966, Eliz. 2. Ch. 22. The following Acts of Parliament to make provision for independent status within the Commonwealth also received the Royal Assent during 1966:

STATEMENT by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on South-East Asia.-Westminster, 1st April, 1965(1)

(Extract)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart):

The House will remember that in 1954 there was in Viet-Nam a partial and limping settlement.(2) I call it that because South Viet-Nam and the United States were not parties to it and because the free elections to which it referred and on which the reunification of Viet-Nam was to depend were not possible either in the Communist dominated North or in the disturbed South. There emerged what one might call a de facto settlement with Viet-Nam divided into North and South at the 17th parallel.

Yet even that limited settlement could have been helpful to both North and South. For a time both parts continued to endeavour to put themselves in order and to make economic and social

(1) H.C. Deb. Vol. 709, coll. 1859-1868 and Miscellaneous No. 25 (1965), (Cmnd. 2834), page 25.

(2) See Vol. 161, page 359.

progress. Those possibilities remained open until, in 1959, there was a call by the Government of North Viet-Nam for an intensification of the Viet Cong activities in the South and for full-scale guerilla warfare against the Government of South Viet-Nam. Not only did the Northern Government call for that; they then proceeded to help it with more weapons and military advice, as was made clear by the majority report of the International Control Commission in 1962.

Faced with that situation, South Viet-Nam appealed to the United States for help, and the United States responded. But it is important to notice that in 1959, when this pressure from the North began, and even as late as 1961-nearly two years laterthere were still only 700 members of the United States Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam. I think it important to remind the House of this, because it cannot be claimed that the action taken by the North was the result of a considerable United States military presence in the South. The action from the North preceded the arrival of United States forces in any considerable degree in the South.

It was not until 1964, after United States vessels had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, that the United States struck back at the territory of North Viet-Nam itself.(3) In 1965, came the incidents where United States forces were attacked at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. The House knows the passage of events since then.

It might be argued-and in Communist quarters it is argued that the whole problem could be solved if the United States simply withdrew its forces and left North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong to deal with the whole situation. I suppose that it might be said that that solution has the merit of simplicity since it would leave nothing to negotiate or to confer about. But for the United States that would be, in the first place, a breach of its clear undertaking to South Viet-Nam. It would leave the problem of what would happen to the very many Viet-Namese who do not wish to live under a Communist Government, and we should notice that when the de facto division between North and South occurred 1 million people moved down from the North to live in the South.

It would further be an admission that what is, in fact, the aggression from the North had succeeded. I assure the House (3) See Vol. 167, pages 733-737.

that that event would be regarded with profound alarm by all the non-Communist countries in that part of the world. I have noticed from the very many letters which I have received about this matter, and which my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite have sent to me from their constituents, that, although many of them ask urgently, and naturally, that Her Majesty's Government should do everything possible to get a peaceful solution, very few indeed ask for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the United States forces.

I make that point because if we reject, as I think we should reject, that solution, we must ask: what is the position if United States forces remain in South Viet-Nam and are continually struck at and those strikes are aided and directed from the North and often carried out by people who have been sent down from the North for that purpose? It does not seem to me possible to ask the United States, in that situation, to say that its forces are to be struck at in that manner and that they are to be bound by the condition that they could never in any circumstances strike at the territory of North Viet-Nam from which the attacks on them are directed.

I put these points before the House because I believe that they are essential features in the situation, though unwelcome. It will follow from what I have said that many hon. Members will ask themselves, "If this is so, is there not grave danger that, with strike and counter-strike, there will be a continued escalation of the war with growing danger to the people of the world?" On that matter, we should notice this. As I have told the House, there was a period of nearly five years, from 1959 to 1964, between the time when the northern pressure and aggression on the South began and the time when the United States first struck at the territory of North Viet-Nam.

That is one piece of evidence to weigh. Another is the statement by Mr. Adlai Stevenson, on behalf of the United States Government, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that if there were "a prompt and assured cessation" of the aggression the United States would be prepared to withdraw its forces and co-operate in a programme of aid for South-East Asia.

More recently, President Johnson has expressed the matter thus:

"It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is

required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.' The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries, too."(4)

I do not feel that that can be regarded as the language of a man or a nation eager to engage in a reckless escalation of the conflict. There is close and continuous consultation between London and Washington on this matter, and, of course, Her Majesty's Government form and express their own judgment of events as they occur, but I repeat, that on the evidence and the record, I think that it would be wrong to argue that the action of the United States is the action of a country engaged in a reckless escalation of the conflict.

I think that at this point I ought also to say something about methods of warfare. If this debate had occurred a few days earlier, I should have been expected to deal particularly with the use of gas. As the debate occurs when it does, I might perhaps refer more to the terrible incident in Saigon the other day. There is no doubt that cruelties have been committed by both North and South Viet-Namese forces, apart from what might have been done on the battlefield, or against men in action.

In 1963, 2,000 unarmed civilians were killed by the Viet Cong, and nearly 2,800 in 1964. Recently, at the village of Kinh Mon, a policeman was murdered by the Viet Cong and his body cut into pieces. At the funeral, the Viet Cong exploded an anti-tank mine, killing one of the mourners, and wounding a score of others. At Pleiku, two bus loads of people, civilian men, women and children, were murdered as a pure act of terror by the Viet Cong. I am not going to continue the list. I mention these episodes only so that the House shall see the horror and cruelties of this war in proper perspective.

Surely one lesson that we must draw from every story of horror that can be produced by anyone from any quarter is the imperative need to try to reach a settlement of this dispute? On that matter, Great Britain had a special responsibility, as one of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Viet-Nam of 1954, and accordingly, as far back as 20th February, we addressed

(4) See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1965 pages

846-847.