to the Soviet Government, our fellow Co-Chairman, a proposal that we and they jointly should invite all the Powers concerned to state their views on this whole matter in the hope and expectation that out of that something like a basis for settlement could be secured.(5) We deliberately made this a modest proposal, since it was known that the two Co-Chairmen did not view this matter in exactly the same light, and it was important, therefore, to search for what measure of agreement could be found.

We had the Soviet reply after about three weeks. It came immediately before Mr. Gromyko's visit here. It was simply a suggestion that we and the Soviet Union should issue a statement which was entirely a condemnation of the United States, and a demand for the withdrawal of its troops. It seemed to me that, apart from anything else, for us to have done that would have been a complete misunderstanding of the role of Co-Chairman. It is not for Co-Chairmen as such, I think, to engage in propagandist statements. They should endeavour to reach statements on which they can agree, and which might help to promote a settlement.

But, unhappily, this attitude expressed in the Soviet reply is similar in tone and substance to the other comments from the Communist Powers concerned with the conflict. For example, on 7th March, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia gave an account of the Indo-Chinese People's conference, and described the line taken by the Communist representatives from Viet-Nam who said, in effect:

"We absolutely refuse a conference on our country, we absolutely refuse a negotiated solution, we demand that the Americans leave without conditions."

Similarly, on 10th March, the Commander-in-Chief of North Viet-Nam said:

"The United States Government must stop at once its acts of provocation, sabotage and aggression against the Democratic Government of Viet-Nam, end the aggressive war in South Viet-Nam, withdraw United States troops and weapons from there and let the South Viet-Namese people settle their own affairs by themselves in accordance with the programme of the (5) See Miscellaneous No. 25 (1965) (Cmnd. 2834), page 209.

South Viet-Namese Liberation Front. The problem of peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is the affair of the Viet-Namese people, it will be settled by the Viet-Nam Fatherland Front and the South Viet-Namese Liberation Front."

The House will notice in that statement not only that it is not thinking in terms of conference or negotiation at all, but that the affairs of Viet-Nam are subsequently to be settled exclusively by Communist organisations, and that by these proposals no nonCommunist in Viet-Nam would have any chance of taking part in framing the future of his country.

On 12th March, the Chinese Government spoke in similar terms. When Mr. Gromyko was here my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I pressed him most earnestly on the question of what possible basis he saw for conference, negotiation, talk, call it what one will, about Viet-Nam, but he, too, stuck to the position that the first, and, indeed, only, essential, was unconditional withdrawal by the United States.

I think we should notice that this Communist attitude at the present time and I stress "at the present time"-differs very markedly from the attitude over the question of Laos in 1961.(6)

What we have had to struggle with during these last weeks is a situation where the repeated attitude of the Communist side was that it saw no need for negotiations or a conference at all. It has sometimes been suggested that this attitude of the Communist Powers can be blamed on us; that if we had been prepared to engage in phrases condemnatory of the United States, or to dissociate ourselves from its actions, we should have got a better response. But I think that we should notice what response others have been getting-France, India and Yugoslavia.

The French approach glanced at, but no result from it; the Indian ignored and the People's Daily, in Peking, saying on 22nd March of the Yugoslav initiative, "The Tito clique serves America" and going on to say that President Tito had no right to express opinions about Viet-Nam. However, having said that, I trust this will not discourage any nation or group of nations that feels it can help in bringing about such a settlement from any initiative that it may think wise. Later, I will say something of the action that we are taking.

(6) See Vol. 166, page 732.

Hon. Members will have seen the report of a further initiative by a group of non-aligned nations. Her Majesty's Government view this initiative with sympathy and are in earnest agreement with its aim of reaching a peaceful solution for the serious situation in Viet-Nam. The Communist attitude has been difficult indeed, impossible, so far, but I most earnestly hope and trust-and there are now some signs of more ground for hope than even a day ago -that this attitude is not final. In that situation we shall still seek a settlement. Since our fellow Co-Chairman will not at present act with us, we intend, as I explained during my recent visit to the United States to act ourselves as Co-Chairman and to invite an expression of views from all the Powers concerned, and we shall endeavour to get from them by persistent enquiry what can be the basis for a settlement.

Similarly, as the House knows, Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker will be visiting capitals in the Far East, because we believe that approaches to try to break through the wall of resistance we have so far met should be made by a considerable variety of means, not merely by ordinary diplomatic exchanges but by inquiries of any kind that seem likely to prove fruitful.

I will mention another possibility. As far back as 2nd February we made another proposal to the Russians, this time in connection with our duties as Co-Chairmen for the conference on Laos. The proposal that we made was itself a limited one, simply that we should carry out the duty imposed on us as CoChairmen for Laos to make recommendations for the future of the International Control Commission for that country. Although that was a limited proposal it was a definite proposal and we await the Russian reply that could get talks started on one aspect of South-East Asia-talks which can be widened if there is willingness to widen them, to deal with the main anxiety facing us at the present time.

It might be said that the United States Government should spell out more fully what was required as a satisfactory assurance by North Viet-Nam that it was prepared to cease attacks on the South, or that the United States should describe the exact process through which a cease-fire might be reached, or that it should describe more fully how it pictures the future of Viet-Nam, for all these things must at some time be part of the discussion.

It is difficult for the United States to do this so long as there is no indication from the other side of its preparedness to consider a settlement on any terms. If and when there is a clear indication to that effect, when the other side communicates in any form that it desires a cessation of hostilities, or considers there is room for negotiation, then the door would be open and there would be something which could be regarded as a basis for negotiation; and then the thoroughly sound proposition that this whole problem must have a political and not merely a military solution could become alive and real.

The various inquiries and initiatives that we are taking in the forms that I have mentioned, and in others that may appear to be fruitful in the future, are directed at getting that indication and opening that door, at making it possible to secure not merely a military but a satisfactory political settlement of this vexed and agonising and threatening question.

ACT OF PARLIAMENT to provide for the acquisition of the status of British subject by alien women who have been married to persons being British subjects without citizenship by virtue of section 13 or 16 of the British Nationality Act 1948(1) or British subjects by virtue of section 2 of that Act, and for purposes connected with the matter aforesaid

[Eliz. 2. Ch. 34]

[5th August 1965]

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1.-(1) A woman shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of this section, on making application to the Secretary of State in the prescribed manner, to be registered as a British subject by virtue of this section if she satisfies the Secretary of State that she is an alien and has been married to a person who, at the date of the application, is, or, but for his death, would be—

(a) a British subject without citizenship by virtue of section 13 of the principal Act (which provides for a British subject whose citizenship was, at the commencement of the principal (1) Vol. 150, page 480.

Act, potentially that of a country mentioned in section 1(3) of that Act, but had not then been ascertained, to remain a British subject without citizenship during a transitional period); or

(b) a British subject without citizenship by virtue of section 16 of the principal Act (which enables a person who, before the coming into force of the principal Act, ceased, on the loss of British nationality by a parent, to be a British subject, and would otherwise have been a British subject without citizenship under the said section 13, to become a British subject without citizenship and for that section to apply to him); or

(c) a British subject by virtue only of section 2(1) of the principal Act (which provides that a citizen of the country that is now known as the Republic of Ireland and is therein referred to as Eire who was, immediately before the commencement of the principal Act, also a British subject, shall remain a British subject if a notice is given claiming that he should so remain), and a person registered as a British subject by virtue of this section shall be a British subject by virtue of this section as from the date on which she is so registered.

(2) A person shall not be entitled to be registered as a British subject by virtue of this section except on her taking an oath of allegiance in the form specified in Schedule 1 to the principal Act.

(3) If, by any enactment for the time being in force in any country mentioned in section 1(3) of the principal Act, provision corresponding to subsection (1) above, or to so much thereof as has effect by virtue of any one or two of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) thereof, is made for enabling a woman who is an alien to become a British subject, a woman who by virtue of that enactment is a British subject shall, so long as she remains a British subject by virtue thereof, be deemed also to be a British subject by virtue of this section.

(4) A woman who, under the principal Act, has renounced, or has been deprived of, citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or who, under the following provisions of this Act, has been deprived of the status of British subject shall not be entitled to be registered as a British subject by virtue of this section but may be so registered with the approval of the Secretary of State.