put into Bay of Bulls on the east coast of Newfoundland to obtain water and make necessary repairs. The Newfoundland authorities refused to allow the procuring of a new riding sail, asserting that "a riding sail is part of a fishery outfit and is not necessary for the sailing of a vessel." The master protested to the Collector of Customs and also sought to obtain a different ruling through the American Consular Agent, but the authorities at St. Johns sustained the local authorities and persisted in the refusal. In consequence of inability to procure the sail at Bay of Bulls, the vessel was compelled to go to St. Pierre therefor. Five days were lost in getting to St. Pierre and further time in getting back to the fishing grounds. During that time the bait decayed. Also there was a "spurt of fish," and other vessels on the spot took large cargoes. At the time of the occurrence it was contended by the authorities of Newfoundland that the words "repairing damages" in the treaty must be construed to limit the permissible repairs to repairs essential to navigation and could not be held to cover repairs necessary to fishing. At the hearing, a further contention was made to the effect that "repairing damages" must be limited to such repairs as the crew itself could make with the materials carried by the ship. But we observe that the treaty secures the right to "American fishermen." This indicates that it was given in order that they might fish in the waters adjacent to Newfoundland, not part of British territorial waters, where they had been accustomed to fish, and negatives an interpretation which would restrict the right to repairs essential to navigation and distinct from fishing. For the rest, it is enough to say that replacing a sail needed for fishing purposes, where such a sail has been blown away, seems to us clearly within the phrase "repairing damages," and we so hold. It is contended in the answer that the damages claimed are "remote, speculative, contingent, and incapable of ascertainment." As to this, it is enough to say that a long line of decisions of international tribunals has established as the measure of damages for such cases loss of use of the vessel, to be measured by the loss of probable catch. For this purpose the catch of other vessels or the average catch under the conditions at hand has often been taken as the measure. Indeed this tribunal has so held in three prior cases. The Wanderer, Claim No. 13, American-British Claims Arbitration;1 The Favorite, Claim No. 12, Id.;2 The Kate, Claim No. 28, Id.3 See also, The Hope On, Moore, International Arbitrations, IV, 3261; Bering Sea Damage Claims, Id., II, 2123, 2131; Case of Costa Rica Packet, Id., V. 4948; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, Appendix I, pp. 451, 454, 459. Objection was made at the hearing that the affidavits in the memorial of the United States do not expressly preclude the possibility of the ship's having afterwards obtained a full cargo. But we find the evidence in this case is of 1 This JOURNAL, Vol. 16 (1922), p. 305. * Ibid., p. 301. * Ibid., p. 328. the sort which has usually been presented in such cases, and, as the answer raised only the question of the legal rule as to the measure of damages, and did not challenge the evidence in the memorial as not sufficiently specific and circumstantial, we think there is a sufficient basis upon which we may make an award. We therefore award the sum claimed by the United States, namely, $1,500, on account of failure to obtain cargo and $100 for loss of bait, in all $1,600. Done at Washington, D. C., November 6, 1925. The President of the Tribunal, A. NERINCX. THE THOMAS F. BAYARD (Fishing Claim-Group 2) [Claim No. 77] Award rendered at Washington, November 6, 1925 Great Britain held liable in damages for the refusal of Newfoundland authorities to permit an American vessel to exercise the right of fishing in Bonne Bay on the treaty coast of Newfoundland. This is a claim for damages by reason of refusal of Newfoundland authorities to permit an American vessel, enrolled and licensed for the fisheries, to exercise the right of fishing in Bonne Bay on the treaty coast of Newfoundland. The American case is that while the vessel was fishing for halibut off the coast of Newfoundland bait became exhausted and it put into Bonne Bay to obtain a fresh supply. Upon arrival the customs officer gave the master a printed notice as follows: I am instructed to give you notice that the presence of your vessel in this port is in violation of the articles of the International Convention of 1818 between Great Britain and the United States, in relation to fishery rights on the coast of Newfoundland, and of the laws in force in this country for the enforcement of the articles of the convention, and that the purchase of bait or ice, or other transaction in connection with fishery operations, within three miles of the coast of this colony, will be in further violation of the terms of said convention and laws. The master testifies that he showed the collector a copy of the provision of the Treaty of 1818 and argued that he had a right to take bait under the treaty, but was told by the collector that the latter had an official duty to perform. Fearing that the vessel would be seized if he remained in the bay, and that the halibut already taken would spoil if he went elsewhere in search of bait, the master returned to Gloucester, losing thirty-eight days of fishing before he could get back to the fishing grounds. It is argued that the notice in question meant only that the master would not be allowed to buy bait, and that he was not precluded from catching it, as he had a right to do under the treaty. We think the answer to this contention is to be found in the attitude of Newfoundland prior to the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration. The sixth question put to that Tribunal was: Have the inhabitants of the United States the liberty under the said articles or otherwise to take fish in the bays, harbours and creeks on that part of the southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray to Rameau Islands, or on the western and northern coasts of Newfoundland from Cape Ray to Quirpon Islands or on the Magdalen Islands? That question grew out of the claim of Newfoundland that the fishing privilege, conceded by the treaty of 1818, did not include the taking of fish in bays, harbors, and creeks on the treaty coast. Great Britain on behalf of Newfoundland so contended before the Hague Tribunal. The notice in question was drawn up in view of this contention, and we have no doubt that any attempt of the vessel to catch bait fishes in Bonne Bay would have been followed by serious consequences. The very language of the notice declaring that the mere presence of the American fishing vessel in Bonne Bay was unlawful and forbidding any "transaction in connection with fishery operations within three miles of the coast" shows that the Newfoundland authorities were asserting and were prepared to maintain the claim as to the limits of the fishing privilege of the United States which the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, by its answer to the sixth question in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, has held to have been unwarranted. As to the damages, the claim is set forth with unusual precision of detail and is substantiated by affidavits, receipts, and documents as to each item. We are entirely satisfied with this proof and award the sum of $3,212.98, as claimed. Done at Washington, D. C., November 6, 1925. The President of the Tribunal, A. NERINCX. HAWAIIAN CLAIMS Frederick Henry Redward, Heir of Edward Bedford Thomas, Thomas William Rawlins, Frederick Harrison, Representatives of Lewis J. Levey, G. Carson Kenyon, Michael Cole Bailey. [Claim No. 84] Award rendered at Washington, November 10, 1925 The doctrine of state succession held not applicable to claims for alleged delicts committed against British subjects by authorities of the Hawaiian Republic prior to annexation by the United States. The legal unit which did the wrong no longer exists, and legal liability for the wrong has been extinguished with it. These are claims for wrongful imprisonment, detention in prison, enforced leaving of the country, and other indignities, claimed to have been inflicted upon British subjects by the authorities of the Hawaiian Republic prior to annexation by the United States. We think the cases are governed by the decision of this tribunal in the Case of Robert E. Brown, American and British Claims Arbitration, Claim No. 30.1 It is contended on behalf of Great Britain that the Brown Case is to be distinguished because in that case the South African Republic had come to an end through conquest, while in these cases there was a voluntary cession by the Hawaiian Republic as shown (so it is said) by the recitals of the joint resolution of annexation. We are unable to accept the distinction contended for. In the first place, it assumes a general principle of succession to liability for delict, to which the case of succession of one state to another through conquest would be an exception. We think there We think there is no such principle. It was denied in the Brown Case and has never been contended for to any such extent. The general statements of writers, with respect to succession to obligations, have reference to changes of form of government, where the identity of the legal unit remains, to liability to observe treaties of the extinct state, to contractual liabilities, or at most to quasicontractual liabilities. Even here, there is much controversy. The analogy of universal succession in private law, which is much relied on by those who argue for a large measure of succession to liability for obligations of the extinct state, even if admitted (and the aptness of the analogy is disputed), would make against succession to liability for delicts. Nor do we see any valid reason for distinguishing termination of a legal unit of international law through conquest from termination by any other mode of merging in, or swallowing up by, some other legal unit. In either case the legal unit which did the wrong no longer exists, and legal liability for the wrong has been extinguished with it. We decide that these claims must be rejected. Ker & Co., Hoskyn & Co., Stevenson & Co., Warner, Barnes & Co., Smith, Bell & Co., Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (Limited), W. S. Macleod, J. Thomson, W. S. Fyfe, H. T. Fox, E. D. and J. D. Hawkins, F. von Kauffmann, Strachan & McMurray, "Pohoomull," "Pohang," J. M. Underwood, C. M. Chiene, J. W. Higgin. [Claim No. 40] Award rendered at Washington, November 19, 1925 The United States held not liable for destruction of British property when Iloilo was burned by Filipino insurgents who were forcibly driven out by American forces on February 11, 1899. 1 This JOURNAL, Vol. 19 (1925), p. 193. There was no duty upon the United States under the terms of the protocol of agreement with Spain concluded August 12, 1898, or of the unratified treaty of peace, or otherwise, to assume control of Iloilo upon its evacuation by Spanish forces under pressure of Filipino insurgents. De jure there was no sovereignty over the islands until the treaty of peace was ratified on April 11, 1899, nor was any de facto control over Iloilo assumed until the taking up of hostilities against the United States on the part of the so-called Filipino Republic required it on February 11, 1899. No culpable disregard of the interests of the claimants was shown in the conduct of military operations, which were in charge of experienced officers. These are claims for destruction of property of British subjects on the occasion of the occupation of Iloilo by the forces of the United States during the Philippine insurrection. On August 12, 1898, a "Protocol of Agreement" had been entered into between the United States and Spain whereby it was provided that the United States should "occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. On December 10, 1898, a treaty was signed whereby, in Article III, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. Article V of the treaty provided that on exchange of ratifications Spain should evacuate the islands. Exchange of ratifications did not take place till April 11 following. In the meantime, the Spanish commander at Iloilo, on the Island of Panay, the second place of importance in the archipelago, being pressed by Filipino insurgents, desired to evacuate, and seems to have communicated this desire to General Otis, the American commander at Manila. The latter stated that he was without authority to act on the suggestion. On December 14, however, the business men of Iloilo having requested General Otis to occupy the place in order to preserve peace and property, the General cabled to Washington asking pemission to do so. No answer was sent till December 21. In consequence an expeditionary force could not be dispatched until December 26; and it did not reach Iloilo until December 28. Although General Otis had endeavored to get word of the expedition to the Spanish commander, he had not succeeded. The place had been evacuated on December 24, and was promptly occupied by a force of Filipino insurgents. General Miller, who commanded the expeditionary force, acting on a petition from the business men of Iloilo, which he communicated to General Otis, and on instructions from Manila, and ultimately from Washington, remained in the harbor without landing his force or attempting to take possession until February 11. On that date, pursuant to orders dated February 8, which reached him on February 10, he landed, drove out the insurgents, and occupied the town. From the beginning the insurgents had threatened to burn the town if forcibly driven out, and on February 11 they succeeded in carrying out this threat. The property of the claimants was destroyed by, or lost in consequence of, this fire. It is contended by Great Britain that there was culpable neglect on the part of the authorities of the United States in three respects: (1) In the delay of a week in answering General Otis's request, so that the Spanish |