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paragraphs scattered here and there in the book the reader is able to piece together an account of the way in which Dr. Schacht, the head of the Reichsbank, was able to guard the plans which he already had under way for the improvement of the German banking and currency situation.

The book is curiously organized-a mixture of narrative, diary, and economic analysis. But it is clearly written, it is candid and modest in tone, and it reflects the openmindedness and intelligence with which the American participants in the conferences of which the book tells approached the problems they helped to solve.

ALLYN A. Young.

A Concise Treatise on Private International Law based on the Decisions in the English Courts. By John Alderson Foote. 5th ed. by Hugh H. L. Bellot. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1925. pp. xxviii, 692. Index. £1. 15s.

Foote's well known treatise first appeared in 1878. The present edition by Dr. Bellot considerably enhances its value to the practitioner. Not only has it brought the English decisions down to date, but it has embodied in the text the Nationality Act of 1914 and has given attention to the changes effected by the Bankruptcy Act of 1914 with its comprehensive provisions assuming to control all property of the bankrupt, both real and personal, even though situated abroad. It also adds new matter in discussing the orders contained in the Judicature Rules in regard to the service of writ or process in foreign countries. Differing from general legislation in the United States, English judicial procedure makes extensive use of the British Foreign Office in serving writs and processes in foreign countries through the coöperation of the government of the particular foreign country. It may also seem strange to American practitioners that different procedural rules are applicable in the service of process upon British subjects than upon aliens, whether or not such aliens are domiciled in England (p. 564).

The tendency in England is to draw the links closer in the matter of international assistance in private legal procedure. This is evidenced by the convention of 1922 with France, and of 1924 with Belgium, facilitating service of process abroad and providing for reciprocal execution of commissions to take testimony (commissions rogatoires). The judicial authority to whom the commission is addressed in the foreign country executes it by the use of the same compulsory measures as would be applied in the case of a commission emanating from the authorities of the foreign country itself (p. 589).

Foote properly sensed the practical value of the discussion of procedure and evidence generally in cases involving foreign issues or foreign proof. The proof of foreign law is one of the most difficult tasks which confronts the practitioner. The English rule is in some respects narrower than the

prevailing rule in the United States where foreign written law found in an officially published statute book is generally admissible as a document, whereas the English rule seems to admit only those parts of foreign codes or statutes which have been expressly referred to by expert witnesses (p. 575). The editor has also added as appendices to certain chapters the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1924, and the so-called York-Antwerp Rules of 1924 relating to General Average. As to the latter, the reader should be cautioned that these rules do not partake of the authority of legislation but are model provisions for voluntary adoption in bills of lading, charter-parties, insurance policies and other documents. General adoption by American shipowners and other interested parties in this country is still under discussion. ARTHUR K. KUHN.

Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916. By Viscount Grey of Fallodon, K. G. Two Volumes. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925. pp. xxx, 331; and x, 353. Index. $10.00.

Viscount Grey's Memoirs must be ranked as the most important publication written from the British point of view regarding the international events during the quarter of a century which this record covers. It is important not only because for a great part of this time, Sir Edward Grey, as he was then known, was personally the centre of the diplomatic action of the British Empire, but because of the moral and intellectual qualities of the man. His elevation of mind, his sensibility to right and wrong, and his sincere interest in human welfare are clearly evident to the unprejudiced reader of these well documented recollections.

The picture he paints is, however, far removed from the character of the writer. It is remarkable that a man of such unusual serenity of spirit, a man of thought and a lover of nature, simple in his tastes and without a passion for political activity, should ever have found himself so permanently placed at the centre of the machinery of imperial diplomacy as to be the pivot about which, for nearly a decade, to a very considerable extent, the whole mechanism of British policy revolved.

The first impulse of an American reader of this book is to ascertain what Lord Grey has to say about the precipitating causes of the Great War. Upon this he has much to offer, but in the light of what is already known this is not the most important topic of this book. Although he writes with a singular openmindedness, it is not what Lord Grey says, but what is implied in what he says, which to the present writer is most impressive. Never once does he condemn British policy. No one would expect him to do that. But he does unveil it; and in his loyal determination to defend it he sometimes gives reason to believe that, in his own thought, imperialism is a dangerously rough game, even when played with much delicacy of conscience and a true sense of sportsmanship.

Honestly and punctiliously Lord Grey reviews the causes and consequences of the four great Anglo-German crises that preceded the war. Great Britain, thinking always of her trade, was truly anxious for peace and had no reason to desire war. Lord Salisbury, at an earlier period, had made considerable efforts for an understanding with Germany, and for a long time it was France and Russia that had been regarded as England's natural adversaries. With Germany's naval ambitions the tide changed. Peace was still desired according to Lord Grey it was always desired in England-but Germany had become annoying, and began to be regarded as a source of danger as an ambitious world power, specifically as a sea power. Compared with Germany, the ambitions of France and Russia were easily satisfied. Since "splendid isolation" had become an evident weakness, a way was found to create an entente with France as regards Egypt and Morocco, and later with Russia, the ally of France, in the East. But this only irritated Germany and promoted the crises that followed over the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the agitations about Agadir and the commotions of the Balkan Wars.

An entente with France and Russia was not to be had for nothing. France wished an out-and-out defensive alliance against Germany. This Britain would not promise. But of what value was a friendship that would promise no help? France inquired. And so, help was contingently provided for through army and navy conferences, with France for both arms and with Russia for the navy; but everything was held to be without obligation of performance. Britain was to be free to help or to abandon her friends, according to her interest at the time!

With a clean alliance of three Great Powers confronting it, the Triple Alliance, of which Italy was in a sense a forced member, might have concluded that peace was necessary; and yet in this case also, war might eventually have come from either side thinking itself superior.

But as it was, the Entente was an irritant to Germany much more than it was a sure protection, even temporary, for France and Russia. Lord Grey seems deeply conscious of this. The ambiguity of England's position appears to remain unpleasantly on his mind as something to be explained if not excused. Britain, it is maintained, had not really promised anything to France or Russia, which left them both anxious and very dependent upon each other. Germany, on the other hand, without being greatly intimidated, was irritated and angered by what she knew, and even more by what she suspected. In time she came to believe that she had been deceived. There was, according to Lord Grey, no intimidation intended, only a prudent preparation for defense. It is entirely credible that Britain did not want war, and was hoping to avoid it. If war should come from the hand of fate, it would be the aggressor, whoever it was, against which Britain would stand! And yet was it not with France and Russia alone, and not with Germany also, that Britain was making military and naval preparations for

war? And this was done behind the back of Germany. It continued, Lord Grey affirms, during eight years in a time of peace.

Sir Edward Grey was troubled at the time, and Lord Grey seems to be troubled still, by this attitude toward a nation with which friendship was professed. It is evident by the pains he takes to give assurance that it was only against an "aggressor" that the force of Britain was to be employed. This was of course in itself a position wholly beyond criticism, if it had been openly so understood. But it was so far from being thus understood that the fact of military and naval conversations with France and Russia with regard to a war with Germany was not supposed to be known by Germany. It was carefully concealed. When Sir Edward Grey was asked in Parliament if any naval agreement had recently been entered into between Russia and Great Britain, he answered, referring to a previous assurance, "It remains as true to-day as year ago. . . . No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be, as far as I can judge. But, if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament."

"The answer," Viscount Grey comments, "is absolutely true. The criticism to which it is open is, that it does not answer the question put to me. That is undeniable." But both Parliament and Germany appear to have believed that the question had been answered negatively. And why was it not plainly answered? Lord Grey explains: "Parliament has an unqualified right to know of any agreements or arrangements that bind the country to action or restrain its freedom. But it cannot be told of military and naval measures to meet possible contingencies."

It would be difficult to deny this last proposition. It reveals the very heart of military diplomacy. Unless it is secret, it is futile; and to keep it secret there must be a resort to evasion and suppressio veri. It is of the very essence of imperial power that the people, even their parliaments, should not know the dangers to which they are exposed by the actions of their own governments. An empire is of necessity in the hands of its trustees.

It is impossible within the limits assigned to this brief notice to follow out all the ramifications of imperial ambition and diplomatic finesse disclosed in these volumes. To appreciate their revelations, their effort to state the truth with more than usual frankness, and their value for history, it is necessary to read them, every word, and between the lines. Their meaning is liable to be distorted in opposite directions, according to the prepossessions of the interpreter: one seeing in these statements a complete vindication of the wisdom of British policy; the other, a confession of complicity in a system of diplomacy which, more than any single act of any nation, is responsible for the fear and the consequences of war. To jurists in particular this reflection would appear to be the deepest impression received from the reading of these absorbing and illuminating volumes. There is something wrong with the

public law of Europe-or must we say of the world?-that makes the relations of powerful nations what they were, and what they still are; and Viscount Grey's frankly human, and sometimes very noble, expressions of sentiment and judgment help to disclose what it is. It is that there exists in connection with the European conception of the State a belief in a difference between the interests of the State as such and that of the people who compose the State, a difference which requires a secrecy in the interest of the State in which the people may not share. This conception is a heritage from absolutism and belongs to a stage of human evolution from which Europe has not entirely emerged. The escape from its consequences is honest conference in the light of everybody's interest.

Of this Sir Edward Grey seems to have been more acutely conscious than any other European statesman of his time. His method of procedure was not of his choice. It was imposed upon him by forces over which he had no control. He felt the pressure of the thongs by which he was bound. The closing chapters of his first volume reveal the conflict that went on within him. He desired peace with Germany, but he had not been able to escape the conviction that Prussian militarism meant an eventual war. He shrank from the prospect that its occurrence might find Europe unprepared. To his mind Britain had a part to play in preventing it, and if need be in armed resistance. Hence the conversations with France and Russia. But why not also with Germany?

It is this question which Lord Grey's first volume is intended to answer. With Germany, conference in which the interests of Europe as a whole might be considered appeared to him impossible.

If only the conferences which in 1912-1913 had kept the general peace of Europe during the Balkan Wars could have been continued through 1914! There is something pathetic in Lord Grey's disappointment that this could not be. With a heavy heart he reflects upon what might have happened, if he could have had Cambon, Benckendorff, Mensdorff, Lichnowski and Imperiali, sitting around the same table as in 1913, in the Balkan crisis, and their governments loyally standing behind their united efforts for peace.

It is often flippantly suggested that it is the diplomats who make wars. No, it is not true. It is the hereditary hates of peoples, the asperities of the press, the ambitions and the weaknesses of rulers, but above all the reliance upon force in order to obtain the fruits of force, that make wars.

"The fact is," writes Lord Grey, "that in dealing with Chancellors and Secretaries for Foreign affairs at Berlin, we could make no progress, because we were not dealing with the men who really directed policy. The last and decisive word was with some military or naval person."

It has been said that if, in 1914, Sir Edward Grey had promptly announced a real alliance with France and Russia, and not a mere entente, the Central Powers would have been frightened, and there would then have been a peaceable conference, and no war. It is easy to throw out such hypotheses,

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