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appeared so difficult that it was felt a year's time should be given to the study of it. The Lithuanian representative therefore formally requested that the question then before the Fourth Assembly should be referred to the next Assembly to meet in September, 1924, and in pursuance to this request the Assembly decided so to refer it.51 However, the Assembly has never referred the question to the Court, due to intervention of Lithuania herself. At the Fifth Assembly, when the question came to be considered by the sixth committee, the Lithuanian delegation requested that a Lithuanian member should be added to the subcommittee dealing with the question. By a vote of 18 to 2, this request was refused. When the Lithuanian Government was informed of this decision it instructed its delegation to withdraw the whole question from the agenda, reserving to itself the right to bring forward the question again at an opportune moment. 52 What is now the result of the whole matter? There are two main legal questions: (1) The competence of the Conference of Ambassadors to decide the territorial question as they did on March 15, 1923; (2) the legal questions arising out of Lithuania's request to the Assembly of the League to have an advisory opinion given by the Permanent Court.

In the last analysis an answer to the first of these two questions will dispose of the case. But as Lithuania has taken the position that the answer to the first question necessarily depends on the answer to the second question, we must examine the second question, and also see what relation exists between the two.

To dispose of the whole question it is only necessary to consider the possible alternatives. If the Lithuanian Government decides to renew its request to the Assembly, and if the Assembly decides not to refer the question to the court, a situation not improbable, Lithuania will find herself out of court, so to speak, for both organs of the League will have refused her request and all that remains to her is: First, an appeal to the Conference of Ambassadors, which is unlikely to yield any results, for such an appeal already made has fallen on deaf ears. Second, direct negotiations with Poland, which is at present beyond serious consideration by either Poland or Lithuania. Third, direct appeal to the Permanent Court may be suggested, but under Article 36 of the court's statutes the court will take jurisdiction of a question only when both parties agree to submit the question to the court, and Poland would never agree. Fourth, War—an alternative which has usually proved disastrous in modern times both to victor and to vanquished, and which Lithuania with her present force of arms would be extremely unlikely to adopt.

If on the request of the Lithuanian Government the Assembly were to decide to refer the question to the court, there are two possible alternatives: first, the court might decide that the Council was competent, which would 51 Archives, ibid., Documents 82 and 83.

2 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 29, pp. 7, 8 and 9.

end the matter on Lithuania's own contention. Second, suppose, however, that the court were to decide that the Council was not competent, what would be the situation then? We must notice exactly what such a decision would be. The court by that decision would have stated merely that the Council did not have "the right when a dispute is submitted to it under paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the Covenant, to address to the parties, with regard to incidental questions which have not been expressly submitted to it, recommendations having the force of the Council reports referred to in paragraphs 4, 6, 7 of the same article," in other words, that the Council in its final report of February 3, 1923, had no right to lay down a provisional line of demarcation.

And what has that to do with the final decision of the Conference of Ambassadors? Merely this. The Conference of Ambassadors adopted the line laid down by the Council resolution of February 3, 1923, and saw fit to refer to it as follows: "And whereas, as regards the frontier between Poland and Lithuania account must be taken of the de facto situation created by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations dated February 3, 1923," etc. This reference to the Council resolution cannot invalidate the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors. In so far as one may deduce from it that the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors is based on the resolution of the Council, one may conclude that the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors has equal merit with the resolution of the Council. But whether the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors is a desirable or expedient one under all the circumstances is an entirely different question from the one whether the Conference of Ambassadors had power to make the decision. It is submitted that the Conference of Ambassadors had power. If so, Lithuania finds herself facing a final decision of a competent tribunal which decision she regards as unjust. Supposing for purposes of argument that the decision is unjust, the question arises what should Lithuania do? There is an analogy in private law. Suppose a private corporation has tried to vindicate what it considers its rights in one court after another until finally it is faced with the decision of the highest possible court, which decision it deems unjust. What should it do? There is only one possible thing to do, viz., accept the decision.

The world has passed through a long history of international disputes. The earliest method of settlement was a resort to armed force. In more modern times nations have resorted more and more to arbitration or other peaceful methods of settlement. At the close of the World War men hoped that all international disputes would henceforth be settled by peaceful But it is only now after five years of work of the League of Nations

means.

"It is impossible to deny the source of power as set out in the decision itself, viz., Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Request of Poland to the Conference of Ambassadors made February 15, 1923, and the note of Lithuania to the Conference of Ambassadors of November 18, 1922.

that men are beginning to realize what is the price of international peace. The price of peace between nations is like the price of peace between private interests within a nation. In one sphere as in the other men must resort to the best tribunals that it is possible for human intelligence to devise; and when these tribunals have given their decision, that decision must be accepted respectfully as the nearest approach to justice of which man is capable.

COMPUTATION OF TIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

BY FRANCIS DEÁK

The Council of the League of Nations has recently appointed a committee to report on the possible codification of international law. There are no rules in international law determining computation of time, and the prevailing uncertainty opens the door for arbitrary interpretation of the interested parties, which can lead and has often led to unnecessary differences.

What does a year, month, or day mean in international law? How is the moment when treaties go into effect to be determined? Should the civil" computation, which is concerned only with days, be taken into consideration? Or should the "natural" computation, which considers also hours, sometimes minutes, be applied? If the "natural" computation be applied in a treaty, between the United States and China for instance, should the treaty be considered effective according to American or Chinese time? In a fixed period, should the first and the last day be reckoned exclusive or inclusive?

This lack of certainty in the definition of time is not a new thing in international law. H. W. Halleck, in his International Law, writes that "general rules laid down by text-writers, respecting the interpretation and observance of truces and other compacts in war, are necessarily somewhat indefinite and questions almost always arise in their application to particular cases," and he insists upon the greatest possible exactness in such documents to avoid all ambiguity.1 Undoubtedly the need for exact determination of time is most important in the period of a war, when hours and minutes are bearing the fortune or misfortune of millions and the lives of thousands of people.

Vattel shows in his Law of Nations that the word "day" might be employed with two meanings in one and the same treaty. "It might be stipulated in a treaty that there should be a truce for fifty days upon the condition that during eight successive days the belligerent parties should, through their agents, endeavour to effect a reconciliation; the fifty days of the truce would be days and nights or days of twenty-four hours, according to the ordinary legal computation; but it would be irrational to contend that the condition would not be fulfilled unless the agents of the belligerent parties were, during the eight days, to labor night and day without interruption."2

1H. W. Halleck, International Law, 4th ed., London, 1908, Vol. II, p. 353. Vattel, The Law of Nations, 1854, Philadelphia, p. 251, §280.

Fauchille calls attention to the dangers of uncertainty in armistices and also complains about the disagreement of writers on international law."

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David Dudley Field, in his outline of an international code, determines "year" as consisting of 365 days without considering the leap year, and the "month" according to the division of the Gregorian calendar. He goes a step further, taking into consideration the differences between local times and determines the mean solar meridian passage at Greenwich on January 1 as January 1 throughout the world."

Notwithstanding the early discovery of this gap by the learned writers on international law, extremely few acts or documents are found requesting and determining an exact computation of time. The conventions of The Hague of 1907 could be considered as one of the bases for written international law, though they have not been ratified by all the contracting parties. There are in Convention XIII, Articles 12-20, certain definite prescriptions concerning the stay of vessels in neutral ports. Article 12 limits the stay of belligerent war vessels in a neutral port to twenty-four hours, and according to Article 16 the war vessels of the two belligerent parties can leave the neutral port in an interval of at least twenty-four hours. These articles seem to exclude all ambiguity. But reading Article 20, one may ask whether the three months, mentioned here, within which period the war vessel of a belligerent party can not renew its provisions, will mean calendar months or months of thirty days, and whether or not either or both of the first and last days should be included or excluded?

In the national legislation of some of the contracting Powers are to be found decrees or laws limiting with extraordinary exactness the stay of war vessels in their ports, according to Articles 12-20 of the XIII Hague Convention of 1907. The decree of the French Government of October 18, 1912,5 may be cited as an example of clearness and exactness. The decree limits the stay of war vessels at "three times twenty-four hours," and includes in this term the time necessary for administrative formalities (Art. 5). The duration of delay given to war vessels leaving the territorial waters under French sovereignty should be computed from the moment of notification to the respective vessel.

The Italian legislation requests the belligerent war vessels to leave out of cannon shot of the Italian artillery within twelve hours computed from the moment of notification of the ordinance on board ship.

It is extremely important to avoid any ambiguity in computation of time in another field of international law: in the declaration of blockade

3 Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public, 8 ed. 1921, Vol. II. (Guerre et Neutralité), p. 328, Art. 1251.

David Dudley Field, Outlines of an International Code, 2d ed., New York, 1876, §§ 522524, 994.

Journal officiel de la République française, 1912, No. 286.

• Decrét of August 20, 1909. Gazetta ufficiale, 1909, No. 232.

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