"The Protection of Alien Chinese through Chinese Authorities." In no other work can the reader find so much information upon these points. There have, of course, been other studies dealing with the Chinese living in particular countries, as, for example, Coolidge's Chinese Immigration [into the United States] and Campbell's Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, but, until now, there has been no work dealing comprehensively with all phases of the problems, national and international, created by the emigration to so many quarters of the globe of between eight and nine million of the Sons of Han.

With regard to the manner in which the Chinese have been treated by the governments of the countries in which they have settled, one fact stands out clearly so far as the United States is concerned, and that is that, however much we may pride ourselves upon having pursued in China a more liberal and enlightened policy than have the other "Treaty Powers," we have little reason for congratulating ourselves upon the consideration we have shown the Chinese dwelling within our midst. As regards the entrance of Chinese into the United States, it is well known that the Exclusion Act of Congress of 1888 was in direct violation of the treaty of 1868 and of the supplemental treaty of 1880 with China, and was recognized so to be by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Chae Chan Ping v. United States (130 U. S. 581), but nevertheless held validated as a municipal law because of the provision of the United States Constitution which, without placing one intrinsically above the other, declares that laws of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution and treaties made under the authority thereof shall be the supreme law of the land.

A fact which stands out prominently in all accounts of economic conditions in the Pacific possessions of the Western Powers is the extent to which these possessions are dependent for their industrial and commercial prosperity upon the industry and business shrewdness of the eight millions of Chinese living within them. Notwithstanding this fact, these Chinese have been, in many cases, exploited in a manner which certainly would not have been the case had they been Caucasians or had they had back of them a militarily powerful home government. This disregard of the welfare of the Chinese is at present strikingly shown in the opium policies of Great Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands, all of which countries legalize and derive large revenues from the sale of smoking opium, which, for the most part, and, in some cases, exclusively, is consumed by the Chinese. However, this is a subject not considered by Dr. MacNair.

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo furnishes an introduction and Dr. Fang F. See a foreword to Dr. MacNair's volume.

W. W. WILLOUGHBY.

Latin America and the War. By Percy Alvin Martin. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925. pp. xii, 582. Index. $3.50.

This is the expanded version of a series of lectures delivered in 1921 at the Johns Hopkins University on the Albert Shaw Foundation.

In an introductory chapter Professor Martin discusses the general factors which predisposed the majority of Latin American states to regard with favor the Allied cause; he then proceeds to consider, in the body of his work, the stresses and changes to which the relations of the separate republics were subjected as the war progressed; and finally, reverting to general considerations, he concludes with some observations on the effects of the war on their national and international life.

Of the various factors which influenced the foreign policies of these countries, Professor Martin regards sympathy for the principal powers of the Entente group as the most important. Bound to France by cultural ties, they looked upon her as the champion of Latin civilization. Indebted to England for reasons historical, economic and social, they had been accustomed for a century to consider her as a barrier against foreign interference from whatever source. Influenced by the presence within their borders of a numerous and welcome Italian population, they were profoundly moved by the entry of Italy into the war. The bonds of union which thus stretched across the Atlantic were strengthened by a common feeling of indignation at German methods of warfare, and by common interest and sympathy among the American nations. To this last factor, continental unity, the author does not attach too much importance. Indeed, his brief reference to it in his introductory chapter leaves the reader in doubt; but as the story unfolds, the conviction grows that it played no inconsiderable part in determining the course of action of a majority of the republics.

There were other influences, to be sure, operating in a contrary direction, and Professor Martin points these out. By a highly organized and skillfully directed economic and intellectual penetration effected during the decades preceding the war, Germany had acquired a hold on Latin America which was difficult to shake. Moreover, the Allied Powers were not uniformly fortunate in their dealings with the Latin American Republics. Such measures as the Black List, and decrees against the non-importation of certain products, aroused dissatisfaction and led to demands for reprisals. The movement of Pan-Hispanism, on the one hand, and distrust of the United States, on the other, reacted measurably in favor of the Central Powers. And yet, in spite of all counteracting forces, the attachments between these countries and the Allied Powers grew firmer as the conflict progressed. Antipathy for Germany developed correspondingly, and eventually eight of the twenty republics declared war; five broke relations with Germany, and of the seven remaining neutral, all but one or two leaned toward the cause of the Allies.

The reader is not led, however, to infer that Latin-American policy was

determined wholly by sentiment. On the contrary, he is made to see that the more important republics at least, declared war, broke relations, or remained neutral for reasons of a more practical sort. The first to declare war were Cuba and Panama. They were closely bound to the United States by treaty, yet their course was determined by their own national interests. Less evident were the motives of the Central American Republics, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, though each had its peculiar reasons for declaring war, apart from sympathy and apart from any undue influence which the United States may have exerted over them. Haiti declared war, but as the republic was at the time occupied by United States marines, no deduction can be made as to its real attitude. The clearest case is that of Brazil. Its policy was frankly Pan-American. None the less it was actuated mainly by national considerations. The events leading up to its declaration of war were strikingly similar to those which induced the United States to enter the contest. The repeated attacks of German submarines on Brazilian ships, occasioning the loss of Brazilian lives and property, caused the government first to break relations, then partially to revoke neutrality, and finally to recognize and proclaim a state of war.

The states which broke relations with Germany were Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. Those remaining neutral were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. Of those which severed relations, Uruguay presents the most interesting study. When the United States declared war, the Uruguayan Republic had suffered no act of aggression or attack upon its rights. It accordingly proclaimed its neutrality. It extended, however, its "moral sympathy and solidarity" to the United States, and shortly afterward issued a declaration to the effect that no American country at war with the nations of another continent would be treated by the Uruguayan Government as a belligerent. This action was followed by the severance of relations with Germany "solely on the principle of high solidarity with the defenders of right and justice who are at the same time the stalwart defenders of the sovereignty of the small nations." In the meantime the Government of Uruguay bent every effort to effect a concert of American nations in the interest of a common struggle against Germany. "The ideals and principles of Pan-Americanism," says Professor Martin, "to which many of the Latin American countries in the past had rendered merely lip service, were in the case of Uruguay, adopted as the norm of her international policy." Its Pan-American efforts were unremitting, but they failed, as the mild attempt of President Wilson to achieve the same end failed. Such failures prove no lack of essential unity among American Republics. They merely demonstrate that whatever unity exists is not in the nature of a defensive alliance.

To the subject of Argentina's neutrality Professor Martin devotes a long and interesting chapter. In this republic, as elsewhere in Latin America,

public opinion favored the Allies. The national legislature, the press and a large and influential element of the population demanded drastic action against Germany, particularly after the Luxburg revelations. But President Irigoyen held firmly to a neutral course. This led to charges that he was partial to Germany. Professor Martin admits that the nearness of the events and the serious lacunae in the documentary evidence rob any conclusions which may be made at the present time of the stamp of finality. After examining all the available evidence, however, he became convinced that Irigoyen's policy was neither pro-German nor pro-Ally, though toward the close of the war it gravitated toward a neutrality favorable to the United States and the Allies. In stubbornly maintaining neutrality the Argentine President may have been influenced in part, Professor Martin thinks, by a desire to concentrate the energies of the nation on certain domestic reforms for which his party stood sponsor; in part by a disinclination to follow in the wake of the United States; and in part by the ambition to have Argentina seize the opportunity for assuming a position of leadership among the Latin American nations. As evidence of this last consideration the author points to the repeated, though unsuccessful, attempts of the President to assemble a Latin American congress at Buenos Aires. In the light of the whole history of Argentine foreign policy, this view seems plausible.

Chile maintained neutrality with dignity and success. Within such limits however as international law permitted, the government interpreted its obligations, the author thinks, in a sense distinctly advantageous to the United States and the Allies. Popular sympathy, at first divided, turned steadily toward the Allied cause, and when the Armistice was signed the event was celebrated in the press and by great public gatherings as though it were a victory of Chile itself. The situation of the Colombian Republic was complicated and difficult. Geographical considerations gave to its action the highest importance, and the presence of strong pro-German influences, together with the existence of a smouldering resentment against the United States, lent an element of doubt as to the course it might pursue. Yet Professor Martin concludes after a careful scrutiny of the official acts of the government, that Colombian neutrality was preserved without the slightest bias in favor of Germany. So much he could not say of Venezuela, though technically that government in no way departed from a neutral The attitude of Mexico toward the war is still a matter of controversy and Professor Martin brings to bear upon the subject no important new information.

course.

As to the general effects of the war on the Latin American countries, Professor Martin inclines to the belief that the good results preponderate over the evil. On the whole, the republics acquired a graver sense of national responsibility, and a more sober consciousness of national dignity. Their public conscience was aroused and their public opinion was invested with new power. They learned self-reliance, established their commercial

and financial relations upon a more solid foundation, and drew into closer relations with the United States and the rest of the world as well. "To our sister republics," says Professor Martin, "is no longer applicable the half contemptuous charge made in pre-war days that they stand on the margin of international life."

Professor Martin has given a good general view of Latin America and the World War. From sources widely diverse and ordinarily inaccessible he has industriously gathered and carefully digested a vast array of facts and he has presented the results in a lucid and readable form. But he disappoints the reader in some respects. His treatment of the legal questions involved is not wholly satisfactory, and a certain lack of detachment on his part vitiates the work to some extent.

JOSEPH B. LOCKEY.

The Problem of International Sanctions. By D. Mitrany. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1925. pp. viii, 88. $0.85. This little book is an elaboration of a memorandum which the author prepared for the American group responsible for the Draft of a Treaty of Security and Disarmament. The author believes that "sanctions really are the crux of the difficulties which clog our efforts to organize peace" (p. v). We cannot do without them (p. 2). The peaceful settlement of international disputes and sanctions are completely interdependent (p. 72).

Assuming that "it is not at present practical policy to make participation in military sanctions obligatory," that a reliable system of international security is nevertheless indispensable, and that it will be better to begin with a modest system which can be relied upon to work (p. 26), the author proceeds to subject to critical examination the scheme of sanctions in the League Covenant, the Geneva Protocol, and proposed regional pacts. He is convinced that "the military sanction must remain an extreme measure, to be adopted only in exceptional circumstances; and no country may be forced into taking it whose sentiment or interests or means are opposed thereto" (p. 27). Economic sanctions must be the chief reliance, and even economic sanctions should be carefully confined. "In the general function and effect of economic action one can distinguish three phases: preventive, repressive, and punitive; and it is neither in the League's interest nor in its spirit to have much to do with the last" (p. 45). "To put it positively, in support of the League's economic sanctions, members should not, as a general rule, be bound to do more than to cut off supplies and economic facilities which the aggressor State might draw from their own territories" (p. 42). The only definite general obligation approved is "that of not giving assistance to the aggressor" (p. 55). This means that the League Covenant's machinery of sanctions should be moderated in the hope that so moderated it may really be made effective (p. 75).

The efficacy of even a moderate plan of economic sanctions may be de