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American Revolution through the Washington Conference under President Harding, in some eighteen chapters arranged chronologically and sometimes topically. In the main the proportion maintained is good, and the chapter captions are dignified and self-explanatory. Some of these headings, however, are either spectacular or misleading, such as: "Drifting into a Useless War" (Cap. VII) for the War of 1812; "Another White Man and His Burden" (Cap. XII) for our Pacific and Cuban relations; "Creeping Down the Caribbean" (Cap. XIII). Some of the sub-titles are far from descriptive of the events related, for instance: "Irresponsible Diplomacy" (p. 68); "The Vengeance of Vanderbilt" (p. 280); "Nagging the British Lion" (p. 365); and "Recrudescent Isolation" (p. 430) for Harding's non-interference policy. Sometimes the adequate treatment of important topics is sacrificed for unimportant detail or comment, which the careful reading of well-known standard writers in the field might have prevented.

Dr. Adams states his own opinions with great vigor and freedom throughout the book. Though these are generally suggestive and most interesting, they do not always show a clear conception of the facts and causes of events or of the motives of the actors in them. The Department of State receives scant and grudging credit for many of its important activities and there is much less appreciation of its services and of the spirit of American diplomacy than we find in the well-known works of the diplomats John W. Foster, John Bassett Moore and David Jayne Hill. The influence of a single economic factor or product, such as sugar in Hawaii or Cuba, in controlling American action or policy is sometimes overemphasized. Dr. Adams gives a very appreciative account of President Wilson's relation to the World War, the treaty, and world peace based upon Baker, Tumulty and other eulogists, but few will admit the good judgment of his repeated criticisms of Senator Lodge and the other "wilful" patriots of the Senate. The author seems somewhat unduly impressed with the myth which he, like some others, calls the "isolation" policy, and fears that under Harding it meant "an atavistic reversal-to the negative side of the Monroe Doctrine which had been intelligent before the days of aëroplanes and radio-communication."

While the author modestly disclaims any attempt at specialized research or the addition of new material of importance, he has made a distinctive contribution to the literature of the subject with a presentation that will inspire reading.

The mechanical side of the book is well done. It contains seventeen maps, some unusual illustrations, a good index, and appendices giving a bibliography and a chronological list of Secretaries of State of the United States. JAMES CURTIS BALLAGH.

La Conciliation Internationale (Règlement des Différends Internationaux). Par Philip Marshall Brown. Paris: Pedone, 1925. pp. 95.

This booklet contains six lectures delivered by Professor Brown before the Academy of International Law at its second session in 1924. Following an introduction in which he points out that the question of arbitration has heretofore been considered from the historical rather than the analytical point of view, and pronounces as false the notion that international law regulates solely the mutual relations of states and is unconcerned with the protection of the rights of individuals, he proceeds to define the object of international law to be the protection of national interests when those interests have been recognized by international law as legal rights. He devotes a lecture to a consideration of the nature of those interests, which he classifies as moral, political and legal. He dwells upon the differences between international and municipal law and, as stated above, combats the tendency to limit the domain of international law to relations between states and "to reduce men to the status of objects of the common law of dumb brutes." This theory of the function of international law, he says, had its origin in an age when sovereignty was represented by an absolute monarch and when subjects enjoyed only such rights as were graciously "octroyed" to them by sovereign princes-a theory which has no place in an epoch when sovereignty not only resides in the people but is actually exercised by them.

The most important of Professor Brown's lectures are the two which deal in turn with the classification of international differences and the amicable methods for the settlement of those differences: diplomacy, arbitration, judicial settlement, conciliation, commissions of inquiry and others. In the first of these he points out the obstacles which stand in the way of the conclusion of general arbitration treaties, especially the presence of conflicting interests which make states hesitate to agree to arbitrate generally their differences, the impossibility of finding an acceptable test for distinguishing between political and legal differences, and the lack of established rules of international law applicable to many disputes which arise between states. He discusses the differences between arbitration and judicial settlement and, on the basis of the distinction which he draws, he concludes that the Permanent Court of International Justice is neither an arbitral tribunal nor, strickly speaking, a judicial court, but a "Court of Arbitral Justice." In summary form the general conclusions of his study are the following: the basis of international law and of friendly relations between states is mutual respect and common consent; their vital and essential interests are generally moral and political rather than strictly judicial; conflicts of a juridical character are generally of the least importance and are susceptible of peaceable settlement; the more serious differences (those of a moral or political character) should be settled by methods of conciliation, the normal forms of which are diplomacy, confer

ence, mediation, and commissions of inquiry; obligatory inquiry for the determination of questions of fact is preferable to obligatory arbitration or obligatory conciliation; and finally, the idea of conciliation rather than coercion should be emphasized. "The greatest need of the world is good will and a generous and spontaneous sentiment of conciliation."

J. W. G.

Septième Congrès International de Legislation Aérienne du Comité Juridique International de l'Aviation. Paris: Per Orbem, 1926. pp. 322.

The Seventh Congress of the Comité Juridique International de l'Aviation was held at Lyons between September 28 and October 2, 1925. The Comité is an unofficial body of jurists maintaining headquarters at Paris. It has met at intervals since 1911 for the purpose of drafting a complete code of international air law, both public and private. The code thus far drafted contains forty-two articles devoted to public law and twenty-six to private law. The work of the Seventh Congress was devoted principally to the elaboration of suitable regulations for customs administration in respect to aircraft, and of legislative clauses applicable to the insurance of lives and property transported by air.

Professor de Lapradelle, who presided over the deliberations of the congress, took occasion at the outset to emphasize the importance of speedy administrative clearances to the progress of aërial navigation as a whole. Any undue hindrances by customs control tends to lessen the importance of aërial traffic (p. 45). The congress adopted the principle that, to avoid descent at the frontier, every private aircraft must depart by and make its first descent at a customhouse aërodrome, unless special authorization is otherwise obtained (Art. a, p. 318). Every aircraft engaged in transporting goods must be provided with a manifest, certified by the custom-house authorities, and must have a bill of lading for each consignee (Art. c, p. 319). Regulations to apply in the event of a forced landing, or an accident, were also adopted (Arts. b, c, d, p. 318).

The congress accepted the principle that every risk in connection with aircraft may be covered by insurance, except that resulting from the intentional act of the assured or of the pilot. The object insured may be surrendered to the insurer in the event that the cost of repairs amounts to three-quarters of its value, or if three months have passed without news of the aircraft (Art. 62, p. 317). All life and accident policies shall be deemed to cover also the risks incurred by the insured while traveling upon regular air lines (Art. 65, p. 318). In countries where the pilot and crew are not covered by legislation for workmen's compensation, coverage shall be deemed obligatory (Art. 66). These provisions were accepted in preference to the proposal of M. Henry-Couannier for the compulsory insurance of passengers (pp. 231-235).

The congress recommended to the attention of the International Conference of the Red Cross, resolutions for the protection of personnel and material used exclusively for the transportation and treatment of wounded by air. These resolutions propose that personnel and material exclusively devoted to the transportation and to the treatment of wounded over aĕrial routes shall be respected and protected to the same extent as upon land and sea. This protection ceases in the event of any acts committed harmful to the enemy. The use of sanitary aircraft for maintaining a search for wounded on the field of battle is prohibited (p. 319). It is expected that the automobile will act as a liaison between the battlefield and the points behind the lines where aircraft of the Red Cross may operate (p. 304). The proposed rule seems reasonable enough in the light of the experience of the late war, but as aircraft will be the very means by which the plane of battle will be extended in future wars, one is inclined to foresee much difficulty in accurately defining what is embraced in the phrase "champ de bataille."

The Comité Juridique International has taken the initiative in a new and important field of jurisprudence. Its method of approach is scientific and it is not afraid to strike out into new ground. As the distinguished president of the congress remarked, aviation itself is the result of initiative and courage, and the Comité thus aims to prove itself worthy of the art constituting the field of its juristic studies.

ARTHUR K. KUHN.

The League of Nations. By Santos Kumar Das, M.A. Calcutta: G. B. Manna Mitra Press, 1925. pp. xxv, 164.

Professor Das announces in his preface that this small volume is a reprint of a lecture given in Calcutta with the idea "of reducing a complex subject to comprehensible categories, of emphasizing its dominant characteristics, and of rendering it more intelligible." So far as spreading detailed and precise information is concerned, this small volume is no more authoritative than the many others which have been published on the League of Nations; but, it must, in justice, be said, that the author, writing in a foreign language, indicates plainly a surprising mastery of phrase and idiom— which augurs well for the future of the English language in India. The text is marred by numerous typographical errors (vide pp. 58, 68, 73, etc., and 163, 164); again, in places the usual constraint of the professor escapes him, and there appear flamboyant passages, (such as pp. 59, 60, 61), the exuberance of which is in marked contrast with preceding and succeeding passages.

The knowledge and wide reading of the author are just as apparent, as is the somewhat slavish adherence to the German system of reference and documentation, once described as "a magnificent pudding of splendid ingredients, but, unfortunately, too heavy for digestion." While adding but

little to the knowledge of the student, the volume presents the evidence that an Indian audience not only was sufficiently interested to assemble to hear this type of lecture, but also to demand that it be reprinted; for which the West should rejoice that the East at least discusses its ideas and their application.

B. C.

Les Mandats Internationaux. Par Giulio Diena. Extrait du Recueil des Cours, 1925, Académie de Droit International. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1925. pp. iii-51.

This is a reprint from the official collection of the lectures delivered by Professor Diena, of the University of Pavia, before the Academy of International Law at its third session in 1925. After tracing the development of the idea of international mandates as it first appeared in the Brussels Acts of 1885 and 1890, and its adoption by the Peace Conference of 1919 (Article 22 of the Covenant) as the solution for the disposition of the territories taken from Germany and the Ottoman Empire, Professor Diena proceeds to examine the juridical nature of the institution. He points out that it represents a compromise solution between the views of those who desired to see the territories in question annexed by the victorious Powers and those who wished to have them placed under a system of international administration. He admits that the task of describing precisely the juridical nature of the system is a very difficult one, although it had been already attempted by various writers, notably by Professor Quincy Wright in his learned article on "The Sovereignty of the Mandates" in this JOURNAL (Vol. 17, p. 691ff).

Professor Diena addresses himself first to the question as to whether the so-called mandates provided for by Article 22 of the Covenant possess the juridical character of a real mandate as that term is understood in private law. Some jurists, e.g., M. Henry Rolin, have denied this thesis for the reason, as they argue, that the League of Nations does not possess a juridical personality and consequently lacks the capacity to confer a mandate upon a state. Professor Diena declines to accept this view and maintains that the League is endowed with a juridical personality of its own and does therefore possess the capacity to give mandates to particular states. He then considers the question as to whether the relation between the League and the mandatory Power is really a juridical relation, and he concludes that it is not, at least not in the sense of mandates in private law. Is the relation analogous to that between a guardian and a ward (relation of tutelage), or that between a trustee and the object of the trust, according to Anglo-American law? His conclusion is that it is neither, but that it falls within the category of international protectorates which may be distinguished from both. He then proceeds to consider the perplexing question as to where the sovereignty in such a system resides. Is it suspended, as some writers claim? Does it

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