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and reinforce Capt. Brush, of the state of Ohio, commanding a company of volunteers, and escorting provisions for. this army. At Brownstown a large body of Indians had formed an ambuscade, and the Major's detachment received a heavy fire, at the distance of fifty yards from the enemy. The whole detachment retreated in disorder......... Major Vanhorn made every exertion to form, and prevent the retreat, that was possible for a brave and gallant officer, but without success. By the return of killed and wounded, it will be perceived that the loss of officers was uncommonly great, Their efforts to rally their companies was the occasion of it. I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,
WILLIAM HULL. Killed, in Major Vanhorn's defeat-4 Captains-1 Lieutenant-2 Ensigns-10 privates-total 17.5
[ENCLOSED IN THE PRECEDING DISPATCH.]
DETROIT, 13th August, 1812. SIR-The main body of the army having re-crossed the river at Detroit, on the night and morning of the 8th, inst. six hundred men were immediately detached under the com mand of Lieut. Col. Miller, to open the communication to the river Raisin, and protect the provisions, which were under the escort of Capt. Brush. This detachment consisted of the 4th U. States regiment, and two small detachments under the command of Lieut. Stansbury and Eusign M'Labe of the 1st regiment; detachments from the Ohio and Michigan volunteers, a corps of artillerists, with one six-pounder and an howitzer under the command of Lieut. Eastman, and a part of Captains Smith and Sloan's Cavalry, commanded by Capt. Sloan of the Ohio volunteers. Lieut. Col. Miller marched from Detroit on the afternoon of the 8th instant, and on the 9th, about four o'clock P. M. the van guard, commanded by Capt. Snelling of the 4th U. States' regiment, was fired on by an extensive line of British troops and Indians at the lower part of the Maguago about fourteen miles from Detroit. At this time the main body was marching in two columns, and Capt. Snelling maintained his position in a most gallant manner, under a very heavy fire, until the line was formed and advanced to the ground he occupied, when the whole, excepting the rear guard, was brought into action.
The enemy were formed behind a temporary breast work of logs, the Indians extending in a thick wood on their left. Lt. Col. Miller ordered his whole line to advance, and when within a small distance of the enemy, made a general discharge, and proceeded with charged bayonets, when the British line and Indians commenced a retreat. They were pursued in a most vigorous manner about two miles, and the pursuit discontinued only on account of the fatigue of the troops, the approach of evening, and the necessity of returning to take care of the wounded. The judicious arrangements made by Lt. Col. Miller, and the gallant manner in which they were executed, justly entitle him to the highest honor. From the moment the line commenced the fire, it continually moved on, and the enemy maintained their position until forced at the point of the bayonet. The Indians on the left, commanded by Tecumseh, fought with great obstinacy, but were continually forced and compelled to retreat. The victory was complete in every part of the line, and the success would have been more, brilliant had the cavalry charged the enemy on the retreat, when a most favorable opportunity presented. Although orders were given for the purpose, unfortunately they were not executed. Majors Vanhorn and Morrison, of the Ohio volunteers, were associated with Lt. Col. Miller, as field officers in this command, and were highly distinguished by their exertions in forming the line, and the firm and intrepid manner they led their respective commands into action.
Capt. Baker, of the 1st. Capt. Brevort, of the 2d. and Capt. Hull, of the 13th, my aid-de-camp, and Lieut. Whistler, of the 1st Regt. U. S. Infantry, requested permission to join the detachment, as volunteers. Lieut. Col. Miller assigned commands to Capt. Baker and Lieut. Whistler ; and Capts. Brevort and Hull, at his request, attended his person and aided him in the general arrangements. Lieut. Colonel Miller has mentioned the conduct of these officers in terms of high approbation. In addition to the captains who have been named, Lt. Col. Miller has mentioned Capts. Burton and Fuller, of the 4th Regt. Capts. Saunders and Brown, of the Ohio Volunteers, and Capt. Delandre, of the Michigan Volunteers, who were attached to his command-and distinguished by their valor. It is impossible for me, in this communication to do justice to the officers and soldiers, who
gained the victory which I have described. They have acquired high honor to themselves and are justly entitled to the gratitude of their country...
Major Muir, of the 41st Regt. commanded the British in this action... Their regulars and volunteers consisted of about 400, and a large number of Indians. Major Muir, and two subalterns were wounded, one of them since dead. The militia and volunteers attached to his command, were in the severest part of the action, and their loss must have been great-it has not yet been ascertained. . I have the honor to be, &c..
Killed 18-Wounded 57.
Killed 51-Wounded 65-Prisoners 4.
H. Q. Detroit, Aug. 16, 1812. It is with pain and anxiety that Brigadier General Hull announces to the North-Western army, that he has been compelled from a sense of duty, to agree to the following articles of capitulation.
Camp Detroit, Aug. 16, 1812. Capitulation of surrendering fort Detroit, entered into between Major-General Brock, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces, of the one part, and Brig. General Hull, commanding the North-Western army of the U. States, of the other part:
Article 1st. Fort Detroit with all the troops, regulars as well as militia, will be immediately surrendered to the British forces under command of Major-General Brock, and will be considered as prisoners of war, with the exception of such of the Militia of the Michigan territory, who have not joined the army.
Article 2d. All public stores, arms, and public documents, including every thing else of a public nature, will be immediately given up.
Article 3d. Private persons and private property of every description will be respected.
Article 4th. His excellency Brig. General Hull, having expressed a desire that a detachment from the state of Ohio, on its way to join the army, as well as one sent from fort
Detroit, under the command of Col. M'Arthur, should be included in the above stipulation, it is acordingly agreed to. It is, however, to be understood, that such parts of the Ohio militia as have not joined the army, will be permitted to return home on condition that they will not serve during the war-their arms, however, will be delivered up if belonging to the public.
Article 5th. The garrison will march out at the hour of 12 o'clock this day, and the British forces will take immediate possession of the fort.
J. M'DOWEL, Lt. Col. Militia B. A. D. C.
(Approved) WILLIAM HULL, Brig Gen. JAMES MILLER, Lt. Col. 5th U. S. Infantry. E. BRUSH, Col. 1st. Regt. Michigan Militia. (Approved) ISAAC BROCK, Maj. Gen. The army at 12 o'clock this day will march out of the east gate, where they will stack their arms, and will be then subject to the articles of capitulation.
WILLIAM HULL, Brig. Gen.
Colonel Cass to the Secretary of War.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 10, 1812. SIR Having been ordered on to this place by Col. M'Arthur, for the purpose of communicating to the ment particulars respecting the expedition lately commanded by Brig. General Hull, and its disastrous result, as might enable them correctly to appreciate the conduct of the officers and men; and to develope the causes which produced so foul a stain upon the national character, I have the honor to submit for your consideration, the following
When the forces landed in Canada, they landed with an ardent zeal and stimulated with the hope of conquest. No enemy appeared within view of us, and had an immediate and vigorous attack been made upon Malden, it would doubtless have fallen an easy victory. I know Gen. Hull afterwards declared he regretted this attack had not been made, and he had every reason to believe success would have crowned his efforts. The reason given for delaying our operations was to mount our heavy canuon, and to afford to the Canadian militia time and opportunity to quit
an obnoxious service. In the course of two weeks the number of their militia, who were embodied, had decreased by desertion from six hundred to one hundred men ; and in the course of three weeks, the cannon were mounted, the ammunition fixed, and every preparation made for an immediate investment of the fort. At a Council, at which were present all the field officers, and which was held two days before our preparations were completed, it was unanimously agreed to make an immediate attempt, to accomplish the object of the expedition. If by waiting two days we could have the service of our heavy artillery, it was agreed to wait: if not, it was determined to go without it, and attempt the place by storm. This opinion appeared to correspond with the views of the General, and the day was appointed for commencing our march. He declared to me, that he considered himself pledged to lead the army to Malden. The ammunition was placed in the waggons; the cannon embarked on board the floating batteries, and every requisite article was prepared. The spirit and zeal, the ardor and animation displayed by the officers and men, on learning the near accomplishment of their wishes, was a sure and sacred pledge, that in the hour of trial they would not be found wanting in their duty to their country and themselves. But a change of measures, in opposition to the wishes and opinions of all the officers, was adopted by the General. The plan of attacking Malden was abandoned, and instead of acting offensively, we broke up our camp, evacuated Canada, and re-crossed the river, in the night, without even the shadow of an enemy to injure us. We left to the tender mercy of the enemy the miserable Canadians who had joined us, and the protection we afforded them was but a passport to vengeance. This fatal and unaccountable step dispirited the troops, and destroyed the little confidence which a series of timid, irresolute, and indecisive measures had left in the commanding officer.
About the 10th of August, the enemy received a reinforcement of four hundred men. On the 12th, the commanding officers of three of the regiments, (the fourth was absent) were informed through a medium which admitted of no doubt, that the General had stated that a capitulation would be necessary. They on the same day addressed to Governor Meigs of Ohio, a letter of which the following is