the principle of all the members of the Cabinet, and that no one will be admitted who is not of this opinion. It is to be hoped that England, in her turn, will act with perfect confidence towards this Cabinet, and if there have been differences of opinion on one point, it would be fair to appreciate the particular circumstances of France and to come to an amicable arrangement.

The Russian Embassy is extremely annoyed. It is supposed that M. de Pahlen will be recalled, and perhaps replaced by Count Pozzo di Borgo.

The Tiers Parti continues to repeat that the Chambers will overthrow the Ministry. To this end it deceives the deputies as to the intentions of the Ministry, but we believe that facts and the debates will enlighten the representatives of the nation.

The opposition intends to support itself by the question of the reduction of the interest of the debt. The turn of this affair will depend on circumstances. Besides, it will not be a Cabinet question. In fine, public opinion becomes more and more pronounced against the reduction.

Paris, 11th September.

Notwithstanding the assertions of the press, it appears certain to-day that no further determination has been taken with regard to co-operation in Spain. The resolution, therefore, is maintained to leave the foreign legion in that country under the Spanish cockade, not to allow the troops concentrated in the south to pass the Pyrenees, and in fine not to break up the depôt formed at Pau.

A marked difference therefore continues to prevail, notwithstanding the remarks of certain journals, between the late and the present ministry, even in as far as regards the co-operation in Spain; for if the depôt at Pau is not dissolved, on the other hand our troops will not at present cross the frontiers, the French cockade will not be displayed in Spain. The difference, therefore, is that the intervention will not now take place.

In fact, the opponents of the ministry know it full well. Consequently, after protesting that the same faults prevail, they equally say that matters have changed, which is true. But they only show that in concealing the truth they make use of it in the interest of their own tactics by endeavouring to prove that the new ministry yields to the importunity of the Northern Courts. M. Thiers, they say, wished the intervention at the instigation of

England; M. Molé and M. Guizot declined, in order to please Russia.

But this is not the case. It is not to please the North that Louis Phillipe has changed his ministers; it is not with this view that the new ministry has commenced by renouncing the intervention.

The grand motive which determined M. Guizot against the intervention was that at the present moment it appears to him inopportune. We know with certainty that formerly M. Guizot, as well as M. de Broglie, looked to an intervention which would have easily extinguished Carlism in its infancy, and it is exactly those who opposed it who now urge its adoption. M.Guizot is unwilling to intervene at the moment when the constitution has just been proclaimed. This appears to him dangerous in every point of view; but if the constitution shall be modified in a sense favourable to the Queen, and if the Queen, confirmed on the throne by the national party and by the population recovered from its excitement, should still demand the co-operation under the Spanish cockade against Carlism, then perhaps the co-operation might appear to M. Guizot opportune, and we should not be surprised to see his adversaries then changing their opinions, with the sole view of opposing this minister.

M. Molé, in pronouncing at present against intervention, appears more particularly animated by the idea that sufficient confidence cannot yet be placed in the North; in Russia, which has just ordered her armaments; in Prussia, which seems ready to imitate her example, and excites Austria and all Germany to the same step. M. Molé aims at guaranteeing France on the side of the Rhine before mixing in affairs beyond the Pyrenees. He is a man capable of setting the North at defiance, and he knows the best means of doing so. When Russia, therefore, shall have replaced her sword in the scabbard, it will be time to look to Spain.

The English journals, whose honesty I acknowledge, seem to be misled by their correspondents, or to judge according to isolated facts which are but little understood. The "Globe," in its petty warfare against M. Molé, seems animated by its predilection for M. de Broglie. That statesman in reality deserves so honourable a support. But I say it without bitterness, justice

towards one statesman must not degenerate into injustice towards another.

The English journals accuse our new ministry of being unfaithful to the quadruple alliance. This is not borne out by facts. That Treaty stipulates nothing about the entry of French troops into Spain.

The same journals, in order to represent M. Molé as Russian, find only the testimony of Lafayette. The dead cannot refute them. But as I have known Lafayette intimately, and have frequently spoken with him on the subject of M. Molé, I can attest that M. Lafayette has never spoken of him, but in the most honourable manner.

The difference between M. de Molé and M. de Broglie is that M. de Broglie, believing in the warlike projects of Russia against France and Turkey, would have been well pleased with an expedition to the Dardanelles; M. Molé and his friend M. Bresson* at Berlin have never imagined Russia to entertain such extensive views, or at least they have imagined that it would be easy to oppose them. M. de Broglie is the enemy of Russia. M. Molé is the adversary of that power. These are facts which would very much astonish readers in France, and I must even fear that my frankness may seem ill-placed to well informed persons, but, in my opinion, the French ministers may manifest their opinions before all the world.

The English Government, with Lord Palmerston as Foreign Minister, and Lord Granville as Ambassador at Paris, must see things more clearly than the journals, and know the whole truth. The English Cabinet could hardly allow itself to be misled by incorrect correspondence, or to judge of the general policy of a country by isolated facts and misrepresentations. In every case, the British Cabinet will do well to insist on a more complete execution of the Quadruple Alliance, and to divert our Government unceasingly from every political approximation towards the

* M. Bresson is one of the most distinguished diplomatists of France. But he does not understand the Eastern question. He has been eminently distinguished by his services in the Western Hemisphere, but the East is a field so entirely different, and one which demands so exclusive a study and we may add a residence in the East, that we are not surprised at his not having yet grasped all the bearings of this all-embracing subject.-Eo.

Northern Powers, who are no less opposed to France than to England. The best mode will be for England to give to our Government still stronger guarantees; for, if France is sufficiently powerful in case of need to defend herself against the North, it will be much easier to do so with the cordial support of England. The more we have such guarantees, the more will they hasten the co-operation in Spain. I cannot, therefore, but think that it will still take place. But the worst event which could happen would be that of following the impulse pointed out by some English journals, which speak with bitterness of the French Ministry, of the King, and of France herself. One must not thus alienate a Government which has the consciousness of its dignity, a nation which holds out its hand to England, and which, in the name of the Revolution of July and of British Reform, sincerely wishes the friendship of Great Britain.

Russia knows this; her diplomatists are unceasingly active. They are putting everything in motion to dissolve the AngloFrench alliance. The affairs of Spain, Algiers, the journey of M. de Medem, every thing offers them a pretext to arrive at this end, which they will not attain.

AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.

Paris, September 14, 1836.

I ought not to leave you in ignorance, that, ever since the close of last year, a sort of Tiers Parti has been formed in Spain between the moderate party and M. Mendizabal. Their object is to steer clear of the ultra-revolutionary party. Amongst their number we may name Count Almadovar, the Minister of War, and almost all the superior officers of the army, who look back with shame and disgust at the part which they played in conjunction with Count de Las Naves, the deputy Chacon, &c. The opinions and interests of the moderate party are supported by the principal officers remaining at Madrid, and by the royal guard, which forms the principal strength of the garrison in the capital.

AFFAIRS OF CIRCASSIA, PERSIA, AND

TURKEY.

Constantinople, September 1st, 1836.

EVENTS are transpiring in this quarter calculated to excite alarm, and arouse, if any thing can, the British Government and nation to prompt measures for their own protection. A Russian force of twelve thousand men has just succeeded in carrying, by assault, the Castle of Silgik, on the coast of Circassia, between Anapa and Ghilingik; thus giving a most distressing blow to the hopes and efforts of the Caucasians, in whom we have the only remaining check to Russia's free ingress into Asia Minor and Persia. From Persia herself our own arms are turned against us-that country which we sought to uphold as a barrier for the security of India from the North. To save it from anarchy-a necessary duty in pursuit of this ob

ject

-British officers aided the reigning Monarch in putting down all his rivals, among whose partizans in the Southern provinces were the most attached adherents to a connexion with us. The error was not here, but it arose from Russian

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