had emancipated from paternal authority, by allowing him to be placed at the head of an independent kingdom.

We shall observe hereafter the consequences that the violation of this article has entailed.

VIOLATION II. ART. IX.

"The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his 20th year; that is to say, on the first of June, 1835."

ART. X.

"During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent by a Regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by his Majesty the King of Bavaria."

In the Protocols which accompanied and explained the Treaty, it was stated that Count Armansperg, M. von Maurer and General Heydeck, were to be the "permanent and definitive government of Greece," until the majority of the King. They were constituted an independent power, yet the King of Bavaria, in July, 1834, removed one

VL. IV.-NO. XXVII.

F

of the councillors, and substituted another in his place. This was a complete violation by a foreign Potentate, who was himself a party to the convention, of the independence of the Regency, and consequently it was the subversion of the independence of the sovereignty of Greece.

VIOLATION III. ART. XVII.

"The Three Courts shall announce to the Greek nation, by a joint declaration, the choice which they have made of his Royal Highness the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, and shall afford the Regency all the support in their power."

We have shown in our last number how that support was given to a minority in the Regency against a majority; whereas one of the Protocols determined that "the majority of votes in the council of the Regency thus constituted should decide on all state affairs."

It is singular that the Monarch of a kingdom, which has so few interests in common with those of Greece, was allowed to interfere in the affairs of that country unimpeded by the allied Courts, who had promised the Regency the whole of their support.

If, therefore, that sovereign has acquired the power of interfering on one occasion, what guarantee is there for his not interfering again? If there be no guarantee, as it would appear that there is none, is not the independence of Greece at an end, without the formal union of the two crowns on one head, which the negotiators seemed so very anxious to prevent? And if no guarantee for its independence, what guarantee for the money advanced by the three powers being applied to objects Bavarian and not Greek?

"The Sovereign of Greece, and the Greek state, shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, the first revenues of the state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, first of all, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund; and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee

of the three Courts shall have been completely secured for the current year.

"The Diplomatic Representatives of the three Courts shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned stipulation."

This stipulation was violated. Now, on whom does the responsibility fall? It was stated by several Members from various parts of the House during the debate, that Greece had violated its engagements; and yet it never made any engagements whatsoever, the Treaty between the three Courts and the King of Greece, stipulated in Art. VI., having never been drawn up. The whole responsibility, therefore, of the non-fulfilment of this article rests upon the allied Courts, and on their Diplomatic Representatives in Greece, who did not take care that the interest and sinking fund should be raised out of the first revenues of the Greek state. It was because Greece was not a party to the Convention of May the 7th, that the charge was especially handed over to the Diplomatic Representatives in Greece, to watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned stipulation.

But, in the same article, 6o. we find mention made of two parties-the Sovereign of Greece, and

the Greek state, who were "to be bound," &c. It is clear from two parties being mentioned, that it was the original intention that Greece should be constituted in such a manner, that there was to be some peculiar body distinct from the King, which was to represent the nation; that in fact Greece was to be governed constitutionally. Of course it was not for foreign nations to define what kind of institution was best adapted to the Greek state, or what forms would secure the voice of the nation being best heard; but, as the Greek state was required to perform certain functions, and those functions, too, of a financial character, it is natural to infer that there was to be a constitution to control the expenditure of the King; a constitutional body, before whom were to be laid the public accounts. All official authorities upon the subject have said that a constitution would be advisable for Greece. The Ambassadors at Poros declared in their conference that it would be " unjust," and even "dangerous, to deprive the Greeks of their municipal and representative rights, which they had enjoyed even under the Turks." And, in the declaration addressed to the Greek nation by the Plenipotentiaries of the Conference of London, the Greeks