whether he should pass sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor. The Judges did not decide the case at that time, it being understood that a bill was to be brought into parliament to explain this obscure statute.

At this trial, Talfourd, as counsel for the prisoner, insisted that he could not at all be indicted for a felony under this statute, for that before this statute passed, the act of receiving stolen goods was not a substantive felony, but a misdemeanour only, where the principal was not convicted. Now this statute only says such an act shall be deemed and construed to be a felony, instead of declaring it to be a felony in distinct and positive terms. The learned Judge overruled the objection, but in submitting to the Judges the question as to the extent of the punishment, this point was also stated.

The Judges met twice to consider the case, and in Easter term, 1824, the majority of the Judges present, viz., ABBOTT, C. J., BEST, C. J., BAYLEY, J., BURROUGH, J., and GARROW, B., held the conviction wrong, being of opinion that the 3 G. 4, c. 24, s. 3, leaves as misdemeanors what were misdemeanors before the passing of that statute, and therefore this offence was not punishable as a felony. HULLOCK, B., Littledale, J., Holroyd, J., and GRAHAM, B., thought that since the passing of that act this offence was a felony, and punishable as such.

REX v. EDWARD WALTERS and Others.

Burglary. An out-house in the yard of a dwelling-house, will be parcel of the dwelling-house if the yard is enclosed, though the occupier has another dwelling-house opening into the yard, and he lets such dwelling-house with certain easements in the yard.

THE prisoners were tried before Mr. Justice HOLROYD at the Lent assizes, in the year 1824, and convicted of a burglary.

A question arose, whether the warehouse in which the robbery was committed was in law part of the prosecutor's dwelling-house, and which question was submitted to the consideration of the Judges.

The prosecutor, a grocer, had a dwelling-house in which he lived and carried on his trade. The back part opened into a yard, where the warehouse, which he also used for his trade, was situate, and into which yard the warehouse also opened.

The yard was entirely inclosed by his house and other buildings, and by a wall, and gates which were closed and fastened at night, and the whole were his property; and, except as after-mentioned, were in his possession.

His dwelling-house was in one range of building with the warehouse broken into; but between them, in the same range, was another dwelling-house, his property also, opening into the yard, and let to a person who occupied it, together with some easements in the yard, as his yearly tenant.

The two houses had formerly been both in one.

The prisoners received judgment as for a burglary, but the learned Judge reserved the point for the opinion of the Judges.

In Easter term, 1824, nine of the Judges met, and considered the case. They held the conviction right, being of opinion that the warehouse was part of the prosecutor's house; it was so before the division, and they thought it remained so after the division. (a)

(a) See Brown's Case, 2 East. P. C. 501, 502; but see also ibid. 493. S. C. 2 Leach, C. C. 1018, notis. 4th ed.; S. P. Rex v. Stock, Russ. & Ry. C. C. R. 185.

REX v. JAMES WALSH.

Larceny. Prisoner had lifted up a bag from the bottom of a boot of a coach, but was detected before he had got it out, it did not appear that it was entirely removed from the space it at first occupied in the boot, but the raising it from the bottom had completely removed each part of it from the space that specific part occupied. The Judges held this was a complete asportation.

THE prisoner was tried before THOMAS DENMAN, Esquire, Common Serjeant, at the Old Bailey Sessions, January, 1824, on an indictment for stealing a leathern bag containing small parcels, the property of William Ray, the guard to the Exeter mail.

At the trial it appeared that the bag was placed in the front boot, and the prisoner, sitting on the box, took hold of the upper end of the bag, and lifted it up from the bottom of the boot on which it rested. He handed the upper part of the bag to a person who stood beside the wheel on the pavement, and both had hold of it together, endeavouring to pull it out of the boot, with a common intent to steal it. Before they were able to obtain complete possession of the bag, and while they were so engaged in trying to draw it out, they were interrupted by the guard, and dropt the bag.

The prisoner was found guilty, but the facts above

stated were specially found by the jury, in answer to questions put to them by the Common Serjeant.

The Common Serjeant, entertaining some doubts whether the prisoner could be truly said to have "stolen, taken, and carried away" the bag, he respited the judgment, in order that the opinion of the Judges might be taken on the case.

In Easter term, 1824. The Judges met and considered this case. They held the conviction right, being of opinion that there was a complete asportation of the bag. (a)

(a) Vide East. P. C. 555, 556, 557. 1 Hale, 508. 527.

REX v. RICHARD BEACALL.

By 24 G. 3, c. 15, (local act) certain inhabitants in seven parishes are incorporated by the name of “the Guardians of the Poor of those Parishes,” twelve directors are to be appointed out of the guardians, and the property belonging to the corporation is vested in "the Directors for the time being," who are to execute the powers of the act. The prisoner was indicted for embezzling the moneys of "the Directors of the Poor of the said Parishes." The Judges held that the moneys should have been laid as the moneys of the "Guardians of the Poor by their corporate name,” or of the directors for the time being in their individual names.

THE prisoner was tried and convicted before Mr. Justice PARK, at the Lent assizes for Shrewsbury, in the year 1824.

The indictment charged that the prisoner was servant to the directors of the poor of the several parishes within the town of Shrewsbury, and the liberties thereof, in the county of Salop, for the time being, and employed and entrusted by the said directors to receive money and notes for them, and being such servant so employed and entrusted, then and there, by virtue of such employment and entrustment as aforesaid, he the said Richard Beacall did receive and take into his possession fifteen shillings in moneys numbered, and various notes (on which

no point depended), for and on account of the said directors of the poor of several parishes within the town of Shrewsbury, and the liberties thereof, in the county of Salop then being, his said masters and employers, and having so received and taken into his possession the said fifteen shillings in moneys numbered, &c., for and on account of his said masters and employers, he the said Richard Beacall fraudulently and feloniously did embezzle and secrete the same. And so the jurors aforesaid, &c., say that the said Richard Beacall did then and there feloniously steal, take and carry away from the said directors of the poor of several parishes, &c., (describing them as before,) the said fifteen shillings in moneys, numbered, &c., being the moneys, &c. of the said directors of the poor of several parishes within the town of Shrewsbury, and the liberties thereof, in the county of Salop, on whose account the said moneys were received and taken into the possession of him the said Richard Beacall, being such servant as aforesaid.

There were several other counts in the indictment, but all of them described the prosecutors in the same language, nor did any count state from whom the moneys were received for the use of the prosecutors.

Curwood for the prisoner objected that the indictment was defective in not stating from whom the prisoner had received the money he was charged with having embezzled. That not having notice by the indictment from whom the prosecutors would attempt to prove he had received money, he could not be prepared with evidence to rebut it, and even though he might bring evidence to rebut what he might have got some hint of, it might turn out wholly unavailing, as the prosecutors might proceed on some other charge. Supposing the prisoner to be acquitted on this indictment, how could he use this acquittal on a plea of auter fois acquit on account of the