In the course of his only long speech, made on the 10th of June, Mr. Monroe said : : "What is the form of our State governments? They are all similar in their structure, perfectly democratic. The freedom of mankind has found an asylum here which it could find nowhere else. Freedom of conscience is enjoyed here in the fullest degree. Our States are not disturbed by a contrariety of religious opinions, and other causes of quarrels which other nations have. They have no causes of internal variance. Causes of war between the States have been represented in all those terrors which splendid genius and brilliant imagination can so well depict. But, sir, I conceive they are imaginary, mere creatures of fancy. I will admit that there was a contrariety of sentiments, a contest in which I was a witness in some respects, a contest respecting the western unsettled lands. Every State, having a charter for the lands within its colonial limits, had its claims to such lands confirmed by the war. The other States contended that those lands belonged not to a part of the States, but to all; that it was highly reasonable and equitable that all should participate in what had been acquired by the efforts of all. The progress of this dispute gave uneasiness to the true friends of America; but territorial claims may now be said to be adjusted. Have not Virginia, North Carolina, and other States ceded their claims to Congress? The disputes between Virginia and Maryland are also settled; nor is there an existing controversy between any of the States at present. Thus, sir, this great source of public calamity has been terminated without the adoption of this gov ernment. "What are the powers which the federal government ought to have? I will draw the line between the powers necessary to be given to the federal, and those which ought to be left to the State governments. To the former I would give control over the national affairs; to the latter I would leave the care of local interests. Neither the Confederation, nor this Constitution, answers this discrimination. To make the first a proper federal government, I would add to it one great power, I would give it an absolute control over commerce. To render the system under consideration safe and proper, I would take from it one power only, I mean that of direct taxation. I conceive its other powers are sufficient without this. My objections to this power are that I conceive it not necessary, impracticable under a democracy (if exercised), as tending to anarchy, or the subversion of liberty, and probably the latter. In the first place, it is unnecessary, because exigencies will not require it. The demands and necessities of government are now greater than they will be hereafter, because of the expenses of the war in which we were engaged, which cost us the blood of our best citizens, and which ended so gloriously. "There is no danger of war, as I have already said. Our necessities will, therefore, in a short time, be greatly diminished. What are the resources of the United States? How are requisitions to be complied with? I know the government ought to be so organized as to be competent to discharge its engagements and secure the public happiness. To enable it to do these things, I would give it the power of laying an impost, which is amply sufficient with its other means. The impost, at an early period, was calculated at nearly a million of dollars. If this calculation was well founded, if it was so much at five per centum, what will it not amount to, when the absolute control of commerce will be in the hands of Congress? May we not suppose, when the general government will lay what duties it may think proper, that the amount will be very considerable? There are other resources. The back lands have already been looked upon as a very important resource. When we view the western extensive territory, and contemplate the fertility of the soil, the noble rivers which penetrate it, and the excellent navigation which may be had there, may we not depend on this as a very substantial resource? In the third place we have the resource of loans. This is a resource which is necessary and proper, and has been recurred to by all nations. The credit of our other resources will enable us to procure, by loans, any sums we may want. We have also, in the fourth place, requisitions, which are so much despised. These, sir, have often been productive. As the demands on the States will be but for trivial sums, after Congress shall be possessed of its other great resources, is it to be presumed that its application will be despised? If the government be well administered, or possess any part of the confidence of the people, is it presumed that requisitions, for trivial sums, will be refused? I conclude, sir, that they will be readily complied with; and that they, with the imposts, back lands, and loans, will be abundantly sufficient for all the exigencies of the Union. In the next place it appears to me that the exercise of the power of direct taxation is impracticable in this country, under a democracy. Consider the territory lying between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi. Its extent far exceeds that of the German Empire. It is larger than any territory that ever was under any free government. It is too extensive to be governed but by a despotic monarchy. Taxes can not be laid justly and equally in such a territory. What are the objects of direct taxation? Will the taxes be laid on land? One gentleman has said that the United States would select out a particular object, or objects, and leave the rest to the States. Suppose land to be the object selected by Congress; examine its consequences. The landholder alone would suffer by such a selection. A very considerable part of the community would escape. Those who pursue commerce and arts would escape. It could not possibly be estimated equally. Will the taxes be laid on the polls only? Would not the landholder escape in that case? How then will it be laid? On all property? Consider the consequences. Is it possible to make a law that shall operate alike in all the States? Is it possible for there to be sufficient intelligence for the men of Georgia to know the situation of the men of New Hampshire? Is there a precise similitude of situation in each State? Compare the situation of the citizens in different States. 'Are there not a thousand circumstances showing clearly that there can be no law that can be uniform in its operation throughout the United States? "If you give the resources of the several States to the general government, in what situation are the States left? I, therefore, think the general government will preponderate. "Besides its possession of all the resources of the country, there are other circumstances that will enable it to triumph in the conflict with the States. Gentlemen of influence and character, men of distinguished talents, of eminent virtue, and great endowments, will compose the general government. In what a situation will the different States be, when all the talents and abilities of the country will be against them? "The Confederation has been deservedly reprobated for its inadequacy to promote the public welfare. But this change is, in my opinion, very dangerous. It contemplates objects with which a federal government ought never to interfere. The concurrent interfering power of laying taxes on the people will occasion a perpetual conflict between the general and individual governments; which for the reasons I have already mentioned, must terminate to the disadvantage, if not in the annihilation, of the latter. Can it be presumed that the people of America can patiently bear such a double oppression? Is it not to be presumed that they will endeavor to get rid of one of the oppressors? I fear, sir, that it will ultimately end in the establishment of a monarchical government. The people, in order to be delivered from one species of tyranny, may submit to another. I am strongly impressed with the necessity of having a firm national government; but I am decidedly against giving it the power of direct taxation, because I think it endangers our liberties. My attachment to the Union and an energetic government is such, that I would consent to give the general government every power contained in that plan, except that of taxation. "Permit me to examine the reasoning that admits that all powers not given up are reserved. Apply this. If you give to the United States the power of direct taxation, in making all laws necessary to give it operation (which is a power given by the last clause in the 8th section of the 1st article), suppose they should be of opinion that the right of the trial by jury was not one of the requisites to carry it into effect; there is no check in this Constitution to prevent the formal abolition of it. There is a general power given to them to make all laws that will enable them to carry their powers into effect. There are no limits pointed out. They are not restrained or controlled from making any law, however oppressive in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry their powers into effect. By this general, unqualified power, they may infringe not only on the trial by jury, but the liberty of the press, and every right that is not expressly secured or excepted from that general power. I conceive that such general powers are very dangerous. Our great inalienable rights ought to be secured from being destroyed by such unlimited powers, either by a bill of rights, or by an express provision in the body of the Constitution. It is immaterial in which of these two modes rights are secured. "Why is the government divided into different branches? For a more faithful and regular administration. Where is there a check? We have more to apprehend from the union of these branches than from the subversion of any; and this union will destroy the rights of the people. There is nothing to prevent this coalition; but the contest which will probably subsist between the general government and the individual governments will tend to produce it. There is a division of sovereignty between the National and State governments. How far, then, will they coalesce together? Is it not to be supposed that there will be a conflict between them? If so, will not the members of the former combine together? Where, then, will be the check to prevent encroachments on the rights of the people? There is not a third essentially distinct branch, to preserve a just equilibrium, or to prevent such encroachments. In developing this plan of government, we ought to attend to the necessity of having checks. I can see no real checks in it. "Let us now consider the responsibility of the President. He is elected for four years, and not excluded from re-election. Suppose he violates the laws and Constitution, or commits high crimes. By whom is he to be tried? By his own council, by those who advise him to commit such violations and crimes. This subverts the principles of justice, as it secures him from punishment. He commands the army of the United States till he is condemned. Will this not be an inducement to foreign nations to use their arts and intrigues to corrupt his counselors? . . Will not the influence of the President himself have great weight in his re-election? The variety of offices at his disposal will acquire him the favor and attachment of those who aspire after them, and of the officers and their friends. He will have some connection with the members of the different branches of government. They will esteem him because they will be acquainted with him, live in the same town with him, and often dine with him. This familiar and frequent intercourse will secure him great influence. I presume that when once he is elected, he may be elected forever. "When we take a more accurate view of the principles of the Senate, we shall have grounds to fear that the interest of our State may be totally neglected; nay, that our legislative influence will be as if we were actually expelled or banished out of Congress. The Senators are amenable to and appointed by the States. They have a negative on all laws, may originate any except money bills, and direct the affairs of the executive. Seven States are a majority, and can, in most cases, bind the rest; from which reason the interest of certain States alone will be consulted. Although the House of Representatives is calculated on |