THE NORTH SEA or DOGGER BANK CASE' between GREAT BRITAIN and RUSSIA Findings Reported February 26, 1905 In October, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, the Admiral of the Russian Baltic fleet, then coaling off the coast of Norway, received rumors from several sources of the presence of Japanese torpedo boats in the vicinity, and on this account the fleet set sail for the Far East twenty-four hours ahead of schedule. As the last division of the fleet, in immediate charge of the Admiral, was passing through the North Sea in the early hours of the morning of October 9, 1904, it came upon what afterwards proved to be an English fishing fleet from Hull, England. The Russians, under a misapprehension that the English vessels were the Japanese torpedo boats, opened fire, with the result that one fishing boat was sunk and others damaged, while two fishermen were killed and six injured. In order to prevent serious results from this incident, France suggested resort to an international commission of inquiry, as provided for in the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, adopted by the Hague Conference of 1899. The suggestion was accepted by Great Britain and Russia, and an agreement was signed on November 25, 1904, which invested a commission composed of admirals from the British, Russian, United States, French and Austrian navies with authority to find the facts in dispute and to fix responsibility. The commission held sessions at Paris from December 22, 1904, to February 26, 1905, on which date its report was rendered. The conclusion reached was that there were no torpedo boats either among the trawlers or anywhere near and that the opening of fire by the Russian Admiral was not justified. His action under the circumstances was not, however, such as to cast discredit upon his military abilities or humanity or that of the personnel of his squadron. Russia accepted the decision and paid damages to the extent of about $300,000. 1This case is also known as "The Hull Incident." 2Post, p. 410. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION Report of the commissioners, drawn up in accordance with Article 6 of the declaration of St. Petersburg of November 12/25, 1904.-Paris, February 26, 1905.1 1. The commissioners, after a minute and prolonged examination of the whole of the facts brought to their knowledge in regard to the incident submitted to them for inquiry by the declaration of St. Petersburg of the 12th (25th) November, 1904,2 have proceeded to make, in this report, an analysis of these facts in their logical sequence. By making known the prevailing opinion of the commission on each important or decisive point of this summary, they consider that they have made sufficiently clear the causes and the consequences of the incident in question, as well as the deductions which are to be drawn from them with regard to the question of responsibility. 2. The second Russian squadron of the Pacific fleet, under the command-in-chief of Vice-Admiral Aide-de-camp General Rojdestvensky, anchored on the 7th (20th) October, 1904, off Cape Skagen, with the purpose of coaling before continuing its voyage to the Far East. It appears, from the depositions made, that, from the time of the departure of the squadron from the roadstead of Réval, Admiral Rojdestvensky had had the vessels under his charge take minute precautions in order to be fully prepared for a night attack by torpedo boats, either at sea or at anchor. These precautions seemed to be justified by the numerous reports of the agents of the Imperial Government regarding possible hostile attacks, which in all likelihood would take the form of torpedo boat attacks. Moreover, during his stay at Skagen, Admiral Rojdestvensky had been warned of the presence of suspect vessels on the coast of Norway. He had learned, also, from the commander of the transport Bakan coming from the north, that he had seen on the previous night four torpedo boats, carrying a single light only, and that at the masthead. 1American Journal of International Law, vol. 2, p. 931. For the original French text, see Appendix, p. 609. 2Post, p. 410. This news made the Admiral decide to start twenty-four hours earlier. 3. Consequently, each of the six distinct divisions of the fleet got under way, separately and in turn, and reached the North Sea independently, in the order indicated in Admiral Rojdestvensky's report; that flag-officer commanding in person the last division, formed by the four new battleships Prince Souvoroff, Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, Orel, and the transport Anadyr. This division left Skagen on the 7th (20th) October at 10 o'clock in the evening. A speed of twelve knots was ordered for the first two divisions, and of ten knots for the following divisions. 4. Between 1:30 and 4:15 on the afternoon of the next day, the 8th (21st) October, all the divisions of the squadron passed in turn the English steamer Zero, whose captain examined the different units so attentively that they could be recognized from his description of them. The results of his observations are, moreover, in general agreement with the statements in Admiral Rojdestvensky's report. 5. The last vessel to pass the Zero was, according to his description of her, the Kamchatka. This transport, which originally was in a division with the Dmitri Donskoi and the Aurora, was, therefore, left behind and isolated about ten miles to the rear of the squadron. She had been obliged to slaken speed in consequence of damage to her engines. This accidental delay was, perhaps, incidentally the cause of the events which followed. 6. Toward 8 o'clock in the evening this transport did, in fact, meet the Swedish vessel Aldebaran and other unknown vessels and open fire on them, doubtless in consequence of the anxiety due to the circumstances of her momentary isolation, her damaged engines, and her poor fighting ability. However this may be, the commander of the Kamchatka, at 8:45 o'clock, sent a message by wireless telegraphy to his commander-inchief regarding this encounter, stating that he was "attacked on all sides by torpedo boats." 7. In order to understand the effect which this news had on Admiral Rojdestvensky's subsequent decisions, it must be remem bered that, in his opinion, the attacking torpedo boats, of whose presence fifty miles to the rear of the division which he commanded, he was thus, rightly or wrongly, informed, might overtake and attack him about 1 o'clock in the morning. This information led Admiral Rojdestvensky to signal to his ships about 10 o'clock in the evening to redouble their vigilance and look out for an attack by torpedo boats. 8. On board the Souvoroff the admiral deemed it essential that one of the two superior officers of his staff should be on watch on the captain's bridge during the night in order to observe, in his place, the progress of the squadron and to warn him at once if any incident occurred. On board all the ships, moreover, the Admiral's standing orders to the officer of the watch were to open fire in case of an evident and imminent attack by torpedo boats. If the attack were from the front he should open fire on his own initiative, and, in the contrary case, which would be much less pressing, he should refer to his commanding officer. With regard to these orders, the majority of the commissioners consider that they were in no way excessive in time of war, and particularly in the circumstances, which Admiral Rojdestvensky had every reason to consider very alarming, seeing that it was impossible for him to verify the accuracy of the warnings that he had received from the agents of his Government. 9. Toward 1 o'clock in the morning of the 9th (22d) October, 1904, the night was rather dark, a slight, low fog partly clouding the air. The moon only showed intermittently between the clouds. A moderate wind blew from the southeast, raising a long swell, which gave the ships a roll of 5° on each side. The course followed by the squadron toward the southwest would have taken the last two divisions, as the event proved, close past the usual fishing ground' of the fleet of Hull trawlers, which was composed of some thirty of these small steamboats, and was spread over an area of several miles. It appears from the concordant testimony of the British witnesses that all these boats carried their proper lights, and were trawling in accordance with their usual rules, under the direction of their 1Dogger Bank. |