181 Settlement. DIGEST. Sheriff. 182 apportioned between the estate of B. and C. according to the quantity of coal gotten during their respective lives. A line of railway passed over a portion of the testator's mines of which he had granted leases. After the death of B. the lessees gave notice to the railway company of their desire to work the minerals lying under and adjoining a portion of the railway. A counter-notice was given by the railway company that the coal was required for the support of the railway, and ultimately a compensation was paid by the railway company, part of which was apportioned as representing the lessor's interest. Held, that such apportioned part belonged to C., the present tenant for life, as the coal in respect of which the compensation was paid was not of such an extent that it could not possibly have been gotten during the lifetime of the existing tenant for life.Gamlen v. Lyon, CH.D. KAY, J. 164—33 Ch. D. 523; 56 L. J. Ch. 175; 55 L. T. 87. 19. Tenancy for life—Mortgage-Sale-Consent of mortgagee-Settled Land Act, 1882, 88. 3, 15, 20-22, 34, 50, 53.-Where a tenant for life has mortgaged his interest in the settled estates for its full value, the court, before exercising the discretion given to it by section 15 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, to order a sale of the mansion-house, will require to be satisfied that the mortgagee consents to such sale. Decision of North, J., affirmed.-In re Sebright's Settled Estates, c.A. 49-33 Ch. D. 429; 56 L. J. Ch. 169; 55 L. T. 570. 20. Tenancy for life-Payment into court-Election-Payment out-Settled Land Act, 1882, 88. 21, 22. -A., who died in 1829, devised his freehold estate in strict settlement. In 1859 a suit was commenced for the administration of the testator's estate, and in 1861 the usual administration decree was made. While the suit was still pending, the tenant for life of the settled estates contracted to sell them under the provisions of the Settled Land Act, 1882. Certain questions raised in the suit not having been determined, the purchaser refused to pay the purchase-money to the persons who had been appointed trustees of the will for the purposes of the Act, and applied for and obtained an order giving him liberty to pay the money into court. The tenant for life was a party to the application, and did not oppose the order made on it. The purchase having been completed, the tenant for life presented a petition asking to have the purchase-money paid out to the trustees for the purposes of the Act. Held, that the tenant for life, by consenting to the order giving the purchaser liberty to pay the money into court, had exercised the option given him by subsection 1 of section 22 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, and that the money must remain in court and be invested under the direction of the court.-Cookes v. Cookes, CH.D. NOR., J. 402-34 Ch. D. 498; 56 L. J. Ch. 397; 56 L. T. 159. 21. Tenancy for life-Sale-Notice to trusteesSettled Land Act, 1882, s. 45.-Upon a contract by a tenant for life, with the verbal assent of the trustees of the settlement, to sell, but without the written notice required by section 45 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, before the making of the contract, written notice sent to the trustees not less than a month before the time fixed for completion, but within a month before the death of the intending purchaser, is a sufficient compliance by the tenant for life with the requirements of the Act.-Duke of Marlborough v. Sartoris, CH.D. CHI., J. 55-32 Ch. D. 616; 56 L. J. Ch. 70; 55 L. T. 506. 22. Voluntary settlement-Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), 8. 47.-Section 47 of the Bank ruptcy Act, 1883, provides that "Any settlement of Held, that section 47 must be read to mean "without the aid of the property which by the settlement passes to other persons"; and that a settlement which leaves the settlor still able to pay his debts, although his means of paying them may be in part derived from the interest reserved to him under such settlement, does not fall within the meaning of the section.-Ex parte Official Receiver, In re Lowndes, Q.B.D. BKCY. 549-18 Q. B. D. 677; 56 L. J. Q. B. 425; 56 L. T. 575. 23. Voluntary settlement-Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 8. 47.-A., in 1877, executed a deed amounting to a declaration of trust, whereby, after reciting his posses sion of certain shares, he purported to transfer the same to trustees upon trust for his wife and children. The deed contained no covenant or obligation binding A. to carry out its provisions. No actual transfer of the shares was executed until February, 1886. In the following April A. was adjudicated a bankrupt. Held, that the instrument executed in 1877 was not a settlement in any legal sense of the term, but that the transfer executed in 1886 was a settlement within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and that it was void under sub-section 1 of the same section as having been made within two years of the settlor's bankruptcy. Decision of Cave, J., affirmed. Per Lord Esher, M.R., and Lopes, L.J.-A section of a new Act, so far as it is identical with a section of a former Act upon the same subject-matter, must be construed as retrospective in effect, but, so far as it contains any new enactment, it comes under the general rule that a new Act is not to be construed as retrospective unless specifically stated to be so.-Ex parte Todd, In re Ashcroft, c.a. 676-19 Q. B. D. 186; 56 L. J. Q. B. 431. See also BILL OF SALE, 28; COPYHOLD, 2; DIVORCE, 3-5; INFANT, 5, 6; LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 4; POOR LAW, 1-5; PROBATE DUTY; STAMP, 3, 4; SUCCESSION DUTY, 2. SHELLEY'S CASE, RULE in.-See WILL, 21. 1. Costs-Interpleader.-Goods taken in execution were claimed by the claimant under a bill of sale. On the trial of an interpleader issue the claimant was successful, and the goods seized were sold by the sheriff. Held, that the successful claimant was entitled to recover as costs the sheriff's charges for levy and sale. -Goodman v. Blake, Q.B.D. 812-19 Q. B. D. 77; 56 L. J. Q. B. 441. 1a. Death of sheriff-Liability of under-sheriff.— After the death of a sheriff, and before the appointment of his successor, the under-sheriff sold goods taken in execution on a writ delivered to him before the death of the sheriff. He did not pay over all the proceeds to the execution creditors, who, more than six months after the death of the under-sheriff, and more than six months after they had undertaken administration, sued his executors for money had and received, and also for the tort committed by the undersheriff. Held, that the action for money had and received would lie; and that, as that action did not require the same evidence to support it as the action for tort, it was not necessary to waive the tort.-Gloucestershire Banking Co. v. Edwards, Q.B.D. 842. 2. Execution-C laim for rent-Bill of exchangeNotice to creditors-6 Anne, c. 8, 8. 1.-After seizure of goods under a writ of fi. fa., the sheriff discovered that a year's rent was due to the landlord, and withdrew without giving notice to the execution creditor of the claim for rent. The value of the goods seized was less than the rent claimed, and a bill of exchange given for the rent, accepted by a third party, was not yet due. The execution creditor sued the sheriff for withdrawing from the execution. Held, (1) that the currency of the bill of exchange did not suspend the rights of the landlord; (2) that the sheriff was not bound to give notice to the execution creditor of the landlord's claim for rent.-Davidson v. Allen, Q.B.D. (Ir.)-20 L. R. Ir. 16. 3. Execution-Pledge-Receiver.—Under a writ of fi. fa. the sheriff seized, among other things, redeemable pledges in the possession of the execution debtor, a pawnbroker. A receiver appointed in a subsequent action, in which judgment was obtained against the pawnbroker, claimed the redeemable pledges from the sheriff. Held, that the redeemable pledges had been properly taken in execution; and that the sheriff was entitled to retain possession of them as against the receiver, but subject to the pledgor's rights of redemption.Rollason v. Rollason, CH.D. NOR., J. 607-34 Ch. D. 495; 56 L. T. 303. 4. Execution Withdrawal from possession Guarantee Damages.-Goods were seized under a fi. fa., and R. and F. signed a document by which, in consideration of the sheriff not putting the execution in force at present, they undertook to have the goods delivered to the sheriff when required, or, in default of so doing, to be answerable for the full amount of the execution. The sheriff, with the consent of the execution creditor, withdrew from posses. sion. Held, that the sheriff, after demand of delivery, could sue R. and F. for refusing to deliver the goods or pay the amount of the execution, and was entitled, without proof of actual damage, to the value of the goods.-Hobson v. Riordan, c.a. (Ir.)-20 L. R. Ir. 255. See also BANKRUPTCY, 27; COUNTY COURT, 1. SHIPPING: BILL OF LADING 1. Exception-" Dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation "-Collision Negligence.A charter-party excepted "dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation." Part of the cargo was lost in consequence of a collision with another ship brought about solely by the negligence of the latter. Held, that the loss was within the excepted perils.Garston Sailing Ship Co. v. Hickie, c.A. 33-18 Q. B. D. 17; 56 L. J. Q. B. 38; 55 L. T. 879. 2. Exception-Jettison-Deck cargo at shipowner's risk.-Certain bales were shipped on board a steamship under bills of lading, which, among other risks, excepted jettison and stranding. Some of the bills of lading contained the words "under deck." The bales were stowed on deck, and, on the ship taking the ground, they were jettiscned. It was admitted that the jettison was proper, and that there was a frequent practice to carry goods on deck at shipowner's risk. Held, that it made no difference whether the bills of lading contained the words "under deck" or not, and that the cotton was carried in breach of the contract; that the exceptions in the bills of lading referred to goods stowed under deck only; that the shipowners were liable for non-delivery; and that the cause of action was not too remote. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (reported 33 W. R. 868) affirmed.-Royal Exchange Shipping Co. v. Dixon, H.L. 461—12 App. 11; 56 L. J. Q. B. 266; 56 L. T. 206. 3. Exception-Perils of the sea-Collision-Negli. gence-Burden of proof.-The Xantho, c.A. 23-11 P. D. 169; 55 L. J. P. D. & A. 65; 55 L. T. 203.— Since reversed by the House of Lords. 4. Indorsement—Quality marks — Variance—Liability of indorsee-Estoppel.-Five hundred bales of jute were shipped on board the defendants' vessel under a bill of lading which provided that if quality marks were used they were to be of a certain size, and if such quality marks were inserted in the shipping notes, bills of lading in conformity therewith should be signed by the captain, and the ship should be responsible for the correct delivery of the goods. The bales had on them quality marks indicating three dif ferent qualities of jute, but in the shipping notes, which were made out by the shippers, the number of bales of each quality was wrongly inserted, there being stated to be fifty-nine bales more of the second quality, and fifty-nine bales less of the third quality. The quality marks, with the number of bales of each quality, were inserted in the bill of lading from the shipping notes and were in conformity therewith. The bill of lading was indorsed to the plaintiffs for value, who had no notice of any incorrectness in the description of the goods in the bill of lading. The 500 bales which had been shipped were duly delivered to the plaintiffs, but they claimed the difference in value between the bales delivered and those described in the bill of lading. Held, that the defendants were not liable under the above clause in the bill of lading; and that they were not liable to the indorsees for value of the bill of lading on the ground of estoppel by the misrepresenta tion of the master, the master having no general authority to insert the mercantile quality of the goods in the bill of lading so as to bind his owners. Cox v. Bruce, c.a. 207-18 Q. B. D. 147; 56 L. J. Q. B. 121. 5. Mistake of date-Broker-Liability of ownerShip's brokers at a foreign port have not authority to relieve the master of a ship from the duty of seeing to the accuracy of statements contained in bills of lading which they present to him for signature.— Stumore v. Breen, H.L.-56 L. J. Q. B. 401. 6. Negligence Transhipment — Collision — Merchant Shipping Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63), &. 54.-A vessel carrying cargo shipped under a charterparty and bills of lading containing an exception of fire and other dangers and accidents of the seas and navigation, but not excepting negligence of the master or crew, having received damage in a collision caused in part by her own negligence, was compelled to discharge the cargo and to proceed in ballast to a port where it could be repaired, and the master, acting justifiably and with the knowlege, but without the assent or dissent, of the cargo-owner, transhipped the cargo into three vessels whose masters signed bills of lading making the same deliverable at the port to which the cargo had been originally coneigned, but excepting loss from any act or default by the master or mariners in the navigation of the ship. Portions of the cargo so transhipped were, before arrival at their port of destination, totally lost by the negligent navigation of the masters of the vessels on which they had been transhipped, and to recover damages for their loss the cargo-owner brought an action against the owners of the vessel on which the cargo had been originally shipped. The defendants denied any liability in respect of the plaintiff's claim, and raised the further defence that, by a decree of this court in a limitation of liability suit, the liability of the defendants for the loss and damage caused by the collision had been limited to an amount already distributed amongst third parties; that the plaintiff's claim was limited as in such decree mentioned, and that, by reason of the limitation proceedings, the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the action. The court found at the hearing that the master of the defendants' vessel had transhipped the cargo for the purpose of earning his freight. Held, that the contract of the defendants to carry and deliver the cargo had not been performed, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the damages he claimed. Held, also, that the loss in respect of which the plaintiff claimed damages was not a loss the defendant's liability for which was limited by virtue of the decree in the limitation of liability suit, and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the full amount of the damages he claimed, notwithstanding the proceedings in that suit.-The_Bernina, P.D. & A.D. 214 -12 P. D. 36; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 38; 56 L. T. 450. CHARTER-PARTY 7. Bill of lading-Inconsistent provisions-Sale of cargo "to arrive "-Advanced freight-Damages.— The plaintiffs shipped a cargo of cotton seed on the defendant's ship under a charter-party which provided that the master was to sign bill of lading at any rate of freight, and as customary at port of lading, without prejudice to the stipulation of the charter-party; sufficient for ship's disbursements to be advanced, if required, to the captain by charterers on account of freight, subject to insurance only. The master signed a bill of lading with a clause exempting the defendants from liability for any act, neglect, or default of the master or crew. This exception was not in the charter-party. £160 was advanced by the plaintiffs on account of freight. The ship and cargo were totally lost on the voyage by the negligence of the master. The jury found that it was not the custom at the port of loading to insert a clause in bills of lading exempting the ship from liability for loss occasioned by the negligence of the master and crew, and that the bill of lading was signed only as a receipt for the cargo. Held, that the defendants were liable for the loss of the cargo, notwithstanding the clause in the bill of lading. The plaintiffs sold the cargo "to arrive." Held, that the measure of damages was the market value of the cargo at the port of destination at the time when the ship ought, in due course, to have arrived, less the freight that would be payable if the ship had arrived, whether such market value were greater or less than the price at which the goods had been sold; and that, in making the deduction on account of accruing freight, the agreed freight less the £160 ought to be deducted.-Rodocanachi v. Milburn, C.A. 241-18 Q. B. D. 67; 56 L. J. Q. B. 202; 56 L. T. 594. 8. Exception-" At ship's risk."-By a charter-party 11. Compulsory pilotage Exemption River Danube.-A collision occurred on the River Danube between two steamships, each having on board, in accordance with the regulations for the navigation of the River Danube, a certificated pilot, who, before and at the time of the 'collision, was in charge of the navigation of the steamship on board which he was, and all of whose orders were obeyed by the master and crew of such steamship. The owners of one of the steamships instituted an action of damage against the other steamship to recover the damage sustained in the collision; and a copy of a book entitled Regulations of Navigation and Police applicable to the Lower Danube,' and containing an English version of the regulations for the navigation and police of the river, was admitted by the plaintiffs and defendants to be the rules in force for the navigation of the Danube at the time of the collision. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants alleged that their vessels were in charge of pilots by compulsion of law, and the court found that both ships were to blame for the collision. 12. Compulsory pilotage-Exemption-River Seine. -Although the employment of a pilot by a vessel entering the River Seine is compulsory according to French law, the master remains in charge, and the owners of a ship are not exempt from liability for damage resulting from the pilot's negligence.-The Augusta, P.D. & A.D.-56 L. T. 58. 13. Compulsory pilotage-Exemption-River Tyne Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 8. 354-Tyne Pilotage Order Confirmation Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 44), 8. 1.-By clause 16 of the provisional order in the schedule to the Tyne Pilotage Order Confirmation Act, 1865, pilotage is no longer compulsory in the pilotage district of the River Tyne, either in the case of British or foreign vessels.-The Johann Sverdrup, c.a. 300— 12 P. D. 43; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 63; 56 L. T. 256. 14. Limitation of liability - Estoppel - Collision action-Discontinuance.-A collision having occurred between the K. and the A., the owners of the K. brought an action against the owners of the A, for damages. The parties afterwards signed an agreement to discontinue the action, "without costs, on the ground of inevitable accident." The owners of the cargo of the K. brought an action against the owners of the A. for damage arising from the same collision. Both ships were held to be in fault, and the cargo owners were held entitled to half the damage sustained. The owners of the A. obtained a judgment limiting their liability, and paid a sum into court. owners of the K. then obtained, with the consent of the owners of the A., an order rescinding the order for discontinuance, and claimed against the sum in court. The Held, that the owners of the K. were not debarred from claiming against the sum in court by signing the agreement for discontinuance, as it was not in fact a release of all claims. Decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed. The Bellcairn, 34 W. R. 55, 10 P. D. 161, distinguished. The Kronprinz, H.L. 783-12 App. 256; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 49; 56 L. T. 345. 15. Limitation of liability-Payment into courtClaim by Crown-Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 8. 514-Merchant Shipping Act, 1862, 8. 54—Admiralty Suits Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 78), 88. 3, 8.-The owners of a vessel which had brought about a collision instituted an action of limitation of liability to limit their liability for the damage caused by the collision, and obtained a decree limiting their liability to £9,183 and interest, and ordering, inter alia, advertisements to be published intimating that all claimants not appearing and bringing in their claims before a day three months from the date of the decree would be excluded from sharing in such limited amount. Government stores to the value of nearly £6,000 had been shipped by the Lords of the Admiralty on board the plaintiff's vessel, and were lost in the collision, but no appearance was entered for the Lords of the Admiralty within the time specified in the advertisements issued pursuant to the decree, and the registrar held the usual reference, and, without taking into consideration the value of such Government stores, reported that claims for loss or damage to goods had been proved to the extent of £6,053. Afterwards, but before the fund in court had been paid out, the Lords of the Admiralty moved the judge in court for leave to appear and enter a claim in respect of stores. The motion was supported by an affidavit which stated that the agents of the Admiralty had not seen the advertisements and had no knowledge of the legal proceedings in respect of the collision. Held, that, on or before the date specified in the advertisements as the last day for bringing in claims, the Lords of the Admiralty might, as of right, have appeared and entered a claim in respect of loss or damage to the stores belonging to them on board the plaintiffs' vessel. Held, also, that, in limitation of liability suits where the limited amount has not been distributed, the court has power, if it thinks it just to do so, to allow appearances to be put in and claims entered, even after the registrar has reported how the fund in court ought to be distributed, and that the circumstances of the case were such that the court would exercise that power in favour of the Lords of the Admiralty on payment by them of the costs occasioned by their not having appeared in ordinary course. The Court of Admiralty rule, with respect to an action of damage being dismissed without costs, where the court pronounces the collision to have been the result of inevitable accident, has no application in a case where the defendants apply before the hearing for the action to be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs admit on their pleadings that the defendants Shipping. 188 have not been guilty of negligence.-The Zoe, P.D. & A.D. 61-11 P. D. 70; 55 L. J. P. D. & A. 22. 16. Negligence-Burden of proof.—When a vesse in motion has come into collision with a vessel at anchor there is prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the former vessel, which can only be rebutted by setting up the defences of inevitable accident or compulsory pilotage.-The Indus, c.a. 490 -12 P. D. 47; 56 L. T. 376. 17. Negligence Contributory negligence - Par senger-Loss of life-Action by executor-Lorá Campbell's Act―Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vid. c. 66), s. 25, sub-section 9.-An injured passenger by a public conveyance is not deprived of his remedy by reason of the contributory negligence of those in charge of the conveyance; and therefore where there has been a collision between two ships, contributory negligence on the part of those in charge of the one ship is no defence to an action brought under Lord Campbell's Act by the representatives of one of its passengers against the owners of the other ship. Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, and Arntag ▾. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., 23 WE 295, L. R. 10 Ex. 47, overruled. The admiralty rule as to joint liability for j negligence does not apply to actions brought usin Lord Campbell's Act for damages arising out of s collision between two ships. Decision of Butt, J., reported 34 W. R. 595, reversed. The Bernina (2), c.s. 314-12 P. D. 58; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 17; 56 L. T. 258. 18. Negligence-Lights-Merchant Shipping Ad 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 85), s. 17-Regulations for Preventing Collisions, art. 3—River Mersey.-The starboard light of the ship of the plaintiff in 8 collision action was obscured to the extent of from 2 to 3 degrees by the cat-head; but the side lights showed otherwise an unbroken light over ten points of the horizon. Held, that there was not such negligence as would oblige the court to hold that the plaintiff's ship was to blame.-The Fire Queen, P.D. & A.D.—12 P. D. 147; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 90. 19. Negligence-Merchant Shipping Act, 1873, 17-Regulations for Preventing Collisions, art. 14, 22.-Where a collision occurs owing to the infringement of one of the regulations made for preven collisions at sea, the ship by which such regula has been infringed shall not be deemed to b fault under section 17 of the Merchant Shipping 1873, if the circumstances were such that the charge of the ship could not, with ordinary skill reasonable care, have ascertained that there was risk DIGEST. navigate in the shallow water, even if by remaining in the deep water the passage of steamships which can only navigate in the deep water is obstructed.-The Ralph Creyke, p.D. & A.D.-55 L. T. 155. Co-OWNERS21. Mortgage Freight Equitable mortgage Receiver-Jurisdiction.—In an action in personam by an equitable mortgagee of a foreign ship and freight who has accepted bills drawn by the managing owner whom he believed to be the sole owner, the court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to go with the ship to a foreign port and receive the freight due there.— The Faust, C.A.-56 L. T. 722. 22. Mortgage-Restraint action-Cancellation of bail-bond.-A mortgagee not in possession cannot maintain an action of restraint. The Highlander, 2 W. Rob. 109, and The Innisfallen, L. R. 1 A. & E. 72, 14 W. R. Adm. Dig. 26, followed. Where an action of restraint is dismissed an order will, if the vessel proceeded against has been released on bail, be made to cancel the bail-bond. Forms of pleading in an action of restraint.—The Keroula, P.D. & A.D. 60-11 P. D. 92; 55 L. J. P. D. & A. 45; 55 L. T. 61. 23. Restraint action-Jurisdiction.-The England, P.D. & A.D. 367-56 L. T. 896. em The defendants were 24. Tonnage rates powered by their special Act to charge tonnage rates on all ships entering or leaving the docks according to their voyages and the places to or from which they should trade to. Ships trading inwards were to pay in respect of the most distant ports from which they should have traded. Ships arriving in ballast but trading outwards, or built at Liverpool, or trading outwards were to pay in respect of the most distant ports to which they should trade. One arrival with one departure was to count as one voyage, without the intermediate ports traded at, but the ship was to be liable in respect of the most distant ports traded at. The plaintiff's ships sailed partly loaded from Glasgow to Liverpool, where they finished loading in the docks, and then proceeded to India. On their return they unloaded part of their cargo at Liverpool, and sailed with the remainder to Glasgow. Held (Lord Eeher, M.R., dissenting), that the plaintiff's ships were liable to pay on ships going to India the tonnage rates on ship trading inwards from Glasgow, and on ships returning from India the tonnage rates on ships trading inwards from Glasgow.-Henderson v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, C.A.-19 Q. B. D. 124; 56 L. J. Q. B. 473. MASTER 25. Necessaries-Disbursements-Maritime lienAdmiralty Court Act, 1840 (3 & 4 Vict. c. 65), 8. 6— Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 8. 191-Admiralty Court Act, 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10), s. 10.-The master of a ship has a maritime lien on the ship for disbursements. The Mary Ann, 14 W. R. 136, L. R. 1 A. & E. 8, approved. Judgment of Butt, J., affirmed.-The Sara, c.A. 826 -12 F. D. 158. a foreign vessel and freight included in his claim sums paid by him to third persons in respect of light dues and sums due for towage services on account of the vessel proceeded against. After judgment the suit was transferred to the High Court. The proceeds of the vessel and freight were insufficient to satisfy both the claim of the plaintiff in the cause so transferred and the claims of seamen who had recovered judgment against the vessel and freight for their wages and had intervened in the cause of necessaries. Held, that the material man was not entitled, in respect of any portion of the amount of his judgment, to take priority over the seamen.-The Andalina, P.D. & A.D. 336-12 P. D. 1; 56 L. T. 171. PILOT 26a. Certificate-Renewal-Discretion of pilotage authority-Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 88. 340342.-Pilotage authorities have an absolute discretion, under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, s. 341, to refuse to renew a pilotage certificate granted to the master or mate of a ship under section 340.-Reg. v. Trinity House Corporation, Q.B.D. 835. 27. Remuneration-River Thames-Tilbury Docks -Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, s. 333.-A Trinity House pilot who has pilɔted a vessel from Gravesend into the outer basin of the docks at Tilbury cannot recover, in an action of pilotage, any amount beyond the pilotage rate fixed by the Order in Council of the 17th of May, 1882, for piloting the vessel from Gravesend to Northfleet.-The Clan Grant, P.D. & A.D. 670-12 P. D. 139; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 62. SALVAGE 28. Apportionment.-The steamship W., of 5,109 gross register tonnage, with mails and 544 passengers, and on a voyage from Bremen to New York, lost its propeller in the Atlantic Ocean, and, when so disabled, was taken in tow by the steamship V., and towed to Boston, a distance of about 1,000 miles. The service was rendered in July and August, and lasted about eight days, and, to recover salvage reward, an action of salvage was brought by the owners, master, and crew of the V. against the W., the freight and cargo. the For the purposes of the suit the value of the W., freight and cargo, was taken to be £240,500. The Court awarded to the plaintiffs £7,000, and apportioned the amount as follows:-£5,250 to the owners of the V., £583 to the master, and £1,167 to the crew.-The Werra, P.D. & A.D. 552-12 App. 52; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 53; 56 L. T. 580. 29. Apportionment-Compromise-Acceptance of unapportioned sum without authority.-Two steamtugs rendered salvage services to a vessel in distress, and their owners, masters, and crews instituted a salvage action to recover salvage reward for such services. The managing owner of one of the steam-tugs, acting under the erroneous impression that the rest of the plaintiffs had agreed to a settlement of the action out of court, personally consented to a specified unapportioned sum being received from the defendants in full discharge of the claims of all the salvors. The compromise was not binding on any of the plaintiffs other than the owners, master, and crew of the steamtug whose managing owner had personally consented o it. The Court, being of opinion that it could not apportion the sum received by the plaintiffs, so as to determine how much of that sum was received in respect of the claim of those plaintiffs who were not bound by the compromise, awarded salvage remuneration to all the plaintiffs, and a claim for salvage on behalf of a licensed pilot who had assisted at the helm and windlass of a distressed vessel was dismissed. The Monarch, P.D. & A.D. 292-12 P. D. 5; 56 L. T. 204. 50 |