You CHAPTER XIII. 1781. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH. OU can well understand the distrust caused by the treason of Benedict Arnold. Other officers were suspected, but a strict investigation showed no grounds for such suspicion. Knowing that Arnold would be sure to tell Sir Henry Clinton all he knew about West Point, Washington hurried the completion of the works and threw a strong garrison into them. The command was temporarily given to General Greene, who was ordered to march with the New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire and Stark's brigades, and to take every possible precaution against attack. Washington was with the main body of the army at Preakness, near Passaic Falls, New Jersey. It was about this time that a court of inquiry was ordered to investigate the conduct of General Gates at Camden, South Carolina. Congress had determined that whatever officer lost a post should be subject to a court of inquiry. The treatment of Gates was rather harsh, as he was degraded and brought to trial without being accused of any military offense. In 1782, however, he was acquitted of all blame and restored to his position in the army. These proceedings made it necessary that some one should be appointed to succeed Gates. As you have been told, this officer was General Greene, who reached Gates's head-quarters in South Carolina on the 2d of December, 1780, and assumed command the following morning. General Heath became commander at West Point. Washington knew the sterling qualities of Greene, and had wanted to send him south long before, but congress prevented. Had the commander-in-chief been left to follow his judgment, there would have been a far different story to tell. The appointment of Greene was now urged by the delegates of the three southern states. “I think I am giving you a general," wrote Washington to one of the South Carolina members; "but what can a general do without men, without arms, without clothes, without stores, without provisions?” This was not the worst that might have been said. That section was so full of Tories that Greene was in personal danger while on his way to his post of duty; but the brave Quaker general had solemnly vowed, when starting for the south, that he would clear it of its invaders or he would leave his dead body there. It is much easier to form a good resolution than to carry it out. When Greene contrasted the half-clothed men, the poor weapons, the total lack of discipline, with the superior numbers of the enemy, well disciplined and armed and finely commanded, he might well have given up in despair. One fact was clear to the new commander: with his weak force, it was folly for him to meet the foe in open battle, for defeat would be certain. Gates's blindness to this truth was the cause of his overthrow. Greene, therefore, determined that while he was forming his army, he would avoid battle. Instead of fighting in a fair field, he would imitate on a large scale, the tactics of Marion and Sumter: that is, he would harass and exasperate his stronger enemy in every possible way. You must not forget that Marion and Sumter and other famous partisans were galloping back and forth through the swamps and pines of Georgia and the Carolinas, and striking their stealthy and effective blows whenever the chance presented itself. The first step of Greene was to enforce discipline in his army, which he succeeded in doing only by severe measures. The better to carry on his warfare, he divided his forces into two divisions. General Morgan at the head of a small body of infantry and cavalry, was ordered to go south of the Catawba, where he could observe the positions of the foe, while Greene himself with the main body took post on the east side of the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw Hills, some seventy miles northeast from Wynnesborough where Cornwallis was stationed. The British post at Ninety-six appeared to be threatened, and Cornwallis sent Colonel Tarleton, with eleven hundred men, including cavalry, artillery and infantry, against Morgan. At the same time, Cornwallis himself marched in a northwesterly direction, so as to check Morgan if he should escape Tarleton. He hoped also to frighten Greene by getting between him and Virginia. Hearing of Tarleton's approach, Morgan retreated across the Pacolett to Cowpens. There he stopped, resolved to fight. It was a wise course, for his force was nearly as large as that of his enemy, and he could select the ground and make his own dispositions for battle. On the morning of January 17, 1781, Tarleton assailed him with his usual impetuosity and drove back the first and second of the American lines; but they rallied on the top of the hill, and, led by Colonels Washington and Howard, charged the British ranks with great fury and pursued them to the bottom of the hill, where most of them threw down their arms and cried for quarter. In his eager pursuit, Colonel Washington, in advance of his troops, was set upon by three mounted officers. Sergeant-major Perry rode up just in time to ward off a blow and slash the sword arm of one of the men, and a young trumpeter shot a second officer who also was on the point of delivering a fatal thrust. The colonel himself parried the blow of the third and slightly wounded him, but received a pistol shot in the knee as his assailant rode away. This last, it is believed, was Tarleton himself. Morgan had gained a most inspiriting victory. Although Tarleton escaped with a handful of men, he lost a hundred privates and ten commissioned officers killed, more than a hundred wounded, six hundred prisoners, his two guns, his colors, eight hundred muskets, a hundred horses and most of his baggage train. The Americans lost only twelve killed and sixty wounded. Cornwallis was astounded on learning of the defeat, but he was too good a general to be discouraged. When the news reached him he was at Turkey Creek, twenty-five 1781.] PURSUIT OF MORGAN. 133 miles south of Cowpens. He was thus in reality between Greene and Morgan, and it was Cornwallis prepared for the race by destroying most of his own and his officers' baggage, including a large quantity of food, wine and spirits, and keeping no wagons except those with hospital stores and four empty ones for the wounded. Horses and men were pressed to the utmost, and the Catawba was reached January 29th, just two hours after the Americans had passed safely over. A heavy rain had set in and the river rose to such a height that Cornwallis had to wait two days before he could cross. During that time. Morgan was enabled to send off his prisoners to Charlottesville, Virginia. Relieved of this incumbrance, he made ready to dispute the passage of the river. His camp was at Sherwood's Ford, where on the 31st of January, General Greene joined him. He had come almost alone, riding in post haste and leaving his division to follow as fast as it could. The British crossed the next day in the face of strong opposition. The race was then kept up to the Yadkin, where a sharp fight took place between a body of American riflemen and the advanced guard of the British army. On the night of the 2d of February Greene crossed the Yadkin, partly by fording and partly by the use of boats and flats. By a singular coincidence, the river again rose to such a height that, the next morning, Cornwallis found it impossible to cross. Unwilling to suffer the delay, he marched twenty-five miles up the south bank of the Yadkin, to a point where the ford was shallow enough to be waded. You may be sure that Greene made the best use of the time thus gained. He was joined on the 7th of February, near Guilford Court House, by the division that he left at Hicks's Creek, on the east side of the Pedee. By this time, he was close to the southern frontiers of Virginia, his aim being to withdraw into that state, while Cornwallis was putting forth every effort to check him. If Greene could succeed in reaching the Old Dominion, he would be among a more patriotic population, and after he should remove all the boats, the broad river would prove an impassable barrier to pursuit by his enemy. The most direct road to Virginia was by Dix's Ferry over the river Dan, a branch of the Roanoke; but the British were as near to the ferry as were the patriots, and no boats could be brought up from below, on account of the rapid current. Greene, therefore, shaped his course for the ferries known as Boyd's and Irwin's, which were about seventy miles from Guilford Court House. This route was twenty miles longer than the other, but it was the only one that could be used. Dispatching a detail of men to Dix's Ferry to send the boats there down stream to Boyd's and Irwin's, which were only four miles apart, Greene left Guilford Court House on the 10th of February. Cornwallis was close upon him, but a corps of American light troops, formed for that purpose, continually harassed him, and on more than one occasion inflicted severe loss. On the 14th of February, the patriots crossed the Dan with their baggage and stores, and at last stood safe on Virginia soil. North Carolina was turned over to the invaders, but Cornwallis had failed entirely in his purpose. This remarkable flight and pursuit had covered two hundred miles, and was pressed with so much vigor that both armies suffered a great deal from want and fatigue. It rained most of the time, and the soldiers had no tents and were often unable to kindle fires. The condition of the patriots was pitiful. They were barefooted and so ragged that some of them had only a single piece of cloth tied about them. Some weeks before, Greene had written to Reed that his men were living upon charitythat is, by such contributions as were made to them daily. He told Washington that his militiamen were as ragged and naked as Virginia negroes. But the commander-in |