thereof, and may be in the same form as if the defendant were a

natural person.

2. The corporation in such case shall appear by attorney, who may on its behalf elect, and confess or deny the charge, and thereupon the case shall proceed as if the defendant were a

natural person.

3. If the corporation does not appear and confess or deny the charge, the magistrate may proceed in the absence of the defendant, as upon a preliminary investigation.

Origin]-8-9 Edw. VII, Can., ch. 9, sec. 2.

Company defendant]-This procedure for the summary trial of a corporation for an indictable offence is similar to that provided upon a trial by jury under sec. 916 et seq. Compare sec. 720A in Part XV.

Absolute jurisdiction in respect to disorderly houses.-Inmates of bawdy-houses.

"

774. The jurisdiction of the magistrate is absolute in the case of any person charged with keeping a disorderly house, or with being an inmate or habitual frequenter of a common bawdyhouse, and does not depend on 'the consent of the person charged to be tried by such magistrate, nor shall such person be asked if he consents to be so tried.

2. The provisions of this Part do not affect any absolute summary jurisdiction given to justices by any other Part of this Act.

Origin]-8-9 Edw. VII, Can., ch. 9, sec. 2; sec. 784, Code of 1892; R.S.C. 1886, ch. 176, secs. 4, 5.

When jurisdiction "absolute "]-The word "absolute" is used in the sense of "unconditional," that is to say, not dependent upon the conditions precedent to the right to exercise the jurisdiction which are prescribed by the Act as ordinarily applicable, and the words referring to the consent of the accused were added ex abundanti cautela. R. v. Helliwell (1914) 30 O.L.R. 504, 23 Can. Cr. Cas. 146.

"Disorderly house" defined]-The term disorderly house includes any common bawdy-house (sec. 225), common gaming-house (sec. 226), common betting-house (sec. 227), or opium joint (sec. 227A). See Code sec. 228; R. v. Jung Lee, 22 Can. Cr. Cas. 63, 25 O.W.R. 63.

Absolute jurisdiction in disorderly house cases]-See secs. 228, 229A, 773 (f).

Habitual frequenter of bawdy-house]-This phrase formerly applied to the offence designated in sub-sec. (k) of sec. 238 (vagrancy), which

has been repealed. Concurrently with the repeal, sec. 229 was amended so as to make it a summary conviction offence to be found in any disorderly house without lawful excuse.

The fact that see. 774, relating to procedure, still, evidently by an oversight, contains the words, "or habitual frequenter," while subclause (ƒ) of sec. 238, substantively constituting the offence (" (f) Is in the habit of frequenting such houses and does not give a satisfactory account of himself or herself,") has been repealed by sec. 7 of the Criminal Code Amendment Act 1915, cannot affect the application of sec. 774 to such substantive offences mentioned in it as still exist. R. v. James, (1915) 9 W.W.R. 235, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 23, at 24, 9 Alta. L.R. 66.

Jurisdiction as affected by illegality of arrest]-There are conflicting judicial opinions as to the right of a magistrate to try against his protest a man who, having been illegally arrested without a warrant, is brought before him for trial. The opinions negativing the right to try are based upon the theory that the magistrate is without jurisdiction to try him in such case without his consent, which might be evidenced by his failure to take exception. R. v. Pollard, [1917] 3 W.W.R. 754, 29 Can. Cr. Cas. 35 (Alta.), decided under a liquor law; R. v. Wallace, 32 W.L.R. 264, per Stuart, J. (Alta.); Re Baptiste Paul (No. 2) 2 W.W.R. 927, 5 Alta. L.R. 442, 20 Can. Cr. Cas. 161 (Beck, J.); R. v. Miller, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 151, 25 W.L.R 296 (Beck, J.); R. v. Young Kee, [1917] 2 W.W.R. 442, 28 Can. Cr. Cas. 161 (Hyndman, J.); R. v. Young Kee (No. 2), [1917] 2 W.W.R. 654, 28 Can. Cr. Cas. 236 (Alta.); R. v. Davis, (1912) 3 W.W.R. 1, 22 W.L.R. 837, 5 Alta. L.R. 443, 20 Can. Cr. Cas. 293 (Walsh, J.).

The other view that the magistrate has jurisdiction notwithstanding the illegal arrest is based upon the theory that once the accused is actually before a magistrate having general jurisdiction over the subject matter, the jurisdiction over the particular charge and over the person accused has attached by reason of the presence of the latter before him, at least if no exception is taken. Re Baptiste Paul (No. 1), 2 W.W.R. 892, 5 Alta. L.R. 440, 20 Can. Cr. Cas. 159 (Simmons, J.); R. v. Hurst (1915) 7 W.W.R. 994, 23 Can. Cr. Cas. 389, 30 W.L.R. 176 (Simmons, J.); R. v. Pudwell, 26 Can. Cr. Cas. 47 (Alta.). As to justification of arrest by a peace officer under secs. 30, 33, 648-652, see Altman v. Majury, 37 O.L.R. 608, 11 O.W.N. 21, 27 Can. Cr. Cas. 398. It is said that if the accused is brought before the justice on a warrant which could legally have been issued only upon a sworn information, and there is no such information, the accused may protest against the justice's jurisdiction and if convicted notwithstanding his protest of the jurisdiction the conviction will be set aside. R. v. Davis (1912) 3 W.W.R. 1, 120 Can. Cr. Cas. 293 (Alta.), citing R. v. McNutt, 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 186.

A person whose conviction was removed by certiorari and set aside for want of jurisdiction on a pure technicality, e. g., that the accused having been improperly arrested on a warrant under circumstances in which arrest without a warrant was not justified, was illegally brought before the court, may be again tried and convicted upon the same charge on being arrested under a proper warrant. R. v. Young Kee (No. 2), [1917] 2 W.W.R. 654 (Alta.). R. v. Weiss & Williams, 5 W.W.R. 48, 25 W.L.R. 351, 22 Can. Cr. Cas. 42 (Alta.).

Jurisdiction in Ontario as to sentence of females to reformatory]Whenever any female is convicted either under sec. 239 for vagrancy, or is convicted for an offence tried under Part XVI of the Code, she may be sentenced to the Reformatory for an indefinite term less than two years, and if any term exceeding six months is inflicted, no fine shall be imposed in addition. The Prisons Act, R.SC. 1906, ch. 148, bed. 57, as amended, 3-4 Geo. V, 1913, ch. 39, sec. 3. The amended sec. 57, being in Part II of the Prisons, Act, applies only to the province of Ontario. R.S.C. 1906, ch. 148, sec. 42.

Where two justices act, both to sign commitment]—

1

Where the trial under Code sec. 773 takes place before two justices the warrant of commitment following a conviction made, should be signed by both justices, but if there be a valid conviction a commitment irregularly signed by only one justice is cured by Code sec. 1130. R. v. James (1915) 9 W.W.R. 235, 239, 9 Alta. L.R. 66, 32 W.L.R. 528.

Sentence dates from conviction]-A woman was convicted before a police magistrate of being an inmate of a disorderly house, and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The warrant was held over for 48 hours to give her an opportunity, if she felt disposed to take advantage of it, to leave the city. No definite time was fixed as to how long she was to remain away. She left the city, and remained away for three months. Upon her return she was re-arrested upon a warrant based upon the above conviction, but was discharged on the ground that her re-arrest was illegal. R. v. Fitzpatrick, (1915) 9 W.W.R 191 (Man.).

It was held that at the expiration of the three months the effect of the conviction was spent, and no power existed to re-arrest the applicant on a warrant based on the old conviction. Ibid.

Absolute jurisdiction as to seafaring person. No consent necessary.

775. The jurisdiction of the magistrate is absolute in the case of any person who, being a seafaring person and only transiently in Canada, and having no permanent domicile therein, is charged, either within the city of Quebec as limited for the purpose of the police ordinance, or within the city of Montreal as so limited, or in any other seaport city or town in Canada

where there is such magistrate, with the commission therein of any of the offences in this Part previously mentioned, and also in the case of any other person charged with any such offence on the complaint of any such seafaring person whose testimony is essential to the proof of the offence.

2. Such jurisdiction does not depend on the consent of any such person to be tried by the magistrate, nor shall such person be asked whether he consents to be so tried.

Origin]-Sec. 784, Code of 1892; R.S.C. 1886, ch. 176, secs. 4, 5. Restitution of property]-See Code secs. 795 and 1050.

Jurisdiction absolute in certain provinces.-Exception.

776. The jurisdiction of the magistrate in the provinces of British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan and Alberta, and in the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory, under this Part, is absolute without the consent of the party charged, except in cases coming within the provisions of sec 777, and except in cases under secs. 782 and 783, where the person charged is not a person who under sec. 775, can be tried summarily without his consent.

Origin]-63-64 Vict., Can., ch. 46, sec. 3; sec. 784, Code of 1892; R.S.C. 1886, ch. 176, secs. 4 and 5.

Absolute jurisdiction in certain provinces]-This absolute jurisdie tion was originally limited to Prince Edward Island and Keewatin: Cr. Code, 1892, sec. 784 (2); but was extended in 1895. Re Worrell, 8 W.W.R. 230, affirmed, 8 W.W.R. 478. The exception referred to as contained in secs. 782 and 783, is the special power to summarily try Only in case the plea is one of guilty for theft, false pretenses or receiving if the property exceeds $10 in value.

“Summary trial by judge under the N.W. Territories Act]-Under the operation of the Alberta Act (1905, Can., ch. 3), the Supreme Court of Alberta which had been constituted a superior court of criminal jurisdiction, was to be governed by the procedure in criminal matters of the former Supreme Court of the N.W. Territories, until otherwise provided by competent authority. 1905, Can. Stat., ch. 3, sec. 16, subsec. 2. But the Governor-in-Council may, from time to time, declare all or any part of such procedure to be inapplicable to the Supreme Court of Alberta.

Similar provisions were contained in the Saskatchewan Act as regards the Supreme Court of Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan Act. 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, Can., ch. 42. The power of summary trial in

Alberta and Saskatchewan under the N.W.T. Act gave a judge of the Supreme Court the powers of a justice of the peace or of any two justices, and also power to try summarily without a jury charges of theft, embezzlement or obtaining money or property by false pretenses, or receiving stolen property in any case in which the value of the whole property alleged to have been stolen, embezzled, obtained or received, did not, in the opinion of the judge, exceed $200. N.W.T. Act, R.S.C. 1886, ch. 50, sec. 66; 60-61 Vict., Can., ch. 28, sec. 14.

A Supreme Court judge might also try summarily without a jury a person charged with having committed an aggravated assault by unlawfully and maliciously inflicting upon any other person either with or without a weapon or instrument any grievous bodily harm or by unlawfully and maliciously wounding any other person. N.W.T. Act, R.S.C. 1886, ch. 50, sec. 66; 60-61 Vict., Can., ch. 28, sec. 14.

An assault upon any female when not amounting, in the opinion of the judge, to an assault with intent to commit rape might be tried by a Supreme Court judge summarily without a jury; N.W.T. Act, R.S.C. 1886, ch. 50, sec. 66; 60-61 Vict., Can., ch. 28, sec. 14; and likewise an assault upon any male not over fourteen years of age; escape from lawful custody; prison breach; assaulting or obstructing a peace officer in the lawful performance of his duty or with intent to prevent the performance thereof. N.W.T. Act, R.S.C. 1886, ch. 50, sec. 66; 60-61 Vict., Can., ch. 28, sec. 14.

Summary trial in other cases before police magistrates of certain places.

777. If any person is charged in the province of Ontario before a police magistrate or before a stipendiary magistrate in any county, district or provisional county in such province, with having committed any offence for which he may be tried at a court of general sessions of the peace, or if any person is committed to a gaol in the county, district or provisional county, under the warrant of any justice, for trial on a charge of being guilty of any such offence, such person may, with his own consent, be tried before such magistrate, and may, if found guilty, be sentenced by the magistrate to the same punishment as he would have been liable to if he had been tried before the court of general sessions of the peace.

2. This section shall apply also to district magistrates and judges of the sessions in the province of Quebec, and to police and stipendiary magistrates of cities and incorporated towns having a population of not less than two thousand five hundred