Number, tonnage, and nationality of steam and sailing vessels totally lost, condemned, etc., during the year 1894, as reported up to June 30, 1895. [The tonnage given is gross for steam vessels and net for sailing vessels. Vessels under 100 tons are not included in this return.j NOTE.-Material of construction of above vessels: Steel, 58-85,175 tons; iron, 260-295,086 tons; wood and composite, 836-328,710 tons. Some cases of condemnation may have been consequent upon stress of weather, etc., experienced prior to the period covered by the return. Vessels condemned after damage by fire, collision, stranding, etc., are included, according to the dates of the casualties, under "Burned," "Collision," Wrecked, etc. Under the heading "Lost, etc.," are included total losses which, for want of sufficient information, or for other reasons, can not be otherwise classified. Under the heading "Missing are included only vessels posted or reported during the year as missing. 4 Under the heading Wrecked are included vessels lost through stranding or through striking rocks, sunken wrecks, etc. This vessel is the Kow Shing, sunk by a torpedo. APPENDIX N. REPAIRED WRECKS. OPINION OF SOLICITOR-GENERAL. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: On the 22d instant you transmitted to the Attorney-General the application of Benjamin F. Clyde for the registry of the foreign-built schooner Croatan, formerly called the Joaquin Ancona, and requested his opinion whether such registry should be granted. The facts are that the vessel was built by a foreigner in a foreign country, was wrecked in American waters, and the wreck was towed by direction of her foreign owner to an American shipyard, where she was repaired. The repairs made upon her before she was ready for service again exceeded three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when repaired. Some years after her restoration, and after sailing under a foreign flag, she was sold by her foreign owner to a citizen of the United States. Section 4136 of the Revised Statutes provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may issue a register or enrollment for any vessel built in a foreign country whenever such vessel shall be wrecked in the United States and shall be purchased and repaired by a citizen of the United States if it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the repairs put upon such vessel are equal to three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired. The question is, Do the facts above stated bring the Croatan within the benefit of the section? If the section is to be literally and strictly construed, they do not. The natural meaning of the language would limit the privilege of registry therein conferred to a vessel which had first been purchased and then repaired by a citizen of the United States. Such a construction, however, is too narrow. By section 4132 vessels built within the United States and belonging wholly to citizens thereof may be registered as vessels of the United States. It is clear that under this section if a foreigner should build a vessel in the United States, sail it under a foreign flag, and then sell it to a citizen of the United States such citizen might obtain registry for the vessel as an American vessel. The plain intention of section 4136 was to give to wrecked vessels which were practically rebuilt in the United States the same privilege that vessels would have if wholly built within the United States. Its ultimate purpose was to aid American shipbuilding, and it was evidently considered by Congress that the rebuilding of three-fourths of a vessel was to be encouraged as well as the building of a vessel entire. The section must be construed in connection with section 4132 and in the light of the general purpose of Congress in the passage of both sections. Otherwise, and following the letter of the section, a foreign-built vessel wrecked in the United States and purchased and repaired by a citizen of the United States in a foreign port would be entitled to American registry. A result so plainly contrary to the spirit of the section and the intention of Congess shows the necessity of not following too closely the letter of the statute and warrants even a slight variation therefrom to carry out the plain purpose of the enactment. By transposing the words "purchased and repaired," so that the section shall read "repaired and purchased" by a citizen of the United States, the section would be made literally to include within its benefit the vessel here in question, and I do not think it is doing violence to the language of the section to hold that it may be so construed, considering the evident intention of Congress in its enactment. Your own Department, by Treasury decision No. 8688, granted registry to a British vessel which was wrecked in the waters of the United States, transferred to a British subject as the agent of the British underwriters, who made a contract to raise her, subsequently sold her to an American citizen, the consideration being a sum of money in addition to an assumption by the latter of bills incurred by the British subject in raising her before the sale. Repairs were then made upon her, which, together with the amount expended in raising her, exceeded three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired. It is obvious that a very considerable part of that which was counted as repairs, namely, the expense of raising the vessel, was expended by a British subject, and that the case did not come literally within section 4136 any more than the one under discussion. But an authority which is more directly in point is a decision by Attorney-General Black, to be found in the ninth volume of Opinions of Attorneys-General, page 424. The question was there asked by the Secretary of the Treasury whether a vessel built in the United States but transferred to a foreign owner and afterwards wrecked in the waters of the United States and purchased and repaired by an American citizen was entitled to registry under what has since become section 4136. Judge Black, after stating the case, uses the following language: "Does this case come within the act of 1852 so as to entitle the vessel so purchased and repaired to registry? Literally it does not, for the words of the act require the real to Late been Veils it a fire mantry, whereas this vessel was built here and becam or the transfer of it to a foreign owner. But erase be not within the strict letter of the law, it is within its spirit and asdestly was to let all freign vessels wrecked and repaired in the United States and purtziend by American citizens Lave the benefit of Amerjean regi I am therefore of opinion that the party who has made this application is entitled to w at Le asks for." The statement of the intention of Congress made by Judge Black in this opinion would include the rewel with respect to whose registry you ask the question, and the departure from the letter of the section by hill in the case there decided was even greater than is required in the present case to grant the registry. You are therefore advised that the application of Mr. Clyde should be granted. You accompassed your request for an opinion with papers containing evidence upon which under section 416 you are called upon to decide, first, whether the vessel was wrecked: second, whether the wreck took place in the United States; third, whether the repairs made upon her in the Unitel States before she was ready for service again after the wreck were equal to three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when repaired. T..is opinion has been found in favor of the applicant. The Attor ney-General, in discharging the duty imposed him by section 356 of the Revised Statutes, is required only to answer questions of law and can not consider questions of fact upon evidence submitted. (19 Opin. A. G., 672.) The papers inclosed with the letter requesting an opinion are herewith returned. Very respectfully, WM. H. TAFT, Solicitor-General. W. H. H. MILLER, Attorney-General. Approved. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. OPINION OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D. C., July 13, 1895. SIR: I have the honor to answer the questions in yours of the 10th instant. They are, first, whether the application for registry of the Southery, under section 4136 of the Revised Statutes, which has been denied by your Department on the ground that the vessel was not "wrecked in the United States," was properly refused, and second, "what, in law, is sufficient injury to answer the condition wrecked'?" It appears from your statement and the accompanying papers that the ship was wrecked and abandoned on Alacran Reef, which is not in the United States, but several hundred miles from our nearest coast, and subsequently towed into the United States, where she was purchased and repaired by American citizens, the repairs amounting to more than three times the price paid for the wreck at marshal's sale, which I presume you consider equivalent to "three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired," as the application was refused on the ground that the "evidence did not show that the injuries to the vessel, constituting her a wreck, were received in the United States." In view of the extremely liberal construction which has been given to all the other provisions of section 4136 (9 Opin., 424; 15 Opin., 402; 20 Opin., 253), I should not hesitate to say, if the question remained open, that the clause "wrecked in the United States was not intended by Congress to limit the benefits of that section to vessels which receive within the boundaries of this country the injuries which constitute them wrecks, but intended them to apply to any foreign-built vessel in the United States in such a state of wreck as to require virtual rebuilding, provided she should be purchased and repaired by American citizens. This construction certainly carries out the well-known object of the law and can be given without doing violence to its language, although such language is capable of the other construction, and at first sight seems to carry it. Your question, however, being whether you rightly denied the application, I am compelled to answer yes, because in so doing you merely followed the express regulations and long-settled practice of your Department, which have put the narrower construction on the clause "wrecked in the United States." And in 1875, in the case of The United States v. The brig Victoria Perez (8 Ben., 109) Judge Benedict, having the exact question before him, gave the language the same construction. He conceded the force of the opposing argument, but based his decision upon the long and wellsettled construction which your Department had given. The question, therefore, really is one for you to settle yourself, viz, whether you will change the regulations and practice of your Department. You undoubtedly have the right to do this, the true meaning of the law being at least doubtful. Whether you should do it or not depends upon considerations with which you are doubtless quite as familiar as I, and probably more so. * Your second, so far as it is one of law, becomes a moot question unless I assume that you propose to change the practice of your Department or reconsider your finding of fact. As you may do either or both, however, it would not violate the wellsettled rule of this Department to answer it. It was rightly held in an opinion given your Department many years ago (15 Opin., 402), that the word "wreck" in section 4136 "must be taken in a very comprehensive sense as applicable to a vessel which is disabled and rendered unfit for navigation, whether this state of the vessel has been caused by the wind or the waves, by stranding, by fire, by explosion of boilers, or by any other casualty." This definition is not broader than the intention of Congress, and you will be justified in holding a vessel to be wrecked when she is in a condition unfit for use, no matter how brought about. For instance, without attempting to pass upon the disputed question of fact presented by the claims of the applicant and the resistant, if, as claimed by the former, the vessel, though somewhat leaky and injured before, struck ground on her way to Erie Basin, in consequence of which she sank therein, necessitating raising, dry docking, and repairs to put her in such condition that she could go to the place where it had been decided to make the permanent repairs, this would undoubtedly constitute a wrecking, and the vessel would also have been "wrecked in the United States." There is nothing in what has been said above to prevent the ruling, which I think is required to carry out the manifest object of the statute, that if any of the injuries which have made the vessel a wreck were received in the United States she should be held to come within the law, although others had been received elsewhere. Nor would failure to use diligence or the best means of avoiding such further injuries prevent the above conclusion, always assuming the absence of bad faith with respect to the registry law in question. This opinion is to be taken as supplementary to that of my immediate predecessor with respect to the same case at an earlier stage, to which your letter did not refer and to which my attention was not called until the above opinion was written. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. JUDSON HARMON, Attorney-General. EFFECTS OF DECEASED SEAMEN. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MAURICE J. POWER, UNITED STATES SHIPPING COMMISSIONER, TO BE RELIEVED FROM THE CUSTODY OF DECEASED SEAMEN'S EFFECTS. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The petition shows that on the 16th of August, 1893, the shipping commissioner received from his predecessor in office certain effects of deceased seamen which had been deposited with said predecessor during several years of his incumbency of the said office, a schedule of such effects being annexed to the petition. The Revised Statutes provide that in case of death of any seaman or apprentice who is at the time of his death entitled to claim from the master or owner of any vessel in which he has served any unpaid wages or effects such master or owner shall pay and deliver the same to the shipping commissioner. (Rev. Stat., sec. 4542.) Within one week after receiving such money, wages, or effects, the shipping commissioner is to pay, remit, or deliver the same to the circuit court subject to such deductions as may be allowed by the circuit court for expenses incurred in respect to such money and effects. (Sec. 4542.) Many years ago it was held by Mr. Justice Blatchford, then circuit judge and sitting in this district, that the shipping commissioner being an officer of the court, the effects delivered to the court under section 4543 might be placed in his custody to be kept until claimed in the manner provided by section 4544. This was necessary because the quarters assigned to the circuit court for this district in the Federal Building were so restricted that it was impossible to make room for the various sea chests and bags of seamen's dunnage which were accumulating under the provisions of the shipping act, and inasmuch as the Treasury Department provided the shipping commissioner with quarters or with the means to hire quarters commodious enough to accommodate such accumulation, that disposition of the effects was the most convenient. Since the appointment of the present shipping commissioner he has paid the rent, $25 a month, for the premises in the basement of No. 19 Pearl street, in which the accumulations of seamen's effects on hand when he took office were stored; but the Treasury Department no longer allows or audits any claim by him for such rent, he being furnished with quarters in the barge office for the transaction of his business as shipping commissioner. It further appears that the room available in the barge office is not more than sufficient to accommodate the accumulations of seamen's effects during his own term and such additions as may be expected during the current year. He therefore applies (1) for an allowance by the circuit court for expenses incurred in respect to such effects, namely, the rent of the premises where they are stored, under section 4543; and (2) for instructions as to future dispositions of the past accumulations. This court now holds accumulations of unclaimed wages of deceased seamen much more than sufficient to pay the expenses incurred in taking care of the effects, but the section evidently contemplates that the expenses incurred in respect to the effects of each individual seaman shall be deducted from the money or effects of that particular seaman and not from the unclaimed wages of other seamen. The court therefore can not allow the rent of the premises in Pearl street as a charge against the general fund representing unclaimed wages of deceased seamen. There is no place in the Federal Building, now assigned for the use of this court, where such effects could be placed, and they should therefore be kept by the shipping commissioner in such place as may be furnished by the Treasury Department or other proper authority. By most unwise legislation Congress has provided for the retention of these effects of deceased seamen for six years or more without any discriminaton as to what are valuable and what are valueless; but so long as the statutes require the court or the shipping commissioner, as its officer, to keep them, the obligation of providing a place for such keeping would seem to rest with the particular Department or officer whose duty it is, under the Federal law, to provide quarters for the performance of such duties as the statutes require to be performed. A copy. [SEAL.] JOHN F. SHIELDS, Clerk. DISPLAY OF TORCH. OPINION OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D. C., September 25, 1895. SIR: In a letter of 12th instant you ask my opinion whether the provision of section 4234, requiring sailing vessels to show a lighted torch on the approach of any steam vessel during the nighttime, was repealed by section 3 of the act of February 19, 1895, which reenacts portions of section 4234, but omits that relating to torches. I have the honor to say that in my opinion there was no such repeal. Section 4234 is part of general chapter 5, relating to navigation and providing rules for preventing collisions, to be observed by American vessels on all waters. August 19, 1890, an act was passed (26 Stats., 320) making regulations for preventing collisions, to be observed by American vessels on the high seas and connecting waters. This act was passed pursuant to a plan for the adoption of a common code of regulations by maritime nations, and therefore section 3 provided that it should take effect at a time to be fixed by the President's proclamation. Such proclamation has not been issued, and the act, therefore, is not yet in force. Congress, however, anticipating that such proclamation would be issued on or before March 1, 1895, passed two acts, which, with that of 1890, would cover the various navigable waters formerly dealt with together in the general chapter on navigation. The first was that of February 8, 1895 (28 Stats., 645), providing rules for preventing collisions, to be observed by American vessels "upon the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as Montreal." It was made to take effect on and after March 1, 1895. The other was that of February 19, 1895, to which you refer (28 Stats., 672), which covered "harbors, rivers, and inland waters of the United States except the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as Montreal," and is stated in the caption to be supplementary to the act of August 19, 1890, above mentioned. Article 30 of the act of 1890 had provided for special rules for harbors, etc., and the act of February 19, 1895, undertook to provide these on and after March 1, 1895, by adopting as such special rules the provisions of certain sections of the Revised Statutes which are mentioned by number and include 4233 but not 4234. In section 3 the first part of the first sentence of section 4234, requiring all sailing vessels to be furnished with proper signal lights, is literally quoted, but the last part of the sentence requiring the showing of a lighted torch is omitted. The last sentence of section 4234, providing the penalty, is also repeated, changing the expression "navigated without complying with the provisions of this and the preceding section" to "navigated without complying with the statutes of the United States or the regulations that may be lawfully made thereunder." The |