devraient être punis, conformément à l'art. 85, sans qu'il fût nécessaire que les représailles eussent été commandées par le gouvernement anglais. Tel est aussi l'avis de M. Hans. Et il a été jugé, à cet [207] égard, que les violences exercées par des Français envers *un poste de la douane étrangère à l'effet d'enlever des objets introduits par contrebande sur le territorie étranger, et saisis par les préposés à la douane, constituent des actions hostiles, dans le sens de l'art. 84, c. pén., ou tout au moins des actes qui exposeraient des Français à éprouver des représailles dans le sens de l'art. 85 du même code, (Grenoble, 25 avril 1831.)

(Min., pub., c. Cayen, etc.) LA COUR:-Attendu qu'il résulte de la procédure que, le 25 février 1831, à onze heures du soir, un attroupement de quaranté à cinquante personnes, habitant sur le territoire français, s'est porté sur le territoire sarde, où il a attaqué le poste de la douane sarde et s'est livré à divers actes de violence envers les préposés; que le poste a été envahi et le corps-de-garde désarmé; qu'un coup de carabine a été tiré sur l'un des préposés; que les autres armes ont été retenues et déchargées; que les portes d'une remise et d'une écurie ont été brisées, à l'effet d'enlever un tonneau de vin, qui avait été introduit, par contrebande, sur le territoire sarde, ainsi qu'un char et des vaches qui avaient servi de moyens de transport, lesquels objets avaient été saisis

par les préposés de la douane, et que ces objets, ainsi violemment [208] enlevés, ont été ramenés à la *frontière; que Joseph Cayen, Pierre

Malenjon et Antoine Magnin sont suffisamment prévenus d'avoir fait partie de cet attroupement, d'en avoir été les chefs et d'avoir, d'une manière active, participé à l'attaque du post de la douane sarde et aux actes de violence ci-dessus énoncés; que ces faits constituent des actions hostiles non-approuvées par le gouvernement, lesquelles exposaient l'état à une déclaration de guerre, ou tout au moins des actes non-approuvés par le gouvernement, lesquels exposaient des Français à éprouver des représailles, crimes prévus par les art. 84 et 85, c. pén., et emportant peine afflictive et infamante;-attendu qu'il résulte de la dite procédure qu'Antoine Perret est suffisamment prévenu d'avoir, par dons, promesses, machinations ou artifices coupables, provoqué les auteurs des crimes ci-dessus énoncés à les commettre, ou donné des instructions pour les commettre;-attendu que le fait est qualifié crime par la loi; qu'il est prévu par les art. 59 et 60, c. pén., et qu'il importe peine afflictive et infamante ;-attendu qu'aux termes de l'art. 5, c. inst. crim., tout Français qui s'est rendu coupable, hors du territoire de France, d'un crime attentatoire à la sûreté de l'état, peut être poursuivi, jugé et puni en France, d'après les dispositions des lois françaises :-par ces motifs, déclare qu'il y a lieu à accusation contre Antoine Perret, Joseph Cayen, etc. Du 25 avril 1831, c. de Grenoble, ch. réun. MM. Vignes, pr. Moyne, pr.-gén.

DALLOZ, General Jurisprudence, vol. XIV, p. 531.

SECTION 5.-Acts which may expose a state to a declaration of war, and its citizens to reprisals.

67. Here it is no longer a question of treason; it is a question of simple acts which tend less to show the perversity or immorality of the performer than his imprudence, his temerity, or his foolishness. They are

acts which, according to the circumstances under which they happen, might expose the state to a declaration of war, or the citizens to repri sais. They are the subject of two articles. "Whoever," says article 84, penal code, "shall have exposed the state to a declaration of war by hostile acts not approved by the government, shall be punished by banishment; and, if war should follow, by deportation." Not understanding how the act of a private individual could be of enough importance to expose the state to a declaration of war, Carnot was of the opinion that this article could only apply to government agents. He says: "The acts of government agents alone can bring about a war between France and foreign nations; we see this also explicitly set forth in article 85, which treats particularly of private individuals." The same author refers in

support of his opinion to the terms of article 2 of the code of [210] 1791, part *2, section 1, which is indeed to this effect; but at the

present time this is not the fact, and, in face of the generalty of the word whoever, used in article 84, no uncertainty can possibly exist on this point. (V. the "réquisitoire" de M. Dupin, in the Jauge case.) 68. A first condition is necessary to constitute the crime provided for in article 84; it is that the imputed actions should be hostile. What is then to be understood by this word? The law does not answer this question, nor could it do so, for the definition depends no less upon the nature of the relations existing between the two nations than upon the circumstances under which the act is committed. The gravest and most important act would pass unnoticed and would not lead to a conflict, if the nation to whose prejudice it had been done should be bound by ties of friendship to France, or should not be in condition to carry on war, while on the other hand the most insignificant act, the smallest offense, would lead to an outbreak, if this nation should be only waiting for a pretext to commence operations. It was, therefore, wise to refuse to define hostile acts which might expose the state to a declaration of war in the law, and to confine it simply to an exposition of their result. And in accordance with this article, it has been decided that the negotiation of loans in the name of a prince at war with an ally may not be regarded

as constituting a hostile action of a nature to expose France to a [211] declaration of war, unless this action falls under the *censure of the court of cassation.-(Crim. rej. 28 Nov., 1834-Jauge case, No. 28.)

69. A second condition constituting the crime is that the acts shall not have been approved by the government. Observe that the law does not say authorized, for the authorization, having been previous to the act, renders it legitimate and lawful, and no prosecution is ever possible; while, on the other hand, approbation is posterior to the act, and does not change its character, but only insures immunity from its consequences. If government approves hostile acts, it appropriates them, it assumes the responsibility and consequences of them, and protects the agent from all prosecution.

70. A third condition to the crime is that the hostile acts should have exposed the state to a declaration of war. Observe the law does not say to hostilities, but to a declaration of war, (V. Crim. rej., 28 Nov., 1834, Jauge case, No. 28; MM. Chauveau & Hléié, vol. 2, p. 61.) Think that it would have been better if the code had demanded hostile acts simple, "for," they say, "the aggressions which are most often manifested, either on the frontiers between the border inhabitants, or on the sea on isolated islands, may lead to acts of the same nature, but not a declaration of war." In the present state of Europe, the isolated act of a citizen, or even of a government functionary, would not be

likely to lead to a war. A declaration of war does not take place until the injured state has asked explanations, and if the govern[212] ment to which the aggressor belongs has had no connivance in the

act, then, as soon as this government disavows it, it is improbable that a war can follow." But may it not happen that the offended government is not contented with this disavowal; that, exaggerating the offense, it also exaggerates its demands; that it requires reparation humiliating to France, and satisfaction to which the latter cannot agree?

71. The commission of the Corps Législatif proposed (meeting of the 9th of January, 1810) to declare the punishment to be death instead of deportation in case the hostile acts should lead to war, the punishment of deportation not being sufficient when such a blow has followed the crime. The Conseil d'État rejected this motion because article 84 supposes that the agent has not calculated the result of his actions; and even if it were otherwise, if there had been trickery or an understanding, the act would fall under the preceding articles. Is this answer absolutely correct? MM. Chauveau & Hélié (v. 2, p. 64) do not think so. "Without doubt," they say, "if the hostile actions were the result of an understanding with foreign powers, article 76 could be applied in accordance with the case; but if the acts had been concerted with no foreign power, had been preceded by no act preparatory to treason, although they were premeditated, they would come under no part of the same section."

72. On the other hand, at the time of the revision of the code, it was proposed by a member in the Chamber of Deputies to substitute [213] temporary detention for deportation. The author *supported his

proposition by saying that in almost all cases, whenever this crime is possible, the criminal is actuated by a feeling of courage, even of generosity, thoughtless, undoubtedly, but presenting none of that depth of guilt assigned to it in article 82. "The chamber did not feel at liberty to adopt this amendment," according to the note of the law reporter, "for if one is to judge of the act by the intention, there is no intention more culpable than that which, not taking into account the grave interests of France, exposes it to the chances and misfortunes of war;" consequently the punishment of deportation was retained.

Besides, it must be observed that it is not the hostile act, violence, or depredation that the law punishes, but only the fact of having by these acts exposed the state to a declaration of war.-(V. crim. rej. 18th June, 1824; Herpin case, vo. comp. crim., No. 112.)

73. Article 85 reads: "Whoever shall have exposed the French to reprisals, by acts not approved by government, shall be punished by banishment." Observe, the law does not say whoever shall have caused reprisals, but whoever shall have exposed Frenchmen to them, whence it follows that for the charge it is of little account whether or not reprisals have taken place; it is sufficient that French inhabitants have been exposed to the danger of them. What should be the nature of the acts spoken of in this article, capable to expose the inhabitants of France to the danger of reprisals? We can only understand them to be of the nature of outrages and acts of violence committed on the subjects [214] of a foreign nation, and not of simple *losses, as the original

draught had it.-(Conf. MM. Carnot on the said art.; Chauveau and Hélié, v. 2, p. 61.)

74. Is it necessary that the reprisals shall have been ordered by the foreign government? MM. Chauveau and Hélié, vol. 2, p. 62, pronounce in the affirmative. It appears to us impossible to admit this

restriction when the law confines itself to saying: "Whoever shall have exposed Frenchmen to reprisals * * shall be punished," * &c.; evidently this cannot be interpreted as if it read: Whoever shall have provoked reprisals by a foreign government against Frenchmen, &c. Thus we are of opinion that if, for example, certain Englishmen had suffered outrages from certain Frenchmen, of such a nature that they might provoke reprisals against Frenchmen in England, these outrages. should be punished, in conformity to article 85, without it being necessary that the reprisals should have been ordered by the English government. Such is also the opinion of M. Hans; and it has been decided in this connection that violence exercised by Frenchmen toward the agents of the customs of a foreign government, the result of which was the removal of certain articles smuggled into the foreign territory, and seized by the officers, constituted hostile acts in the sense of article 84, penal code, or at least acts which would expose the French reprisals in

the sense of article 85 of the same code, (Grenoble, 25th April, 1831; [215] Min. Public, c. Cayen, &c.) The court: Whereas from the case *we

conclude, that on the 25th of February, 1831, at 11 o'clock in the evening, a mob of forty or fifty persons, inhabitants of French territory, went into Sardinian territory, where they attacked the post of the Sardinian customs, and committed various acts of violence on the officers; that the post was invaded and the corps-de-garde disarmed; that a carbine was fired at one of the overseers; that the other arms were retained and discharged; that the doors of a coach-house and stable were broken in, in order to carry off a tun of wine which had been smuggled into Sardinian territory, as well as a cart and some cows which had served as the means of transport, which objects had been seized by the inspectors of the customs; and that these objects, thus violently carried off, were brought back to the frontier; that Joseph Cayen, Pierre Morlenjon, and Antoine Maguin are sufficiently convicted of having taken part with this mob, of having been its leaders, and of having participated in an active manner in the attack on the Sardinian post of customs and in the other acts of violence as aforesaid; that these acts constitute hostile actions not approved by the government, which exposed the state to reprisals, crimes provided for in articles 84 and 85, penal code, and accompanied by a personal and infamous punishment:

Whereas it results from the said procedure that Antoine Per[216] ret is sufficiently convicted of having, by gifts, *promises, mach

inations of criminal artifices, instigated the authors of the aforesaid crimes to commit them, or of having given instructions to commit them; whereas the act is defined by the law as a crime, and is provided for in articles 59 and 60, penal code, and is accompanied by a personal and infamous punishment; whereas, according to the terms of article 5, C. Inst. Crim., every Frenchman guilty outside of the territory of France of a crime endangering the security of the state, can be proceeded against, convicted, and punished in France according to the laws of France: Therefore it is declared that there is ground of accusation against Antoine Perret, Joseph Cayen, &c.-(25th April, 1831, C. of Grenoble, Ch. réun. MM. Vignes, pr. Moyne, pr.-gén.

Théorie du code pénal d'Adolphe Chauveau et Faustin Hélié, troisième édition, tome 2e, pages 58 et seq., articles 84 et 85.

Il ne s'agit plus d'un crime de trahison: la loi ne soupçonne même aucune intelligence entre l'agent qu'elle inculpe et les ennemis de l'état;

ce qu'elle punit, ce sont des actes imprudents et téméraires, qui peuvent attirer sur les citoyens des représailles; sur l'état la guerre, avec ses chances et ses malheurs. "Si on n'avait pas mis dans le code," a dit un illustre magistrat (M. Dupin, réquisitoire dans l'affaire Jauge), "des peines contre l'homme qui expose son pays à la guerre, si le crime était impuni, il n'y aurait aucune satisfaction légale à donner à l'étranger qui se plaint: la guerre serait le seul remède; ou, bien, on ferait comme chez les penples anciens, on attacherait cet homme les mains derrière le dos avec une corde, on lui ferait franchir la frontière, et on le livrerait à l'étranger, pour qu'il puisse en faire justice. Il y aurait inhumanité; il faut que le pays ait ses lois, qu'il y ait des juges français pour juger et punir les coupables, afin qu'elle offre aux étrangers une juste satisfac[218] tion. La loi française* a conservé la dignité nationale en mettant parmi les crimes les faits de cette nature, et en réservant le jugement à des juges français. Quelle que soit cette décision, elle devra être respectée; alors, si on fait la guerre, elle sera juste."

Rappelons le texte des deux articles:

ARTICLE 84.

ARTICLE 85.

Il est évident que ces deux dispositions prévoient le même fait, mais en le supposant dans des espèces diverses et en lui imprimant un caractère différent. Nous allons successivement examiner ces deux hypothèses.

M. Carnot paraît penser que l'article 84 ne s'applique qu'aux agents du gouvernement, et il se fonde sur ce qu'il n'y a que les agents qui, par des agressions hostiles ou des infractions aux traités, puissent exposer l'état à une déclaration de guerre. Le code pénal de 1791 portait, en effet, dans l'article 2 de la section 1ère de la 2ème partie: "Que, lorsqu'il a été commis quelques agressions hostiles ou infractions de

traites, tendantes à allumer la guerre entre la France et une nation [219] étrangère. . . . le ministre qui aurait donné ou contre-signé

l'ordre, ou le commandant des forces nationales, de terre ou de mer, qui, sans ordre, aurait commis les dites agressions hostiles ou infractions de traité, serait puni de mort." Mais si le législateur de 1791 n'avait cru devoir s'occuper que des actes hostiles du fonctionnaire, notre code a effacé cette restriction; l'article, en employant le mot quiconque, ne laisse aucun doute sur sa généralité.

La loi n'a point défini les actes hostiles, et peut-être cette définition était-elle impossible. En général les actes de cette nature empruntent toute leur valeur politique des circonstances dans lesquelles ils se produisent. Un fait grave, important, n'entraînera aucune conséquence sérieuse, s'il est commis envers une nation que des liens étroits d'amitié unissent à la France. Dans d'autres circonstances, le fait le plus mimime peut élever un conflit et jeter l'alarme au sein de deux nations. Il faut donc se borner à dire, dans les termes de la loi, que les actions hostiles sont toutes les actes matériels qui, non-approuvés par le gouvernement, ont exposé l'état à une déclaration de guerre.

[220] Ainsi, il ne suffirait pas que les *actes hostiles eussent exposé

à de simples hostilités: la loi exige formellement, pour constituer le crime, le péril et l'alarme d'une déclaration de guerre. Ce point a été solennellement reconnu par la cour de cassation dans l'affaire Jauge. . .

Et ceci nous donnera lieu de remarquer une sorte de lacune dans la loi. Dans l'état politique de l'Europe, il est difficile que le fait isolé d'un simple citoyen, et même d'un fonctionnaire public, puisse allumer la guerre entre deux nations. Une déclaration de guerre n'intervient pas sans que l'état offensé ait demandé des explications. Et dès que l'agression a été commise à l'insu du gouvernement auquel appartient