which was brought by a vessel to an English port, verbally offered the captain of the vessel which brought it half the amount of the freight in cash, and also offered to give the captain per proc. the acceptance of the principal for the other half, if the captain would draw a bill. This the captain refused: -Held, a sufficient tender of the freight, as it was the duty of the captain to draw the bill. Luard v. Butcher, 29

2. The question as to whether a tender was made conditionally or not is for the jury. Marsden v. Goode, 133

THREATENING LETTER.

1. An indictment on the stat. 4 Geo. 4, c. 54, s. 3, charged that the prisoner sent a letter to T. L., threatening to burn the house of J. R.:— Held, bad, as the threat must be to the owner of the property; and that if the letter was sent to T. L., with intent that it should reach J. R., and did reach him, it should have been charged in the indictment as sent to J. R. Reg. v. Jones,

398

TRAVERSE.

A defendant, in a case of misdemeanor, for which he was indicted at the quarter sessions, and in which he was entitled to traverse, did traverse: -Held, that his traverse was to the next sessions, and not to the assizes, which came before the next sessions, and the defendant, being imprisoned in the gaol on this charge, the judge, at the assizes, would not discharge him on his own recognizance. Reg. v. Arlett, 596

TRESPASS.

See ACQUITAL.

1. If, in an action of trespass against several defendants, there be

2. In trespass for taking goods, the defence, under the stat. 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 3, that the goods had been seized after having been fraudulently removed to prevent a distress for rent, cannot be gone into unless specially pleaded; but where, in trespass against a landlord and his broker for taking goods, there was no evidence against the landlord, and this defence was opened but could not be gone into, as Not guilty "by statute" was the only plea, the judge would not certify, under the stat. 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, s. 1, that there was reasonable cause for making the landlord a defendant, in order to deprive him of his costs. Ibid.

TRIAL.

See GAOL DELIVERY.-TRAVERSE. The stat. 38 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 2, which relates to the trial of offences in an adjoining county, only applies to cities and towns corporate which are counties of themselves, and not to towns corporate which are not counties of themselves. Reg. v. Milner, 310

TRIAL (POSTPONING).
See POSTPONING TRIAL.

TROVER.

See DISTRESS, 2.-LANDLORD AND TENANT, 7.

1. In an action of trover, where the

plaintiff had been endeavouring to baffle his creditors by a merely ostensible transfer of the goods to another, and where they were seized upon premises in which the plaintiff's tenancy had expired:-Held, 1st, that there was a sufficient possession as against a wrongdoer, without regard to the question of ownership; and, 2ndly, that the measure of damages was the value of the plaintiff's real and bona fide interest in the goods, and not the full value. Cameron v. Wynch, 264

2. In trover a written demand of the goods, signed by the plaintiff, and attested by a subscribing witness, was served on the defendant:-Held, that, at the trial, a duplicate original of this could not be given in evidence as a demand by the plaintiff, without calling the subscribing witness; but the judge allowed it to be read as a paper delivered to the defendant, (though not as sent by the plaintiff), in order to allow the plaintiff (if he could) to shew anything that the defendant had said or done in consequence of it. Briant v. Dormer, 692

USE AND OCCUPATION. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 9, 10.

VARIANCE.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 9.-FORGERY, 14.

Where, after recital of two several contracts between the parties, the declaration alleged that they agreed to consolidate them, but the several contracts alone were proved in evidence, and the fact of an agreement to consolidate was negatived:-Held, that the variance was fatal, and that the Court would not amend the declaration. Moncrieff v. Reade, 705

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
See RAILWAY COMPANY, 1.
A perfect abstract of title is one

which shews such a title as enables a purchaser to complete his purchase. Therefore, where A. had contracted to sell lands to B., and B. afterwards contracted to sell them to C., and agreed, amongst other things, to furnish C. with a full and sufficient abstract of title; and before any conveyance by A. to B., A. died:-Held, that B., having before A.'s death delivered to C. an abstract, bringing the title down to the contract by A. to sell to him, had performed his agreement. Blackburn v. Smith, 561

VENUE.

See FORGERY, 23.—Justice of the PEACE. RECEIVER, 2.

VIEW.

Where on the trial of a case of rape it was wished on the part of the prisoner that the jury should see the place at which the offence was alleged to have been committed, and the place was so near the court that the jury could have a view without inconvenience, the judge allowed a view, although the counsel for the prosecution did not consent to it. Reg. v. Whalley, 376

WARRANT OF DISTRESS.

See CHURCH RATE, 7.

WARRANTY.

1. Where a horse is warranted 'sound," the plaintiff cannot recover in an action on that warranty, unless he shew that the horse was unsound at the time of the sale: and mere defective formation, not producing lameness at that time, is not an unsoundness within the meaning of the warranty. Bailey v. Forrest, 131

2. Where a party buys a specific cargo of goods, expected by a particular ship, and which are warranted

3. A witness in an action brought to recover certain commission or brokerage stated, on the "voir dire," that he had a claim to one moiety of whatever commission the plaintiff should receive:-Held, that the evidence of the witness was admissible under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85 (Lord Denman's Act). Hill v. Kitching, 278

4. A., B., and C., were jointly indicted, A. and B. for stealing tea, and C. for receiving it scienter, &c. A.

and C. pleaded Not guilty, and B. pleaded Guilty, and the trial proceeded against A. and C., no judgment having been pronounced against B.:-Held, that B. was a competent witness for the prosecution on the trial of A. and C. Reg. v. Hinks, 462

5. If a witness claims the protection of the Court, on the ground that his answer would tend to criminate himself, and there appears reasonable ground to believe that it would do so, he is not compellable to answer; and, if obliged to answer notwithstanding, what he says must be considered to have been obtained by compulsion, and cannot be given afterwards in evidence against him. Reg. v. Garbett,

474

6. Whether the mere declaration of a witness on oath, that he believes that his answer would tend to criminate him, would or would not be sufficient to protect him from answering, where sufficient other circumstances did not appear in the case to induce the judge to believe that the answer would tend to criminate the witness-quare? Ibid.

7. It makes no difference in the right of the witness to protection, that he had before answered in part, as he is entitled to claim the privilege at