of them only when absolutely necessary. The most striking feature of the whole system as actually administered was the extent to which the effort was made to fix conditions by agreements voluntarily entered into with the Food Administration by manufacturers and dealers; to secure the voluntary assistance of persons technically familiar with the conditions to be met; and to rely upon the voluntary compliance on the part of the consuming public with such restrictions as the Food Administration should from time to time declare to be necessary. The extent to which this voluntary cooperation on the part of the public was secured is one of the most remarkable features of the war. Such control as was exercised was exerted upon the manufacturers and dealers rather than upon the consumers. The whole vast field service of state and local food administrators rested largely upon a basis of voluntary service without compensation, and many of the force at Washington, including the Food Administrator himself, gave their services gratuitously or for but a nominal compensation. It is, of course, recognized that conditions were not so acute in thus country as elsewhere, and that had they been equally acute, a more rigid bureaucratic administration of food-control measures might have been necessary. It was nevertheless an act of wisdom to have recognized this difference and not to have considered recourse to the latter system until it was imperatively necessary. CHAPTER XII THE MOBILIZATION OF FUEL - Analysis of the fuel problem - First attempts to meet the situation by the Committee on Coal Production of the Council of National Defense — Repudiation of its price agreement by the Secretary of War-Powers of control derived from Congress - The Food and Fuel Control Act Creation of the United States Fuel Administration under Harry A. Garfield-Its functions and activities - In the stimulation of production - In the adjustment of labor disputes In the fixing of prices through State Fuel Adminis trators and local coal committees. In the control of distribution and apportionment through zoning, priorities, and licensing In the promotion of economy and efficiency in consumption-Control of fuel oil, gasoline, and other fuels Removal of restrictions after the armistice. The necessity for the immediate assumption by the Government of control over the production, distribution, and consumption of coal and other fuel was, if anything, even more imperative than in the case of food. Coal, on account of its bulk and its deterioration when exposed to the air, is a commodity that cannot be stored to advantage. Practically all industrial plants are dependent upon the steady receipt of coal for their current needs; only to a slight extent can they stock up for the future. The same is true to an almost equal degree of domestic consumers. Consequently the greater part of the coal as mined must be immediately placed on cars for transportation to the place of consumption. In no small degree the ability of mines to produce coal is thus controlled by the ability of the railroads to furnish cars for the prompt removal of coal from the mines to consumers. On our entrance into the war everything conspired to make the coal situation a difficult one. The demand for coal was enormously increased to meet the requirements of the new munitions factories and the increased activities of the railroads and shipping. The railroads did not have an adequate number of cars and locomotives to meet the demand thrown upon them, and such as they had they could not use effectively because of the congestion that took place at eastern ports and other terminals. Labor was difficult to get because of the draft on the available supply for the recruitment of the Army and the Navy and the personnel of the shipyards and munitions plants. On top of this came one of the severest winters the country has ever experienced. Excessive cold and snow not only called for a larger consumption of coal for heating and steaming purposes, but hampered greatly the ability of the railroads to handle their trains. The situation was thus one of extreme gravity, and it tended steadily to become worse. The whole problem of coal supply was like a chain, the breakage of a single link of which meant disaster. It could not possibly adjust itself. With an inadequate supply prices tended to soar, and there was no assurance that the industries most in need of fuel would get it unless the industry was subjected to rigid control. How critical the situation was may be seen from the fact that the Federal Trade Commission, which made an investigation of the coal industry in response to a resolution of Congress, recommended in a report made to the Senate1 on June 19, 1917, that the production and distribution of coal and coke be conducted through a pool in the hands of a Government agency, and that the producers of various 1 Senate Document No. 70, 65th Congress, 1st Session. grades of fuel be paid full cost of production plus a uniform profit per ton, with due allowance for quality of product and efficiency of service.2 An attempt to meet this situation was first made by the Council of National Defense, which early in May, 1917, appointed a Committee on Coal Production with Francis S. Peabody as Chairman. This Committee at a conference with coal operators held in Washington June 28, 1917, at which members of the Council of National Defense and the Federal Trade Commission were present, reached an agreement fixing the price at which bituminous coal should be furnished at $3 a ton. This agreement was immediately repudiated by the Secretary of War, who, as Chairman of the Council of National Defense, wrote under date of June 30, 1917, to the Director of the Council calling attention to the fact that the Council was a purely advisory body and as such had no power to fix prices or to perform any other act of an administrative character, and stating that in his opinion the price agreed upon was "exorbitant, unjust and oppressive." This difference between members of the administration attracted considerable attention, and served to emphasize all the more strongly the need for some organ that should have positive powers not only to fix prices, but to take the other action required to meet a situation which was constanly growing more acute. Provision for the creation of such an organ and the exercise of such powers was made by the Food and Fuel Control Act of August 10, 1917, an account of the passage of which 2 For a more detailed analysis of the coal situation see, in this series, George Otis Smith, The Strategy of Minerals. has been given in our consideration of the Food Administration. This Act provided for the exercise by the Government of powers of control over the production, distribution, and consumption of coal and other fuels which were even more drastic than those granted for the control of food products. All the powers conferred upon the President to license food industries, requisition food supplies, purchase, store, and sell food products, issue regulations to prevent the charging of excessive prices and speculation in food articles, take over and operate plants for the manufacture or handling of food products, etc., which have been enumerated in our account of the Food Administration were likewise granted to the President in respect to fuels. In addition he was expressly authorized, whenever in his judgment the efficient prosecution of the war required it, "to fix the price of coal and coke wherever and whenever sold, either by producer or dealer, to establish rules for the regulation of and to regulate the method of production, sale, shipment, distribution, apportionment or storage thereof among dealers and consumers, domestic or foreign." In case of failure by any producer or dealer to conform to any such regulation, he was authorized to take over the plant or business of such person and operate it. Enlarged powers were also granted to the President, acting through the Federal Trade Commission, to prosecute inquiries regarding the cost of producing coal and coke and to compel all persons to produce their books, records, and accounts and to furnish such other information as might be needed in making such investigations. In broad terms the Government was thus given practically plenary powers over the whole industry of the production, distribution, and consumption of coal and coke even, to the extent, if necessary, |