CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

Analysis of the problem-Its importance and immediate urgency - Elements in the mobilization of facilities and resources Need for an organ of general administration - The President as administrator-in-chief- His administrative powers derived from Congress - The Overman Act-Council of National Defense Its purpose as originally conceived - Its composition and functions as prescribed by the Act of March 26, 1916-Its Advisory Commission Organization of the Council and Advisory Commission - Its defects - In the formulation of programme - In the correlation of activitiesIn administrative personnel - In the interpretation of functions - In_committee organization - The real service of the Council Its gradual decline in importance Its activities

as a reconstruction agency.

Among the problems of organization for the prosecution of the war none was of greater importance, or of more immediate urgency, than that of general administration. This problem consisted in the perfection of means by which a general programme of operation might be formulated, the several features of this programme allotted to the services best fitted for their performance, and measures of control established to insure that the programme as thus formulated and assigned should be in fact efficiently carried out. The need for the adoption of such a work programme and the creation of an agency or agencies through which the organization and activities of the Government might be correlated, conflicts of jurisdiction avoided or adjusted as soon as they arose, duplication of organization, plant, and activities eliminated or reduced to a minimum, and all the several services of the Government integrated into one harmonious piece of administrative machinery is great in

times of peace. Upon the entrance of the United States into war it became imperative.

This was due not merely to the magnitude and complexity of the task that was thrown upon the Government, but also to the unusual conditions under which the war had to be fought. These conditions consisted in the fact that the resources of the country in both men and material were utterly inadequate to meet the demands made upon them. There was a shortage of man power, or at least of man power of the character required, of transportation facilities, both on land and water, of fuel, food, and almost every commodity required to meet the munition, equipment, and other needs of our military and naval forces. This shortage necessitated not only the taking of immediate steps for removing it, but the determination of the use to which should be put such resources as were available and the conditions under which they should be acquired.

Under these conditions it became necessary that the Government should at once undertake to do the following things: (1) formulate as definitely as circumstances would permit its military programme; (2) determine the total requirements in respect to all classes of men and material called for by such programme; (3) ascertain the extent to which these requirements could be met under existing conditions; (4) take steps to insure the creation of new facilities for meeting any shortage thus revealed; (5) determine the use to which such facilities and resources as were available should be put; and (6) fix the prices or compensation rates that should be paid for such services and supplies.

We have given this brief analysis of the purely administrative phase of the problem of the conduct of the war in order to make clear the need for the creation of

the various war agencies which will hereafter be described and the necessity for some organ of general administration which, standing outside of, and in a way superior to, the operating services, properly speaking, of the Government, should have as its function to see that these several steps were taken. A moment's reflection will show the necessity for some such organ of general direction, supervision, and control. If the separate services were left free to act according to their best judgment, each would naturally consider its own interests. There would be no assurance that they would be working to a common programme. They would compete with each other in a market inadequate to meet all their needs, with the result that prices would advance almost without limit, and there would be no assurance that services and supplies would be secured by those departments most urgently requiring them. Duplication of organization and work would occur on a large scale. And many things would remain undone by reason of the fact that they did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Government services as established prior to the war.

At the outbreak of the war the National Government was wholly without any such organ of general administration except in so far as the President and his Cabinet constituted such an organ. Though constitutionally the President's powers are exclusively executive as distinguished from administrative, the President has nevertheless become in effect the administrator-in-chief of the Government. This has resulted partly as a logical consequence of his duty as Chief Executive to see that the laws are duly enforced, partly in consequence of the powers possessed by him to nominate and, with the con

sent of the Senate, to appoint the chief administrative officers of the Government and his unrestricted power to dismiss all such officers, but chiefly from the fact that Congress has by statute conferred upon him administrative powers of the most comprehensive character. Especially has this policy been pursued by Congress since the entrance of the United States into the war. In almost no case did Congress attempt itself to prescribe the character of organization or the administrative methods that should be employed in enforcing the large volume of war legislation it enacted. Almost invariably it contented itself with providing that the President should take such action as in his opinion was wise to see that the provisions of those acts were properly carried out.

By an Act approved May 20, 1918,1 it went much further even than this, and conferred a general power upon the President during the war and for six months after its termination to effect such a coördination or consolidation of existing bureaus, agencies, and offices of the Government as in his opinion would lead to a more efficient prosecution of the war. This very important Act, which is known as the Overman Act from the name of its author, reads as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That for the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, for the better utilization of resources and industries, and for the more effective exercise and more efficient administration by the President of his powers as Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces the President is hereby authorized to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties, and

1 An Act Authorizing the President to coördinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and the more efficient concentration of the Government.