Bunau-Varilla as impossible under the financial situation.

The populous in France became divided and many savagely attacked de Lesseps and the whole undertaking. Bunau-Varilla says that "there was then but one crime, and that was to have served the Panama enterprise. There was but one virtue; and that was to have helped to destroy it." The canal trouble was then taken up by parliament, and for seven years it was a seething political caldron. In 1894 the affairs came into the hands of the New Panama Canal Company, which attempted to complete the work, but in 1898 they made an offer to sell the rights and interests to the United States. Matters were in such a precarious state that it was impossible to rehabilitate the enterprise. There was now only one hope; sell to the United States and destroy the Nicaragua scheme. At last this was the consummation.

The plan of the French was to build a much smaller canal than has been constructed by the Americans. While one was a makeshift, the other is a full sized operating machine. The French idea was to make the locks 65 feet wide and 590 feet long; and the Culebra cut was to be 72 feet wide. The American plan is: locks 110 feet wide and 1,000 feet long; with the Culebra cut 300 feet wide while the sea-level ends are 500 feet wide. This is stated in Bunau-Varilla's work on Panama, page 112. In the early stages of the French undertaking Bunau-Varilla at the age of 26 years had charge of all the canal work from Colon to Panama.

CHAPTER VII.

SECURING THE ROUTE.

After securing the treaty in 1901, the crucial struggle then began. We now had the right to build a canal anywhere across the isthmus so far as England was concerned. Nicaragua was in the ascendency, yet to many engineers this seemed almost an impossibility. There were the San Juan river and the Nicaragua lake to be traversed and deepened; and, then there was the very high ridge between the lake and the Pacific. It would be a difficult and expensive undertaking. The route through the lake was more than 70 miles long; twenty-eight miles of this would need to be dredged and this would only be a narrow canal in a vast inland sea, which in time of storm would be as boisterous as the ocean. How would a ship be kept in a narrow channel in such a state of weather. The heavy seas would also cause the channel to fill from the sides and constant dredging would be required. But the greatest of all difficulties according to Bunau-Varilla would have been the ridges both east and west. The greatest cut at Nicaragua would be the depth of 297 feet; and by this route eight locks would be required. Another great detriment at Nicaragua was the sharpness of the curves which would have made it dangerous navigation for ships of extreme length.

The French Company having virtually reached the end of its courage and finances, America was offered the opportunity to buy the incomplete Panama canal, rights and works. Before this could be done a treaty must be made with and a charter secured from Colom

bia. This passed to the stage where the Hay-Herran treaty was signed by which America was to pay $10,000,000 to Colombia. But this unfortunately failed of ratification by the Colombian Congress.

The whole matter now came to a standstill; for Colombia held the key to the situation. Bunau-Varilla representing the French Company was compelled to act promptly and with decision. Panama as a state must not lose the canal; it seceded, established a temporary government and Colombia sent troops to coerce her rebels. If Panama and Colombia had engaged in war, America would have been compelled to protect the railroad. Peace had to be maintained and this meant liberty to the new Republic. This was the legal theory, at least of a most important and critical situation. Bunau-Varilla in his late book on Panama discloses the whole story with all of its thrilling episodes and diplomatic adventures.

On Nov. 4, 1903, Bunau-Varilla was appointed minister from Panama, (a nation de facto), and on Nov. 13 was received as such minister by President Roosevelt. In his address Varilla spoke in part as follows: In consecrating its (Panama's) right to exist, Mr. President, you put an end to what appears to be interminable controversy as to the rival waterways, and you definitely inaugurate the era of the achievement of the Panama Canal.

* The highway from Europe to Asia, following the pathway of the sun is now to be realized. The pathway sought has hitherto remained in the land of dreams. Today, Mr. President, in response to your summons, it becomes a reality. (House documents 58 Cong. 1 session, page 17.)

On Nov. 18 a treaty with Panama was duly signed. Panama pledged ratification on Dec. 2, 1903; America

did not ratify until Feb. 23, 1904, with 66 senators in favor and 14 against it.*

The Republic of Panama was recognized by America Nov. 13, 1903; by France Nov. 16; by China Nov. 26; by Austria-Hungary Nov. 27; by Germany Nov. 30; by Denmark Dec. 3; by Russia Dec. 6; by Sweden and Norway Dec. 7; by Nicaragua Dec. 15; by Peru Dec. 19; by Cuba Dec. 23; by Great Britain Dec. 24; by Italy Dec. 24; by Japan Dec. 28; by Costa Rico Dec. 28; by Switzerland Dec. 28; by Belgium Dec. 9; and later substantially all of the other civilized nations joined in welcoming the new Republic into the family of nations; which increased the grand total to 25 powers.

The new ambassador has said that in less than two months after Panama's Declaration of Independence, the Republic was recognized by all of the powers of the earth, great and small, with a few insignificant exceptions. And what was the purpose of this speedy, phenomenal, universal, harmonious world action? It could have meant nothing else than that the world demanded the connecting of the two oceans, and that the demand should be imperatively granted.

Panama's first minister was a full-born Frenchman, and had no interest in Panama except his relation to the French Canal Company. All he desired was to make sure of a tight and binding treaty. This part he worked out to a complete conclusion, and no one takes greater pleasure in America's success than he. His firm belief, however, is that the lock canal must gradually be brought to a sea-level strait. This could probably be done by removal of the top-load from the mountain on each side of the Culebra cut and thus avoid "slides" arising from deepening of the cut. There should be little difficulty in excavating sufficiently * See Cong. Record, Feb. 23, 1904.

to eliminate the higher lock. Every lock removed is one step nearer the open strait.

According to report the Nicaragua route would be 183 miles long, while the Panama Canal is 50 miles long. It would have taken three times as long to pass through a Nicaragua Canal as at Panama, for travel can only be safely taken through the canal in the daytime.

We have selected the route at Panama and built the canal and no benefit can come from discussing discarded plans. Our hands are now full and other routes can have but little attractions for us; only perhaps we might use our foresight to protect our present monopoly by securing the privilege of any other available route.

TEN YEARS AFTER.

The preceding statement shows the situation not in 1914, but in 1904, and it is now a part of the world's recorded history. But conditions have changed, somewhat, and we now have an interest in the canal property to the extent of $400,000,000. Our nation has tried amicably to adjust all questions with Colombia and a treaty has been signed which was ratified at Bogota, June 9, 1914, and is now pending before our Senate for ratification.

Under the Constitution the President and the Senate hold all the treaty-making authority, and there is no appeal from their decision, the nation and the people are bound. Most treaties are negotiated in secret and are ratified by the Senate in secret session, and may thus become "the supreme law of the land" without any advice from the electorate.

The citizen has his constitutional protection in the requirement, that a treaty must be ratified by a two