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applied in periods of emergency. What embargoes have not been able to accomplish, might be secured through a bureau of the commission such as the Car Service Bureau, charged with the duty of watching congested terminals, and exercising a control over traffic that would assure a more steady flow, and when necessary, divert traffic through gateways that were better prepared to handle it. In connection with the solution of this problem, the Railroad Administration also undertook the coördination of the marine departments of the different railroads and the use of all piers regardless of ownership. A much more ambitious project was the creation of the Exports Control Committee, with power to determine the ports to which traffic should be hauled, thus overcoming the utter lack of coördination between rail and water agencies that prevailed at the beginning. The permit system was employed to prevent the shipment of goods to any port until there was a practical certainty that ships would be promptly available.

The war did not last long enough to give this committee the opportunity to make its influence felt in any large way on the traffic of the country. But some means must soon be found to put this policy into practical operation if we are to utilize to the best advantage our railroad, port, and steamship facilities, and avoid the frequent congestions and blockades that arise from a too great popularity of a relatively few of our ocean terminals. Shipping must be attracted to the less frequented ports, and traffic must be so distributed that a steady flow to and from the ports can be assured the railroads serving them. This will raise the question whether it is to the public interest to permit the continuance of the railroad control of terminal facilities, under which close traffic agreements are made with steamship lines, frequently to the detriment of the proper development of the port.

We shall have no thorogoing solution of the ocean terminal problem until the public recognizes its right and its duty to own and control the facilities in the interest of the public as a whole.

In the reduction of costs of operation and the improvement of service, the greatest opportunities for the future center in the problem of terminals. The public has permitted these properties to develop without, until recently, taking any serious interest in their character and location, and large cities have been provided with separate and scattered terminal yards constructed on the theory that each railroad is an isolated undertaking having no relation to any other. The result is that consolidation of terminal properties becomes today a wellnigh insoluble problem because of its physical difficulties and its financial magnitude. The claim that any movement toward joint terminals would be illegal under the Antitrust Act has no basis in court decision, beyond the ruling that such terminals must not be organized with the purpose of preventing competition. Whether the very moderate movement in the direction of unification inaugurated by the Railroad Administration will be carried over and further developed, depends to a considerable degree upon the plan finally adopted for the future operation of the railroads. The public should certainly not allow this promising beginning to lapse.

By the reduction of the operating organizations, and the elimination of two or three hundred officers at salaries of $5000 or over, Director General McAdoo estimated that he had accomplished an annual saving of about $4,600,000. But this "saving," widely heralded in the newspapers because it meant the elimination of the exorbitant salaries paid to railroad executives, was largely a matter of bookkeeping. The greater part

1 United States v. Terminal R. R. Association of St. Louis. 224 U. S. 383.

of the officers released by the Administration continued as officers of the railroad corporations, and the sum total of administrative expense remained as before. Moreover, the Director General recognized the necessity of paying salaries of $40,000 and $50,000 to his Regional Directors. Other members of his staff whom he secured at lower salaries, assumed their duties as a war service and at a considerable personal sacrifice. When in addition to this, it is observed that the expenses of the federal administration are steadily growing, it must be concluded that this is one of the instances in which the desire of the Administration to do the popular thing, led it into promises that it was unable to fulfill.

In contrast with the British plan, leaving the operation of the roads to their General Managers under a government guarantee, the Director General inaugurated a régime of federal operation, with a staff which, altho made up largely of experienced railroad men, was required to sever all its former connections and recognize responsibility to him alone. Basing his action upon the Biblical generalization that "no man can serve two masters," he made a definite cleavage between the operating staff and employees, which now were placed on the pay-roll of the Federal Railroad Administration, and the officers of the railroad corporations, who represented the owners, stockholders, and creditors as lessors of the railroad property. Many of the former executives have been retained as operating heads of systems or groups of roads, many others have become presidents of their corporations, with the duty of protecting the interests of their stockholders. The explanation of the practice of the Director General, in notable instances, in passing over the presidents of the large railroads, and selecting subordinate officers as his federal managers, seems to have been a feeling that more whole-hearted

subservience to federal authority would be assured in the case of younger men, whose duties had not brought them so closely in touch with broader corporate interests and questions.

The three "economies" in which the largest estimated saving was shown have now been discussed. Other administration policies may be summarized briefly. Rerouting of traffic to avoid unnecessary mileage was attempted in all sections, and it was assisted materially by shippers themselves who, after the disappearance of the traffic forces and the ending of solicitation, naturally sought the shortest routes for their goods. But direct routes, especially in the east, became so congested that roundabout hauls were required, and the saving was thereby largely nullified. No satisfactory estimate of savings can be made, but it is doubtful whether any large economies resulted under the emergency conditions of the war period. The "sailingday-plan," under which less-than-carload freight is assembled in solid cars and despatched without transfer to destination, has been widely introduced, but not without protests from shippers in some sections, who have felt that their privileges were being curtailed. They have protested against being obliged to bring their traffic to the freight station on designated days only, and to ship it only by designated routes. But many of the objections to the plan as originally promulgated have now been removed, and with its more general introduction its advantages from the standpoint of service are likely to be better understood and appreciated. The movement for better loading of cars and trains, begun and largely accomplished under the Railroads' War Board, has to some degree improved during the period, with the invaluable assistance of the various government agencies concerned. Moreover, the shippers contributed to this

not alone from patriotic motives, but because they felt the necessity of making full use of their limited supply of cars. Solid trains were routed direct from origin to destination, expediting traffic and saving yard expense. The service was applied most extensively to traffic in flour and grain, lumber, fruit, packing-house products, live-stock, cotton, and oil. However, the statistics of loading, particularly for the Eastern Region, are materially affected by the extent of empty car mileage westbound, which the war exigencies forced upon the management. So far as was possible, the "permit system" was used as a weapon to enforce full return loads. The coal-zoning plan, introduced primarily to meet the fuel shortage, was effective in eliminating a large waste in transportation, altho it necessitated a serious readjustment in markets that were accustomed to certain grades of coal, and were by this plan now obliged to resort to substitutes. An increase in demurrage rates almost to a prohibitive point, was put into force to speed up the unloading of cars. Through interline way billing was extended and reconsignment privileges to a considerable degree eliminated. A system of store door delivery of package freight was introduced in New York and Philadelphia to relieve the terminal situation. The Car Service Section undertook with some success the campaign for advance movement of important raw materials during the summer months, to avoid a possible congestion in the fall. Finally, there may be mentioned the devising of methods for the consolidation and simplification of tariffs and the completion of a uniform freight classification, in preparation long before the war, which has been submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission, but not yet approved.

In the passenger field, the project which is looked upon with the greatest satisfaction by the Administra

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