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They tend to introduce personal solicitation and personal influence as elements in the procurement of contracts, and thus directly lead to inefficiency in the public service and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds. *** All agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government or the regular administration of justice, or the appointment to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country."

In this case the doctrine of the court in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., reported in 16th Howard, was emphasized. There compensation was claimed by the plaintiff for services rendered in procuring the passage of a law by the Legislature of Virginia, upon a contract that if the law was not passed, or if passed, was not accepted and adopted or used by the stockholders, no compensation should be allowed. It was held that the contract was void as against public policy. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Grier, said: "Bribes in the shape of high contingent compensation must necessarily lead to the use of improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the demoralization of the agent who covenants for them; he is soon brought to believe that any means which will produce so beneficial a result to himself are proper means;' and that a share of these profits may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and warming the zeal of influential or 'careless' members in favor of the bill." See, also, Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543.

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In Trist v. Child, reported in 21st of Wallace, the distinction is drawn between the use of personal influence to secure legislation and legitimate professional services in making the Legislature acquainted with the merits of the measures desired. Whilst the former is condemned, the latter are, within certain limits, regarded as appropriate subjects for compensation. There the defendant had employed the plaintiff to get a bill passed by Congress for an appropriation to pay a claim against the United States. It was considered by the court to have been a contract for lobby services, and adjudged void as against public policy. Other similar cases were mentioned by the court, and after observing that in all of them the contract was held to be against public policy and void, it added, speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne: "We entertain no doubt that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement express or implied for purely professional services is valid. Within this category are included drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. All these things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable. But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation, and the other means and appliances which the correspondence shows were resorted to in this case."

So too with reference to furnishing the government with arms or supplies of any kind. It is legitimate to lay before the officers authorized to contract, all such information as may apprise them of the character and value of the articles offered and enable them to act for the best interests of the country. And for such services compensation may be had as for similar services

with private parties, either upon a quantum meruit, or where a sale is effected, by the ordinary brokerage commission. And here it may be observed, in answer to some authorities cited, that the percentage allowed by established custom of commission merchants and brokers, though dependent upon sales made, is not regarded as contingent compensation in the obnoxious sense of that term, which has been so often the subject of animadversion by this court, as suggesting the use of sinister or corrupt means for accomplishing a desired end. They are the rates established by merchants for legitimate services in the regular course of business. But where, instead of placing before the officers of the government the information which should properly guide their judgment, personal influence is the means used to secure the sales, and is allowed to prevail, the public good is lost sight of, unnecessary expenditures are incurred, and generally, defective supplies are obtained, producing inefficiency in the public service.

In Meguire v. Corwine, decided at the last term, the doctrine of the above cases was approved. There an agreement to pay the plaintiff-in consideration of his appointment as government counsel-one-half the fees he might recover, was adjudged invalid. Transactions of the kind were declared to be "an unmixed evil;" and the court said that whether forbidden by statute or condemned by public policy, "no legal right could spring from such a source." 101 U. S. 111.

In the present case there is no feature that relieves the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce from the condemnation pronounced in the several cases cited. It is the naked case of one officer of a government, to secure its purchase of arms, selling his influence with another officer in consideration of a commission on the amount of the purchase. The courts of the United States will not lend their aid to collect compensation for services of this nature; nor does it make any difference that the Turkish government did not object to the plaintiff's taking commission on such contracts, which counsel contended we must consider as admitted together with the rest of the opening statement. We may doubt whether we are compelled to take as correct, with the facts mentioned touching the contract in court, his statement of the law or customs of other countries. But admitting this to be otherwise, and that the Turkish government was willing that its officers should be allowed to take commissions on contracts obtained for it by their influence, that is no reason why the courts of the United States should enforce them. Contracts permissible by other countries are not enforceable in our courts, if they contravene our laws, our morality, or our policy. The contract in suit was made in this country, and its validity must be determined by our laws. But had it been made in Turkey, and were it valid there, it would meet with the same reprobation when brought before our courts for enforcement.

The general rule undoubtedly is that the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where it is made, unless it is to be performed in another country; but to this, as to all general rules, there are exceptions, and among these Story mentions contracts made in a foreign country to promote or reward the commission of crime, to corrupt or evade the due administration of justice, to cheat public agents, or to affect the public rights, and other contracts which in their nature are founded in moral turpitude, and are inconsistent with the good order and solid interest of society. "All such contracts," he adds, "even although they might be held valid in a country where they are made, would be held void elsewhere, or at least ought to be, if the dictates of Christian morality, or even of natural justice, are allowed to have their due force and influence in the administration of international jurisprudence." Story's Conflict of Laws, § 258.

Among such obnoxious contracts must be included

all such as have for their object the control of public agents by considerations conflicting with their duty and fidelity to their principals. A contract to bribe or corruptly influence officers of a foreign government will not be enforced in the courts of this country-not from any consideration of the interests of that goverument or any regard for its policy, but from the inherent viciousness of the transaction, its repugnance to our morality, and the pernicious effect which its enforcement by our courts would have upon our people. Hope v. Hope, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 731; Watson v. Murray, 8 C. E. Green, 257.

In any view of the contract here, whether it would be valid or invalid according to Turkish law and customs, it is intrinsically so vicious in its character and tendency, and so repugnant to all our notions of right and morality, that it can have no countenance in the courts of the United States.

Our conclusion therefore is that the third position of the plaintiff is not well taken.

It follows that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

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The learned judge at Special Term, in a brief note, assigned the following as the reason for his decision: Motion denied on the ground that by the decision of Mr. Justice Donohue it was held that this court has no jurisdiction in cases of supplementary proceedings."

It is apparent that none of the suggestions of irregularity, or insufficiency of the papers on which the motion was founded, now presented by the respondent's counsel, were considered and passed upon by the court below. We think it our duty to confine our decision to the single question upon which that court passed.

Section 2432 of the code provides for three distinct remedies by proceedings supplementary to execution against property, and section 2434, under which the question in this case arises, specifies the judge before whom such proceedings may be instituted and conducted. Its language is as follows:

"Either special proceeding may be instituted before a judge of the court out of which, or the county judge or special county judge of the county to which the execution was issued; or, where it was issued to the city and county of New York, from a court other than the Marine Court of that city, before a judge of the Court of Common Pleas for that city and county. Where the execution was issued out of a court other than the Supreme Court, and it is shown by affidavit that each of the judges before whom the special proceeding might be instituted as prescribed in this section, is

absent from the county, or for any reason unable or disqualified to act, the special proceeding may be instituted before a justice of the Supreme Court. In that case, if he does not reside within the judicial district, embracing the county to which the execution was issued, the order made or warrant issued by him must be returnable to a justice of the Supreme Court residing in that district, or the county judge, or the special county judge of that or an adjoining county, as directed in the order or warrant." We are at a loss to see any difficulty in ascertaining the true sense and intention of this section. It was intended to confer jurisdiction in either of the proceedings specified in section 2432, upon the judges of several different courts, and to define the cases in which each jurisdiction might be exercised by some of them. To do this it first declares in very general terms that either special proceeding may be instituted before a judge of the court out of which the execution was issued.

This broad language embraces every court of record authorized to enforce its judgment by execution against property, and the phrase "judge of the court is used, as it is in various other sections of the same title, in its general sense, aud without regard to the question whether the title of such judge is technically that of justice or judge. This general power to institute the proceeding, conferred upon a judge of the court out of which the execution was issued is nowhere limited by the section. But provision is afterward made in some cases which are specified for the further conduct of the proceedings before another judge. The same clause of the section provides also that either special proceeding may be instituted before "a county judge or special county judge of the county to which the execution was issued." This power also is general, and in all counties of the State where the office of county judge or of special county judge exists, such judge is clothed with authority to institute the proceedings whenever the execution is issued to his county. But this latter provision would not affect the city and county of New York, because in that city there is no county judge or special county judge; and so it was thought necessary to provide that the judges of a local court standing in place of the county judges or special county judges of other counties, should be clothed with the same jurisdiction. It was therefore enacted that where the execution was issued to the city and county of New York, from a court other than the Marine Court of that city, a special proceeding may be instituted before a judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York. This undoubtedly gives to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas power to institute supplementary proceedings in all cases where the execution has been issued to the city and county of New York, from any court other than the Marine Court of that city. Jurisdiction of proceedings founded upon judgments of the Marine Court are left to be enforced by the judges of that court, under the power conferred by the first clause of the section, which declares that either special proceeding may be instituted before a judge of the court out of which the execution was issued. But with that exception the section gives a general power to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas in all cases of judgments upon which the execution is issued to the city and county of New York. The exercise of that power may be restricted somewhat by questions of residence and personal jurisdiction as specified in subsequent sections, but those questions are not now under consideration.

The next section provides for cases where the execution is issued out of a court other than the Supreme Court, and it is shown that each of the judges before whom the proceeding might be instituted, as prescribed in this section, is absent from the county or for any reason uuable or disqualified to act. In such a case it

is provided that the proceeding may be instituted before a justice of the Supreme Court. The objects of this provision are too plain to require comment. The residue of the section provides for cases where the justice of the Supreme Court before whom the proceeding is instituted in the case just mentioned, does not reside within the judicial district embracing the county to which the execution was issued. In that case the order made by him must be returnable to a justice of the Supreme Court residing in that district; or to the county judge or special county judge of that, or of any adjoining county, as may be directed in the order. The system of section 2434 seems to be very plain. It is to confer power to institute the proceedings, 1st, Before any judge of any court out of which the execution was issued. 2d, Before any county judge or special county judge of any county to which the execution was issued. 3d, Before any judge of the Court of Common Pleas in and for the city and county of New York, where the execution was issued to the city and county of New York out of any court other than the Marine Court of that city, and 4th, To provide for cases where the execution is issued out of a court other than the Supreme Court, and each of the judges before whom the special proceeding might be instituted as previously prescribed in the section, is absent from the county, or for any reason unable or disqualified to act, by authorizing the proceeding in such cases to be instituted before a justice of the Supreme Court, and directing where the subsequent steps in the proceeding shall be taken in cases in which the party proceeded against does not reside within the judicial district embracing the county to which the execution was issued.

All the various parts of the section are harmonious and consistent with each other, aud offer no occasion for construction, or as it seems to us for reasonable doubt.

In the case before us the action was in the Supreme Court; execution had been issued and returned, and proceedings supplementary taken, under which a receiver was appointed in that court.

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The learned judge was in our opinion fully authorized by the code to grant the motion made before him. The decision upon which he relied in denying the notion was erroneous, and for that reason the order must be reversed with $10 costs, and disbursements.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. CRIMINAL LAW — RESENTENCE BY GENERAL TERM OF PRISONER CONVICTED OF MURDER. - A prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced at the Oyer and Terminer to be hung March 19, 1880, was by the governor respited until April 30, 1880. Before that date a writ of error and stay of execution were granted by a justice of the Supreme Court. The case was argued at a General Term of that court, and the conviction affirmed. Thereafter a General Term in the same department, composed in part of different justices, issued a writ of habeas corpus, under which the prisoner was brought up before it on November 27, 1880, and on that day sentenced to be hung January 7, 1881. Held, that under the provisions of 2 R. S. 659, §§ 23, 24, authorizing a General Term to bring a prisoner sentenced to death, but not executed, before it by habeas corpus, to inquire into the facts and circumstances, and if no legal reasons exist against the execution of the sentence, to sign a warrant directing the sheriff of the proper county to do execution of such sentence at such time as shall be appointed therein, the General Term had jurisdiction to direct the carrying out of the sentence, and the passing of sentence, though a needless, was a harmless formality. Judgment affirmed. Moet v. People of New York. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided May 31, 1881.]

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An objection generally to evidence, without assigning any ground of error, furnishes no cause for reversal. Shaw v. Smith, 3 Keyes, 316; Fountain v. Pettee, 38 N. Y. 184. (2) The lien law of 1875 applicable to the city of New York provides that " every person performing labor upon or furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any building, shall have a lien on the same. Held, that to authorize a lien, the materials, both in fact and intention, must have become part and parcel of the building itself. The rule as to fixtures stated in McRae v. Central Nat. Bank of N. Y. applies. Three requisites are criteria of a fixture: first, actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto; second, application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; third, the intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. In the present case plaintiff placed mirror frames in the halls and parlors of several houses defendant was building, during the process of building. They were set in gaps left in the walls or base boards for that purpose, and were constructed so as to correspond with the inner surface of the rooms in which they were. They were fastened to the walls with hooks and screws. They could be removed, but their removal would leave unfinished walls, and work would be required to repair their absence. They formed a prominent feature of the internal ornamentation of the house, and were intended by the owner to be permanently attached to the buildings, and to go with them when sold as essential parts of the construction. Held, that a mechanic's lien could be filed by the one constructing such frames, against the buildings containing them, to secure payment for them. The case McKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38, distinguished. Judgment affirmed. Ward v. Kilpatrick. Opinion by Finch, J.

[Decided May 31, 1881.]

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MORTGAGE ASSUMPTION OF-FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION - EVICTION OF ONE ASSUMING, BY PARAMOUNT TITLE.-A. Executed a mortgage upon land which he afterward conveyed to B., who assumed the payment of the mortgage. B. conveyed the land to defendant, who also assumed payment of the mortgage as part of the purchase-price. Defendant was thereafter evicted under a paramount title. Held, that the consideration of the covenant of assumption failed, and defendant could not be held liable for deficiency upon a foreclosure of the mortgage. It was said in Tallmage v. Wallis, 25 Wend. 117, that upon an eviction under paramount title the consideration for a note or bond given by a purchaser for the purchasemoney of the land wholly failed, and the covenants of title in the deed of the grantor could not be regarded as a consideration which would support the promise to pay. The same rule has been authoritatively declared elsewhere, and is in accordance with the general current of authority. Knapp v. Lee, 3 Pfck. 452; Rice v. Goddard, 14 id. 293; Trask v. Vinson, 20 id. 105; Rawle on Cov. 607. In Rice v. Goddard the court say: "The promise is not made for a promise, but for the land; the moving cause is the land, and if that fails to pass the promise is a mere nudum pactum." In Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, it was held that an assumption clause in a deed did not give a right of action to the mortgagee when the grantor was not himself liable to pay the mortgage. The cases Halsey v. Reed, 9 Pai. 446; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, and Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 id. 253, distinguished. In the case at bar defendant would not be liable to B. on his covenant, and the principle is that a mortgagee who seeks to avail himself of an assumption clause in a sub

sequent deed of the mortgaged premises takes under and through the grantor, and is subject to defenses arising out of the contract or transaction between the original parties when the deed was executed. See Flagg v. Munger, 9 N. Y. 483. Judgment of General Term reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed. Dunning v. Leavitt. Opinion by Andrews, J. Folger, C. J., and Earl, J., dissent.

[Decided April 19, 1881.]

CONSIDERATION

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PAYMENT

EX

SURETYSHIP TENSION OF TIME. — - (1) While the contract of suretyship needs a consideration to sustain it as well as any other contract (Bailey v. Freeman, 4 Johus. 280; Leonard v. Vreedenburgh, 8 id. 29), that need not be something passing from the creditor to the surety. Benefit to the principal debtor or harm or inconvenience to the creditor is enough to form a consideration for the guaranty and the consideration in that shape may be executory as well as executed at the time. In this case an agreement was made by the plaintiff to extend the payment of a part of a debt owing by the principal for a definite time if the debtor would procure a mortgage executed by his wife as security for the payment of the debt thus extended. In pursuance of this promissory notes for extension were made by the principal. The mortgage was made by the wife on the next day, which was subsequent to the date of the notes. Held, that there was a consideration for the mortgage, and it was valid. See Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; Breed v. Hillhouse, Tib. 523. (2) The principal tendered a check in payment of one of the notes. The creditor informed him if it was applied to pay the note, credit to him on account would be stopped. He thereupon authorized the creditor to apply the check upon an account owed by him. Held, that the surety could not claim that this constituted payment of the note or an agreement to extend time thereon. The test as to whether there is an extension discharging the surety is, could the surety have paid the note and enforced the consequent liability against the maker? This she could have done here. Judgment affirmed. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Blake. Opinion by Folger, C. J.

[Decided April 26, 1881.]

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.*

EQUITABLE ACTION -TO ENFORCE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT VOID UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Equity will enforce specific performance of a contract within the statute of frauds when there has been such a part performance that a refusal by one party to perform will operate as a fraud upon the other. Thus, where defendants, by promising to accept and execute on their part a lease of certain stores from plaintiff for five years, induced plaintiff to break off pending negotiations for renting such stores to a third person, and to materially alter their structure in order to adapt them to defendant's use, and entered into and held full possession of such stores for two years, paying rent therefor according to said agreement, but neglected (without refusing), during that time, to execute on their part the lease executed by plaintiff and tendered to them when they took possession, and at the expiration of the two years refused to execute such lease, or continue to occupy or pay rent according to its terms, held, that they should be adjudged to execute the lease. Story's Eq. Jur., § 754; Potter v. Jacobs, 111 Mass. 32. The refusal to complete such a contract is in the nature of a fraud and defendants are estopped from setting up the statute of frauds. Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24. See Paine v. Wilcox, 16 Wis. 202; Noucer v. Fabrian, L. R., 1 Ch. App. 35; Dowell v. Dew, 1 Young & C. 356; Willis v.

* To appear in 52 Wisconsin Reports.

Stradling, 3 Ves. Jr. 378; McCarger v. Rood, 47 Cal. 141; Wait's Act. and Def. 776, 777, 790; Rankin v. Loy, 2 De G. F. & J. 55; Brown v. Dawson, 14 Ves. Jr. 386. Seaman v. Ascherman. Opinion by Orton, J. [Decided April 19, 1881.]

FORECLOSURE

WHEN RECEIVER WILL NOT BE AP

POINTED. In foreclosure of mortgages, where no waste, or failure to pay taxes, or diminution of the value of the security, or increase of the mortgage debt is shown, but on the contrary such debt has been reduced since the securities were taken, and where less than half the remaining debt is due, including only a small amount of interest, and the property consists of city lots, presumptively salable in parcels, and there is nothing to show that a party personally liable for a large part of the debt is not responsible to the full amount of any probable deficiency, it was error to appoint a receiver. Insurance Co. v. Stebbins, 8 Paige, 568; Quency v. Cheeseman, 4 Sandf. Ch. 405; Brown v. Chase, 1 Walker's Ch. 43; Morrison v. Buchner, 1 Hempst. 442; Keep v. Railway Co., 6 Chic. L. N. 102. Morris v. Branchaud. Opinion by Cassoday, J. [Decided April 19, 1881.]

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NEW PROMISE

- WHAT

IS NOT SUFFICIENT. It is the settled doctrine in this State that when the statute of limitations has run against a debt the debt is extinguished, and that the bar of the statute is not removed by any mere admission of legal liability, but only by an unqualified promise to pay; and under section 37, chapter 138, Revised Statutes, 1858 (§ 4243, R. S. 1878), such promise must be in writing, signed by the alleged debtor. The written words, "I think I see my way clear to pay you the $200 and interest I owe you. I am in hopes another two years will enable me from my present income to clear off all pressing debts. Rest assured that not a day of pecuniary freedom will pass over my head without you hearing from me," held, not to contain any promise of payment sufficient to remove the bar of the statute. Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 id. 432; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 id. 247; Howell v. Howell, 15 id. 55; Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 id. 577; Lindsey v. Fay, 28 id. 177; Carpenter v. State, 41 id. 36; Martin v. F. & W. R. Impr. Co., 19 id. 553; Mattocks v. Chadwick, 71 Me. 313. Pierce v. Seymour. [Decided May 10, 1881.]

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CONVICTION — WHAT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE · PLEADING GUILTY.-The Constitution of the State of Oregon (art. 2, § 3) declares that "the privilege of an elector shall be forfeited by a conviction of any crime which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary." The defendant was indicted for an assault with a dangerous weapon, contrary to section 536 of the Oregon Criminal Code, which crime was thereby made punishable by fine or imprisonment in the jail or penitentiary, in the discretion of the court, to which accusation he pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to pay a fiue of $200. Afterward, on June 7, 1880, the defendant voted for representative in Congress at an election held in Madison precinct, Oregon. Held, (1) that the term "conviction as used in the Constitution of Oregon, supra, is used in its primary and ordinary sense, and siguifies a proving or finding that the defendant is guilty, either by the verdict of a jury or his plea to that effect, and does not include the sentence which follows thereon; (2) that a crime" is punishable by " imprisonment in the penitentiary when by any law it may be so punished, and the fact that it also may be or is otherwise punished does not change its grade or character in this respect; (3) that the defendant was convicted by his plea of guilty of a crime

punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and thereby forfeited his privilege as an elector under the Constitution of Oregon; and (4) that, assuming the term "conviction" to include the sentence, still the defendant was convicted of a crime so punishable, the liability to such punishment and not the punishment actually inflicted being the circumstance which controls the effect of the conviction in this respect. See People v. Apgar, 35 Cal. 389; United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 40; 2 Hawk P. C. Ch. 36, §§ 1, 10; Bish. Stat. Cr., § 348; Whart. Cr. Prac., § 935; Stevens v. People, 1 Hill, 261; Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 S. & R. 69; People v. Van Steenberg, 1 Park Cr. 39; People v. Park, 41 N. Y. 21; Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend. 34; Peabody v. Fenton, 3 Barb. Ch. 462; Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 255. U. S. Circ. Ct., Oregon, March 11, 1881. United States v. Watkinds. Opinion by Deady, D. J. (6 Fed. Rep. 162.)

FORGERY "6 FALSE DEED"- A DEED BY ONE ASSUMING TO ACT AS ATTORNEY WITHOUT AUTHORITY

NOT.-Defendant W. was indicted for uttering a false deed under a statute against forgery. It was shown that the deed was signed thus: "H. by W., his attorney in fact." Held, that this did not constitute the offense charged, although W. had no authority to act for H. Where one executes an instrument purporting on its face to be executed by him as the agent of a principal therein named, when in fact he has no authority from such principal to execute the same, he is not guilty of forgery; the instrument is not a false or a forged deed within the meaning of the statute. This is no false making of the instrument, but merely a false assumption of authority. In State v. Young, 46 N. H. 266, the court say: "The term 'falsely' has reference not to the contents or tenor of the writing, or to the fact stated in the writing, but implies that the paper is false, not genuine, fictitious, not a true writing, without regard to the truth or falsehood of the statement it contains." In Rex v. Asscott, 6 C. & P.

408, the defendant had indorsed on a bill of exchange, "Rec'd of R. Aikman. G. Asscott." Littledale, J., says: To forge a receipt is writing the name of the person for whom it is received. But in this case the acts done by the prisoner were the receiving for another, and signing his own name." In Regina v. White, 2 C. & K. 404 (2 Coxe, C. C. 210), a bill of exchange, payable to the order of Thomas Tomlinson, was indorsed by the prisoner, "Per procuration Thomas Tomlinson. Emanuel White." White had no authority whatever from Tomlinson. It was held by a unanimous court of fifteen judges that this was not forgery. In Heilbom's case, 1 Park. C. C. 429, a bill of exchange had been made payable to the order of McIntosh & Co. It was indorsed by "Alex. Heilbom." Heilbom had no authority to make the indorsement. The court said: "It is the essence of forgery that one signs the name of anothor to pass it off as the signature of that other. This cannot be when the party openly and on the face of the paper declares that he signs it for another." In Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 11 Gray, 197, the prisoner made and delivered a note signed "Schouler, Baldwin & Co.," stating at the same time that he and Schouler composed the firm. There was no such partnership. It was held not to be forgery. The court say: "As a general rule to constitute forgery the writing must purport to be the writing of another party than the person making it. The mere false statement or implication of a fact not having reference to the person by whom the instrument is executed, will not constitute the crime." This case is referred to approvingly in Commonwealth v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311, and the court there say: "The distinction is plainly drawn between one who assumes to bind another, either jointly with himself or by procuration, however groundless and false may be the pre

tense of authority so to do, and one who signs in such a manner that the instrument may purport to be the actual signature of another party having the same name. To the same effect is Mann v. People, 15 Hun, 155. Minnesota Sup. Ct., May 26, 1881. State of Minnesota v. Wilson. Opinion by Mitchell, J.

RAPE FORNICATION NOT- OFFENSE RELATED TO, SO AS TO CONVICT UNDER INFORMATION FOR. - The statute of Wisconsin provides that if any man commits fornication with a single woman both shall be punished. Held, that under this statute fornication and rape are

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not related to each other as a smaller offense to a greater, and an information for rape would not sustain a conviction for fornication. Fornication is not a common-law offense, and therefore both the information and proof under it must conform to the statute which prescribes the penalty. 2 Whart. Cr. L. 2667; Commonwealth v. Isaacs, 5 Rand. 634; Smith v. Minor, 1 Coxe, 16; State v. Cox, 2 Taylor, 165. The crime of incest can be committed only with a woman of certain consanguinity or relationship with the man. crimes of incest, adultery, and fornication, therefore, differ only as to the persons, while the crime of rape differs from the other crimes against chastity both as to the persons and the manner of the sexual connecThese distinctions in this class of offenses by the stattion, as by force and against the will of the woman. ute of this State are clearly defined. In North Carolina, where fornication is not limited by the statute to a single woman, both offenses are placed together in the same section as fornication or adultery, and both may be charged together in the same indictment, and a conviction had of either. State v. Cowell, 4 Ired. 231. But in that case it is held that without this peculiar statute the distinction between the offenses is so

great that such latitude would not be allowed. Where they are defined as distinct offenses in the statute, then under an indictment for one a conviction for the other cannot be had. State v. Pierce, 4 Blackf. 318. So,

also, rape cannot be charged in one count and incest in another, they being such different and distinct offenses. State v. Thomas, 4 N. W. Rep. 908 (Iowa). An information charging only the necessary elements of the crime of rape falls short of charging two essential elements of fornication: First, that the female was a single woman; and second, that the sexual connection was by concert or consent. It is thus clearly obvious that fornication, as the lesser offense, is not included in rape as the greater. And the statute relating to fornication requires both parties to be punished, which is not the case with that relating to rape. See, also, 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. 419, 420; People v. Harridan, 1 Park. Cr. 344; State v. Lewis, 48 Iowa, 578; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 2 Allen, 163. Wisconsin Sup. Ct., March 2, 1881. State of Wisconsin v. Shear. Opinion by Orton, J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

ASSAULT- FORCE NECESSARY- RELUCTANT SUBMISSION BY DOMESTIC SERVANT TO COMMAND OF

MISTRESS. The plaintiff was a domestic servant in the service of Capt. and Mrs. Braddell. In consequence of a suspicion entertained by Mrs. Broddell, she sent for the doctor and requested him to examine the plaintiff to see if she was in the family way. The doctor did so without using any force or doing any thing more than was necessary for the purpose of the examination. The plaintiff strongly expressed her dislike to take her clothes off, and cried most of the time, but offered no further resistance, and did what the doctor told her. She afterward brought an action of assault against the master and mistress and the doctor. At the trial she swore that what was done was not done with her consent. The learned judge withdrew the case from the

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