This admission is of importance, as shewing same writer, who in one case so touchingly depicted his helpless condition, in eight weeks asserting that "he knew that the forces under his command were amply sufficient for his purpose."

As we have now established the fact that there was no lack of troops, we will proceed to enquire what was General Van Ranselaer's purpose. Fortunately, Ingersol's, Armstrong's, Wilkinson's, and Col. Van Ranselaer's works are sufficient to answer this question most satisfactorily.

In his letter of October 8th, to General Dearborn, General Van Ranselaer thus details his plans:-" Under these circumstances, and the impressions necessarily resulting from them, I am adopting decisive measures for closing the fall campaign. I have summoned MajorGeneral Hall, Brigadier-General Smith, and the commandants of the United States regiments, to meet me in a consultation; and I am well aware that some opinions, entitled to

what powerful reinforcements must have arrived between the middle of August, when Geo. Van Ranselaer arrived at the Niagara frontier on the 13th Oct. His situation in August is thus described :-" From the mo ment of his assuming the command, his posi tion was one of the utmost exposure and dan ger. He lay within sight of a powerful enemy, separated from him only by a narrow river, for the crossing of which, that enemy possessed every facility. He had a line of thirty-six miles to guard, and his whole force was considerably less than one thousand men, many of them without shoes, and all of them clamorous for pay-of ammunition there were not ten rounds per man, and no lead. There was not one piece of heavy ordnance in the whole line, and there were no artillerists to man the few light pieces which we possessed. Add to this, that the troops could not take or keep the field for want of tents or covering; that the medical department, if one could be said to ex-great respect, will be offered for crossing the ist at all, was utterly destitute of everything Niagara, a little below Fort Erie, and pursuing necessary for the comfort of the sick or disa- the march down the river. I think this plan bled; and that there was among the men that liable to many objections. The enemy have entire want of subordination, to say nothing works at almost every point, and even an infeof discipline, which always characterizes raw rior force might hold us in check, and render militia, and some idea may be formed of the our march slow; by taking up the bridges at condition of our army." Chippewa, they might greatly embarrass us: the cleared country is but a mile or two wide, one flank would be constantly liable to be galled by Indians from the swamps; for a considerable distance, the rapidity of the current, and the height of the banks render transportation across the river impracticable; of course our supplies must follow the line of march, with the trouble and hazard of them every

Here was a lamentable condition for an amateur General to be placed in, especially when contrasted with the ease and comfort which pervaded the British frontier. "The condition of the forces on the opposite bank of the river was in contrast with ours in every particular. There was a well-appointed and well-found army, under the most exact discipline, and commanded by skilful and expe-day increasing, and should the enemy retreat rienced officers. Every important post, from Fort Erie to Fort George, was in a defensible state, and the enemy had possessed himself of a very commanding position on the heights at Queenston, which he was rendering every day more secure and formidable. He had, moreover, the mastery of the lakes, and was at that moment industriously employed in using that advantage to increase his numbers, and add to his supplies at Niagara."

Let this statement be well considered, and the conclusion cannot fail to be arrived at, that General Van Ranselaer's reinforcements must very considerable, as we find the

from General Harrison, they would have a double object in intercepting our supplies; and by falling on our rear, and cutting off our communication, we might experience the fate of Hull's army. Besides these, and many other objections, there is no object on that side, until we should arrive at the commanding heights of Queenston, which are opposite my camp.

"The proposal, which I shall submit to the council, will be, that we immediately concentrate the regular force in the neighborhood of Niagara, and the militia here; make the best possible dispositions, and, at the same time,

that the regulars shall pass from the Four Mile Creek to a point in the rear of Fort George, and take it by storm; I will pass the river here, and carry the heights of Queenston. Should we succeed, we shall effect a great discomfiture of the enemy, by breaking their line of communication, driving their shipping from the mouth of the river, leaving them no rallying point in this part of the country, appalling the minds of the Canadians, and opening a wide and safe communication' for our supplies. We shall save our own land-wipe away part of the score of our past disgrace, get excellent barracks and winter quarters, and, at least, be prepared for an early campaign another year. As soon as the result of the council shall be known, I shall advise you of it."

This was a very feasible plan,and failed only, according to Colonel Van Ranselaer, through Brigadier-General Smyth's delay.

We have been thus particular in making these extracts, as we are anxious to show that the failure of the attack on Queenston is not to be attributed to any want of troops, nor must it be considered as a hastily devised plan, as preparations had been making for it from the period when General Van Ranselaer first assumed the command of the army.

Brock.

A few days before the battle of Queenston, full instructions were Despatches of Gen. forwarded by General Brock to the officers in command of the posts along the frontier, for their guidance in case of attack, and a despatch to Sir Geo. Prevost, dated 12th October, shows that he was fully aware of the impending storm, though uncertain of the direction in which it might break: "Major-Gen. Brock to Sir Geo. Prevost, October 12th.

"The vast number of troops which have been this day added to the strong force previously collected on the opposite side, convince me, with other indications, that an attack is not far distant. I have, in consequence, di

the militia to two thousand men, but fear I shall not be able to effect my object."

What says Ingersol on the subject:-"Gen. Alexander Smyth commanded at Buffalo, only a few miles from General Van Ranselaer, fifteen hundred men of the regular army; but, as I was informed by a highly respectable offi-rected every exertion to be made to complete cer still living, was not invited to take part in the projected descent upon Canada, lest the glory of the day should be taken from General Van Ranselaer's cousin, Colonel Solomon Van Ranselaer, an officer in the militia; both of the Van Ranselaers being, perhaps laudably, though, as it turned out, unfortunafely, bent on monopolizing the credit of this affair for the militia, if not exclusively, at any rate in preferance to the regular army."

General Armstrong's remarks are much to the same effect-"The troops employed, or intended to be employed in this service, were principally militia; and, therefore, not better chosen than the object itself. Why this was so,is a problem not yet satisfactorily explained. If it originated in an esprit de corps, or belief of militia efficiency, there may be some color of excuse for the error; but if, as reported, the arrangement was made to gratify the ambition of an individual, the act was not merely injudicious but criminal. At the period in question, there were at the General's disposal more than three thousand troops of the line; from whom a corps might have been selected, which, well found, equipped, and commanded, would not have been either beaten or baffled."

General Brock's letter of instructions to Col. Proctor shows that the situation of the British troops was far from being as comfort- * able as Col. S. Van Ranselaer's statement would induce one to suppose. "The unfortunate disaster which has befallen the Detroit and Caledonia will reduce us to great distress. They were boarded while at anchor at Fort Erie, and carried off; you will learn the particulars from others. A quantity of flour and a little pork were ready to be shipped for Amherstburg; but as I send you the flank companies of the Newfoundland, no part of the provisions can go this trip in the Lady Prevost. It will be necessary to direct her to return with all possible speed, bringing the Mary under her convoy. You will husband your pork, for I sm sorry to say there is but little in the country.

"An interesting scene is going to commence with you. I am perfectly at ease as to the result, provided we can manage the Indians, and keep them attached to the cause, which, in fact, is theirs.

"The fate of the province is in your hands,

judging by every appearance; we are not to remain long idle in this quarter. Were it not for the positive injunctions of the commander of the forces, I should have acted with greater decision. This forbearance may be productive of ultimate good, but I doubt its policy, but perhaps we have not the means of judging correctly. You will, of course, adopt a very different line of conduct. The enemy must be kept in a state of continual ferment. If the Indians act as they did under Tecumseh, who probably might be induced to return to Amherstburg, that army will very soon dwindle to nothing. Your artillery must be more numerous and effective than any the enemy can bring,* and your store of ammunition will enable you to harass him continually, without leaving much to chance.

"I trust you will have destroyed every barrack and public building, and removed the pickets and other defences around the fort at Detroit.

enemy were in motion, and Captain Dennis of the 49th, who was in command at Queenston, immediately marched his company (grenadier) and the few militia who could be hastily assembled, to the landing place opposite Lewis ton; this small force was soon followed by the light company of the 49th, and the remaining disposable militia force. Here the attempt of the enemy to effect a passage was, for some time, successfully resisted, and several boats were either disabled or sunk by the fire from the one-gun battery on Queenston Heights, and that from the masked battery about a mile below. Several boats were by the fire from this last battery so annoyed, that falling below the landing place, they were compelled to drop down with the current, and recross to the American side. A considerable force, however, had effected a landing, some distance above, by a path, which had been long considered impracticable, and was, therefore, unguarded, and succeeded in gaining the summit of the mountain. Lad not this been

"You will have the goodness to state the expedients you possess to enable you to re-done the Americans would have been defeated, place, as far as possible, the heavy loss we have sustained in the Detroit. Should I hear of reinforcements coming up, you may rely on receiving your due proportion. May every possible success attend you."

These letters are interesting, from being the last ever written by General Brock, and from their showing, also, his energetic yet careful mind.

Battle of Queenston Heights.

We have been most diligent in endeavoring to arrive at, as nearly as possible, a correct version of the events of the 13th October, and for that purpose have had many interviews with veterans in different parts of the country who were present on that occasion. Conflicting have been the statements, and it has been no easy task to reconcile all the discrepancies, should we therefore seem to err, the fault has arisen from no want of careful investigation, but from the multiplicity of accounts all differing from each other.

The morning of the 13th was of the the cold, stormy character, that marks so strongly the chingeful climate of the Canadas. The alarm was given before daylight that the

The guns and ammunition captured at Detroit.

by the force then present, as it was, the body, which had made good their ascent, far outnumbering the few troops opposed to them, carried the battery and turned the right of the British position, compelling them to retire with considerable loss. No resistance could now be offered to the crossing from Lewiston, except by the battery at Vromont's point, already spoken of, and from this a steady and harassing fire was kept up which did considerable execution. We give what now followed, on the authority of a volunteer who was attached to the light company of the 49th.

"On retiring to the north end of the village, on the Niagara road, our little band was met by General Brock, attended by his A.D.C., Major Glegg, and Colonel M'Donell." He was loudly cheered as he cried, "Follow me, Boys!" and led us at a pretty smart trot towards the mountain; checking his horse to a walk, he said, "Take breath, Boys!" we shall want it in a few minutes!" another cheer was the hearty response both from regulars and militia. At that time the top of the mountain and a great portion of its side was thickly covered with trees, and was now occupied by American riflemen. On arriving at the foot of the mountain, where the road I diverges to St. David's, General brock dis

hundred, and General Van Ranselaer admits, as will be seen in his letter to General Dearborn, that "a number of boats now crossed over, unannoyed, except by the one unsilenced gun," consequently more troops were hourly arriving.

mounted, and, waving his sword, climbed The position of the parties was now thus: over a high stone wall, followed by the troops; The Americans occupied the heights at Queenplacing himself at the head of the light com-ston, with a force, certainly, exceeding eight pany of the 49th, he led the way up the mountain at double quick time, in the very teeth of a sharp fire from the enemy's riflemen—and, ere long, he was singled out by one of them, who, coming forward, took deliberate aim, and fired; several of the men noticed the action, and fired-but too lateand our gallant General fell on his left side, within a few feet of where I stood. Running up to him, I enquired, "Are you much hurt, sir?" He placed his hand on his breast, but made no reply-and slowly sunk down. The 49th now raised a shout, "Revenge the General!" and regulars and militia, led by Colonel McDonell, pressed forward, anxious to revenge the fall of their beloved leader, and literally drove a superior force up the mountain side, to a considerable distance beyond the summit. The flank companies of the York Militia, under Captains Cameron and Heward, and Lieutenants Robinson, McLean and Stanton, besides many others, whose names I forget, eminently distinguished themselves on this occasion.

Early in the afternoon, a body of about fifty Mohawks, under Norton and young Brant, advanced through the woods, took up a position in front, and a very sharp skirmish ensued, which ended in the Indians retiring on the reinforcements which had now begun to arrive from Fort George. This reinforcement consisted of three hundred and eighty rank and file of the 41st regiment, and Capts. James Crook's and McEwen's flank companies of the 1st Lincoln; Capts. Nellis' and W. Crook's flank companies of the 4th Lincoln; Hall's, Durand's and Applegarth's companies of the 5th Lincoln; (Cameron's, Heward's and Chisholm's flank companies of the York Militia;) Major Merritt's Yeomanry corps, and a body of Swayzee's Militia artillery, numbering in all between three and four hundred men. A short time afterwards, Col. Clark of the Militia, arrived from Chippewa, with Capt. Bullock's company of the 41st; Capts. R. Hamilton's and Row's flank companies of the 2nd Lin

"At this juncture the enemy were reinforced by fresh troops, and after a severe struggle, in which Colonel McDonell, Captains Dennis and Williams, and most of our officers, were either killed or wounded, we were overpow-coln, and volunteer Sedentary Militia. ered by numbers, and for ced to retreat, as the enemy had outflanked us, and had nearly succeeded in gaining our rear. Several of our men were thus cut off, and made prisoners-myself amongst the number.”

The whole British and Indian force thus assembled, did not amount to more than one thousand rank and file, of whom barely five hundred and sixty were regulars. The artillery consisted of two three-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant Crowther of the 41st. The Indians now mustered, perhaps, one hundred men.

So far, Mr. G. S. Jarvis' account agrees with those received from Captain Crooks, Colonel Clark, Colonel Kerby, and Captain John McMeekin-all of whom were present on this After carefully reconnoitring, Gen. Sheaffe, occasion. It agrees, also, strictly with James' who had now assumed the command, comstatement. Up to the period of the engage-menced the attack by an advance of his left ment the numbers of the British regulars and flank,composed of the light company of the 41st, militia had never reached three hundred, over under Lieut. and Adjutant M'Intyre, supported two hundred of whom now retreated, and by a body of militia and Indians, and a comformed in front of Vromont's battery, there to pany of colored men under Capt. Runchey. await reinforcements-while Gen. Van Ran- After a volley, the bayonet was resorted to, and selaer, considering the victory as complete, the Americans right driven in. The main body crossed over in order to give directions about now advanced under cover of the fire from the fortifying the camp which he intended to oc- two three-pounders, and after a short conflict cupy in the British territory, and then recrossed forced the Americans over the first ridge of the to hasten the sending over reinforcements. heights to the road leading from Queenston to

of over six hundred killed and wounded, and the number seems by no means improbable when we remember that three boats were cut to pieces, and that the loss in crossing in the morning was very heavy.

the Falls. Here, finding themselves unsup- almost undisturbed. This would give a loss ported from the opposite side, except by the fire from the American batteries, they surrendered, with the exception of a few who had thrown themselves down a steep ravine. James says "they threw themselves over the precipice, as if heedless of the danger, and many must have perished in the flood. Others, no doubt, swam across; and some escaped in the few boats that remained entire, or whose crews could be persuaded to approach the Canadian shore." We have, however, a positive assurance from Capt. John MacMicking, that this was not the case, and that two only lost their lives by being forced over the cliffs; the reports, also, that have been so industriously circulated, of the Indians lining the banks and firing on the fugitives, are, according to the same authority, equally unfounded. The numbers, according to James, under General Wadsworth, (who had been left in command by General Van Ranselaer, when he recrossed to hurry over reinforcements,) who now laid down their arms, amounted to seventy-two officers and cight hundred and fifty-eight rank and file, exlusive of two full boat loads previously taken. This account agrees with the statement of Mr. Hepburn, of Chippewa, who alleges that the return of prisoners given in by him was a trifle over nine hundred and fifty

men.

The question now naturally arises, why did not General Van Ranselaer send over more troops, when he found General Sheaffe receiving reinforcements, so as to retain his superiority in numbers? An answer to this will be found in his despatch to General Dearborn, in which a most ludicrous picture is drawn of the behaviour of the American militia at Lewiston, the more remarkable from the fact of these being the very men who, only two days previously, were determined on an invasion of Canada, without waiting for orders from their coinmanding officer. "The ardor of the unengaged troops," says theGeneral, "had entirely subsided." Why? asks the reader! Their wounded comrades had passed over, had described the charge of the "green-tigers" and militia in the morning, and had warned them what they might expect if they came in contact with troops infuriated at the loss of their beloved General. Ingersol says: "Riding among the miscreant militia, with some of their officers and Judge Peck to second him, the disheartened and disgusted General Van Ranselaer in vain tried to prevail on them to pass the river, and secure the victory won; one-third would do it, he assured them. But neither reason, order, persuasion, nor shame had any effect." "Fifteen hundred able-bodied men," says Gen. Armstrong, "well armed and equipped,shortly before clamorous with prowess and untameable spirits, now put on the mask of lawfulness to hide their cowardice." Col Van Ranselaer

The British loss amounted to sixteen killed, and about seventy wounded, making with the loss in the morning a sum total of about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded. The American loss,it is not so easy to arrive at ; one writer (Mr. Thompson), states the number as ninety killed and eighty-two wounded; another, Dr. Smith, in his history of the United States* says, "in the course of the day eleven observes:-"The panic had become so genehundred troops, regulars and militia, passed into Canada from Lewiston, very few of whom returned." In the Albany Gazette, at the conclusion of a most accurate account of the battle, the number that crossed is fixed at six-in their victorious career, stood passively and teen hundred, of whom nine hundred were saw them cut up, and captured in the end by regulars. This last statement seems the more a force amounting to about one-third of their probable when we remember that General united number." Van Ranselaer admits eight hundred as over, before he sent for the first reinforcements, and that the boats were crossing all the morning

Volume 3, p. 200.

ral that but a small portion of our army could be prevailed on to cross, The remainder, to their eternal shame, be it said, instead of lending their aid to sustain their gallant brethren

These hard expressions, be it remembered, are none of our choosing; they are the sentiments of American writers, and of writers, too, who were anxious to palliate the misdeeds of that day. It is not a little remarkable how