a great body of the Inhabitants, with respect to the change of Govern ment. His Sardinian Majesty made his public entry into the City yesterday, and was received with every respect by the People. Sir Henry Bunbury. JOHN P. DALRYMPLE. No. 23.-Sir John Dalrymple to Sir Henry Bunbury.. (Extract.) Genoa, 27th February, 1815. I HAVE the honour to request you to inform Earl Bathurst, that His Sardinian Majesty was pleased, on the 22nd instant, to signify that he had appointed the Chevalier de Revel, Governor of the Town and Province of Genoa; a nomination which I have every reason to believe is very acceptable to the People in general, and will, I am persuaded, be of the best consequences to His Majesty's interests. Sir Henry Bunbury. JOHN P. DALRYMPLE. COMMUNICATION from the British to the Russian Government, in 1805, relative to their Plan of Concert against France, and for the General Pacification of Europe. -(Presented to the British Parliament, May, 1815.) Official Communication made to the Russian Ambassador at London on the 19th January, 1805, explanatory of the Views which His Britannic Majesty and the Emperor of Russia formed for the Deliverance and Security of Europe. (Extract.) Downing Street, 19th January, 1805. THE result of the Communications which have been made by Prince Czartoriski to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and of the confidential explanations which have been received from Your Excellency, has been laid before The King; and His Majesty has seen with inexpressible satisfaction, the wise, dignified, and generous policy, which the Emperor of Russia is disposed to adopt, under the present calamitous situation of Europe. His Majesty is also happy to perceive, that the views and sentiments of the Emperor respecting the means of effecting the deliverance of Europe, and providing for its future tranquillity and safety, correspond so entirely with his own. He is, therefore, desirous of entering into the most explicit and unreserved explanations on every point connected with this great object, and of forming the closest union of Councils, and concert of Measures, with His Imperial Majesty, in order, by their joint influence and exertions, to insure the co-operation and assistance of other Powers of the Continent, on a scale adequate to the magnitude and importance of an undertaking, on the success of which the future safety of Europe must depend. For this purpose, the first step must be to fix, as precisely as possible, the distinct objects to which such a Concert is to be directed. These, according to the explanation given of the sentiments of the Emperor, in which His Majesty entirely concurs, appear to be 3: 1st. To rescue from the Dominion of France those Countries which it has subjugated since the beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits, as they stood before that time. 2dly. To make such an arrangement with respect to the Territories recovered from France, as may provide for their security and happiness, and may at the same time constitute a more effectual Barrier in future against encroachments on the part of Franee. 3rdly. To form, at the restoration of Peace, a general agreement and guarantee, for the mutual protection and security of different Powers, and for re-establishing a general system of Public Law in Europe. The first and second objects are stated generally, and in their broadest extent; but neither of them can be properly considered in detail, without reference to the nature and extent of the means, by which they may be accomplished. The first is certainly that, to which, without any modification or exception, His Majesty's wishes, as well as those of the Emperor, would be preferably directed, and nothing short of it can completely satisfy the views which both Sovereigns form for the deliverance and security of Europe. Should it be possible to unite in a Concert with Great Britain and Russia the 2 other great Military Powers of the Continent, there seems little doubt that such an union of force would enable them to accomplish all that is proposed:-but if (as there is too much reason to imagine may be the case) it should be found impossible to engage Prussia in the Confederacy, it may be doubted whether such operations could be carried on in all the Quarters of Europe, as would be necessary for the success of the whole of this Project. The second point, of itself, involves in it many important considerations. The views and sentiments by which His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia are equally animated, in endeavouring to establish this Concert, are pure and disinterested. Their first view, therefore, with respect to any of the Countries which may be recovered from France, must be to restore, as far as possible, their ancient rights, and provide for the internal happiness of their Inhabitants; but in looking at this object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which even that separate object must principally depend. Pursuant to this principle, there can be no question that, whenever any of these Countries are capable of being restored to their former Independence, and of being placed in a situation in which they can protect it, such an arrangement must be most congenial to the policy and the feelings on which this system is founded; but there will be found to be other Countries among those now under the Dominion of France, to which these considerations cannot apply, where either the ancient relations of the Country are so completely destroyed that they cannot be restored, or where independence would be merely nominal, and alike inconsistent with security, for the Country itself, or for Europe happily the larger number is of the first description. Should the arms of the Allies be successful to the full extent of expelling France from all the Dominions she has acquired since the Revolution, it would certainly be the first object, as has already been stated, to re-establish the Republics of the United Provinces and Switzerland, the Territories of the King of Sardinia, Tuscany, Modena (under the protection of Austria), and Naples. But the Territories of Genoa, of the Italian Republic, including the 3 Legations, Parma and Placentia, and, on the other side of Europe, the Austrian Netherlands, and the States which have been detached from the German Empire, on the left Bank of the Rhine, evidently belong to the 2nd Class. With respect to the Territories enumerated in Italy, experience has shewn how little disposition existed in some, and how little means in any, to resist the aggression or influence of France. The King of Spain was certainly too much a party to the system of which so large a part of Europe has been a victim, to entitle the former interests of his Family in Italy to any consideration; nor does the past conduct of Genoa, or any of the other States give them any claim, either of justice or liberality. It is also obvious that these separate Petty Sovereignties would never again have any solid existence in themselves, and would only serve to weaken and impair the force which ought to be, as much as possible, concentrated in the hands of the Chief Powers of Italy. It is needless to dwell particularly on the state of The Netherlands. Events have put out of the question the restoration of them to the House of Austria; they are therefore necessarily open to new arrangements, and evidently can never exist separate and independent. Nearly the same considerations apply to the Ecclesiastical Electorates, and the other Territories on the left Bank of the Rhine, after their being once detached from the Empire, and the former Possessors of them indemnified. There appears, therefore, to be no possible objection, on the strictest principles of justice and public morality, to making such a disposition, with respect to any of these Territories, as may be most conducive to the general interests; and there is evidently no other mode of accomplishing the great and beneficent object, of re-establishing (after so much misery and bloodshed) the safety and repose of Europe on a solid and permanent basis. It is fortunate, too, that such a Plan of arrangement as is in itself essential to the end proposed, is also likely to contribute, in the greatest degree, to secure the means by which that great end can best be promoted. It is evidently of the utmost importance, if not absolutely indispensable for this purpose, to secure the vigorous and effectual co-operation both of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope, that either of those Powers, and especially Prussia, will be brought to embark in the Common Cause, without the prospect of obtaining some important acquisition to compensate for its exertions. On the grounds which have been already stated, His Majesty conceives that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as giving to Austria fresh means of resisting the views of France on the side of Italy, and placing Prussia in a similar situation with respect to the Low Countries; and the relative situations of the 2 Powers would naturally make those the quarters to which their views would respectively be directed. In Italy, sound policy would require that the power and influence of the King of Sardinia should be augmented, and that Austria should be replaced in a situation, which may enable her to afford an immediate and effectual support to his Dominions, in case of their being attacked. His Majesty sees with satisfaction, from the Secret and Confidential Communications recently received through your Excellency, that the views of the Court of Vienna are perfectly conformable to this general principle, and that the extension at which she aims, might not only safely be admitted, but might even be increased, with advantage to the general interest. In other respects, His Majesty entirely concurs in the outline of the arrangement, which he understands the Emperor of Russia to be desirous of seeing effected in this quarter. His Majesty considers it as absolutely necessary for the general security, that Italy should be completely rescued, both from the occupation and influence of France, and that no Powers should be left within it, who are not likely to enter into a general system of defence for maintaining its independence. For this purpose it is essential, that the Countries now composing what is called the Italian Republic, should be transferred to other Powers. In distributing these Territories, an increase of wealth and power should undoubtedly be given to the King of Sardinia, and it seems material that his Possessions, as well as the Duchy of Tuscany (which it is proposed to restore to the Grand Duke), should be brought into immediate contact, or ready communication with those of Austria. On this principle, the whole of the Territories which now compose the Ligurian Republic, might, it is conceived, be annexed to Piedmont. Supposing the efforts of the Allies to have been completely successful, and the 2 objects already discussed to have been fully obtained, His Majesty would nevertheless consider this salutary work as still imperfect, if the restoration of Peace were not accompanied by the most effectual measures for giving solidity and permanence to the system which shall thus have been established. Much will undoubtedly be effected for the future repose of Europe by these Territorial arrangements, which will furnish a more effectual Barrier than has before existed against the ambition of France. But in order to render this security as complete as possible, it seems necessary, at the period of a General Pacification, to form a Treaty to which all the principal Powers of Europe should be Parties, by which their respective rights and possessions, as they shall then have been established, shall be fixed and recognized; and they should all bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other, against any attempt to disturb or infringe them. It should re-establish a general and comprehensive system of Public Law in Europe, and provide, as far as possible, for repressing future attempts to disturb the general tranquillity; and above all, for restraining any projects of aggrandizement and ambition, similar to those which have produced all the calamities inflicted on Europe, since the disastrous æra of the French Revolution. H. Ê. Count Woronzow. MULGRAVE. CONVENTION between Great Britain and Portugal, relative to the Indemnification of Portuguese Subjects for certain detained Slave-Trade Vessels.-Signed at Vienna, 21st January, 1815. In the Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity. His Britannic Majesty and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, being equally desirous to terminate amicably all the doubts which have arisen relative to the parts of the Coast of Africa with which the Subjects of the Crown of Portugal, under the Laws of that Kingdom and the Treaty subsisting with His Britannic Majesty, may lawfully carry on a Trade in Slaves; and whereas several Ships, the property of the said Subjects of Portugal, have been detained and condemned, upon the alleged ground of being engaged in an illicit Traffic in Slaves; and whereas His Em Nome da Santissima e Indivisivel SUA Magestade Britannica e Sua Alteza Real O Principe Regente de Portugal, igualmente desejosos de terminar amigavel. mente todas as duvidas suscitadas relativamente aos lugares sobre a Costa de Africa, em que aos Vassallos Portuguezes era licito, na conformidade das Leis de Portugal e dos Tratados subsistentes com Sua Magestade Britannica, continuar o Commercio de Escravos; e attendendo á que differentes Navios pertencentes á Subditos Portuguezes havia sido tomados e condemnados, por se allegar que elles faziaô hum Commercio illicito em Escravos: |