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diftin&tnefs and precifion, to follow the arrangement of the argu ments ufed on both fides the queftion, than the order of fpeakers. With respect to the latter therefore it may fufce to mention, that the original add efs was fup. ported by the fecretary of flate, the chancellor of the exchequer, the treasurer of the navy, the folicitor-general, and by Mr. Powis, Mr. Banks, and fome other country gentlemen; the amendments by Lord North, Mr. Fox, Mr. - Burke, Governor Johnfione, Lord Mulgrave, Sir Henry Fletcher, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Adam, and alfo by feveral of the country gentlemen.

The defence of the peace was undertaken on three grounds; firft, on the weak and impoverithed ftate of this country; fecondly, on the merits of the articles themfelves; and laftly, on an attempt to difarm the arguments and objections on the other fide of their force and effect, by throwing on the oppofite party the odium of acting entirely, on this occafion. from interefied motives; and of having entered into an unnatural coalition, merely for the purpofe of difplacing his Majefty's minifters by inducing parliament to cenfure the peace.

On the first of thefe heads, Mr. Thomas Pitt entered into a circumftantial detail of the deplorable ftate of the finances of this country, taken from the report of a committee appointed to enquire into the ftate of the funds, of which he had been chairman. By this he made it appear, that the national debt, funded and unfunded, a mounted to upwards of 250 milLons. That the annual intereft

on it would fall little short of nine millions and a half. That this enormous intereft, being added to the civil lift, and to a moderately calculated peace establishment, our annual expences, in feaions of profound peace, would (according to his detailed calculations) amount at leaft to 14,793,1371. That the amount of the enormous load of taxes under which the landed intereft was finking, did not exceed all together 12,500,00cl. So that there remained an annual fum of near 2,300,cool. to be raised by fresh burthens. From these facts it was demanded, whether the-continuance of the war could end in any hing lefs than certain ruin ?

This flate of our finances, it was faid, ought to be kept conftantly in view in difcuffing the merits of the peace; and whenever it was argued that conceffions had been improvidently made, or that greater advantages might have been obtained, members fhould fairly, atk thenfelves, whether fuch an objest, under tuch circumftances, was worth the expence and hazard of another campaign?

It would doubtlefs be urged that the other belligerent powers felt an equal degree of diftrefs; but to what a confequence would such a mode of reafoning lead the house? What man was fo defperate as to advise the continuance of a war, which might end in the bankruptcy of public faith, a bankruptcy which would almoft diffolve the bands of government, and this merely on a furmife, that probably one of the adverfe powers might experience an equal diftrefs.

The navy, the fecond great en. gine of war, was reprefented to be in a condition fcarcely adequate

to

to the purposes of defence, and (in a competition of ftrength) greatly inferior to that of the enemy. From the papers on the table it appeared that the whole British force, fit for fervice, fcarcely amounted to one hundred fail of the line. Of these many were undermanned, feveral unclean and in a mouldering ftate, and the greatest part had been long and actively employed on foreign ftations. Our magazines were in an exhaufted condition; and with the moft diligent exertions not more than fix fail could have been added to this catalogue in March. The force of France and Spain amounted to one hundred and forty fail of the line. Thirteen new thips would have been added to the fleet of France in the course of the enfuing spring. The Dutch fleet would have amounted to twenty-five fail of the line, and it was uncertain what acceffion the Spanish force would have received at the fame time.

With fo glaring an inferiority, what hopes of fuccefs could we derive, either from the experience of the last campaign, or from any new diftribution of our force in that which would have followed? la the Weft Indies we could not have had more than forty-fix fail to oppofe to forty, which on the day that the peace was figned lay in the harbour of Cadiz with 16,000 troops on board, ready to fail for that quarter of the world, where they would have been joined by twelve fhips of the line from the Havannah, and by ten from St. Domingo, with 25,000 men on board.

A defenfive war, it was univerfally acknowledged; muft terminate in certain ruin; and it

was afked, whether Admiral Pigot, with fuch an inferiority could have undertaken any offenfive operations against the iflands of the enemy; thofe iflands on which Lord Rodney flushed with victory, could not attempt to make an impreflion? Could Admiral Pigot have regained by arms what the minifters had recovered by treaty? Could he, im the fight of fuperior fleet, have captured Grenada, Dominique, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montferrat? Or might we not too reasonably apprehend, that the campaign in the West Indies would have closed with the lofs of Jamaica itself, the avowed object of this immense armament ?

In the Eaft our profpects were not brighter. A mere defenfive refiftance had entitled Sir Edward Hughes to the thanks of parliament; but his fuccefs, if it might be termed a victory, had not prevented the enemy from landing a greater European force than we actually poffefs in that country, and which, in conjunction with Hyder Ally, was at that inftant fubduing or defolating the Carnatic. In the enfuing campaign, after the junction with Commodore Bickerton, the French fleet would at least be equal to our ours.

If we looked forward to the probable operations in the channel,* and in the northern feas, in a future campaign, it was faid to be clear, from the papers laid before the houfe, that the combined fleets of the house of Bourbon and of Holland, would at least havě doubled our force in our own feas.

With refpect to the army, it was afferted, that we were in want of thirty thoufand men to complete" its eftablishments, and that levies [K] 4

could

could fcarcely be torn, on any terms, from a depopulated country. That after the molt careful inveftigation, it had appeared, that only three thousand men could have been fpared with fafety to this country, for any offenfive duty. The foreign troops in garrifon at NewYork we had no power to embark on any other than American fervice; befides, if a new treaty had been entered into with the German princes, no tranfports could have been affembled for an early embarkation; and, even when embarked, where could they have directed their courfe, in the face of an enemy's fleet cruizing with un. difputed fuperiority in every part of the western world?

From this view of our total inability to engage in another campaign, with any prospect of bringing it to a more favourable conclufion than the laft, it was argued, that peace on any terms, by breaking the powerful confederacy that was against us, and giving us time to recruit our waited ftrength, was preferable to a continuance of the war. But it was afferted, in the fecond place, that the peace did not ftand in need of fuch a defence, and that the terms obtained were fair and honourable, and adequate to the juft expectations of the pation

By the 3d and 4th articles of the treaty with the court of France, we had ceded the exclufive right of fishery on a certain part of the coaft of Newfoundland. But at the fame time we have also established an exclufive right to the most valuable banks, The concurrent fishery formerly exercifed was a Cource of endless ftrife. The French were now confined to a certain

fpot: it was almost nothing, when compared to the extent we poffefs, and befides is fituated in the leaft productive part of the coaft In proof of thele facts, the opinions of Admiral Edwards, of Captain Levefon Gower, and of Lieutenant Lane, who took an a curate furvey of the whole, were confidently appealed to.

By the 5th article the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to the French. These islands had formerly belonged to that crown, but were retained, in the pride of our fuperiority, at the treaty of Paris, in 1762; and furely there could be no juft ground of complaint now, if France, in her af cendancy, fhould require the reftitution of them. If it fhould be alledged, that these places might be fortified fo as to annoy us in a future war, and even endanger our fifleries, the answer was at hand;

the moft fkilful engineers had certified, that neither inland would admit the construction of a fortress which would fland the attack of the fmalleft of our frigates.

In the Weft-Indies, by the 7th article, the ifland of St. Lucia was reftored, and Tobago ceded to the French; but in return, by the 8th, his Moft Chriftian Majefty had refored to Great Britain the inlands of Grenada and the Grenadines, of St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Chriftopher, Nevis, and Montserrat. It was afferted, that the island of Dominica, confidered as a place of obfervation and ftrength, was as valuable to this country, if not more fo, than St. Lucia. The importance of the latter inland, it was faid, might fairly be eftimated by the value fet upon it at the laft peace. It was then ours by con

quest;

queft; and if it had been thought of fuch inestimable confequence, as was now pretended, why was it not then retained? The island of Tobago had also been extorted from France at the peace of Paris, and ther fore might now be equitably re-demanded. Its importance to our cotton manufactory had been greatly exaggerated. If this manufacture had rifen to a flourishing state before we ever poffeffed that ifland, why might it not remain fo now? The fact was, that cotton, whether in the hands of friend or foe, would always find its way to our door, in preference to that of those who cannot meet it with fuch a purse.

In Africa, by the 9th article, the King of Gritain Britain cedes the river of Senegal, with its dependencies and forts, and restores the land of Goree. On the other fide, Fort James and the river Gambia is guaranteed to Great Britain, by the 10th; and by the 11th and 12th, the gum trade is put on the fame footing as in the year 1755. By thefe articles, it was faid, we fecure (as much as we ever had fecured) a fhare in the gum trade; and were freed from the neceffity of making that coaft a grave for our fellow-fubjects, thousands of whom were annually fent there to watch an article of trade which we in vain endeavoured to monopolize.

ment of the war, on the coaft o Orixa, and in Bengal, with liberty to furround Chandernagor with a ditch for draining the waters. These conceffions were allowed to be very con derable, and they were defended by the advocates for the peace on two very different and oppofite grounds. Some of them offerted, that the Company's affairs were in every refpe&t in fo deplorable a ftate, that the continuance of the war there must have brought on their irretrievable deftruction; whilst others, in order to remove any apprehenfion that might be entertained from the reestablishment of the French power in India, contended, that their affairs were in fo profperous a train, as would fpeedily put them out of the reach of injury from any rival whatever.

The four following articles re late to the East Indies. By thefe, Pondicherry and Karical, with fuitable dependencies, the poffefion of Maké, and the Comptoir of Surat, are restored, and guaranteed to France, together with all the eftablishments which belonged to. that kingdom at the commence

The abrogation of all the articles relative to Dunkirk, which had been inferted in any former treaty of peace, formed the 17th article of the prefent. During all the adminiftrations which have paffed away fince the demolition of that harbour was firft ftipulated, thofe articles had never been inforced. This negligence, it was faid, was a fufficient proof of the little account in which that mater was held; and the fact was, that all the art and coft that

France could bestow on the bason of Dunkirk, could not render it in any degree formidable to Great Britain. France wifhed for the fuppreffion of thofe articles, merely as a point of honour; and furely no fober man would continue the war to thwart a fancy fo little detrimental to us. At former periods England had dictated the terms of peace to fubmiflive na

tions; but the vifions of her power and pre-eminence were paffed away, and the was under the mortifying neceffity of employing a language that correfponds with her true condition.

To the King of Spain, the poffeffion of Minorca and Weft Florida was guaranteed, and Eaft Florida ceded. With respect to the firstmentioned place, it was urged, that it was kept at an immenfe and ufeless expence in peace, and was never tenable in war; and as to the Floridas, that the poffeffion of them was by no means fo im portant as might be imagined, and that we had gained an equal advantage by the restoration of Providence and the Bahama iflands. The imports of both the Floridas did not exceed 70,0col. and the exports amount to about 20.ocol. It certainly was not defirable to take fo much from the commerce of the nation; but it was a favourite object with Spain, and amidft the millions of our trade, it furely was not worth contending for at the hazard of continuing the

war.

The treaty with the United States of America, as far as regarded their independence, had in fome meafure been previoufly formed by parliament; the only points therefore that remained for di.cuffion were the fixing of the boundaries, the fettlement of the fisheries, and the terms ftipulated for the loyalifts. By the line of boundaries, all the back fettlements, and the whole country between the Allegany Mountains and the Miflifippi were ceded to the United States. To have retained the large tract behind them, for the purpose of planting it with perfons of differ

ent political principles, would have been little better than laying the foun 'ation of new war and new didurbances. The free navigation of the Mithilippi was however re

ferved.

To the northward, the line of divifion was carried through the centre of the lakes, and by that means a participation of the fur trade was fecured to both countries, with a fmall advantage in favour of Great Britain; as it was well known to all men converfant in the nature of that trade, that its belt refources lay to the northward. But fuppofing the entire fur trade was funk in the fea, what was the detriment to this country? Let this and every other part of the treaties be examined by the fair value of the diftrict ceded, drawn from the amount of the exports and imports, by which alone we could judge of its importance. The exports of this country to Canada, then, were only 140,ocol. and the imports not more than 50,0ccl. Was this an object for Great Britain to continue a war, of which the people of England had declared their abhorrence? Surely it was not: and much lefs would it appear fo, when it was recollected that the prefervation of this annual importation of 50,000l. has coft the. country for feveral years paft, on an average, 800,000l. a year. A few interested Canadian merchants might complain; for merchants would always love monopoly, without confidering that monopoly, by deftroying rivalry, which was the very effence of the well-being of trade, was in fact detrimental to it.

The ceffion of Penobscot had been objected to, as depriving us

of

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