construction of the applicable statute, and the special facts of the cases."

It is contended in argument that the notice in this case deals with the use of the invention, because the notice states that the package is licensed "for sale and use at a price not less than one dollar," that a purchase is an acceptance of the conditions, and that all rights revert to the patentee in event of violation of the restriction. But in view of the facts certified in this case, as to what took place concerning the article in question, it is a perversion of terms to call the transaction in any sense a license to use the invention. The jobber from whom the appellee purchased had previously bought, at a price which must be deemed to have been satisfactory, the packages of Sanatogen afterwards sold to the appellee. The patentee had no interest in the proceeds of the subsequent sales, no right to any royalty thereon or to participation in the profits thereof. The packages were sold with as full and complete title as any article could have when sold in the open market, excepting only the attempt to limit the sale or use when sold for not less than one dollar. In other words, the title transferred was full and complete with an attempt to reserve the right to fix the price at which subsequent sales could be made. There is no showing of a qualified sale for less than value for limited use with other articles only, as was shown in the Dick Case. There was no transfer of a limited right to use this invention, and to call the sale a license to use is a mere play upon words.

The real question is whether in the exclusive right secured by statute to "vend" a patented article there is included the right, by notice, to dictate the price at which subsequent sales of the article may be made. The patentee relies solely upon the notice quoted to control future prices in the resale by a purchaser of an article said to be of great utility and highly desirable for general use.

The appellee and the jobbers from whom he purchased were neither the agents nor the licensees of the patentee. They had the title to, and the right to sell, the article purchased without accounting for the proceeds to the patentee and without making any further payment than had already been made in the purchase from the agent of the patentee. Upon such facts as are now presented we think the right to vend secured in the patent statute is not distinguishable from the right of vending given in the copyright act. In both instances it was the intention of Congress to secure an exclusive right to sell, and there is no grant of a privilege to keep up prices and prevent competition by notices restricting the price at which the article may be resold. The right to vend conferred by the patent law has been exercised, and the added restriction is beyond the protection and purpose of the act. This being so, the case is brought within that line of cases in which this court from the beginning has held that a patentee who has parted with a patented machine by passing title to a purchaser has placed the article beyond the limits of the monopoly secured by the patent act.

In Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453, Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, pertinently said (p. 455):

"The vast pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as the public interest, admonish us to proceed with care, and to decide in each case no more than what is directly in issue.

"The true ground on which these decisions rest is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time.

"The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are each substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the patentee.

VOL. CCXXIX-2

"But, in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in the language of the court, passes without the limit of the monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees."

Bloomer v. McQuewan, supra; Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co., 1 Cliff. 348, 354, 10 Fed. Cases, 638; Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co., 22 How. 217, 223; Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S. 659.

Holding these views, the question propounded by the Court of Appeals will be answered in the negative, and It is so ordered.

Dissenting: MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, MR. JUSTICE LURTON and MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER.

229 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

GORMAN v. LITTLEFIELD, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF A. O. BROWN & CO.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 243. Argued April 21, 22, 1913.-Decided May 26, 1913.

Where the trustee of a bankrupt broker finds in the estate certificates for shares of a particular stock legally subject to the demand of the customer for whom shares of that stock were bought by the bankrupt, the customer is entitled to the same although the certificates may not be the identical ones purchased for him. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365.

Where there are in the bankrupt's possession certificates for enough shares of a particular stock to satisfy the legal demand of a customer for whom shares of that stock were purchased, and no other customer can legally demand any shares of that stock, those certificates will be presumed to be the certificates kept by the bankrupt in accordance with his duty so to do to satisfy the demand of such customer.

It is the right and duty of the bankrupt, if he uses securities belonging to a customer, to use his own funds to replace such securities with others of the same kind, and in so doing he does not deplete the estate against his other creditors.

No creditor of the bankrupt can demand that the estate of the bankrupt be augmented by the wrongful conversion of property of another, or the application to the general estate of property which never rightfully belonged to the bankrupt.

There is no presumption that certificates of stock in the possession of the bankrupt were embezzled or stolen, but there is a presumption that such certificates were bought and paid for out of his own funds to replace those which he had used belonging to a customer. 175 Fed. Rep. 769, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the right of a customer of a bankrupt brokerage firm to shares of stock purchased for him by the bankrupt and fully paid for by the claimant prior to the petition, notwithstanding the certificates in

Argument for Appellee-Respondent.

229 U. S.

possession of the bankrupt are not the identical ones purchased, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. James L. Coleman, with whom Mr. Robert Dunlap was on the brief, for appellant-petitioner.

Mr. Daniel P. Hays, with whom Mr. Ralph Wolf was on the brief, for appellee-respondent:

The burden was on appellant to prove that his stocks, or the proceeds thereof, came into the possession of the receiver or trustee. First National Bank v. Littlefield, 226 U. S. 110; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670.

Appellant cannot establish title to the specific shares of copper stock found after bankruptcy unless he identifies such certificates as having been purchased for him. This he has not done. Cases supra, and Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. Rep. 593; Commissioners v. Strawn, 157 Fed. Rep. 49; City Bank v. Blackmore, 75 Fed. Rep. 771; In re Hicks, 170 N. Y. 195; Lowe v. Jones, 192 Massachusetts, 94; In re Berry, 149 Fed. Rep. 176; Thomas v. Taggart, 209 U. S. 385; In re McIntyre, 181 Fed. Rep. 960.

See also various proceedings in Re A. O. Brown & Co., 185 Fed. Rep. 766; 193 Fed. Rep. 24; Id. 30, and In re Ennis, 187 Fed. Rep. 728.

The concurrent finding of both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals that appellant failed to prove that his stock, or the proceeds thereof, came into the possession of the receiver or trustee will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. First Natl. Bank v. Littlefield, 226 U. S. 110; Brainerd v. Buck, 184 U. S. 99; Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1.

These findings of fact, unless reversed by this court, effectually dispose of appellant's claim.

The mere fact that there came into the possession of the receiver 350 shares of this particular stock, does