ments, and her adjacent interests in the West Indies, entitle her to a reasonable share of our attention on those subjects. To such considerations, as you unfold them, I would emphatically add, that the day of dread of her power of aggression upon us, has gone by. But would the popular voice of our country permit this counseling with England, although we retained, as of course we should retain, the right of decision in our own hands? Our jealousy of her is not at an end, however able we now may be to counteract its injurious effects, should she meditate any; and it is the popular voice which, whether hastily or deliberately uttered, will henceforth, and more and more as our power increases, decide without appeal these and other great coming questions in our foreign policy, before the Executive or Congress can consider them. That voice will be likely to proclaim absolute American ascendency in this gulf, as on this continent and its adjuncts. With its present predispositions, it would probably listen to no participation with England. It would distrust her motives. It would underrate her present power, and turn with incredulity from those sources of it which, in the opinions of her own intelligent and ruling people, promise to give it increase for long periods to come.

These are some of my impressions. You may not share them with me. I, indeed, might incline to say, as you also perhaps might, why should two

powerful nations, each knowing its own power, and each in possession of its independence and circumspection, distrust each other? It is for the weak to be jealous and fearful. The strong are neither. Or why should two nations like the United States and Britain, in their altered attitude to each other, continue to quarrel in their thoughts, because they have been twice at war? Why should we fear any joint movement with Britain? Is it because we would aim to do wrong, or claim too much for our share in the counsels? I am unwilling to believe it. We shall inevitably have enough of territory, influence, and every thing else, as time goes on, if we keep together. Is it because her government differs in its constitutional forms from ours? Would this be wise? Surely we cannot imagine that she will overturn ours. Our noble institutions of freedom, with all their preponderating excellence, nevertheless intermingle with them defects interwoven with the works of man. Our well-founded national pride, running to the borders of too much selfexaltation, couples itself with an insensible proneness to disparage nations whose institutions are unlike our own; and chiefly do numbers among us give themselves to the belief that England is an impoverished, sinking country, yet always thinking of mischief to other countries. Some of our presses -strange to say-would have it, that the "World's Fair," soon to open at her crystalline palace in the

Park, that imposing scene of the industry and genius of modern nations, to be concentrated in peaceful rivalry within her metropolis, and of which she has given the first example in modern times, is only a contrivance to hoodwink mankind and save herself a little longer from ruin, by collecting money in London for the benefit of her own impoverished and taxed people! How to reconcile apprehensions that she may injure us, with a belief that she is tottering under burdens too much for her to carry, and that she cannot cast off, would seem not an easy task. But I must separate myself from such topics, lest I should be running into dissertations.

I must by no means omit to remark, that the difficulty of practical arrangements to any just and guarded extent, between ourselves and Great Britain in regard to Cuba, the Gulf, and parts adjacent, would be augmented by the great question of the day, one still deep-rooted and angry,-I mean that of African Slavery among us. Of the true nature of this question, as one exclusively internal to ourselves, England is as ignorant, as we in general are of her home affairs, perhaps more so; yet she decides upon it even more confidently, than we do on things belonging to her internal condition and prospects. But this need not check concert between us on occasions more free from embarrassment, should any such arise and give hope of good results.

At your request, I send with this letter other

copies of the political essays transmitted after receiving your first pamphlet, but which it appears did not reach you. I send also, for your indulgent acceptance, the second volume of a work published by me a few years ago, where you may see, in the places indicated on a slip of paper, notices of the first attempt in our diplomatic annals towards international co-operation, on our part, with England against other powers. This is the instance to which I have heretofore referred. [Ante, page 144.] The object was highly just, and the result sufficiently successful, though not under the forms proposed, owing to a single impediment at that time existing. The main proposal was, and its first suggestion came from the English Foreign Secretary (Mr. Canning) to the Minister of the United States in London, I then being in that capacity, that the two powers should make a joint declaration before Europe, to the effect that if the Holy Alliance, after overthrowing the then existing constitution in Spain, established by the people under the auspices of the Cortes (which ultimately they did overthrow by the instrumentality of a French army), attempted, by force of arms, or force of influence, to arrest the progress of emancipation and independence in the Spanish colonies on this continent, the two powers would put themselves against so arbitrary a project. The project was stopped effectually. England would have stopped it herself, but sought our co

operation; and the knowledge by the Allies that if things had proceeded to extremity, such co-operation would have been afforded, was doubtless of full value in raising a bar to the least attempt at such a course. There will also be found in the same book a condensed history of the celebrated "Monroe Declaration" on the subject of European interference in the affairs of this continent, put forth in the Message of President Monroe to Congress in 1823.

In conclusion, I pray you, my dear sir, to believe in the cordial consideration and esteem with which I am Your faithful servant

and correspondent,

RICHARD RUSH.

NOTE.

Mr. Canning was unwilling to comply with the condition proposed by Mr. Rush, that Great Britain would "unequivocally and immediately acknowledge the Independence of the Spanish American Colonies," as a preliminary to Mr. Rush's concurrence as American Minister, in a "joint declaration before Europe" by the two powers. The history of this proposal by Mr. Canning to Mr. Rush is given in authentic detail in the 21st and 22d chapters of the 2d volume of his Residence at the Court of London, pages 412, 443. After a lapse of now nearly forty years, with the subsequent history of those colonies, it may not be without interest to recall the narrative of the interviews of the two functionaries. In presenting this condition to the English Foreign Secretary, Mr. Rush acted without instructions. In